THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:47 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator East.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning, this hearing will come to order.

Senator East will be here shortly. Senator Biden has sent word that he is chairing a hearing in Wilmington, Del., but otherwise would be very pleased to come.

I want to welcome our witnesses this morning, Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Dan Simpson, Director of Southern Africa Affairs at the Department of State, who will be assisting in the testimony.

Our second witness will be Dr. Peter Vanneman, associate professor, Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas.

Today, we commence a series of five hearings on the role of the Soviet Union, through its puppets in Cuba and East Germany, in fomenting and supporting terrorism in southern Africa.

From the very first hearing in which the subcommittee examined international terrorism, these three countries—the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany—have been described repeatedly as actively and successfully trying, under the overall control of the Politburo in Moscow, to infiltrate and manipulate so-called national liberation movements. We have heard repeated references to the Soviet Union's activities in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and elsewhere in the world. However, we are not painting with a Politburo brush all of the people or all of the movements which exist in southern Africa.

We have held hearings on the historical antecedents of Soviet terrorism and on the role of Moscow and its subcontractors in the use of terrorism as a political instrument. These hearings developed additional information on the extent of the Soviet Union's

commitment to the use of terrorism and armed revolution to achieve its goal of world domination.

The subcommittee recently concluded hearings on Cuba and its worldwide involvement in terrorist activities. These hearings underscored the involvement of the Soviet Union in southern Africa and in Latin America, as well as the very able role of Cuba as Moscow's surrogate. One witness testified that Cuba is given free reign in Latin America by the Soviet Union in exchange for doing the bidding of the Soviets in other areas of the world. With regard to Africa, I trust our witnesses today will be able to enlighten us as to the way in which the Soviet/Cuban relationship functions in that area. I do find it curious that Cuba would remove itself from the Caribbean basin to the continent of Africa on its own, without some outside urging or support.

Because of the economic and strategic importance of southern Africa to the United States and the free world, we believe that the subcommittee should turn its attention to the Soviet, Cuban, and East German involvement in the terrorist activities of the so-called national liberation movements in southern Africa. Americans have only recently begun to understand the strategic, economic, and political importance of that region to the welfare, indeed the survival, of the free world. This is not to say that there have not been experts on Africa who have seen the importance of this region for decades, but it has been a question of governmental priorities. So, today, we are going to examine, in part, the question of the priority of Africa, especially southern Africa, in our political, economic, and strategic interests. We must do so in order to understand the use of terrorism as opposed to guerrilla warfare, as opposed to outright aggression—it is all part of a spectrum.

Regarding the economic interest, in September 1980, Alexander Haig, in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the United Technologies Corp., appeared before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the House of Representatives. In his testimony, General Haig said: "The United States is inordinately and increasingly dependent on foreign sources of supply for many of the raw materials critical to our defense and our economy." His statements are relative not only to our economy, but to the strategic materials involved in our strategic considerations.

To continue the quote:

> Should future trends, especially in southern Africa, result in alignment with Moscow of this critical resource area, then the U.S.S.R. will control as much as 90 percent of several key minerals for which no substitutes have been developed, and the loss of which could bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the free world.

Continuing his comments on Africa:

> As one assesses the step-up of Soviet proxy activity in the third world—in Angola, Ethiopia, southern Yemen, northern Yemen, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, and the December 1979 unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan by regular Soviet forces—then one can only conclude that the era of the resource war has arrived.

I would interject here that, as Secretary Enders mentioned the other day, the United States, like others, is a government of principle in its foreign policy as well as a government of interests. In this

statement by Alexander Haig, he is pinpointing interests, interests which are vital to our national security as well as to our economy. It does not gainsay the fact that the United States does have, and has proved that it has, principles with respect to our involvement in Africa, as in other parts of the world.

American journalists, and many opinion leaders throughout the world, are frequently reluctant to face or even discuss the extent of Communist involvement in, and control of, terrorism in southern Africa. But there is a strong case to be made that African blacks, as well as whites, will suffer if Communist movements expand or triumph in that region. Having lived for nearly 8 years in Southeast Asia, having observed what our media had to say about the relative advantage or disadvantage of that part of the world falling under communism, I would point to that part of the world as an example which one might examine with advantage in looking at the thesis just made, namely, that there is a strong case to be made that African blacks as well as whites will suffer if Communist movements expand or triumph in that region.

General Haig's warning takes on ominous significance when viewed in the light of a statement by Leonid Brezhnev made in 1973 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, a statement also noted previously by my distinguished colleague, John Warner of Virginia. Brezhnev's comment was

> Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends * * *, the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa.

The purpose of these hearings is not to debate the appropriate U.S. policy toward southern Africa. That would be the province of the Foreign Relations Committee in conjunction with the State Department. Nor is it our purpose to analyze South African domestic policies. Surely no one on this subcommittee would condone or attempt to justify, in any respect, policies of racial discrimination in South Africa, the United States, or elsewhere.

As was recently observed by one of today's distinguished witnesses, Dr. Chester Crocker:

> Southern Africa is an increasingly contested arena in global politics * * * We are concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Africa. The Soviets seek to exploit for their own ends existing differences and actual conflict, and they seek to create and sustain situations of conflict from which they can profit. They are aided in these efforts by their client states (such as the Cubans and the East Germans) * * *. The activities of the Soviets and their partners threaten the security of Africa in every corner of the continent, and in accordance with our objectives the U.S. is working to frustrate these activities and to help African states resist them.

What we seek to determine, through the testimony of a number of witnesses, is the extent to which the U.S.S.R. has successfully penetrated, and in large measure taken over, the direction of two organizations in southern Africa: the African National Congress and the South West Africa People's Organization. I hasten to add that it is not my view that the entire membership of these organizations is Communist. History demonstrates, however, that Communist parties do not need 100 percent membership in order to operate. For example, in the Soviet Union substantially less than 10 percent of the population enjoys the "privilege" of party member-

ship. It was a much smaller percentage than that in North Vietnam. The Communist objective is to assume leadership positions and thereby achieve effective control over the organizations.

I might note, for those who may not know, that they don't have to assume the top leadership positions; they can assume positions of importance administratively or functionally in the organization and have effective control over the nominal leader.

The fact that they are trying to get leadership positions and achieve effective control is not a charge made lightly or without evidence. Indeed, the South African Communist Party itself, the oldest Communist Party on the African continent, founded in 1921, has consistently made its position clear with regard to the relationship of "national liberation movements" to the Soviet bloc. In African Communist, the official journal of the South African Communist Party, No. 80, October 1, 1980, the text of an important resolution, adopted by the party in November 1979, is printed under the heading: "The World Communist Movement." I quote:

> We who are part of the liberation movement of South Africa must never fail to appreciate and insist that solidarity is a two-way process, that the aid and support which the socialist countries give so generously and at the expense of their own materials gains, to freedom fighters everywhere, can only be reciprocated by unswerving identification with the socialist community in the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

Those of us who happened to read the comic strip "Doonesbury" yesterday will appreciate the importance of the knowledge of the code words which are thrown around by Communists throughout the world, such as "national liberation movement." There may indeed be legitimate national liberation motivations among the populations of countries but, when the Soviets take it over, it is nothing more than a label for getting possession of the means to exploit those nations and those peoples. That is why you have seen the revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on.

The presidents of both SWAPO and the ANC have repeatedly acknowledged the importance of Soviet support to their organizations. High officials of SWAPO and the ANC were among the speakers at the XXVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1981. In his address to the Congress, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma described Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev as a "devoted, staunch fighter for peace, detente, freedom and the peoples' rights and human dignity of all the world's people." Nujoma then directly acknowledged Soviet assistance to SWAPO by saying:

> Without the support of the Soviet Union, we would not have been able to achieve those results that we have achieved today. . . . We address ourselves to the Soviet Union which is giving comprehensive support to the people of Namibia.

Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, has disclosed a like appreciation of the relationship between the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the African National Congress.

In an article published in the ANC magazine Sechaba, January 1981, Tambo expressed full support for a conference held in East Berlin in October 1980 to consider the principles of scientific socialism. Tambo went on to emphasize the need for strengthening "the unity of the three revolutionary elements of the revolutionary world process." He identified these as the existing socialist states,

the international working class movement, and the national liberation movements. Tambo continued by noting that the unity of these three revolutionary elements was "a vital precondition for the final victory over all forces of imperialism, colonialism, racism, Zionism, and exploitation of man by man."

A report published after a conference on "International Mobilization Against Apartheid and for the Liberation of Southern Africa" held in May 1981 contained reports from the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria on the support that these countries provide to liberation movements in southern Africa. The East German statement is particularly instructive. Now, keep in mind, when we say "East German," we are talking about the Government; there is a wall around East Germany—it points in, not out. So when we talk about "East Germany" or the East German Government, we are talking about it in the same way that we talk about the Polish Government—it does not represent the Polish people.

The East German statement is particularly instructive:

> The people and the government of the German Democratic Republic stand firmly by the side of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements, ANC and SWAPO. . . . Consistent support for those peoples. . . and for the liberated countries . . . represents an inalienable principle of socialist foreign policy. That support is reflected in the German Democratic Republic's close relations with the nationally liberated states of Africa and the national liberation movements, ANC and SWAPO.

During the hearings held by this subcommittee, we have examined the relationships between the Soviet Union and terrorist organizations around the world. It is of interest in this context that Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, speaking at an International Conference on Solidarity with the Struggle of the Namibian People, sponsored by the World Peace Council and held in Paris in September 1980, made the following statements about the relationship between his movement and other terrorist movements:

> Speaking as the leader of a liberation movement, I would like to assure our comrades in arms in the liberation struggles, Polisairo, Fretelin, and the PLO, the fighters in the Canary Islands, that by definition their struggle is ours. Every victory they win advances our cause against the forces of imperialism and racism. We fight in our countries to advance their struggles. As far as the PLO is concerned, our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military, and economic alliance that has developed between racism and Zionism.

As I have suggested, ANC and SWAPO (originally known as the Ovambo People's Organization) began as authentic nationalist movements. The African National Congress (ANC) was formed in South Africa in 1912. Initially, ANC was the target of strong criticism from the South African Communist Party [SACP]. In the early 1940's, the SACP began to infiltrate ANC with younger activists who gradually rose to leadership positions. By 1947, the white-dominated SACP had gained considerable influence over the leadership both of ANC and of its sister organizations, the South African Indian Congress [SAIC] and the South African Congress of Trade Unions [SACTU].

Similarly, SWAPO, which was founded in 1960, soon found itself the focus of Communist attention. Today it is very dependent on the Soviet Union and its allies for funding, for military training,

and for the equipment it uses in its campaign of insurgency and terrorism.

The subcommittee staff has devoted considerable effort to obtain firsthand evidence of the involvement of the Soviets and their proxies in directing the so-called national liberation organizations operating in southern Africa. As chairman of the subcommittee, I also want to acknowledge the able assistance of the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. We also recognize that the subcommittee's investigators would not have been able to produce the body of evidence to be presented in these hearings without the cooperation of the South African Government.

As I have previously mentioned, today we will hear from the Honorable Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Dr. Peter Vanneman, associate professor of political science at the University of Arkansas.

In subsequent hearings this week and next, we will hear testimony from former members of the ANC, SWAPO, FRELIMO, and the South African Communist Party. We have also asked the presidents of SWAPO and ANC to offer their testimony, and we hope that they will appear before us.

Dr. Crocker, please stand to be sworn in.

[Dr. Crocker stands.]

Would you raise your right hand, sir?

[Dr. Crocker raises his right hand.]

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. CROCKER. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated, sir. Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Secretary?

Dr. CROCKER. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Would you please deliver it.

TESTIMONY OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY DAN SIMPSON, DIRECTOR OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you first for the opportunity to be the leadoff witness in hearings which I understand will extend over 5 days.

As I understand it, the topic that will be the principal focus of the hearings will be the role of Communist influence in southern Africa. The scope will include not only external Communist influence in the area—the role of the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact associates, and Cuba—but also Communist influence in political movements indigenous to the area, including the South West Africa People's Organization and the African National Congress. Consideration of Communist influence in southern Africa would also include the question of relations of various Communist countries with the independent states of the area, all of which consider themselves to be nonalined nations.

It is an indisputable fact, faced squarely in policy terms by President Reagan's administration beginning in January 1981, in consul-

tation with our Western allies, that a wide range of vital Western interests and U.S. interests in particular are engaged in the southern African region. The 10 nations of southern Africa comprise an area of great mineral wealth, including resources critical to Western strategic interests. Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, and the territory of Namibia are all littoral states on the strategic Cape sea route, a lifeline of Western commerce. U.S. two-way trade with the countries of southern Africa amounted in 1980 to some $7.2 billion and U.S. direct investment in the region is estimated at $2.3 billion.

All of these factors obviously make southern Africa an area of great interest also to the Soviet Union and to its surrogates. In recent years, we have detected a substantial increase in Soviet interest and involvement in the area. In Angola and Mozambique the number and range of activities of Soviet, Cuban, and other foreign Communist advisers and technicians, in the civilian and military domains, has increased, implying concomitant political and economic influence. The Soviet Union has concluded arms agreements with Zambia and Botswana, complementing those countries' previous arms supply relationships with Western nations. Zimbabwe recently requested North Korea to train and equip a brigade, although that country continues to work closely with Great Britain as its primary foreign source of military equipment and training. Other countries of the region and of Africa, in general, have remarked with concern the increase in Soviet activity in the region, noting particularly that the Soviet Union has concentrated its efforts there on military assistance, showing little interest at all in contributing to the economic development of the region.

It is also clear that the Soviet Union has continued to play a very active role in southern African political and military organizations such as SWAPO and the ANC, on whose activities the hearings will focus. SWAPO is the primary external Namibian organization seeking power in Namibia. Its military elements are based primarily in Angola and other neighboring countries and carry out some actions within Namibia itself. It exists also as a political structure, inside and outside Namibia, and is one of the parties—with the Western Contact Group, the African Front Line States, South Africa, the United Nations, and other Namibian political organizations—to the present negotiations underway to reach a settlement of the Namibia issue. We estimate that SWAPO receives some 90 percent of its military support and some 60 percent of its overall support from Communist sources. It also receives direct assistance from African States, Western States other than the United States and from some U.N. bodies.

The ANC, which seeks to replace the present government in power in South Africa by violent as well as other means, receives comparable percentages of its military and other support from Communist and other sources. It is basically an African nationalist organization with a long history, founded in 1912, 5 years before the 1917 revolution in Russia. A main thread in the history of the ANC over the years is the varying degrees of internal and external Communist influence that have characterized what is basically an African organization. These conflicts within the organization have

often been very bitter and have resulted in various segments and individuals breaking with the ANC at different points in time.

We categorically condemn all terrorist and other violent acts that either of these organizations take to try to bring about change in Namibia and South Africa. Our policy in relationship to both seeks to channel the impetus toward change into peaceful channels. We seek in general in pursuing our objectives in southern Africa to strengthen and make more viable the possibilities of peaceful change. As we have repeatedly stated in the Namibia-Angola context, we believe the spiral of violence is a two-way street, and we deplore it. In doing so, we seek to obviate the necessity for terrorism that some parties involved in developments in the region choose to perceive.

In Namibia, we have been working very actively since last April to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Namibia issue that would bring that territory to an internationally recognized independence based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. We are pursuing a carefully crafted, three-phase negotiating process, with coordination at all stages with all of the interested parties, including South Africa, SWAPO, and other Namibian political elements.

In South Africa, we are pursuing a policy of constructive engagement, encouraging the government of Prime Minister P. W. Botha and other elements in South African society to move away from apartheid toward a South Africa changed, modern, and strong, with bright prospects for stability and development rooted in justice, free of the problems that now stand in the way of closer United States-South African relations. We believe that a process of peaceful, evolutionary change promises a much better immediate and long-term future for all South Africans than the protracted, bloody terror and violence that is the alternative for that nation.

Speaking directly to the purpose of these hearings, I believe that the policy that the administration is pursuing under President Reagan's leadership is one calculated to meet head-on the intentions that the Soviet Union may have in southern Africa. These objectives would represent not only a serious threat to our own interests there but are objectives which would also push the people of that area deeper into an environment of chaos, violence, and disorder, the antithesis of the peaceful economic development that I believe the leaders of the countries of southern Africa seek for their people. We proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union does not have a grand design for southern Africa, but that it is, in fact, taking advantage of targets of opportunity that present themselves to act counter to Western interests. The Soviet Union alone has a vested interest in keeping the region in turmoil. It is to no one else's advantage, neither to that of the South Africans, the other southern Africans, nor certainly to the United States and the West.

We seek a settlement in Namibia that will permit a fair and democratic expression of the will of the Namibian people and will bring to power a constitutional government not only with the support of the Namibian people but also with solid long-term prospects for stability.

We seek an end to the guerrilla warfare that has continued in northern Namibia and southern Angola for 15 years now and

which has cost the lives of many people in the area, most recently in the South African attack on SWAPO in southern Angola this month.

In seeking to resolve the Namibian problem through negotiations, we strip the Soviet Union and its surrogates of any excuse they have to continue to fuel violence in southern Africa through military aid to SWAPO and through the Cuban forces in Angola.

We seek an end to the conflict between political elements in Angola which has preoccupied that country since 1974.

We seek the withdrawal of all Cuban combat forces from Angola. Their continued presence in Angola represents a threat to regional security that is an obstacle to resolution of the Namibian issue. Their removal can also be part of a process of national reconciliation among Angolans that can result in time in a unified, peaceful Angola whose leaders can concentrate the country's efforts on national economic and social objectives.

We seek, through our own programs of assistance and cooperation, alternatives to Soviet involvement in and attempts to dominate the national security structures of independent southern African nations.

Finally, in seeking to encourage South Africans to resolve their problems through peaceful, evolutionary change, we strip the Soviet Union not only of any justification that it may put forth to justify its efforts to fan tensions within South Africa itself into racial war, but we also make it clear to the people of other African nations and to the world the gravity with which we view developments in southern Africa and the strength of our own policy.

I think it is important that we all understand that in southern Africa the world faces a dangerous conjunction of factors. Vital western interests are involved, vital American interests are involved. The Soviet Union is involved. The region itself is severely troubled by problems that inevitably carry with them general instability. South Africa is strong, economically and militarily. But the momentum of events in the area, whether it be toward independence for Namibia, national unity and peace in Angola, or toward change within South Africa itself, is also strong and vital. We believe that the diplomacy that the United States is pursuing in southern Africa can be a key factor in the outcome of these developments and that our diplomacy is, in fact, essential if hope for a peaceful solution of southern Africa's problems is to remain alive.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State will pay the closest attention to the information that will be brought to light by these hearings. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to present to you at the beginning of the hearings the policy context within which the administration conducts our diplomacy toward southern Africa.

I welcome your questions.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Crocker. In your opening statement you mention that "We proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union does not have a grand design for southern Africa . . ."—and you went on to develop that.

For your information, and for the record, in our hearings, beginning with the initial one, the subcommittee had done enough back-

ground study on the Soviets, involvement with support of and relative direction of terrorism worldwide to take note of the fact, and to so state in my opening remarks, that the Soviet Union can not be justifiably charged with directing terrorism in detail everywhere in the world. In spite of the fact of all of that having been contained in the opening statement and in the opening statements of several of our witnesses, the headlines in two major newspapers in the United States the next day read: "Denton Fails To Establish Soviets Direct Worldwide Terrorism." It is very difficult to contend with and understand that kind of journalism.

The subcommittee has found through a series of hearings just completed on the activities of Cuba that there is, relatively speaking, more Soviet influence and direction of terrorism, through Havana, in Latin America. Therefore, it will be informative to find out the extent of Soviet influence and direction of terrorism and of national liberation movements in southern Africa. And you have made it clear that they are taking advantage of targets of opportunity there.

Would you view the Soviets' involvement and intentions in such a way that you would sum it up as saying they do not have long-term objectives—they themselves do not have long-term objectives in southern Africa?

How would you address that subject?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think there is no question that the Soviets have long-term policy objectives; if one wants to call that a strategy, they have a strategy. The distinction I was seeking to make in my opening statement, sir, was between having a detailed blueprint years into the future, both for controlling or seeking to control events in the region, and for relating that region to other regions. I think in that respect it would be an exaggeration to say that they have a grand design. There is no question that they have objectives and they have targets.

Those objectives I think we indicated—I indicated in my opening statement—concentrate on the reduction or weakening of Western influence and access to key resources, also political influence, exploiting tensions and polarization in the area, and seeking to pose as the champion of Third World causes and Third World liberation.

Senator DENTON. I in no way meant to challenge your statement. You have clarified that which I wished to have clarified, namely, the difference between a design which would constitute not only an end, but the means, the tactics, by which they are pursuing it, having been well worked out and available to them, and, on the other hand, long-term objectives.

And you have just made that distinction clear. You answered the second part of my question, namely, how do you perceive these long-term objectives; what are they?

Would you care to add anything?

Dr. CROCKER. Just one point, if I could, Mr. Chairman, which is that I believe the objective remains general until the opportunity arises. But, for example, one of the most available opportunities is to seize upon and to exploit potential for economic disruption, for making countries feel threatened or dependent in various ways, and in general to deter outside investment that is needed in these areas to pursue the development process; by creating an environ-

ment of violence, by furthering and fueling that violence, I think they accomplish some of their objectives.

Senator DENTON. In what way does instability and turmoil in southern Africa and elsewhere in the world benefit the Soviet Union, from your point of view?

I ask that question because we did, in the first hearing, establish that the Soviet Union has made what you might call a gross bet on the side of terrorism, be it black or red, left or right, because terrorism tends to destabilize relatively democratic governments. The violence caused by terrorism many times results in an overthrow of the government and movement toward the Soviet orbit. This seems to be their worldwide technique.

Any comments you might have about instability and turmoil in southern Africa benefiting the Soviet Union, and whether such instability and turmoil in any way inures to the benefit of the United States or the countries in southern Africa, would be appreciated.

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think the place to begin is by recognizing that in Africa, as elsewhere, it is easier to destroy than it is to build, and I think, given that there are, in fact, some limits on the Soviets' foreign policy tools, they use those tools to acquire influence, in effect, through the transfer of the instruments of destruction and destabilization.

Many of the countries of Africa, virtually all of the countries of Africa, are relatively young; their institutions are young, in many cases vulnerable or fragile. And in such a climate it is easy to transfer to the countryside large quantities of perhaps relatively unsophisticated weaponry which can become rapidly a challenge to central government authorities.

Second, the Soviets are able to specialize through this means in what is their comparative advantage, which is the quiet, discreet transfer of both physical and doctrinal training and advice in the military and security fields, fields in which we are more open, Western democratic societies are much less comfortable being involved with, and where we are much more constrained by legislation and by public opinion. The Soviets do capitalize on this comparative advantage precisely because they feel, as you have said, that instability is in their interests.

The final factor I would mention is the economic one. The Soviets recognize that they cannot compete with us economically in the world; they cannot compete with us in Africa. And if they are able to create an environment in which Western businessmen, Western traders and investors, are simply deterred from taking the risk and putting money there, they have already accomplished one of their objectives.

Senator DENTON. I am compelled to make this generalization, and if you have any comments on it from your superior knowledge and experience in the State Department, I would appreciate them. Since we have people in this room and people who will read of these hearings and will study the findings, who disagree generally with you, with the administration, and certainly with me, on the approach we are taking here, I want it to be known that it is my personal feeling that the United States can be indicted for having been imperfect not only domestically but in its foreign affairs. We have been guilty of certain kinds of exploitation, but during times

in which those kinds of exploitation were practiced by just about everyone—in other words, the relativity hasn't been that bad.

In other areas, where we would like to have seen a more civilized, compassionate set of sociological, political, and economic conditions, we have been well inclined but not as effective as we would have liked to have been in our ability to influence the relatively friendly ruler to move in those directions. The Shah of Iran, although he may be charged justifiably with personal proclivities which were not admirable, he was trying to liberalize in his country in a general way. But he was caught between the proverbial rock and the hard place because he was perceived by the world to be liberalizing not enough and by his own nation as liberalizing too fast. The United States did have some positive influence on him; he was relatively subject to influence from the United States. And yet he, like Thieu and Diem and a number of other rulers, went out because of a perception of his faults.

So we, the United States and the Soviet Union, are both imperfect and relatively impotent to effect change at the rate at which we would like to see it come about. The United States might be accused of being less than concerned; we might be accused of being more nonchalant about the rest of the world than we should be.

But, I would like to state that I have had diehard Communists in a relaxed argumentative mode state their agreement with me that, in the reality of world politics, there is no nation which has been as relatively compassionate as the United States of America in its history, both in its domestic and foreign policies.

I give but two examples in foreign policy. We freed Cuba from Spain in 1898 and within 3 or 4 years we gave them their independence. You name me another nation which has done a thing like that.

We had a nuclear monopoly in 1946–47, but we didn't use it even after we perceived that the Soviet Union had grabbed Eastern Europe by fake elections. You name me another major nation that would have not used blackmail in a situation like that.

I mention this simply because we have lost sight of the big picture in this country, and I hate to see the Soviet Union and the United States pictured as two equal superpowers with equally selfish interests. To me that is a tragedy of our day.

Do you have any comments, sir?

Dr. CROCKER. Senator, I am certainly not here to debate those propositions. I associate myself with them fully.

Senator DENTON. I wanted to give you a chance, because those are my beliefs.

Dr. Crocker, you have noted in your prepared statement that SWAPO received 90 percent of its military support and 60 percent of its overall support from Communist sources.

In your view, why are the Soviets and other Communist states providing this assistance, and what quid pro quo will they exact if SWAPO comes to power in Namibia?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, these are difficult judgmental questions. The first part of the question, why are they doing it, I think I would suggest that the reason basically has to do with a desire for influence in several different spheres: influence, in the first place, over the military aspects of the conflicts that they get themselves

involved with, over doctrine, over training, over arms, where they do have, as I have indicated before, a kind of comparative advantage because they tend to specialize in the instruments of coercion. They do it, second, because they hope thereby to get statements of strong support for Soviet foreign policy from the movements themselves, as you have indicated in your opening comments, and from other states in the region who generally support the concept of freedom in Namibia or greater equality in South Africa.

And by putting themselves in this position, they are able thereby to seek to get greater support from many Third World nations and other nations for what they are doing; even if it's only rhetoric, they get that at least—they get U.N. speeches, they get public declarations, they get rhetorical support from the nonalined movement, that kind of thing.

I suppose also they are hoping that this support will lead to future influence or affinity with an independent government, if that government should be heavily influenced by or controlled by the movements they support.

The second part of your question, Mr. Chairman: what quid pro quo would they exact—is a trickier one. It is easy for them to get a quid pro quo today in terms of public statements of support. It is less obvious what the quid pro quo will be when and if, let us say, SWAPO were to gain a measure of power in Namibia. This depends on the choices available to SWAPO, and many other factors.

Senator DENTON. Regarding the rather hard-nosed interest-versus-principle aspect of the African issue as it impinges on our foreign policy, there was more to General Haig's statement to which I originally referred, when he was president and chief executive officer of United Technologies Corporation, which I think it may be worthwhile to point out. Too often—in fact, almost always—the economists in this country, who study things like interest rates and unemployment levels and the other barometers in our domestic economy, fail to recognize the importance of foreign relations, fail to recognize the importance of national security matters, on our domestic economy.

For example, in General Haig's statement, he is talking about these raw materials—and from the United States point of view, he says "In 1950 only four of the 13 basic industrial raw materials were imported in quantities of 50 percent or more." Now, these are extremely important in the security and economics sense, these 13 basic industrial raw materials. In 1950 four of them were imported in quantities of 50 percent or more. "Today . . ."—that was the date of his speech, which was a couple of years ago—"Today, we have reached that level of import for 9 of the same 13 materials," and he goes on to say: "But as serious as the problem is to us, it is far more so to our industrialized allies and friends around the world. For example, the nations of the EEC, the European Economic Community, have total import dependence . . ."—total import dependence!—"on 10 strategic minerals and metals, including manganese, cadmium, cobalt, and chromium. Japan imports 100 percent of 11 so-called strategic materials." I will skip down to a point where another key issue is made clear. He says: "The fundamental observation to be drawn from these strategic realities is that Russia is nearly self-sufficient in materials for which we and our

allies must turn to external sources, many of which today are either unfriendly or unstable. Should future trends, especially in southern Africa, result in alignment with Moscow, this critical resource area, then the U.S.S.R. would control . . ."—control!—"as much as 90 percent of several key minerals for which no substitutes have been developed, et cetera," a point which I quoted. The important point I wanted to make is that the Soviet Union is already practically self-reliant with respect to those minerals, and therefore is doing only the negative task of—they are about the negative task of denying them to us, which is indeed an aggressive if not arrogant move to make.

It is tragic to me that we cannot see in the United States that, though we might play with this or that factor in our domestic economy, unless we address these realities in the international field, we are going to find our little domestic egg, within which shell we deal, an egg which has sunk to the bottom of the sea.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, our Ambassador to the U.N., has made some statements here which I will ask you to comment on. She was asked her views about SWAPO when she appeared on the Neil-Lehrer Report of April 21, 1981, and she commented as follows:

> I can tell what my view is and what the people whom I have talked to, and it is that SWAPO is one of those coalitions of which we have seen a good many in our time, which includes some rather heterogeneous elements, some purely nationalist elements and some not very well-defined elements, and some Communist elements and some Marxist-Leninist elements that are explicitly oriented toward the Soviet Union and were trained there.

She was asked about the legitimacy of the fear that if SWAPO gained control of Namibia. the Communist faction in SWAPO would predominate. Her response was this:

> Well, Jim, it's a legitimate fear, I think. It actually, in the sense that it so far does include in its leadership some significant portion of persons tied to the Soviets by training and by predilection. * * *

She doesn't complete that statement; she goes on:

> and its principal source of arms is, of course, the Soviet Union, or surrogates thereof, and we have seen in our times a good many such coalitions come to power only to have the most well-organized unit, which usually turns out to be the Soviet-oriented Marxist-Leninist, seize control of the coalition.

Would you care to comment on that characterization insofar as it represents the administration's or your personal assessment of SWAPO.

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think there is no question that the administration is united in the view that there are these heterogeneous elements within SWAPO to which Ambassador Kirkpatrick—whom I should emphasize is a former faculty colleague of mine at the same university—to which she has pointed. And this naturally stimulates concern on the part of those who are making or are being asked to make very tough decisions in the South African side about the future, as well as for those who are going to be living there, about what the future might hold.

In the African context I don't think there is a track record that would enable us to state with any assurance that the movements which have such coalitions necessarily face a victory by the Communist minority within them, but there certainly is that possibil-

ity, and in that sense the concern about it, the fear about it, certainly is a legitimate one.

Senator DENTON. Considering the situation as it now exists, and the forces and trends within SWAPO, what is your assessment? Are you considerably concerned that there will be more development of Communist influence or that it has already reached an alarming degree and must be a matter of our hope and aim that it be decreased? How would you discuss that?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think the influence that we are referring to is quite substantial at the present time. SWAPO is, for the most part, at least as a military organization, in exile in neighboring countries; it is dependent in terms of hardware, advice, and training, as I have indicated, very substantially on the Soviets and their surrogates. Although that influence is not 100 percent, it is fairly significant.

As one looks toward the future, and just as a matter of hypothesis or speculation at this point, much would depend on the nature of the transition process that led to the independence of Namibia. It is for this reason that we have sought through our diplomacy to provide certain general guidelines, if you will, or constraints, concerning the future constitutional development of Namibia, for example.

We are convinced that the nature of that transition to independence will have an effect on the degree to which those committed to minority domination—if you want to call them the Communist minority—would be limited, would be hampered in seeking to control that process and dominate the government that came out of it.

A second factor that will influence the extent of Communist influence, were SWAPO to come to power, is the nature of the problems a new Namibian Government would face. And in that connection, sir, I would emphasize that much will depend in turn on the options available to that Government, and to different elements within that Government. As we have said, SWAPO consists of a coalition, if you will, or alliance of some kind, and once we see what an independent government would like, if indeed SWAPO gets to power, I think a lot would depend on the kind of options that it would face, the choices it has, and who is prepared to have a role vis-a-vis the new Namibia. If South Africa, for example, remains part of the picture, if we offer support in various ways, this would have some effect.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Dr. Crocker. I would like to welcome again Senator John East, my distinguished and respected colleague from North Carolina, who has been interested enough to attend a number of these hearings, and his contributions have been, in every case, most valuable.

Senator East, would you care to make any kind of opening statement at this point?

Senator EAST. No, go right ahead, and I will pick it up at some later point.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. I would like to enter into the record copies of captured documents acquired by the subcommittee staff during their visit to southern Africa. These documents consist of lists of names of SWAPO cadres sent to the Soviet Union for

military training, training in reconnaissance and sabotage and training in "political commissarship."

It is apparent in one of the documents, a letter from the chief of SWAPO's armed forces, Dino Haamambo, to the Angolan Secretary of Defense, dated July 12, 1977, that the approval of the "Soviet General" in Luanda was required for changes in SWAPO training schedules.

From another letter from the Chief Political Commissar of SWAPO dated December 23, 1976, it appears that SWAPO's political commissars are trained at the Komosol Party School in Moscow.[1]

The code words have sometimes become less than cryptic, as we see the increasing Communist infiltration of some of these movements. Look, for example, at one of the lists just introduced which shows 10 persons who departed from Kasinga. They were known as "comrades" going to be trained in "political commissarship" in the Soviet Union, all members of SWAPO.

I want to reemphasize my own personal empathy with those who wish to see reform. The duty I have, as chairman of this subcommittee, is to investigate the degree to which the soviets try to achieve, and in fact do, to a degree, achieve infiltration into and influence over some of those movements.

Dr. Crocker, you have stated that SWAPO receives direct assistance from some United Nations bodies.Would you describe the nature of this assistance, including the quantity, and list the U.N. bodies providing such assistance?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased, with your permission, to submit a detailed statement on that for the record, if I could.

I might just say in general terms that the SWAPO observer team in New York at the U.N. does receive financial support, voted by the General Assembly, and that various specialized agencies, such I believe as UNICEF and UNESCO also provide various kinds of aid. There is support for SWAPO's information programs.

But we will get you a detailed statement on that for the record.

Senator DENTON. Could you, at this time, just give us a general characterization of it? I also want to make a part of the record a paper, "How the U.N. Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups," by Thomas G. Gulick, which bears directly on this issue.[2]

Dr. CROCKER. In general terms, several U.N. agencies, which are bound by General Assembly resolutions, have taken the position that SWAPO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people. This act, which, of course, preempts the judgment of the Namibian people themselves, is not a judgment that this administration or, for that matter, its predecessor, shares; it is not a judgment shared by any of our Western allies in the contact group either.

In any event, having made that judgment, the General Assembly has then gone on to allocate funds. I am certain it is within the range of several million, if one looks at the various accounts that go to support SWAPO.

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[1] Material is included as exhibit A in the appendix to this hearing.
[2] Included as exhibit B in the appendix to this hearings.

But we will get you the detail and the numbers, which I don't have at the tip of my tongue.

[Subsequent to the hearing, the subcommittee received the following information:]

In 1976, the UNGA recognized SWAPO as the "sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people," and since that time has provided annual funding for the operation of the SWAPO observer mission to the United Nations. The United States has consistently opposed this funding from assessed contributions, arguing that no group can claim to represent the Namibian people until a true act of self-determination has taken place. For the biennium 1982–83, the GA has approved $598,200 in funding for the SWAPO office.

In regard to voluntary contributions, there are assistance programs throughout the UN system focused on Namibian refugees. However, pursuant to Public Law 97–12, the United States in fiscal year 1981 decreased its voluntary contributions to UNDP by $297,722, to UNICEF by $13,326, and to FAO/WFP by $3,556. These reductions constituted our proportionate share of the organizations' programs operating in "support of SWAPO".

Senator DENTON. What is the U.S. participation in these U.N. bodies in general? What direct role does the United States play in these U.N. bodies which provide direct assistance to SWAPO?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, we do participate as members in all such bodies.

Senator DENTON. It is my understanding that the Soviet Union signed a new economic and technical aid agreement with Angola in February of this year. How would you assess the impact of that on Soviet influence on Angola and in southern Africa?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, the economic and technical agreement to which you make reference is interesting in a number of respects. It came right in the midst of the dialog that we are undertaking with Angola in an effort to induce that government to face what are for it very difficult decisions concerning the role of Cubans, and so forth, as well as their participation in the Namibia process. And we view that agreement as having been pursued in that context as a way in which the Soviets would stake their claim in effect to influence in Angola. Frankly, as we all know, the Soviet record in providing economic and technical aid to Angola is an abysmal one. The Angolan economy is in very, very difficult straits, getting worse rather than better.

So I would not be optimistic that this agreement will have much impact in improving economic development for Angola. I think it is a 10-year agreement, and we would have to see later on.

Finally, I would make the comment that this is the way the Soviets are seeking to strengthen those within Angola who wish to resist the path of negotiated solutions.

Senator DENTON. I am not clear on what happened with respect to Gulf Oil's apparent involvement in the economy of Angola.

Could you give me an update on where that is, and, if an unclassified hearing permits, what your position is on that?

Dr. CROCKER. The Gulf Oil investments in the oil sector in Angola predate Angola's independence; they have continued. We have not discouraged the continuation of those operations which are not prohibited by law.

Senator DENTON. You have not discouraged them?

Dr. CROCKER. We have not discouraged them, no.

Senator DENTON. There have been allegations that Gulf Oil has subsidized Cuba in some way. Do you have any comments on that?

Dr. CROCKER. The petroleum sector in Angola is one of the few sectors that have foreign exchange. The Angolan Government derived benefits from it and, to the extent—we do not have precise data on this, but to the extent that Angola is obliged to pay for its Cuban Socialist fraternal charity, presumably that money comes from that source, among others.

Senator DENTON. So it is indeed a tangled web?

Dr. CROCKER. It is indeed, Senator.

Senator DENTON. Senator East, any time you care to question, I will defer to you.

Senator EAST. Well, if you have a line of questions that you wish to pursue.

Senator DENTON. No. We have pursued three or four lines and we are ready.

Senator EAST. Are you ready for a rest?

Senator DENTON. Yes.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN P. EAST

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I again wish to commend you for holding these hearings and allowing the subcommittee to pursue this general subject of security and terrorism.

I think you are doing a great service to take the lead in allowing us to pursue this. So I appreciate the opportunity to be a part of it and to assist in whatever way I can. I wish to—I know you have—to thank Dr. Crocker for coming over this morning and taking up his valuable time to talk with us. I am sure members of the administration and all its branches often wonder about the value to them and to the administration of coming over here, but I would like to assure them, even though I think at the moment it may be not clear exactly what the benefit is, that it gives us here in the Congress an opportunity to talk with you firsthand in a public forum. And frankly, we find that useful and valuable as you are perhaps aware, we have had in recent meetings other members of your Department here. We had Mr. Enders here last week, and we had Mr. Ikle prior to that. And I would like to say to you as I had noted to them, that I think the Department of State will find a friendly reception here, although you are frequently buffeted with critics here in the Congress, on a whole range of matters, and you are probably used to that.

The Secretary of State and the State Department do have many people here in the Senate and the House, although we may disagree on particulars, who do support the general effort that they are making in what they are trying to do. And I think they ought to be commended for it. And as you are heavily buffeted from time to time, I think it is important that the Defense Department and the State Department and the Secretary of State appreciate that there are those who do appreciate the leadership that they are giving in so many of these critical areas that concern us all.

So I wanted to pass that thought on to you, lest members of the Department of State think there is a steady drumbeat of negativism coming out of the Senate and the House. And the spirit of my

inquiries today is not to buffet or to embarrass or humiliate but simply, frankly, to get some of your thoughts on these matters and show you some of mine. And where I may depart with you, it is done in the spirit of inquiry and communication, not trying to embarrass or humiliate or anything of that kind. I do not think anybody benefits from that format.

I suppose sometimes people may wonder why a Security and Terrorism Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee would be interested in these things, but certainly the pattern of terrorism and threats to the internal security of nations all over the world is not limited strictly to a domestic context in this country. We have earlier had witnesses indicating, of course, the domestic threat that we face, or potentially face, but certainly the pattern can be found throughout the world, and we are trying to get some of you with a broader scope of it, which may be slightly going over the line of what may be looked upon as more appropriate for the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I think, as we often learn in politics, it is a seamless web, and there are many things that overlap, and I feel Senator Denton is absolutely correct here in trying to see what patterns we are experiencing internationally here.

Mr. Enders was here the other day. The Soviet-Cuban connection, I think, is rather clear in Central America. The confusion of critics to the contrary notwithstanding, I think the reasonable review of the evidence, hard intelligence data, will indicate that the Soviet-Cuban connection is very real in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and that pressure will, I think, mount, and it is a reality whether people want to admit it or not. They can pretend that it is not so, but now and then perceptions do yield to reality. And in this case, I like to think at that time the American people generally will understand the peril and threat that we face in that area.

Now, we know in Southeast Asia of the Soviet-Vietnamese connection in terms of the dominance of Southeast Asia, Cambodia and elsewhere. We know in the Middle East, the Soviet-Cuban connection, for example—I do not mean to make that connection bear more weight than it can carry in evaluating national affairs, but it exists there in South Yemen, it exists in Afghanistan, as I understand it. We know, of course, the Soviet PLO connection in the Middle East. Come to Africa, the great continent of Africa, which is going out of one form of colonialism, in my judgment, into a new form, this time Soviet. Whether it is via the Cuban connection or the Qadhafi connection, clearly the effort here is to create ultimately, and there may be a long road down that path, a Marxist-Leninist Africa of some kind, substantially so, not instanter, but certainly that is the general thrust of it. Whether it is in Ethiopia or Angola or Mozambique, certainly the connection is real and obvious in the presence of Cuban troops extensively throughout the continent of Africa; again that is clear to all except the most hardened ideologues who simply do not want to look at the facts and prefer to live in worlds of their own little mind's eye. I would like to think that the Department of State, and we would like to think the Senate and the Judiciary Committee are not impervious to these facts. They are there. We know it and we know what is afoot. And it does not suggest easy answers as to what we do about it.

Now, as we look at Africa, there is a tendency, and I do not mean to be too rambling here, but just to convey to you my concerns here, when it comes to Africa, and we frequently get this response in other continents throughout the world where this pattern is occurring, we hear that this is not of great moment or consequence to the United States. We have more pressing problems at home. We ought not to be concerned about these developments. We get overly anxious about what is occurring in other parts of the world.

It seems to me to suggest that these other parts of the world are inconsequential, and I would submit with regard to any of these Third World areas, certainly Africa, a premier example, what happens there is extremely important. What happens there is extremely important in terms of the people of Africa, first and foremost. It is very important in terms of the enormous natural resources of Africa, and ultimately all of this is extremely important in terms of the great geopolitical context in which the United States and the Soviet Union and other countries are playing out their roles as countries, nations. Again we are back to the real world of international relations.

I know Senator Denton had earlier commented upon this, and I regret I could not be here at the time you elaborated upon it. I would appreciate your elaborating on it briefly for me. This statement on page 5, if I might turn then to a question or two.

These last two lines:

We proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union does not have a grand design for southern Africa, but that it is, in fact, taking advantage of targets of opportunity that present themselves to act counter to Western interests.

It is an interesting sentence. It almost seems mutually contradictory in a way, first suggesting that there is no Soviet design, which I think the facts would belie, and I would generally say that the State Department's action in so many parts of the world, for example the Secretary of State's very candid assessment of Central America, belie it. I guess it may become a matter of semantics. Maybe it is more a matter of diplomacy or it is not quite cricket or politic to say that the Soviet Union has a "grand design." I am willing to settle for whatever language people would like to use, but are we not correct? It certainly is explicitly stated in Marxist-Leninist theory, and I would submit if one looks at the pattern throughout the world of Soviet behavior via its proxies, Cuban troops in Africa, Central America, for example, is it too much to say that there is not a Soviet grand design?

Dr. CROCKER. Senator, I will try to address your question.

Let me first say that I appreciate your opening comments and we also think it useful to have discussions of this nature and to have them up here and to have them in public.

Second, you made a point about how you think Africa is important to you. Let me say as someone who has spent his entire active adult life in the African field, I obviously share your judgment completely. There was a time when, if you said that you were an African specialist, people suggested but what do you do for a living? That is not true any more, and I am proud to say it is not true.

I think that the Department of State and the Reagan administration since coming into office have been addressing directly the points that you raised. We are not downplaying it in any way. There is the possibility and the threat of a new imperialism, there is no question about it. No one argues that point.

We do believe that the majority of Africans are not eager for such a new imperialism. We are seeking to find ways both through our diplomacy, through our aid programs in the security field and the economic field to address this risk. We are seeking to address it through our diplomacy in southern Africa.

The point in my opening remarks about a grand design, I think, is largely semantic, as I indicated in my reply to Senator Denton.

What we mean by that statement is a simple point, that we do not believe it is a detailed blueprint looking out years into the future with every piece fitting into a neat puzzle for a policy that is completely one of control by the Soviets. The Soviets have to react to events in Africa as they occur. The Soviets will find their opportunities in one place this year, another place next year and, in general, yes, indeed, they will seek to exploit those opportunities. But I am not certain that it would be accurate to say that they have a grand design in the sense of a blueprint or in the sense of relating southern Africa, let us say, in the detailed timing sequence to the Middle East or to Latin America. I think they would take what they can get. And that has probably been true historically as well, but they certainly have long-term objectives which are inimical to our interests, no question about that.

Senator EAST. Well, on your point about not having a detailed blueprint, of course, in the long term, there are so many variables that will come into play; that, of course, no one generally can have "detailed blueprints." It does not adhere very well to politics generally, domestic, or foreign. That is, resilience and flexibility are always a key component of any effective policy plan.

What is critical is that you have a goal of some kind in the direction in which you are trying to work. Absent that, you are simply reactive to worldwide events.

Now, I am simply suggesting not to bog us down over a big quarrel over semantics, but it seems to drive to the most fundamental point here, that in acknowledging candidly that the Soviet Union does have a grand design in terms of establishing its hegemony in Africa as well as other underdeveloped Third World continents. Sure, it is openended as to specific techniques and methods, if you will, the details of the blueprints as you put it, but the grand architectural design is there. It is there in Marxist-Leninist thought—Lenin, of course, advising of the need to take over the underdeveloped parts of the world, and surround the industrial continents.

The grand design is there. The details, of course, will depend on the country's circumstances. Lenin thought it would be easier to subvert the Third World areas and then come back to the industrial societies of Western Europe and North America at a later point.

So I suppose one could say, well, Lenin did not really have a "grand design" because he did not have the detailed blueprints. But I would submit that he did have a "grand design" leaving the details to the judgment of particular circumstances and situations as the variables unfolded, as time unfolded.

Again not to go on ad nauseam with it, but why I am concerned here in the broader context is that the American people and those in leadership positions not delude themselves about the nature of the threat we face in the world.

Now, fair minded and reasonable minds can differ over how we deal with it, how we handle it. What has troubled me, though, is that sometimes I sense there are people in America and elsewhere in the world who take this challenge rather casually. I think they are going to pay a very heavy price for it in time. By that, I mean that they take casually the Soviet grand design in the world.

So, again, I do not mean to force you to the wall on the point, but when I read that we are not sure the Soviet Union has any grand design and they are simply reacting and dealing with and taking advantage of local opportunities, it seems to lack the candor and punch that I would like to see in a public pronouncement by the Government. Of course, I appreciate, too, that what we say and what we do can be two different things in the world of diplomacy. Sometimes we cannot be as candid as we like.

But in a democracy where we are trying to educate the public to the realities of international affairs, that may be good language for reading in the Soviet Ambassador's office here in Washington or over at the Kremlin or elsewhere. The American people, I think, face a difficult problem that the totalitarian and authoritarian governments did not. We have to report to the American people what it is we are doing, where we are going, and why. And if we tell them there is not really any grand design in the Soviet Union, and there is not any great compelling and pressing problem here, the Soviets are sort of reacting to local events and maybe exploiting one or two or three, well, naturally, it creates a mood in this country that there is not really a great challenge or threat; what is everybody all steamed up about? National defense seems to be adequate?

I am not suggesting that we stampede anybody into some rash action. I am simply suggesting that I think the problem is more the other way, of prudently but candidly educating the American people and others in the world who are willing to listen, that the Soviet Union does have some very substantial ideas, if grand design is too heavy a phrase. The U.S.S.R. has some very substantial goals and it seems to be pressing rather unrelentingly with varying degrees of success, to be sure, but the goal is there. I submit the goal is there in Central America. I think it is clear in Asia; I think it is clear in the Middle East, whether it is Afghanistan or South Yemen, or whatever it may be. And to me, in Africa, the continent which you are particularly concerned with, certainly the evidence is compelling and chilling. It is disconcerting, and loss of Africa to the Soviet Union and her Cuban and local proxies is going to mean a great victory. It is going to be unfortunate to consign the people of Africa to that kind of future.

I would hope that they deserve something better than that. But I think it shows the continuing growth and pattern, to get back to our fundamental concern on this committee, about the great threats to security and terrorism generally in the world. And I operate on the assumption that there are limits—we live in a finite world and if we concede Africa, Asia, Central America, and so

forth, to this kind of pattern that I am calling the Soviet grand design, whatever else you wish to call it, eventually we in our own temporarily secure world, temporarily secure, are going to face similar problems. We are concerned about the rule of law here on the Judiciary Committee and maintaining it, so it may seem a little distant to some, but when we see these great threats to security and terrorism throughout all the rest of the world, we see what an enormous threat it is to democratic values and the rule of law as we have historically known it in the Anglo-American tradition, and in which we take pride as being a part of our great tradition and heritage. And we wish to see it preserved.

I see a growing threat to it, and I do not think it is a matter of overreacting or being paranoid or seeing "a monolithic communism," but I do think we must have a healthy and realistic and prudent assessment and understanding of Soviet intentions in the world. And they do not augur well, in my judgment, for people who seek freer and more humane societies.

So I will end on that thought and just get back to the Chairman of the subcommittee. Again, maybe, Mr. Secretary, our differences are purely semantic, but I am concerned that in the polite world of diplomacy we not get polite to the point that the State Department loses sight of the educational function that it must perform in the context of a free society, and that your Soviet counterparts do not have to worry about that, but in this country we must try to inform, I think most importantly in foreign policy, try to inform the American people as realistically as we can, as honestly and candidly as we can, prudently, of course, what we think the realities of the world are like. What are they? And then the American people can react to that. We can react to it, but I do not think "grand design" is too strong a term.

If you would like to respond to that, then we will go back to the chairman. I am sure he is anxious, too.

Dr. CROCKER. Senator, I find myself in agreement with your statements. I think we do disagree perhaps just about the use of two words.

We have been speaking for the past 14, 15 months, I think, as openly about the challenge and the threat that we face from the Soviets, from the Cubans, from the Libyans in Africa as any administration since Africa gained its independence a generation ago.

We are also conducting, if I may say in response to that, but also because we want to get beyond that, the most activist, the most forward African policy that an American administration has had, and it is, in substantial measure, for the reasons you have indicated.

Senator EAST. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. I appreciate, Senator East, your desire to place in context the reality of the urgency with which Americans in general should understand and view the Soviet threat to the world and to our security.

Earlier, when the question was answered regarding the difference between the grand design and long-term objectives, Dr. Crocker certainly satisfied me with respect to his answer. I think that he is correct, from what I understand about the situation, that the Soviets in southern Africa are more in the target of opportunity mode

there than they are, for example, in Latin America. In other words, their capability in terms of what they have already achieved through Castro and the way in which they deal with Latin America or certain parts of Latin America could be presented as a grand design in the sense of step-by-step capabilities and the capacity to look ahead and see 16 chess moves ahead. However, in Africa, their situation, as described by Dr. Crocker, appears to be like that of a raft which has to take advantage of the currents as they develop, which currents are not that predictable. Therefore, the forces and trends are not as orchestratable from Moscow's point of view.

Now, if I am incorrect in my understanding, I want Dr. Crocker to correct me. But he is not in any way contesting the charge that the Soviet Union has objectives in Africa which are distinctly inimicable to those of us in the free world and to the indigenous population of Africa. He is not, as I understand it, trying to present a case which indicates that the Soviets and their surrogates are not into things as much as they can be, being just as antagonistic to our interests today as they are anywhere else in the world.

Is that generally right, Dr. Crocker?

Dr. CROCKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. I would like to insert in the record, without objection, some photographs distributed by the ANC. One is a postcard picture of Fidel Castro and Oliver Tambo, with comments on the back—no big news. The second shows Yusuf Dadoo, chairman of the South African Communist Party, with Tambo. The third is a picture of Umkhonto We Sizwe guerrilla training taking place.[1]

We also have a comic book which is very similar to those I saw the North Vietnamese giving out to the South Vietnamese with English translations. I request and so order that it be inserted into the record. This one is called "The Story of Simon and Jane," and it exacerbates the problems of South Africa in a traumatic way, involving a marriage between two blacks and how the "nasty" people for whom they work denigrate their lives, their dignity and, indeed, end up attacking the foundations of the marriage, their right to live together, and so forth. It ends up on the last several pages showing one of the friends of the people demonstrating a rifle, or rather an automatic weapon, "We must learn everything about the gun. It is the only language that the enemy understands." Then he demonstrates a pistol—"Pistols like this which Simon took from the policeman are good for self-defense." And then it shows all of them cleaning their weapons, the leader saying, "Keep your weapons clean. They are precious in our freedom struggle. With these we will get more weapons from the enemy."

Then it has instructions on how to aim and fire, how to hold the weapon steady, showing the position of the front sight of the weapon with respect to the rear sight, and indicating that the biggest part of the target on a man is the middle of the body, not the head.[2]

It is a familiar pattern. I am amazed at the headlines in today's or yesterday's papers, with reference to what is going on in Nicara-

[1] See exhibit C in the appendix of this hearing.
[2] See exhibit D in the appendix of this hearing.

gua, saying that the administration presented false evidence as to the war in North Vietnam against South Vietnam. This is incredible journalism in light of subsequent events such as the North Vietnamese divisions in the end sweeping across South Vietnam and then overwhelming Cambodia and Laos, the community's vultures fighting over the human and economic carrion of that area. It reminds me of "Alice in Wonderland," to talk about the inability to clearly prove that the North Vietnamese Communists were the real source of the struggle in South Vietnam rather than it being a nice little independent civil war. To try to prove the latter thesis after the fact of what has gone on in Southeast Asia is absolutely an incredible effort.

I will say that U.S. policy in Africa, as you have outlined it, sir, somewhat parallels that which the President has outlined as the real problems in Latin America and Central America at this moment. Security and peaceful approaches are necessary, not as a reactionary way to hold things as they are, but as a means to an end. Those means include the preservation of the institutions by which reform and some form of representation of the people will be present in the government.

Is that a generally correct analogy?

Dr. CROCKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is.

Senator DENTON. Would you comment further on the Soviet Union's influence over ANC at this time, recognizing that the ANC was indeed an indigenous and purely black African movement in the beginning? Where are we today with the influence the Soviets have over SWAPO? Is this increasing or decreasing?

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, these are very difficult judgmental questions; measuring influence, as you know, is a difficult matter. One can see the influence over both—with both movements in terms of the way language is used.

You made reference to an earlier statement in which somebody quoted adherence to scientific socialism. That is not a very common use of language independently. Normally an African socialist would use some other terminology than that. There are other examples. There is influence in the area of training and tactics and strategy, and this takes place on the ground in Africa and in European and other capitals further away.

I would emphasize that the Soviets have close working relationships with the Governments of Angola and Mozambique. They are the key hopes to these two movements respectively. SWAPO, in the case of Angola; ANC in the case of Mozambique, and through their military aid agreement and access to the establishment, they are able to bring their viewpoints without putting a finer point on it through those channels.

In addition, there are obviously a lot of scholarships offered to people who come out under SWAPO or ANC aegis. There are different elements in ANC under those which you might call indigenous Communists with their roots in South African Communist parties, and those more directly subservient or answerable to Moscow. But it is difficult to measure.

As to whether influence is increasing or decreasing, again it has gone up and down in the past. As you yourself indicated, there is a long history of efforts by the SACP to control or shape the govern-

ment of the ANC, and there is ebb and flow there at the present time. It is a tough one to call. A lot will depend on the ability of the ANC over time to be represented somehow within the country. But while it is in exile, primarily in exile, it provides more opportunity for the Soviets.

Senator DENTON. It would not be inaccurate to say that with respect to some important leadership positions, with the exception of Oliver Tambo himself, we do have some out and out Marxist—Leninist Communists at this point?

Dr. CROCKER. No, it certainly would not be inaccurate to say that.

Senator DENTON. I am going to ask you about the relationships of Cuba, East Germany, and other Warsaw Pact countries with the Soviet Union regarding Soviet activities and interests in southern Africa. Prior to that, however, I want to acknowledge that there is a large gray area in my mind with respect to what might be considered residual German national interests dating back to the late 19th century. I assume these interests still reside, to some degree, in the East German Government, and to some extent may be said to parallel those of the Soviet Union.

I do not know where one set of interests begins and the other ends. I know that East Germany is pictured by many experts as wanting to show that it is the principal indispensable ally of the Soviet Union in Africa; therefore, they benefit much from that.

But just for my own curiosity, as you discuss the relationship between Cuba, East Germany and other Warsaw Pact countries with the Soviet Union acting in southern Africa, if you have any parenthetical contributions pertaining to this point, I would be interested in them.

Dr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, you put your finger on the difficulty of getting a clear distinction as to motivation here. It is our general impression that there is close coordination indeed. I would be inclined, I think, to question whether that many East German taxpayers have given careful assessment to Germany's historical interests in becoming involved in southern Africa.

There is, it seems to us, a sort of a struggle for Germany's part on this issue. We have very active and fruitful collaboration with the Western German Government, the FRG, and through that contact we are seeking to bring about a negotiated settlement.

On the other side of the equation, we have the East Germans who specialize in the kind of Communist division of labor in the provision of training and devices and tactics for the Secret Police or securities establishment, where they are known to be among the world's leaders, and they do this in a number of African countries, I might say.

Senator DENTON. If I may interject at this point for clarification.

I studied Angola for almost a year, but it was a long time ago, almost 20 years ago. At that point, West Germany was presented to us in our studies as a relatively altruistic economic investor and contributor to African nations, whereas in your testimony today, you have indicated that the Communist aspects of influence there are principally military and political and that the—I would think that the East Germans are somewhat vulnerable, too, and sensitive

to that kind of distinction between their influence and that of West Germany.

Dr. CROCKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think they are sensitive to it and they seek to portray what they are doing in the security relationships as being a part of some sort of progressive alliance to achieve the objectives of the Third World movements involved.

If I could say a word about the Cuban side of the equation which you referred to.

There is no question in our mind that the Cubans would not be there doing what they are doing in Africa were it not for the active support and financial support and equipping and the overall political umbrella provided by the Soviets.

Having said that, the Soviets, as you indicated, no doubt have their own—I should say the Cuban Government no doubt has its own additional motivation.

Senator DENTON. I would have thought, logically, that they would have had more independent interests in Latin America than they would have had in getting in Russian ships and proceeding to Angola at some economic and human expense to themselves in proceeding over there.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

Dr. CROCKER. I agree with your point, Senator.

I guess the only comment I would make is perhaps they found greater opportunity in Africa where a small input of external advice or troops might be—might have a greater effect in a shorter period of time, and they had been thwarted in their own hemisphere a number of times before they went with the major movement in Angola in 1975.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you, Dr. Crocker, for your extremely valuable testimony this morning. We may have a number of other questions which we will submit for the record to you, sir. We will keep the record open for 2 weeks for your responses.[1]

Dr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Simpson, I would like to thank you, too, sir.

Dr. Peter Vanneman, please come forward as the next witness.

If you will, Dr. Vanneman, while you are standing and while we are bidding adieu to Dr. Crocker, will you raise your right hand for the oath, sir?

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Dr. VANNEMAN. I do, sir.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated, sir.

TESTIMONY OF DR. PETER VANNEMAN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

Dr. VANNEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[1] Subsequent to a subcommittee hearing on March 12, 1982, entitled "The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion," a question was submitted to the Department of State. Since the answer deals with the Cuban activity in Africa, it is included as a part of the record of this hearing and can be found as exhibit V in the appendix to this hearing.

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Senator DENTON. Do you have an opening statement, Dr. Vanneman?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

If I may, I would just like to first of all thank you for inviting me to come here this long distance from my research post in southern Africa. And with your permission, I will not read this opening statement. I would just point to a few comments that might be particularly significant, and then maybe I can insert this in the record.

Senator DENTON. Absolutely, sir.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I would like to point out that my field of competence is the Soviet Union, and I am particularly interested now in Soviet activities in southern Africa, so I would like to talk just for a few seconds about what is really happening in Moscow with respect to the policymaking and the various activities of the Soviets in southern Africa.

I think it is important to note that in his opening speech to the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1981, about a year ago, the head of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, mentioned southern Africa five times.

Now, the significance of this is that this is probably the most important foreign policy document available in the Soviet Union. It is a very authoritative statement, and it is a little bit like our state of the Union address. If it is not important, you do not mention it five times. So I think it is important to look at it.

I would also like to stress that the Soviet interest in southern Africa is not just to dominate that region. Their activities down there reflect as I put it here: "Soviet activities in southern African region, reflect that regime's concern with fashioning policies for areas far from its periphery, which will maximize its global influence, not just its influence in that particular region."

I think another thing is important to stress, moving on to page 2, is that the Soviets have gradually been improving and developing their policy apparatus for dealing with the southern African region. Africa was an area which was of almost no interest to the Soviets in the early sixties and the late fifties. Now they have a very sophisticated group of people dealing with Africa, and they have a considerable number of organizations staffed with African specialists.

I think in the early sixties they had almost no Africanists. Now they have a corps of over 300 specialists in African affairs. So that is the kind of thing that makes for a more sophisticated involvement in an area that we already know is very complex.

Another thing is that more important people tend to be taking notice of this area. For example, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has an Africa Institute, and the new head of that is the son of the Foreign Minister, which means that the sons of the Soviet leaders consider Africa so important that they are willing to devote part of their career to studying and directing policies in that area.

I would like to focus on this Africa Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences for just a second, primarily to point out that the kinds of people that are working there now are changing. It used to be primarily an academic organization. Now it seems as though there is a large group of people who are getting involved in its ac-

tivities who are policy analysts, and who are interested in strategic matter. So what we have there is a kind of a subtle shift in the actual nature of the organization itself.

Moving on very quickly to page 4, I would just like to point out, as so many people have, and as Dr. Crocker very eloquently put it, the cornerstone of Soviet policy seems to be the supplying of arms, advisors and training to its clients in this area, whether they be nations or insurgents, in order to destabilize the area. Their opinion is that instability enhances their grip on their clients.

And here, I give you a little chart of the kinds of heavy Soviet weaponry that has been supplied to the nations in that area. When you realize that none of this weaponry was there before 1970, you realize there has been a significant change in Soviet involvement in this area in the past decade. I think that is important.

Finally, and I think this is very important to emphasize that Soviet policy is not moving forward without failures. There have been significant failures. And here I tried to list, in about two or three pages, the successes and the failures.

Senator DENTON. Would you tend to—if I may interrupt you, because I will forget this question—to offer that as a justification for Dr. Crocker's characterization of it as less than a grand design, in a less than grand design nature. They have to proceed on a target of opportunity basis, because it has been a stop and go operation, successes and failures.

Dr. VANNEMAN. With all due respect to Dr. Crocker, who once was an academic also, I think if we were in a seminar, that that is what he might have said.

I think the other point that he would probably make, and that I would make, is we do not want people to think that the Russians are stupid, that they have some kind of lock-step master plan that they follow rigidly. They, as we have seen, are very flexible. They do suffer significant defeats, but they tend to move on, to compensate for these, and to restore the facilities that they have lost, and the influence in other areas.

Senator DENTON. And that flexibility has the advantage of a continuum of administration, as it were, which we do not have in this country. For example, in naval policy, they have had a chief of naval operations who has held that post for over 25 years. We change every time we have a new President; namely, every 4 years.

The amazing thing to me is that we are keeping up in this at all, but go ahead, please.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I really close with two other points, which I think are worth making.

One is that in the transition in Zimbabwe, we find that the Soviets made considerable mistakes, and so we do not want to think that they are omniscient or omnipotent.

Finally, I think it is important to stress that the influence and the interest of the Soviet Union in Africa goes far back beyond the emergence of the Communist Party in Russia. Peter the Great sent a Russian fleet to Madagascar. The Russians were deeply involved in Ethiopia in the late 19th century. A lot of their motivations for involvement there were very similar to their present motivations, and that is to do what they could to counter the influence and the

power of those Nations who were most influential in the world at that time.

So they do have a body of experience which I think we have underestimated, that they are actually studying, and they are using, I think, to improve their ability to deal with the southern African situation.

Of course, the South African Communist Party, which the Soviets completely dominate, is one of the oldest Communist Parties in the world. And so their experience in southern Africa since the taking of power in 1917, is somewhat reflected in this organization.

Finally, I think it is important to stress that the Soviets' interest there are, to a very significant extent, strategic, and to some extent what is happening in Africa is that it is being used as a kind of testing ground for developing a strategy to deal with an area very, very far from its periphery. I think that is one of the most important reasons for studying this, and one of the great values of this hearing.

We have been able to study things in Latin America, which is very close to us, but here is an area that is very, very far from the Soviet periphery.

Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Which perhaps has something to do with the development of their tremendous maritime fleet, both so-called merchant and military. This brings to mind the fact that we became involved in fighting that kind of Communist extension in Korea and in Vietnam, contiguous to their continental land masses. Hopefully, our relations with China are somewhat improved. Now we find ourselves dealing in our own back yard in Latin America. An interesting situation, to say the least.

On page 2 of your statement, you refer to three relatively new Soviet governmental structures organized specifically to deal with that area of the world.

Would you describe in greater detail these structures and their significance to our understanding of the Soviet commitment there?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, actually, I think some people might quarrel with how relatively new they are, but I think it is important to note that there is a specific section of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the African Institute section, which deals with liberation——

Senator DENTON. The Afghanistan section?

Dr. VANNEMAN. The African Institute section, which deals with so-called liberation questions. So they have a specific organization within their highest academic body that deals with this.

Of course, that body is headed by--the African Institute itself is headed by the son of the Foreign Minster, indicating, I think, the significance of their interest in that area. So they have, in other words, a direct line to the Politburo. It is a rather informal line, but it certainly is a direct line. There is also a specific section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that deals with southern Africa, which has been enlarging, but growing.

In the Soviet intelligence operation, one of the largest propaganda sections deals with southern Africa. I think that is extremely significant, that they have such a large operation devoted to progaganda within their intelligence operations devoted to this faraway area.

The actual coordinating of policy, I did not mention too much here, because we get into various Sovietological debates, but basically it is run by the international department of the Communist Party, headed by Mr. Ponomarev, who is in relatively frequent contact with the ANC and SWAPO people. I have heard of transcripts of his conversations with them, and he constantly, in his speeches, refers to the relations of the international department, and of himself personally with the leaders of these organizations.

Senator DENTON. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, how would you characterize the benefit to the Soviet Union of instability and turmoil in southern Africa and elsewhere in the world, for comparison?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, I think that from a tactical point of view, Soviet influence is enhanced, because their basic strength within these movements is within the military wings of these groups, and so any instability, of course, enhances the value of the military wing to these organizations, and therefore strengthens Soviet influence, because the Soviets are training these people and are providing weapons for them, and the whole organization then tends to be affected.

Senator DENTON. That brings up what appears to me to be a blank spot in the understanding of the American people, and perhaps of the American press, as a general rule, and that is the need for us, if we are to preserve the interest of the people in those regions, as well as our own interest, to counteract that advantage which the Soviet Union would otherwise have, of being sole supplier of the weapons, which in turn would determine the issues.

Therefore, we have to deal in similar terms. This is not a very pure way to deal, but it is, I am afraid, a necessary way to deal in many parts of the world. Is that a generally true statement, from your point of view?

Dr. VANNEMAN. I certainly think that that should at least be one arm of our foreign policy.

Senator DENTON. How do you see the instability and turmoil in southern Africa inuring to the benefit of the United States, or to the countries therein?

Dr. VANNEMAN. I must say, I completely agree with Dr. Crocker, that instability benefits no one, other than the Soviet Union, it does not benefit the frontline States, it does not benefit South Africa, it does not benefit even these movements themselves.

Senator DENTON. In your research, sir, have you come across any information which clearly associates SWAPO and the ANC with the international Communist movement?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Yes, I have. There is considerable information readily available. It is nothing secret, and I think most scholars in this field generally agree that there is a close association.

I have quite a few documents which I will make available to your staff when these hearings are complete.

Senator DENTON. Would you accede to submitting those documents in this hearing, to be considered part of the record?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Yes.

Senator DENTON. They shall be so submitted.[1]

Dr. VANNEMAN. The Russians themselves acknowledge that they have very close relationships with SWAPO, and as I mentioned before, when the head of the international department of the party writes about Africa, which he does very frequently, he always acknowledges the close relations between SWAPO and the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. Do you have Soviet and other Communist literature which supports the connection between SWAPO, the ANC, and the Soviet Union?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Yes, I do, which I can also make available.

Senator DENTON. I recommend that you offer them for submission for the record.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I think that is extremely important, to show it from the other side.

Senator DENTON. They shall be included as a record of this hearing.[2]

Would you say that Soviet influence in southern Africa, in general, is escalating or decreasing?

Dr. VANNEMAN. I think it is gradually growing.

I would agree with Dr. Crocker, that it is up and down, that it has been up and down over the past few years, but I think if you look at it, particularly over the last decade, it is very gradually increasing, and I might point to two things in my paper, which I think indicate the kinds of ways that it grows over the past year, for example.

We find that the Russians have placed a new drydock to service their fleet in Mozambique. It is a rather large drydock, and it will service light cruisers, so this is a part of a process of expanding facilities that can service their fleet.

Some people think that is not very dramatic evidence, but it is the kind of bit by bit, what the Russians would call salami tactics by which they gradually increase their influence.

Another drydock has been put into Luanda, which is the capital city of Angola. All of this within the last 6 months. So we find that

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[1] The documents were subsequently received and are included as exhibits E through R in the appendix to this hearing.

The first four documents (exhibits E through H) are speeches delivered by ranking members of SWAPO in the Soviet Union, Zambia, and Angola. These documents demonstrate the relationship between SWAPO and the international Communist movement and provide evidence of the extent to which Marxist/Leninist ideology has been accepted by SWAPO leaders.

Exhibits I, J, and K consist of extracts from "The African Communist," the official quarterly magazine of the South African Communist Party. These extracts describe the relationship between the SACP and the international Communist movement and the history of the relationship between the SACP, the ANC, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

The next inserts (exhibits L through Q) are extracts from "Sechaba," the official organ of the ANC, which demonstrate the intimate ideological and structural relationship between the ANC, the SACP, and the international Communist movement.

The final insert (exhibit R) is an extract from vol. 11. No. 1, 1981, of "New Perspectives", the journal of the Communist front organization, the World Peace Council, which is published in the German Democratic Republic. "New Perspectives" is sponsored by the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council, whose membership includes Alfred Nzo of the ANC and SACP: Yusuf Dadoo, vice president of the ANC and chairman of the SACP; and Oliver R. Tambo, president of the ANC.

[2] The documents submitted are included as exhibits S, T, and U in the appendix to this hearing.

with two new drydocks, their ability to service the Soviet fleet in southern Africa has increased significantly in the last half year.

Also, the Russians have been deploying some of the most advanced antiaircraft missile devices in their entire arsenal in this area, and normally they are very cautious about deploying this kind of sophisticated equipment. It normally indicates a real quantum step in their interest in the area. I think that is rather significant.

Senator DENTON. Is it true that the relatively sophisticated SAM-6 has been deployed there?

Dr. VANNEMAN. My best evidence is that that is correct.

Senator DENTON. I dare say that it would be evident to you and to any student of strategy that the issue which you brought up, namely, the study being given in the Soviet Union to operations of an assimilative nature, let us call it, taking place in areas far from their shores, would include their perception of the tremendous advantage to be gained from major ship servicing facilities in the area of Mozambique. The water around the Horn is now an extremely important part of the liquid terrain, if you can call it that, liquid real estate of the world. I am not so sure that they are not already ahead of us in their capacities for exercising control in that area.

In the first paragraph, you refer to an address made by Brezhnev before the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 1981. Is there special significance attached to this address?

Dr. VANNEMAN. The fact that it is such an important foreign policy document, the Congress, unlike our Congress, only meets once every 5 years, and it is the Congress of the party, and the address of the head of the party who controls the party is, of course, the most significant document probably in the Soviet political system.

Senator DENTON. How would you assess the degree of influence of the Soviet Union over ANC and over SWAPO? In your opinion, is the Soviet influence increasing or decreasing with respect to ANC?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, as Dr. Crocker said, the political scientists—he is now a Government official, but I am still a political scientist, we get very excited about what is influence and how do you define influence. I am not going to get into that here.

I wrote out a little statement which I think deals with this. I think it is important to say that the Soviets have substantial influence in both the ANC and SWAPO. But they do not completely control them, and as you pointed out, very correctly, in your opening statement, they do control, however, the SACP, the South African Communist Party.

The South African Communist Party has many officials in high policy circles of ANC, and I can provide you with a chart showing who these people are.

[The chart referred to by Dr. Vanneman follows:]

ANC : NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC)

		POSITION IN NEC	SACP	SACTU	UMKHONTO WE SIZWE	WPC	AAPSO
1.	Oliver TAMBO	President			●	●	
2.	Yusuf DADOO	Vice President	●		●	●	
3.	Alfred NZO	Secretary General	●		●	●	●
4.	Dan TLOOME	Deputy Secretary General	●				
5.	Thomas NKOBI	Treasurer General					
6.	Joe MODISE	Chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe	○		●		
7.	Joe SLOVO	Deputy Chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe	●		●		
8.	Josiah JELE	Director of International Affairs				●	
9.	Sizakele SIGXASHE	Director of Information and Publicity	○		●		
10.	Reginald SEPTEMBER	Member	●		●		
11.	Thabo MBEKI	Chief of Political Department					
12.	Moses MABHIDA	Member	●	●	●		
13.	Stephen DLAMINI	Member	●	●			
14.	Hector [illegible]	Member	●				
15.	John [illegible]ADI[illegible]	Member	●	●			
16.	Henry MAKGOTHI	Member	○		●		
17.	Jacob ZUMA	Member	○		●		
18.	Robert MANCI	Member					
19.	Andrew MASONDO	Member					
20.	Mziwandile PILISO	Chief of Personell and Security	●			●	●
21.	Edward DILINGA	Refugee problems	○				
22.	Simon Sipho MAKANA	Information processing					

Dr. VANNEMAN. But historically, there has been a considerable conflict between these two organizations. Much of this, ironically, has resulted from bad advice that they have received from Moscow. Here again, certain ineptitude in the field on the part of certain officials.

The ANC and SWAPO are also divided, as we pointed out. There are factions in each organization and, as I pointed out before, the Kremlin tends to dominate the military wings of both organizations.

There is also, and I think this is important, and it goes to the question of whether influence is increasing or decreasing. There is also strong evidence that Moscow's influence is growing among the younger people, particularly in the ANC. This is inconclusive, but we have some interesting evidence on it.

There is an old saying that the person that pays the piper controls him. I am not sure that that is completely true, but of course, as we have seen ANC and SWAPO get almost all of their funding, particularly for the military side of it, from Moscow.

There seems to be an indication that the older, more established people in the ANC are more resistant to Moscow's influence. So that is another division that I think is important.

Also, when you study what each side says about each other, you realize, just as in all political situations, that there are groups within the Soviet experts who deal with this, who think that both organizations are relatively inept, and that it is going to be a long road.

On the other hand, there are those groups within SWAPO and ANC who feel very much the same about the Soviets.

Senator DENTON. In some ways it would appear to me that in Africa we have a group of people who feel that they have very justifiable reasons for seeking change and that they will deal with either side, to a degree, in trying to achieve those changes. This becomes very complex when you get the Soviet Union involved. The Soviet Union is no more interested in how those people end up in terms of real advantages, which is attested to by all of Eastern Europe, by all of Southeast Asia, by any other place where they have been, and perhaps been kicked out, such as in Egypt. Yet, by the time these people or groups realize that the Soviet Union, in giving them help, actually succeeded in gobbling them up, it is too late.

I wonder if that is part of our difficulty in dealing with the area? We do not want to characterize the individuals or groups as bad, but we want to show the tremendous, dire danger from their point of view, as well as from ours, of their getting entangled permanently with the Soviet Union or with its surrogates.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I think that is an important point to make, and I think, in a sense, that is what Senator East was driving at, also, when he was questioning Dr. Crocker.

I think it is important to reiterate what Dr. Crocker reiterated, that is Soviet economic aid has been really disastrous. That is one of our main levers there, our trade, our aid, our investments. They just do not do that very well, and increasingly, I think the Africans are becoming more aware of that.

I would like to make a further point, and that has to do with the increasing skill of the Soviets in dealing with this. Obviously they read our papers, they know that people, like Dr. Crocker and myself are saying these kinds of things, and I thought it was very interesting that he mentioned, through your questioning of him, this new Soviet pact with the Angolans.

People are going around saying that the Russians never give significant aid to these countries. But here, at a critical moment in the negotiations, and only Dr. Crocker can tell you how critical it was, they come forward with two major pacts, economic pacts.

One, a 10-year economic and cooperation agreement, and the other a 5-year trade economic and technical cooperation accord. So they come forward with very sophisticated and very complex pacts, right in the middle of the negotiations, which Dr. Crocker is carrying on, that is the kinds of sophistication that I think is reflected in the new kinds of people that they have dealing with this situation.

Senator DENTON. You mentioned how people read our papers, and from them and television and magazines get their perceptions of issues. We are being attacked now for monetary investment in Latin America. They are talking about the alleged effort to influence the Nicaraguan Government with something like $19 million. I have no idea whether that is true or not.

But in looking at the treaties, I cannot understand why the central body of our media does not see things like this. [Holds up chart.]

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
($ IN MILLIONS)



Now, this [pointing] is security assistance to Latin America, in millions of dollars, but this is 600 million up here, the broken line is the United States; the solid line is the Soviet Union.

I cannot understand why that chart, which did happen to be reprinted in the Birmingham News, was not reprinted in the Washington Post, for example, instead of the headline "U.S. proof about war in Vietnam, original proof questioned." Why is there so much emphasis on our efforts to do something about security assistance in Latin America, when this chart reflects the truth. I might also add that something similar to this chart exists for Africa as well, but I have not asked for the numbers as yet.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I really do not know the numbers myself, Senator, but I know in that particular area, the sophistication of the Soviet equipment being provided, is extraordinary.

Senator DENTON. This economic and technical aid agreement that the Soviet Union signed with Angola in February of this year, what impact do you ascribe to it, with respect to Soviet influence in Angola and southern Africa?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, I think, first of all, it represents a major effort to sabotage the efforts of Dr. Crocker in that area.

Second, I think it represents a major effort to strengthen the hand of those who are inside the Angolan Government, who are most pro-Soviet. There has been a lot of evidence of a real power struggle within the Angolan system, and this Soviet aid enhances the influence of those who are more likely to be pro-Soviet.

Senator DENTON. Would you care to say anything about your perspective on Soviet strategic interests in southern Africa?

Dr. VANNEMAN. It is my feeling that those are their primary considerations, strategic interests. I think that is why they have these drydocks there. I think you might be able to categorize them very quickly, in maybe four categories.

You might say they are primarily concerned to enhance their influence in the Indian Ocean, in order to, first of all, put pressure on us—this may sound a little strange, but in the Middle East area particularly, I think a lot of people forget, for example, that during the Ethiopian conflict, Cuban troops flew all the way from Angola, the crack, battle-hardened troops there, across Mozambique, and then north to Ethiopia. So, in other words, what is happening in southern Africa is intimately related to what is happening in the Middle East, and in the oil regions.

They are trying to, I think, put pressure on us, all up and down the oil routes, from the beginning, all the way around the whole littoral of Africa. In fact, they have 23 different fishing agreements with countries around the littoral, which also provides services for their fleet.

Senator DENTON. Perhaps it is not coincidental, and this is not to interrupt but to piggyback on what you just said. You mentioned the oil route; it is not coincidental that around the tip of Africa is one route and through the Panama Canal is another.

The contemporary events in Angola and Mozambique, and those in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and in Panama, where a pro-Soviet Union man has just taken over the national guard are not unrelated events. Somehow I wish that the possibility that they are not unrelated events were understood by our media, and understood by

our people, because these are the facts we are dealing with in terms of survival.

Being a Sovietologist, do you have any comment on that?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, I am not one of those people who believe that everything is absolutely related, but I think there is definitely a pattern here, that there is unusual coordination in the Soviet system between their different agencies.

Senator DENTON. Would you describe the relationships between Cuba, East Germany, and the other Warsaw Pact countries with the Soviet Union, regarding Soviet activities' interests in southern Africa? Also, in what way are the resources of these countries, surrogate countries, utilized to Soviet advantage?

Dr. VANNEMAN. Well, I think, again, I would like to emphasize that the main advantage to the Soviet Union is their strategic interests are enhanced by whatever contacts they have in southern Africa.

The Cubans, and the East Germans, of course, have some of their own individual interests. They are varied, as Dr. Crocker suggested. We hear all kinds of things. We hear that some of the East German interest is related to the Soviets guaranteeing them extra oil supplies. We know that the East Germans are interested in expanding their international recognition as much as possible. So whatever they can do down there sometimes enhances their status among African States.

The Cubans have other interests. Of course, that is one of the main ways that the Cubans can get their enormous Soviet subsidy, is to do—is to fight with and for the Soviets in a sense, in southern Africa. So it is a very, very complex question, Senator.

Senator DENTON. It is. But, sir, if you were an average Cuban citizen, and I have studied that, I do not wish to compare myself with you as a political scientist, but I was there during and after the Cuban missile crisis, and have been somewhat fascinated by the skill, or lack of skill with which we have dealt with Cuba over the years.

Could you conceive it to be in the interest of the average Cuban citizen, relatively informed, with the catastrophe that has occurred to the Cuban economy, would it occur to him that he should continue to go after Soviet subsidies, to the extent of traveling across the ocean to Africa to fight, when the overall trend in Cuba economically is down? I do not see how this will reflect the will of any sane, much less, informed citizen in Cuba.

Dr. VANNEMAN. And beyond that, even dying in Africa.

Senator DENTON. Right.

Dr. VANNEMAN. I think the average Cuban citizen would be shocked to realize how many Cubans have been killed in Africa.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you very much, Dr. Vanneman. We may be submitting additional questions to you also.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Vanneman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER VANNEMAN

SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN 1982:

SOME DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

In his major address to the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 1981, Leonid Brezhnev referred explicitly to southern Africa three separate times, not including two additional implicit references to the oil shipping lanes and the nonferrous metals and uranium in the area.[1] Thus as the new decade emerged, the leader of the Soviet Union committed his nation in the most authoritative fashion to expanding involvement in southern Africa. While he provided no definitive description of the precise nature of the proposed activities, the broad outlines are emerging.

Southern Africa is not central to Soviet foreign policy, but it is important. Some analysts rank various areas of the world in order of importance to the USSR, which leaves the southern African region obviously behind Europe, Asia and the Middle East. What is needed is a framework for analysis which seeks to identify the relationships between Soviet activities in southern Africa and Soviet influence in other areas of the world. Simple geopolitical rankings are not very enlightening. The USSR is striving to enhance its influence in southern Africa not merely to affect events there but to influence events throughout the continent and the world. Its purpose is not merely to dominate the southern African region, but to utilize its influence there to enhance its influence elsewhere.

In other words, Soviet activities in the southern African region reflect that regime's concern with fashioning policies for areas far from its periphery which will maximize its global influence. As a global superpower the USSR must devise policies for far-flung areas which will augment its influence in areas of its vital interests throughout the world. The problem is to exploit local conflict to expand global, continental and regional influence.[2] This is, of course, the Soviet dilemma in all of the Third World, but southern Africa, like Latin America, is unusually far from its border and this presents peculiar problems.

The southern African region is particularly important to the USSR as a testing ground for refining its power projection capability, which is an increasingly vital and relatively new element of its forward policy of coercive diplomacy.[3] For example, the new Soviet drydock in Mozambique reflects the gradual expansion of facilities to service its fleet.

Personnel and Policy: The New Thrust in Soviet Policies

The intensity of the continuing long range interest of the USSR in southern Africa is indicated by the creation of three relatively new governmental structures organized specifically to deal with that area of the world. There is a special section of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences that deals with "liberation questions," and the largest section of INU, a department of the KGB (Soviet intelligence) dealing with propaganda, is the one for southern Africa. Finally, one of the three sections of the Soviet foreign ministry dealing with Africa focuses exclusively on southern Africa.

In 1981 the Kremlin sent a new cadre of diplomats to the southern African region of a calibre and experience which did not exist in the early sixties, when Moscow first ventured into Africa on a significant scale.

New Soviet Diplomats in Southern Africa, 1981

Country	Diplomat	Position and Experience
Zambia	Vladimir Cherednik	Ambassador* Deputy Chief, Dept of International Economic Affairs, USSR Foreign Ministry; Ambassador to Ghana
Zimbabwe	Georgi Ter-Gazaryants	Ambassador Ambassador to Senegal and Gambia (1973-81)
Mozambique	Valentin Vdovnin	Ambassador Intelligence, Laos 1972-74 Intelligence, Chad 1965-69

* Cherednik, who replaced Vasily Solodovnikov, former head of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is an expert on international economics, particularly as it relates to Africa, while his predecessor specialized in development economics.

The embassy in tiny, underdeveloped Botswana immediately adjacent to South Africa mushroomed to include a staff of over 50 persons, headed by a highly professional official, Nikolai Petrov. The embassies of Mozambique and Angola each have staffs of over 100 officials.

From 1976 to 1981 Vasily Solodovnikov, former head of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the premier Soviet African expert, served as ambassador to Zambia and as the regime's chief policy "spokesman" in the area. Policy is always "made" in Moscow, which is one reason why he was replaced at the Africa Institute by Anatoly Gromyko, son of Andrei Gromyko, a member of the ruling Politburo and long-time Foreign Minister - a further symbol of increasing interest in Africa at the highest levels of the Soviet government. On Gromyko's arrival the staff of the Africa Institute was strengthened by the addition of six policy specialists, transforming it from a predominantly development-oriented think tank to one more concerned with strategic policy.

In a related personnel shift reflecting a new emphasis in Soviet policy toward southern Africa, Solodovnikov was replaced in Zambia by Vladimir Cherednik, an expert on international economics, especially as it relates to Africa. Solodovnikov was a specialist in development economics; Cherednik had been Deputy Chief of the Department of International Economic Affairs of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The specialists, in both Moscow and Africa, assigned to plan and manage policy in southern Africa mirror the new thrust of Soviet policy toward strategic and international economic concerns and away from developmental and ideological concerns.

The Soviet outposts in southern Africa in the 1980s and the African bureaucracies in Moscow are now manned by experienced specialists of a calibre that did not even exist during the USSR's first major forays into Africa 20 years ago.

Military Assistance: The Cornerstone of Soviet Policy

Another indication of Soviet interest in southern Africa is the quantity of heavy equipment and the number of advisers supplied to states in the area.

Prepositioned Soviet Heavy Weaponry in Southern Africa

Country	Fighter Aircraft	Tanks	Armored Cars	Armored Personnel Carriers	Medium Artillery
Botswana			30*		
Angola	41	264	300	412	550
Mozambique	24	195	200	300	128
Zimbabwe	20	38	109	20	59
Zambia	50	30	65	46	1
Tanzania	56	135	30	100	194

* Purchased

The cornerstone of Soviet policy in southern Africa is supplying arms, advisers and training to its clients - whether they be nations or insurgents - in order to destabilize the area.[4] Instability enhances its grip on its client. The weapons bolster the clients' defenses, which improves their ability to provide sanctuaries for insurgents, which invites raids against insurgent bases. As the Kremlin knows, instability tends to enhance its influence at the expense of Western initiatives like that in Namibia. Going further, weapons stockpiles could ultimately serve as sources of prepositioned hardware for Soviet/proxy power projection. The weapons sales also provide hard currency for the sagging Soviet economy (approximately 10 percent of its foreign exchange) which enhances the influence of the Soviet military-industrial complex in policy circles.

Soviet African Policy in the Seventies: Success or Failure?

Some African states have courted the USSR then rejected it, and Soviet influence in others has declined markedly. In southern Africa the Soviets have found the insurgents unexpectedly intractable. However, since the Portuguese coup in 1974 four African states have declared themselves Marxist-Leninist (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Congo-Brazzaville), one calls itself a socialist-revolutionary state (Benin), one (Madagascar) adopted a Charter of Socialist Revolution, and eleven are designated by the USSR as progressive. According to Moscow the "progressive" states, or those demonstrating a "socialist orientation" are: Algeria, the Congo, Guinea, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, and Malagasy (Madagascar).[5] In 1977 Boris Ponomarev, a major figure in the African decisionmaking process, exulted that thirty per cent (30%) of African territory and

twenty-five per cent (25%) of the population were now "states of a socialist orientation".[6]

The Kremlin is also pleased with the impact of its African initiatives in international organizations. Fifteen African states voted to condemn the Franco-Belgium action in Zaire at the OAU meeting in Khartoum in 1978, thus opposing Western efforts to repel an invasion from Angola. In the United Nations one Soviet pamphlet noted that three of the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 14 of 15 on the Economic and Social Council and 12 of 15 in the Coordinating Bureau of the non-aligned movement were African states.[7]

Clearly this has buoyed Soviet interest in southern Africa and emboldened the USSR to embark on a more forward policy there. The wide-ranging tour of southern Africa by President Podgorny in the spring of 1977 followed by the visit to Angola of Party Secretary Kirilenko[8] in December 1977, as well as the extensive tour of East German President Honecker in February 1979 further reflect the growing Soviet interest.

The Soviet gains are substantial when compared to its position after the Congo debacle in the early sixties; however, one should not overstate the Soviet successes. According to their own calculations there are only ten communist parties in Africa, and only two in southern Africa, Lesotho and South Africa, the latter being an exile party.[9] Although 11 of the 50 or so African states are likely at present to support some form of Soviet/Cuban intervention, nearly three times that number are likely to oppose it. In addition the Soviets did suffer serious setbacks in the seventies. Guinea has vacillated in and out of the Soviet camp; and the Sudan and Somalia evicted the Soviets completely. Thus the USSR lost its major base in Africa at Berbera in Somalia and has suffered restrictions on the use of naval and air facilities at Conakry in Guinea.

Nevertheless it should be emphasized that Soviet failures in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia involved governments firmly entrenched in power; unlike Mozambique and Angola which relied heavily on Soviet help to seize and retain power, and which are avowedly Marxist. In addition, the Soviets now regularly fly naval reconnaisance from Aden and Luanda instead of Berbera and Conakry. They have a fleet serviced at Luanda, a dry dock at Maputo and have towed the Berbera dry dock to the Dahlak Islands.

Zimbabwe: Debacle or Near Run Thing?

The Soviet failures in Africa are partly attributable to the inherent difficulty of influencing both leaders of newly independent states and insurgents seeking power; but they are also the result of incompetence in the field. Of course, in southern Africa the USSR backed Joshua Nkomo against the victorious Robert Mugabe. A similar incident had occurred previously in Angola where the Soviets withdrew support from Augustino Neto in favor of Daniel Chipenda from 1973-74, only restoring it (admittedly in a massive fashion) in 1975 just prior to Neto's victory.

Zimbabwe provides some specific illustrations of Communist incompetence. For example, shortly before Mugabe's victory the East Germans told several leaders of his party (ZANU) that they regarded ZANU as a "splinter group".[10] At approximately the same time, before discussing aid the East Germans attempted to persuade ZANU to sign a document denouncing the Chinese invasion of Vietnam; until then China had been ZANU's chief source of arms.[11] The Russians demonstrated their ineptness in handling ZANU when in return for a few arms they demanded a written statement from Mugabe recognizing his rival Nkomo as leader of the insurgents.[12] Their inability to control even their own client, Nkomo, was exposed when he refused to support their plan to thwart international recognition of the interim Muzorewa government.[13]

To put things in perspective it is important to neither overestimate Soviet successes nor exaggerate Soviet incompetence. After all, virtually no one foresaw the extent of Mugabe's influence. Even the leaders of the Frontline states, Kaunda and Nyerere, backed Nkomo until very near the end of the struggle. The Kremlin did devise a masterplan to install its client as the war came to a close. For Moscow "victory" in Zimbabwe was much closer than most analyses suggest.[14] In any case, it appears that the Soviets have dispatched a new, more experienced cadre of diplomats to redress its mistakes.

The Russian Tsar and the South African Communist Party

There are two other significant, but little discussed reasons why one should not discount Soviet prospects in southern Africa too quickly. First, the South African Communist Party is the oldest in Africa; and second, the Russian Tsar was in-

volved in southern Africa during the nineteenth century for many of the same reasons that the USSR is today, thus the Soviets have an extensive body of experience to draw on which has been considerably underestimated.[15]

To buttress its claims as a naval power and to help mitigate the influence of those empires which opposed it - first the Ottomans, then the English - the Russian Tsars sought naval facilities along the East African littoral. Peter the Great sent an expedition to Madagascar in the early 18th century and a large contingent of Russian advisers were active in aiding the Ethiopian emperor against the Italians in the late nineteenth century.

To diminish British global influence Russian "volunteers" served with the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War and plotted to stir up a native rebellion in the early twentieth century. For similar reasons the Bolsheviks founded the South African Communist Party.

Early Soviet directives to the South African Communist Party provide numerous examples of ineptitude in the field. The crude ideological approach of the early Bolsheviks conditioned them to view the treatment of miners as a paradigm of the exploited society ripe for subversion and revolution. Only whites were SACP members and at Moscow's direction, the SACP supported the creation of native reserves. Thus while the influence of the SACP in the ANC has increased considerably in the past two decades, that influence has always been retarded by the ANC's early experience with the SACP.

Nevertheless the Kremlin continued its involvement in a variety of activities in the Union of South Africa prior to World War II. This body of experience is much underestimated. In a sense, Soviet experience with the Republic of South Africa is far greater than with those Marxist-Leninist states to the north of the Republic where Soviet influence is predominant.

The Cautious Kremlin and Power Projection

Contrary to some considerable rhetoric the USSR has displayed extraordinary caution in Africa. When threatened by Henry Kissinger, it twice halted its airlift to its Angolan clients in 1976, until the US Congress emasculated American efforts.[16]

In 1978 in Ethiopia, its massive involvement only followed clear indications that United States policy extended exclusively to helping Somalia defend itself. Its mixed successes and failures have probably reinforced the USSR's innate caution; but the Angolan and Ethiopian episodes provided invaluable experience in tailoring and orchestrating long-range power projection exercies to a variety of circumstances.[17]

What is clear is that the Soviet leadership now believes that on balance its African policy of the seventies has proved successful, and that despite some reverses the USSR should press forward whenever cost/risks and benefits warrant it, especially given its new capacity to intervene or threaten to intervene at an appropriate force level with the appropriate combination of proxies. As one of the regime's leading spokesmen on the developing world put it:

> "On the whole, the course of events has confirmed that the tendency toward a socialist orientation arises from amidst the liberation struggle of the peoples of Africa and is reproduced again and again - despite a great many difficulties, and sometimes even temporary defeats. The circle of countries with such an orientation has widened, and in a number of other countries the positions of revolutionary, democratic forces have been strengthened...."[18]

FOOTNOTES

1 Leonid Brezhnev, Report to the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, February 23, 1981, (Pravda and Izvestia, February 24, 1981, pp 2-9, complete text) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XXXII , No 8, p 3-12.

On Angola Brezhnev declared: "Together with other fraternal countries, we also help to strengthen the defense capability of liberated states, if they ask that we do so. This was the case, for example, in Angola and Ethiopia. Attempts were made to do away with the people's revolutions in these countries by encouraging internal counterrevolutions or outside aggression. We are against the export of revolution, and we cannot agree to the export of counterrevolution." p 7.

On Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa Brezhnev declared: "The birth of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the growing intensity of the liberation struggle in Namibia - and now in the Republic of South Africa as well - are graphic evidence that the rule of 'classical' colonialists and racists is nearing an end." p 8.

In his third reference Brezhnev listed the new treaties of "friendship" among which were Angola and Mozambique.

The reference to the Cape oil route argued that: "... the story of a 'Soviet threat' to the oil wealth of the Middle East or to the oil shipping lanes is being spread. This is a deliberately false story ..." p 10.

The reference to the mineral wealth of Southern Africa argued that: "The monopolies need other people's oil, uranium and nonferrous metals - so, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean are declared spheres of the United States 'vital interests'." p 10.

2 Undermining Western influence indirectly through the Third World is the central idea of Lenin's doctrine of imperialism, one of the most enduring Soviet ideological tenets. See V I Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Sochinenia (works) Vol XXXI (Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin, 1950, 4th ed) pp 123-7.

3 On Soviet coercive diplomacy see three articles by Peter Vanneman and Martin James: "Soviet Coercive Diplomacy: Saudi Arabia," Soviet Aerospace Almanac of Air Force Magazine, March 1981, p 119; "Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa in the 1980s: The Rise of Coercive Diplomacy," South Africa International, July 1981, p 261; and "Moscow Has a Rapid Deployment Force Too", Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday, 27 January 1981, p 23.

There is nothing new about the coercive aspects of Soviet foreign policy. Historically both Tsarist Russia and the USSR have owed much of their international influence to military prowess. See Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," in Russia, No 1, 1981, p 15. Since 1944 the USSR has utilized its military power 158 times in a coercive manner to compel a country to act according to Moscow's wishes or to deter an antagonist from certain behavior. See Stephen S Kaplan, Diplomacy or Power: The Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Brookings Institute, 1981. The Soviet armed forces were used this way in the Third World 28 times between 1967 and 1976, and 7 times in sub-Saharan Africa. See James M McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force," Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb, 1979, p 20. What is new is the increasing ability to tailor and orchestrate the use of force to a particular situation in a fashion that is below the threshold of superpower or great power intervention, thus minimizing costs and risks. The major ingredients of this capability are rapid deployment, proxy forces and pre-positioned weaponry. Just having this capability imparts influence, especially in regions like southern Africa or the Horn of Africa where it has been demonstrated.

The USSR announced its forward policy in the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution: "The USSR's foreign policy is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for building communism, supporting the ... struggle for national liberation ... and implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence ..." (Chapter 4; article 28), Pravda, 8 October 1977, p 3 (emphasis author's). In short detente and local wars are compatible; this is the loophole in detente. This is perhaps the most militant foreign policy declaration in any constitution in the world.

The importance of the Constitution was underlined by Brezhnev in his address to the 1981 Party Congress: "The new USSR Constitution proclaims ... mutual assistance with socialist countries to be the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy," Pravda, 24 February 1981, op cit note 1, p 5. The leading ideologue on the ruling Soviet Politburo, the late Mikhail Suslov, presaged the Constitution's announcement in 1976 in the Party's major theoretical journal; see "The Communist Movement in the Vanguard of the Struggle for Peace and Social and International Liberation," Kommunist, 11 September 1975, p 5: "No one seeks to deny that the Soviet Union ... renders material assistance to the Angolan people and its vanguard, the MPLA. As for the contention ... that this policy does not accord with the spirit of detente, it only testifies to a false understanding of the meaning of detente ..." Brezhnev reiterated this in the Party Congress in 1981.

4 In southern Africa this is called the "doctrine of superior weapons". It is the ex post facto ideological rationalization for a new more militaristic approach which was first stated explicitly in a TASS press

release in August 1978. See TASS Report, Moscow, 26 August 1978 in BBC Monitor Service, 30 August 1978, SU/4903/A5/1.

Its distinctive feature is the close correspondence to a new trend in radical African thought stressing the importance of military strength, or "superior weapons" in the liberation struggle. Both the Soviets and radical Africans emphasize that the value of "superior Soviet arms" for overthrowing imperialism has been demonstrated in Angola and Ethiopia. Imperialism is usually identified as NATO and South Africa. The new doctrine calls for a "fighting" band of progressive nationalists led by the communists. Clearly, this appears to be the ideological underpinning of a policy which has finally crystallized.

After the successes of the Angolan and Ethiopian interventions, this doctrine, which has been debated by radical African leaders for some time, appeared more realistic and attractive. For example, reports indicate that Nelson Mandela, the leader of one South African radical group, the ANC, found himself in a small minority opposing his younger followers, who supported the "superior weapons" doctrine of the Soviets. In other words, Mandela declined to identify with the USSR, while the young radicals readily acknowledged its leadership. See Colin Legum, "The African Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Vol 57, no 3, 1978.

5 History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR (in Russian), Moscow, 1979, p 147.

6 B Ponomarev, "The World Historical Significance of the Great October Revolution," Kommunist, No 17, November 1977, p 42. See also Robert H Donaldson, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, Westview Press, 1981, for a collection of essays attempting to define the concepts of failure and success.

7 L A Alexseyev, "Africa: Struggle for Political and Economic Liberation" (Moscow, Znanie, 1978), p 7.

8 Kirilenko is regarded as Brezhnev's most likely successor, and heads the powerful national security committee of the ruling Politburo.

9 Anatoly Gromyko, "Tendencies of Development of the Working Class in African Countries", The Working Class and the Contemporary World, No 5, September-October 1978, p 115.

10 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, Faber, 1981, p 266.

11 David Smith, and Colin Simpson, Mugabe, Sphere, 1981, p 116.

12 Ibid, p 88.

13 Martin and Johnson, op cit, p 306.

14 Ibid, pp 305-308.

15 See Edward T Wilson, Russia and Black Africa Before World War II, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1974.

16 On Angola, see Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Intervention in Angola," Strategic Review, Summer 1976, reprinted in the African Environment monograph for U S Armed Forces Staff College.

17 On Ethiopia, see Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Intervention on the Horn of Africa," Policy Review, Summer 1978.

18 R. Ulyanovsky, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Party Central Committee in the Party's leading theoretical journal, "On Countries of a Socialist Orientation," Kommunist, no 11, 1979, p 30.

Senator DENTON. This hearing has served to establish the foundation for our further inquiries into the terrorism issue, which will be examined in the subsequent hearings.

This hearing stands in recess. The subcommittee will continue the examination of these issues in more detail on Wednesday, March 24, 1982, when our witnesses will be two former members of the African National Congress, who were trained in the Soviet Union and in East Germany.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

South West Africa People's Organisation

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

~~P. O. Box 377~~
~~Telephone 74092 Ext. 2~~
~~LUSAKA~~
~~ZAMBIA.~~

Ref. No. DS/HQ/202

P.O: Box 512
Tel: 21862
Lubango
P.R.A.

29th April, 1978

The Command Post
People's Liberation Army of Namibia
Cassinga - PRA.

Dear Comrade,

Attached please find the list of the comrades from USSR. They are twenty (20) in number and led by Kanana and Chikoka.

Yours in Arms.

M.Mupopiwa.

Chief Administrative Officer
SWAPO Defence Headquarters
LUBANGO - P.R.A

THE COMMANDING HQ,
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF NAMIBIA,
CASSINGA,
26 th AUGUST,1977.

Ref No. RX HF 11/8.

THE REPRESENTATIVE,
SWAPO DEFENCE OFFICE,
LUBANGO.

Dear Comrade,

Receive our Revolutionary Greetings!

The Commanding HQ of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia hereby releases the comrades (four) requested for further studies in the Soviet Union:

1.	Kdinomwaameni	Tuhadeleni	Namuxuika
2.	Niiro	Taapopi	Kambwa ka Chilongo
3.	Justus	Itshi	Kwedhi
4.	John Iivula		Mbonjona.

The comrades have been handed over to the Secretary of SYL, comrade Tuli Hiveluah.

Wishing you the best during the celebration of the 11 th Annivery of the Armed Struggle in Namibia.

Remaining yours for the cause,

Dino Hamaambo.

Commander-of-the-Armed Forces.

(P.L.A.N.)

MOSCOW
14/12/1977.

From Soviet Union:

1.	Nestor	Shiwayu	Matimba
2.	Sebloh	Iiyambo	Mzee
3.	Johannes	Shimuleni	Artillery (Shindungul)
4.	Epafras	Ndaitwa	Denga
5.	Epafras	Munyangalala	Kaputu
6.	Soini	Shimwaafeni	Kaude Kamundjavela
7.	Absalom	Mhanda	Kafindeko
8.	Onesmus	Kakoto	Kakuva
9.	Lotto	Shihepo	Mbolongondjo
10.	Mapumba	Lucas	Mapumba
11.	Mupupa	Silas	Nairobi
12.	Nangolo	Moses	Kapalwa
13.	Niclaus	Paulus	Shikoko
14.	Kandume	Sam	Mawila
15.	Natanael	Paulus	Kapanya
16.	Joel	Iimene	Caboy
17.	Edwardt	Shitaleni	Eddy
18.	Hafeni	Hailonga	Hafeni
19.	Nashilundo	Daniel	Wandana Ndadi
20.	Phillimon	Nghishoono	
21.	Alweendo	Sacharia	
22.	Joseph	Andreas	
23.	Sem	Petrus	Mwandjai
24.	Johny	Elondo	John
25.	Nepando	Joseph	Nepando
26.	Manyundela	Lucas	Shoondela
27.	Marx	Paavo	Jogo Zet
28.	Shidolo	Matheus	Tate-okwati
29.	Nangolo	Ignatius	Mbango
30.	Kautwima	Thomas	Haulyondjamba
31.	Joseph	Aluvilu	Kanyenye
32.	Namhidi	Samwel	Ndilimani
33.	Tuyoleni	Erasmus	Nashingwe
34.	Hainyemba	Jesaya	Hainyemba
35.	Kapolo	Pineas	Kapolo
36.	John	Angula	Namuxwika

N.W.FRONT
VIETNAM
21.03.1978

LISTED LEFT FOR MOSCOW:-

1.	Linus	Iipinge	White
2.	Victoria	Mwaama	Mekondjo
3.	Petrus Sh.	Amukwa	Namunyalala
4.	Kanisius	Tobias	SWAPO
5.	Amukwa	Iitondoka	Tjaka
6.	Ashtilongo	Iitula	Kaunda
7.	Jonas	Trughot	Muzolowa Nyerere
8.	Sanale	Andreas	Kodnjashili
9.	Josef	Silas	Mahomato
10.	Nauha	Kambungá	Tukondjeni
11.	Paulus	Shoombe	Ndashindana
12.	Gabriel	Malakia	Niingonande
13.	Albertina	Abed	Mwetuxulika
14.	Shiweda	Matheus	Tuyenikumwe
15.	Mika	Paulinus	David Dingwana
16.	Otile	Uushéna	Bargol
17.	Teresia	Mateus	Tulimesindano
18.	Niigunde	Shinyemba	Sunny Kennedy
19.	Liina	Shikongo	Zambia
20.	Paulus	Toolu	Kavuva
21.	Nirika	Aimbodi	Nawila
22.	Brasius	Teofelus	Nakulwa
23.	Petrus	Immanuel	Mozambic
24.	Brasius	Negumbo	Adidas
25.	Naemi	Shimanda	Kauluma
26.	Nilokwa	Vilho	Nailwa
27.	VEronika	Nhata	Iipumbu
28.	Marta	Uusiku	Ndeyapo
29.	Ester	Johannes	Kamela
30.	Nakwiila	Shikwa	Power
31.	Johannes	Ekandjo	Kateyoilongo
32.	Irja	Iilonga	Zunila
33.	Joel	Kahima	Bazooka
34.	Oswin	Nepembe	Arm-Strong
35.	Johannes	Erasmus	Africa
36.	Abiatar	Angula	Swapo
37.	Titus	Iita	Keendawala
38.	Aipinge		

08 07 1977.
Cassinga CHQ

TO BE TRAINED IN RECONNAISSANCE & SABOTAGE , IN SOVIET UNION, MOSCOW.

1.	Benjamin	Hangombe	Shakoloka	Std VI Artl Engr
2.	Bonhard	Nangolo	Kawali	Std 3 Com Mk.
3.	Vilho	Kakololo	Nakulwa	II Com Mk.
4.	Filholm	Kayofa	Shingwalulu	III Com Mk.
5.	Nghalifavali	Nghishidimbwa	Kekongo	— Comm.
6.	Hestor	Kakonda	Haikuti	FORM III Master
7.	Filemon	Josua	Mbuiti	VI Eng.
8.	Valombveleni	Nghituwamhata	Haimbodi	Com Mk.
9.	Samuel	Festus	Mwaxilili	IV Motor.
10.	Timoteus	Vilho	Nairobi	VI Eng.

No Longer Valid
bai

25.7.1977.

GOING FOR MILITARY TRAINING IN SOVIET UNION:

1. David	Mbadeka	Kenyatta
2. Fransisko	Datipo	Matondo
3. Mikka	Absalom	China
4. Thiophilus	Festus	Ndjembo
5. Johannes	Shiweya	Kendambala
6. Salatiel	Shapuha	Shapuha
7. Leevi	Niinkoti	Akaambo
8. Andreas	Chrisdian	Shinyengu
9. Stephanus	Jonas	Swapo
10. Paulus	Simon	Manyami
11. Thignipo	Shanyenge	Domonufitu
12. Johny	Jacko	Stone Shambala
13. Elago	Makaya	Pelago
14. Jerry	Paulinus	Hamwaadi
15. Joseph	Festus	China
16. Stephanus	Joseph	Haindongo
17. Sackaria	Lazarus	Jackal
18. James	Mufita	Jimmy
19. Simon	Hamutenja	Judas
20. Vatileni	Mutundwa	Mudilo
21. Eliaser	Habhambo	Nandjembo
22. Ngenenye	Demweda	Mudilo
23. Amwaalwa	Shikonuenjo	Nombwangu
24. Jonas	Hailonga	Kushaka Neembulu
25. Nghidibo	Nghitwika	Ndjembo
26. Lucas	Shipiki	Shipiki
27. Michael	Shuudeni	Hand embo
28. Phillipus	Lucas	Kadula Haundo
29. Lucas	Eenghono	Captain Shilapeka
30. ~~Uraiwa~~	~~Mwatongwe~~	

..P.T.O...

31.	Frans	Hangula	Trouble Maker
32.	Petrus	Shimwofeleeni	Nehoma
33.	Matthew	Mushikonga	Kapanya
34.	Steyn	Kakola	Phillemm
35.	Thomas	Mwandingi	Ndohwa
36.	Clemence	Ausi ku	Apolbo
37.	Oiva	Haindjala	~~Kandali~~Kandali
38.	Daniel	Jonaas	M.G 25
39.	Robert	Amuya	Katoneka
40.	Andreas	Nango	Amupondbe
41.	Phillus	Naholo	Haikuti
42.	Jeremia	Abraham	Haikota
43.	Shipolo	Mwalundange	Nekwano
44.	Silas	Iyolela	Kambangala
45.	Vaino	Paulus	Mufita
46.	Joseph	Phillipus	Zulu
47.	Samuel	Nangaku	Hamulungu
48.	Mathias	Johannes	Zapo-Topi
49.	Paulus	Shikongo	Bonyo
50.	Johannes	Shipopyeni	Namuxwika.

(Total: 50)

51.	Benjamin	Nangombe	Shakoleka
52.	Bönhardt	Nangolo	Kawari
53.	Vilho	Kakololo	Nakulwa
54.	Vilho	Kayofa	Shinwalulu
55.	Nghilifavali	Nghishindimbwa	Nekongo
56.	Nestor	Kakonda	Haikuti
57.	Willemon	Josua	Mbwiti
58.	Valombweleni	Nghituwamhata	Haibodi
59.	Samwel	Festus	Maxwilili
60.	Thimotheus	Vilho	Nairobi
61.	Phillimon	Malima	Lumumba
62.	Darius	Shikongo	Mbolondondo
63.	Sacheus	Khakala	Kandjungu
64.	Festus	Aijambo	Nehale
65.	Reinholdt	Ndadi	Isuu
66.	David	Ndjola	Kati kandjola
67.	Traugott	Nghambe	Nauta
68.	Ben	Uirab	Jono Sono
69.	Matthew	Iijambo	Kakukutu.
70.	Peter	Nekongo	Lack.

Cassinga CHQ.

COMRADES GOING TO BE TRAINED IN "POLITICAL COMMISSARSHIP" IN SOVIET UNION, MOSCOW.

	Home Name.		C.Name	Std.Ed.		
1.	Fillemon	Malima	Lumumba	Form III	Group Leader	
2.	Darius	Shikongo	Mbolondondo	" I	Dep.Gr.leader.	
3.	Zacheus	Kkakala	Kandjungu	" III		
4.	Festus N.	Aiyambo	Nejale	" III		
5.	Reinhold Ngh.	Ndadi	Ishuu	" II		
6.	David	Ndjola	Kati ka Ndjola	" I		
7.	Traugott	Nghombe	Nauta	" II		
~~8.~~	~~Otto~~	~~Lukas~~	~~Otto~~	~~Std~~	VI	
9.	Ben	Uirab	Jomo Sono	"	VI	
10.	Mateus	Iiyambo	Kakutu	"	VI	

93-642 O - 82 - 5

000031

RX HP/11/7.

Commanding HQ;
P.L.A.N.
P.R.A.
12/07/1977.

The Secretary Of Defence,
P.O.BOx 512,Lubango.
People's Republic of Angola.

Dear Comrade,

Iam hereby requesting your office due to the demanding of the situation at the front;for you to appraoch the Soviet General in Luanda,so that our infantry can only be trained for three months only and then sent back to the front and we send others for infantry again to be trained for three moths.

We are given the task by yhe party to intesfy the armed struggle,of which is what we are aiming at,but it needs the infantry manpower

I will appreciate if this will be done to that group which is already in Lubango. We are ready to send the other infantry at any time.

I remain,

Yours in liberation.

Dimo Haamambo.

C.A.F.



000031

(P.L.A.N.) Cassinga
P.R.Angola.

RX HF 10/12 23rd December, 1976.

Dear comrade Chikololo,
Revolutionary Greetings,

Letter of Introduction

I am hereby informing you that comrade Martin Iifo would be my Regional Commissar on this very Front, he proved to be fight in his politicising the cadres, and he knows politics, as he was one of those send to the Komsomol High School in Moscow.
He is also very cooperative and quick witted.

Thank you for cooperating with him and brief him on the general situation on the front and the morale of the combatants.

Yours ever,

Chief Political Commissar

Greenwell Matongoh

EXHIBIT B

The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 177 | The Heritage Foundation • 513 C Street • N.E. • Washington, D.C. • 20002 • (202) 546-4400

- - A UNITED NATIONS ASSESSMENT PROJECT STUDY - -

April 8, 1982

HOW THE U.N. AIDS MARXIST GUERRILLA GROUPS

INTRODUCTION

***The PLO, an international terrorist organization, is awarded "permanent observer" status at the U.N. and given a U.N. budget for international publicity.

***The PLO is invited to a U.N. conference on civil aviation to serve as an expert on airplane hijacking.

***SWAPO, a Southwest African terrorist group, becomes a "permanent observer" at the U.N., preparing students to be guerrilla soldiers at U.N.-supported schools in Angola.

***ANC and PAC, communist-dominated guerrilla and terrorist groups operating across the South African border, enjoy at least $9 million biennial U.N. aid plus U.N. political approval.

***The U.N. officially endorses violent "armed struggle" by the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC against U.N. member states -- including tacit approval of terrorist attacks on civilians.

+ + +

These are just a few highlights of U.N. aid and support of Marxist-oriented, Soviet-backed guerrilla movements. The links are no secret and appear in United Nations official documents. Yet U.N. funding and political support for armed guerrilla warfare, whether conducted by Marxists or others, is not authorized by the U.N. Charter. The Charter, in fact, mandates that "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered." (Chapter 1, Article 2, para. 3.)

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Despite this, the U.N.'s own records show that since 1975 at least $116 million has been spent or budgeted to support what the U.N. calls "national liberation movements" (NLMs). About 25 percent of this has been and is being contributed by the American taxpayer.

Some of these NLMs, such as the MPLA of Angola or FRELIMO of Mozambique, have already seized power and are the governments of their countries. ZAPU and ZANU, now the chief political parties of Zimbabwe, were also heavily backed by the U.N. as guerrilla groups. These former NLMs all are Marxist and either are or were aligned with the Soviet Union and its allies.

U.N. support of NLMs has been curiously selective. No backing, for instance, has been given to pro-Western national liberation movements, such as UNITA (now fighting a successful guerrilla war against the Marxist government of Angola). Nor has the U.N. been willing to recognize non-Marxist representatives of the Palestinians or the democratic political parties of Namibia in southern Africa. Instead, the General Assembly recognizes the PLO and SWAPO as the "sole" representatives of the Palestinian and Namibian peoples respectively. Yet there are many other representatives of both peoples who get neither recognition nor assistance from the U.N.

U.N. support of guerrilla liberation movements ranges from gifts of food, housing and health services to radio channels for broadcasting propaganda. Both SWAPO and ANC of South Africa, for instance, make wide use of U.N.-sponsored radio propaganda broadcasts.

U.N. officials interviewed for this study scrupulously avoided even hinting that the U.N. is aiding the military training of NLMs. It is obvious, however, that guerrilla armies need food, medicine and civilian training for their cadres, as well as arms. These necessities they have been able to obtain in abundance from the U.N.

Military arms, equipment, training and advisors for these NLMs are provided by the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc nations. But much of their "humanitarian aid" comes from the United Nations. And most of the money -- about 65 percent -- for this humanitarian aid comes from the U.S. and other Western industrial democracies.

Probably more important than the actual aid and development projects is the international political legitimacy which U.N. recognition confers on the NLMs. Offical U.N. recognition, for instance, is enjoyed by four communist-oriented guerrilla groups: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). This U.N. seal of approval gives them an unfair advantage over their political rivals at home. It gives them money, aid projects, publicity and international lobbying power not available to their competitors.

It also distorts their image on the international scene -- making them appear to be the true representatives of their respective peoples though, in reality, all four are actually fighting for political survival at home.

How did the U.N. stray so far from its charter? Several historians trace the organization's support of guerrillas to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Following the Arab defeat in that conflict, the Soviet Union formed a political alliance in the U.N. General Assembly with the Arab states. The resulting Soviet-Arab-Third World bloc led to a series of General Assembly resolutions, beginning in 1969, affirming what is called the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people." A number of experts on the U.N. maintain that the Soviet Union, its satellites and client states, along with Arab oil nations and the Marxist liberation movements of southern Africa, created the U.N. voting bloc that opened the door to PLO chief Yassir Arafat's appearance at the U.N. in 1974.[1] He addressed the General Assembly and the Security Council as if he headed a legitimate and sovereign state.

With the General Assembly vote to welcome Arafat as "the representative of the Palestinian people," the PLO, the world's most notorious international terrorist organization, was clothed in a new respectability and accepted in international diplomacy at the U.N. This occurred just two years after the PLO murders of the Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich. PLO terror did not stop after Arafat's U.N. appearance, but this did not prevent the PLO from gaining official observer status at the U.N.

Other guerrilla and terrorist groups soon got the message that they could be legitimized and obtain international political credentials at the United Nations.

In 1976, another leading guerrilla organization scored a critical victory when the General Assembly voted to support SWAPO "as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people." (U.N. Resolution 31/146, para. 2.) As in the case of the PLO, -- the U.N. recognized SWAPO as the sole party of the Namibians despite many other political parties in Southwest Africa. In the same resolution, the General Assembly supported SWAPO "in their struggle, by all means, including armed struggle, to achieve self-determination, freedom and national independence." The General Assembly similarly recognized the two Marxist guerrilla groups -- the ANC and the PAC -- as the sole legitimate representatives of South Africa, while stripping the government of South Africa of its General Assembly voting rights.

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1 Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The PLO at the United Nations," American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, January 1979; and Paul Johnson, "Barbarous Parliament," The New Republic, December 20, 1975.

Dramatically reflected in these actions is the U.N.'s increasingly ubiquitous double standard. How can a self-proclaimed peace-keeping organization like the United Nations sponsor guerrillas and terrorists? And why are the only recipients of such U.N. backing Marxists and anti-Western groups? It is hyprocrisy and double standards of this kind which discredit the United Nations, make it an object of derision, and undermine its support in the U.S.

WHAT THE PLO GETS FROM THE U.N.

Before U.N. recognition, the PLO was viewed as an unpredictable and dangerous international terrorist organization. The world's law enforcement agencies have not changed their minds about that. But since Yassir Arafat's speech at the U.N. and the creation of two PLO-dominated U.N. committees -- the Inalienable Rights Committee and the "Special Unit on Palestinian Rights" -- the PLO is now able to wave its U.N. identification badge and call itself a legitimate national liberation movement. PLO spokesman Abdul Abdu Massur, for example, broadcast a startling statement on Radio Damascus as justification for the murders of two innocent Israelis by a PLO terrorist assault group on June 15, 1975. He declared:

> We sponsored the operation because it is our right to fight for our rights, and the whole world sponsored it and our operations along with us, because the United Nations General Assembly has approved the right of the Palestinians to pursue their struggle with all means to regain usurped rights."[2]

The Damascus broadcast, intended for an Arab audience, demonstrates how the PLO uses its U.N. credentials to boost its image among other Arabs. This kind of public relations campaign is essential to the PLO's political existence, especially since 70 percent of the Palestinians in the Middle East live in either Jordan or the West Bank, where the PLO is banned. It was an Arab leader, King Hussein, who banned the PLO in Jordan.

In 1975, following a PLO initiative, the General Assembly created "the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People." Though not a member of the Committee, the PLO was allowed to participate in the closed sessions of the Committee's drafting group. Consequently, the Committee's recommendations essentially echo the PLO Covenant -- rejecting conciliation or negotiation with Israel. Thus, the U.N. tacitly endorses terrorism by its recognition of the PLO, an avowedly terrorist group, as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

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2 Letter from the National District Attorney's Association, Chicago, Illinois to Gerhard Mueller, Executive Secretary, 5th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, August 27, 1975, p. 4.

Through the creation of the Inalienable Rights Committee, the U.N. also makes itself a propaganda voice of the PLO, giving PLO terrorist attacks respectability. The Committee on Inalienable Rights, with the PLO as its chief consultant, was able to persuade the General Assembly in 1977 to create another U.N. organ, the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights.[3] Established within the U.N. Secretariat, this unit has been useful to the PLO in several ways. Its mandate instructs it to turn out publications and direct a public relations campaign for the Palestinian cause, including an annual "International Solidarity Day with the Palestinian People." All these activities are under the direction of the Inalienable Rights Committee, which, in turn, is heavily influenced by the PLO.[4]

The pamphlets of the Special Unit implicitly support the PLO as the only real representative of the Palestinians. One such booklet, sold in the U.N. bookstore and distributed to U.N. centers worldwide, is entitled The International Status of the Palestinian People. It lauds Yassir Arafat as a freedom fighter. It justifies Arafat's and the PLO's use of terrorism by noting how successful the "Palestinian commandos" have been through terrorism in bringing the Palestinian question to the world's attention.

Last year's annual U.N. Palestinian Solidarity Day saw the PLO set up an unapproved exhibition in a U.N. corridor featuring a PLO flag and a map of "Palestine" that did not include Israel. Despite protests from Israel, the PLO propaganda display was allowed to stand after the PLO representative, Zehdi Labib Terzi, told U.N. security guards he would "use force if necessary" to keep the flag and the map in place.[5]

Full observer status for the PLO has been voted by several U.N. agencies, including: UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). When ICAO awarded this privilege to the PLO in October 1977, it allowed the PLO to send observers to all meetings where the U.N. discusses air security. The rationale for this: the PLO has had considerable experience with air piracy (as skyjackers, of course) and the PLO's advice could prove valuable to these meetings.[6]

A few years earlier, the PLO was invited to attend the "Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders," held in Geneva, Switzerland, September

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3 Harris O. Schoenberg, "Terror Legitimized," Midstream, March 1979, pp. 7-8.

4 Ibid.

5 Washington Post, December 1, 1981, p. A11.

6 Robert W. Lee, The United Nations Conspiracy, (Boston, Los Angeles: Western Islands, 1981), p. 211.

1, 1975. This drew a vigorous protest from the U.S. National District Attorneys Association, which called for the withdrawal of the invitation to the terrorist group. In its letter, the NDAA quoted from the "PLO Spokesman," the official newspaper, which boasted only months after the Munich massacre, in its September 1972 issue:

> We have to kill the most famous. Since statesmen are difficult to kill as they are well protected, we have to kill artists and athletes.[7]

Gerhard O. W. Mueller, an American who is Executive Secretary of the U.N. crime prevention congress, refused to withdraw the invitation, citing the PLO's official observer status. Mueller further noted that: "those acts of violence which are caused by political and ideological frustration cannot be expected to cease until the world community succeeds in dealing with the underlying causes."[8] In the case of PLO terrorism, the underlying cause, according to the PLO's own Covenant, is the existence of Israel.

On July 27, 1977, the PLO was admitted to the U.N. Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) Commission for Western Asia. This was the first time that full membership status was ever given to a non-country. The PLO since has been allowed to chair the Commission.

THE PLO AND THE U.N. BUDGET

In the 1982-83 U.N. biennial budget, the Committee for the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People is scheduled to receive $71,800. The Special Unit has budgeted $6,156,500 for the two-year period. This includes money for conferences related to Palestinian rights.

But there is also evidence the PLO may have infiltrated the lavishly funded United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) programs for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. John Miles, director of the UNRWA's New York liaison office, says that all of UNRWA's 17,000 worldwide employees, except for about 120 "international staff," are Palestinians. There is strong evidence that this nearly entirely Palestinian-run organization is dominated by the PLO. There is further evidence that the PLO controls the U.N.'s Palestinian refugee camps. The Associated Press reported on June 18, 1979, that PLO terrorists controlled three Palestinian refugee camps around Tyre, and Lebanon's southern and eastern outskirts. These are UNRWA camps.

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7 NDAA Letter, op. cit.

8 Letter from Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Chief of U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section to NDAA, Chicago, Illinois, September 25, 1975.

In the AP dispatch, the PLO liaison officer for Tyre, Major Saed, said: "Running the camps and handling their defenses is a PLO responsibility [together] with the Lebanese government."[10]

Another Palestinian refugee camp, Tell al Zaater, in Beirut, Lebanon, came to the public's attention during the Lebanese civil war. On August 10, 1976, both Radio Beirut and Radio Palestine reported that the camp was a major PLO military base with reinforced concrete bunkers. The radio reports also confirmed the presence of armed terrorists and artillery emplacements in the camp. Other intelligence sources reported that the camp's bunkers were "camouflaged by civilian hovels inhabited by the refugees of the PLO."

Even more conclusive evidence of PLO use of U.N. refugee camps is the statement of the Lebanese Ambassador, Edward Ghorra, in a letter to former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim:

> The Palestinians increased the influx of arms into Lebanon...they transformed most of the refugee camps -- if not all -- into military bastions...the camps, in fact, became centers for the training of mercenaries sent and financed by other Arab states."[11]

Attached to this letter by Ghorra to Kurt Waldheim was another letter from the deputy prime minister of Lebanon to the 5th conference of Heads of Non-Aligned States in Colombo, Sri Lanka:

> ...[The Palestinians] have breached their accords with Lebanese authorities in 1969 by installing heavy weapons in the camps....They have even occupied the UNRWA offices in the camps.

UNRWA's annual budget is about $200 million. Most of that pays for over 600 Palestinian elementary schools, according to Miles. Roughly $20 million a year goes to the camps in Lebanon.

Whether the PLO directly gets any of this money is not the point; what is critical is PLO access to the refugee camps which serve as valuable recruiting centers, bases for military training, and indoctrination and, as reported by these Lebanese officials, as actual military installations.

PLO leader Yassir Arafat has made it clear recently that PLO plans for national liberation include regions besides Palestine. Arafat told the General Federation of Palestinian Writers and Journalists this January that PLO guerrillas serve in Nicaragua,

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10 Associated Press, June 18, 1979.

11 Letter from Lebanese Ambassador to U.N., Edward Ghorra, to Secretary General of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim, August 17, 1976, U.N. Document A/31/179.

El Salvador and Angola. Arafat emphasized the links between the PLO and other "national liberation" groups around the world. He added that PLO pilots were flying planes in Nicaragua.[12]

The U.S. State Department confirmed Arafat's boast in early March, acknowledging that Soviet-trained PLO pilots apparently were flying ammunition drops from Nicaragua to guerrillas in nearby El Salvador. The Palestinians, Newsweek reported, "can fly large helicopters and transport aircraft that the Nicaraguans have not mastered."[13]

Since it is highly likely the PLO plays a large role inside UNRWA, should the U.S., which contributed $62 million to UNRWA in 1981, continue to participate in the Palestinian refugee program? And why should the U.S. taxpayer underwrite this PLO-dominated organization when the oil-rich Arab states contribute very little to UNRWA? Saudi Arabia and eleven other Arab states in 1981 contributed only about $18.5 million.

SWAPO AT THE U.N

In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the Southwest African People's Organization as the "sole and authentic" representative of Southwest Africa, the South African trusteeship often known as Namibia. SWAPO, however, is only one of forty-five political parties representing Namibia's one million people, but is tightly tied through military aid and training to the Soviet Union. It also has a well-documented record of terrorist attacks against civilians dating from the late 1960s.

Following a pattern it was to repeat in the case of Arafat and the PLO, the U.N. General Assembly invited SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, to speak at the U.N. in May 1973. On that occasion, Nujoma said:

> I pledge here and now that we will continue to talk to South Africa in the only language they understand and that is intensification of armed liberation struggle.... SWAPO will continue to mobilize the masses and intensify and expand military operations until all the objectives of the struggle are realized.

United Nations recognition and support of SWAPO is very similar to U.N. treatment of the PLO. Like the PLO, SWAPO relies heavily on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations for military equipment, supplies and military training. For humanitarian aid, SWAPO turns to the U.N. Namibian refugees, scattered

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12 "Arafat Says PLO Aids Foreign Guerrilla Units," Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1982.

13 "The PLO on the Wing in Nicaragua," Newsweek, March 15, 1982, p. 19.

over four or five southern African countries, are cared for by a dozen U.N. agencies. SWAPO plays a major, and often a controlling role in the administration of these U.N. relief programs. Through these programs, as the only representative of the Namibians recognized by the U.N., SWAPO in 1981 had access to about $28 million worth of food, education, medical and vocational training projects. And the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) recently requested an additional $17.6 million for an industrial management training program for Namibia. (U.N. Document A/36/154/add. 1.) This would almost certainly be dominated by SWAPO.

Another source of U.N. backing for SWAPO is the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). From 1979 to 1981, it allocated about $10 million for the Namibian refugee camps -- principally in Angola, SWAPO's main staging location for terrorist operations into Namibia.

The World Food Program, meanwhile, has given SWAPO $5.4 million worth of food since 1974. The current WFP food gift budget for SWAPO is $2.8 million. With WFP food, SWAPO can feed Namibian refugees in Angola, thus using U.N. resources to ingratiate itself with the refugee population. This surely helps SWAPO attract young recruits from within the camps. A Reagan Administration aide reports that SWAPO is even kidnapping young recruits from Namibia, luring them with promises of medical school fellowships.

SWAPO secured about $5 million in food aid from WFP for Namibians in Angola from early March 1978 through October 1979. When the South African Army raided SWAPO bases in Angola in the summer of 1979, food cartons from WFP were found in the guerrilla camps. SWAPO obviously used U.N. food to feed its terrorist troops as well as the Namibian refugees.[14]

SWAPO AND THE U.N. BUDGET

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) budget for 1977-81 earmarked $7,750,000 for SWAPO; another $7,750,000 has been recommended by UNDP officials for the 1982-86 budget.

UNDP will receive another $4,477,870 for Namibia via the Namibia Trust Fund. As the sole "national liberation movement" recognized by the U.N. for Namibia, SWAPO will play a leading role in the distribution of this sum also.

The World Health Organization also gave about $256,000 to SWAPO from 1974-81, while the Food and Agriculture Organization

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[14] Robert W. Lee, op. cit., p. 209; Lee is quoting from a 1979 London Foreign Affairs Research Institute report on SWAPO.

gave $90,000 to SWAPO in 1980. UNESCO has a separate fund of about $4 million called "Aid to Refugees and National Liberation Movements," divided among the PLO, SWAPO and the two South African terrorist guerrilla groups, the ANC and the PAC.

U.N. aid is also channeled to SWAPO by the U.N. Council for Namibia in New York, which, in turn, funnels funding for aid projects to SWAPO through the U.N. Fund for Namibia and the U.N.-sponsored Institute for Namibia. The United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, with offices in New York, Luanda (the capital of Angola) and Botswana also receives U.N. funds for aid to SWAPO.

The U.N. and its specialized agencies have allocated a grand total of at least $40 million in aid either directly or indirectly to SWAPO for programs begun between 1977 and 1981 and for programs beginning and continuing during 1982-86. The United States contributes about 30 percent of this.

Another $17.6 million is on the drawing boards via UNIDO. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also has submitted a large proposal for national liberation funding which would direct yet more funds to SWAPO, ANC and PAC "to provide an opportunity for the leadership of the NLMs to be more fully acquainted with the activities of UNCTAD in the area of international economic relations" and to build up "management capacity of NLM cadres." (U.N. Document TD/B/WP/16, p. 20.)

In the $17.6 million UNIDO proposal -- for the training of industrial managers -- is found the U.N. rationale for these types of wide-ranging and comprehensive U.N. development programs intended for SWAPO.

The proposal is broken down into three parts: pre-independence, transitional and post-independence aid. This program, like all the U.N. programs for Namibia/SWAPO, takes place outside Namibia and is dominated by SWAPO recipients. The intent is to train the professional cadres of the future independent Namibia. Why then is SWAPO the main beneficiary of these programs? Why has the U.N. decided that in some future Namibia, these professionals will come from the ranks of SWAPO? The U.N., in effect, is feeding, clothing, educating and giving civilian training to the SWAPO guerrilla army. But the U.N. is also training SWAPO candidates as government functionaries for the day when SWAPO seizes the reins of power in Namibia. What about the non-SWAPO groups in Namibia? Why do they not qualify for help from the U.N.? Why are they victims of the U.N. double standard?

SWAPO'S PROPAGANDA AND MEDIA BONANZA AT THE U.N.

Through U.N. Resolution 34/92F (1979), SWAPO is guaranteed a free international public relations service provided by the U.N. Department of Public Information of the Secretariat. This resolu-

tion notes the need "to intensify the wide-spread and continuous dissemination of information on the struggle for liberation being waged by the people of Namibia, guided by their liberation movement, [sic] the SWAPO." Because of this resolution, SWAPO distributes propaganda through U.N. press releases on Namibia and through U.N. publications and periodicals. SWAPO also has access to the U.N. Department of Public Information (DPI) Radio Service, which broadcasts worldwide. SWAPO airs special programs on Namibia Day. It also provides its own radio material to broadcasting organizations, including a special series of six quarter-hour programs in English, French, Spanish and German for international distribution.

The U.N. Visual Service, meanwhile, screens such SWAPO films as "Namibia, a Trust Betrayed," "Colonialism: A Case Study: Namibia," and "End of an Era."

DPI also provides photographic and exhibition services for special SWAPO events -- displays later used as semi-permanent exhibits at the United Nations Headquarters and offices in Geneva and Vienna. Copies go to all the worldwide Information Centers of the United Nations. None of the other Namibian movements enjoys such generous and valuable treatment by the U.N. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, for example, has no privileges or standing at the U.N.

SWAPO'S PRIVILEGED U.N. STATUS

SWAPO became an "observer" to the U.N.'s Council for Namibia in 1967. As such, the Marxist group accompanies the Council on its missions away from New York. From its reports, it seems that the Council not only makes no moves without consulting SWAPO, but responds to SWAPO initiatives. SWAPO also is invited to the international conferences of several U.N. specialized agencies such as the ILO, FAO, WHO, UNCTAD and UPU (Universal Postal Union).

SWAPO's office expenses in New York -- $182,300 in 1979 -- are part of the Council of Namibia budget, as are travel and subsistence expenses of SWAPO's members travelling with the Council's missions ($67,000 in 1979).

A SWAPO representative was present on the Council's "missions of consultation," diplomatic trips to win support for its aims, to twenty-three countries in 1980 -- including the U.S., France, Great Britain and West Germany -- and used the opportunities to convey the SWAPO philosophy of "armed struggle."

In a dramatic application of the double standard, SWAPO was awarded "permanent observer" status in the General Assembly in 1976 and since 1971 has been invited by the Security Council to participate in Security Council meetings on Namibia. No other Namibian group is so privileged.

Despite the U.N.'s intimate association with SWAPO, the U.N. seems ignorant of SWAPO's startling record of terrorist attacks on civilians and government officials. A favorite SWAPO terrorist tactic is the planting of land mines at random on public roads in Namibia. Local residents have been the main victims of these mines. SWAPO has also assassinated officials of rival political parties. The U.N., however, has never criticized SWAPO for its terrorist attacks against black civilians. Former Secretary General Kurt Waldheim ignored completely evidence of 969 terrorist attacks mounted by SWAPO, including 227 deaths, 385 abductions and 227 serious injuries.

SWAPO'S USE OF U.N. REFUGEE CAMPS

Mirroring the PLO, SWAPO is using U.N. refugee camps to recruit and train guerrillas. New York Times reporter Bernard Nossiter visited a UNHCR refugee camp for Namibian exiles in Angola. In his March 28, 1981, dispatch he reported that the camp, designed for 10,000 Namibian school children on a coffee plantation 200 miles south of Luanda, is training its students to "return as guerrillas" to Namibia. The students, he wrote, ranged from 5 to 18 years old, "most of them well under 16."

The UNHCR camp is called the Namibia Health and Education Center. Nossiter estimated the yearly cost of the camp at $2 million, of which the UNDP contributes $612,857. (U.N. Document DP/153.) Other U.N. agencies also may be contributing a share of the camp's programs and maintenance.

Nossiter reported that daily use of the camp's resources are in the hands of SWAPO. Nossiter added that it would be easy for SWAPO to deceive UNHCR about caching arms or conducting military training in the camp. The UNHCR inspector makes the rugged trip to the camp only once a month.

As Nossiter was leaving the Center, a choral group from the nearby women's camp (population: 25,000) sang a refrain for the departing visitors:

> We are determined that Namibia must be free. Marxism-Leninism is our ideology, founded on scientific-socialism.

The United States funds about 25 percent of all U.N. programs for Namibia, including this camp.

THE ANC AND THE PAC OF SOUTH AFRICA

In addition to SWAPO, two other guerrilla-terrorist movements in South Africa are recognized and supported by the U.N.: The African National Congress (ANC) and its offshoot, the Pan-African Congress (PAC). Both have vowed the destruction of the present South African government.

The 1980-81 U.N. budget for ANC and PAC development and support programs was about $9,700,000, not including assistance to ANC and PAC from most of the U.N. specialized agencies. Nor did it include assistance from the Trust Fund for South Africa and the U.N. Educational and Training Program for South Africa. The 1981-83 UNESCO budget, for instance, clearly earmarks about $830,000 for ANC and PAC. Another $3,294,000 is budgeted to be split among the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC. UNCTAD's proposal for "trade and development" assistance for SWAPO also includes money for ANC and PAC.

At least seven U.N. bodies fund educational projects, health care, food, scholastic and training fellowships and refugee aid for the ANC and the PAC. This includes about $6.7 million from UNHCR and almost $3 million from UNDP.

Then there is the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa. Its $4 million is used to pay for attorneys for ANC and PAC members jailed by South Africa and for the support of their families. Many of these prisoners are accused of terrorism and sabotage.

Once again, the United States pays about 25 percent of the U.N. programs benefitting ANC and PAC.

The General Assembly, meanwhile, has asked all organs of the U.N. to invite the ANC and the PAC to attend all meetings concerning southern Africa.

There are other U.N. fringe benefits for ANC and PAC. Like SWAPO, the two groups have been anointed by the General Assembly as "the national liberation movements of South Africa" and, as such, "the authentic representatives of the South African people in their just struggle for liberation" (the most recent statement of this is U.N. Resolution 35/206 A -- 1980).

Since 1974, the General Assembly has denied South Africa its right to answer charges against it. The Assembly has rejected the credentials of South Africa, a sovereign and independent nation and a U.N. member state.

CONCLUSION

United Nations funding of terrorist-oriented "national liberation movements," all of them with ties to the Soviets, the Eastern bloc nations or to mainland China, is a threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies. The goal of the PLO is the destruction of Israel. Yet the U.S. tacitly supports the PLO through numerous U.N. programs, including the UNRWA refugee effort.

South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, both strategically critical to the U.S., are threatened by terrorist sabotage and subversion through ANC and PAC. Still the U.S. pays 25 percent

of the nearly $40 million in U.N. support now going to these two groups and to the SWAPO guerrillas attacking Namibia. Should the U.S. pay for the upkeep of terrorist forces who would bring in Marxist governments in South Africa and Namibia?

The answer clearly should be "no." Washington should cut off contributions to U.N. "national liberation movement" programs. UNDP, for instance, has recommended that SWAPO, ANC and PAC be assisted with $22 million in aid projects during 1982-86. The U.S. contribution in voluntary funding to UNDP in 1980 was at 17.5 percent. At that rate, the U.S. would pay almost $4 million to SWAPO, ANC and PAC during the next four years.

The U.S. contributed about $97 million to the World Food Program in 1980, or about 27.5 percent of the budget. Over the past seven years, WFP has exceeded all other U.N. bodies in contributions to natonal liberation movements (NLMs). Between 1974 and 1981, the World Food Program paid almost $44.5 million in cash, commodities and services to NLMs, most of them Marxist. The Soviet Union, by comparison, which gives arms and military training to the same NLMs, gives nothing to WFP and never has.

Exactly how much guerrilla and terrorist groups get from the U.N. directly and from the U.S. via the U.N. is unknown. The totals could be much higher than the documented figures of this study. What is needed to uncover the full amount is a thorough investigation of the funding of all U.N. agencies by the General Accounting Office and the U.S. Congress which has powers to subpoena documents and take testimony under oath. The focus of the investigation should be on the amount of funding and assistance of all kinds funneled through these organizations to NLMs. All international organizations related to the U.N., such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should also be probed to determine how much U.S. and Western European money is funding loans to current and former guerrilla groups.

Washington also should try to convince America's allies to stop funding guerrilla-terrorist groups through the U.N.

If the Soviets, Africans and Third Worlders insist on using their voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly to fund terrorist, anti-U.S. national liberation movements, then U.S. funding of agencies like UNESCO, the FAO, WFP, WHO, UNHCR and UNDP (all of which have NLM programs) should be cut back or eliminated.

The U.S. Mission to the U.N., moreover, should monitor and report to Congress on whether U.N. forums, such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the Special Committee Against Apartheid, are being exploited by terrorist groups like the Tupamaros of Uruguay. If terrorists cannot be banned from these forums and international meetings of U.N. agencies, then the U.S. should demand that those who oppose the terrorists also be given the chance to speak.

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New schemes to extend U.N. support of guerrillas to groups in South and Central America (including Puerto Rico) and elsewhere should be carefully monitored and reported to the U.S. Congress.

Both Congress and the GAO should investigate thoroughly the suspected use of UNHCR and UNRWA refugee camps by guerrillas and terrorists -- for storing arms; for military training or indoctrination centers; for political indoctrination; and for recruitment.

At present, the U.S. is doing almost none of this. Congress has passed into law three provisions cutting off U.S. contributions to the U.N. destined for the PLO and SWAPO. But the total funds withheld in 1980 and 1981 only amounted to $900,325. The actual amount of U.S. money which went to national liberation movements through the U.N. that year was nearly $2 million from four organizations alone -- UNDP, UNHCR, WHO and FAO.

Congress can avoid the annual wrangle over cutting U.S. contributions to the U.N.-sponsored guerrillas by writing a permanent cut-off of funds to the PLO and other terrorist guerrilla groups into the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 or into the State Department Service Act.

It is time to act. At stake not only are those U.S. national interests threatened by the PLO, SWAPO and other guerrilla groups, but the credibility and integrity of the United Nations. Nor can the United States maintain its own integrity while associated with a U.N. that supports terror.

Thomas G. Gulick
United Nations Assessment Project

EXHIBIT C

"Cuba's commitment to supporting the struggles against fascism, racism for national liberation and social emancipation was an expression of conviction which had driven the Cubans themselves to the sacrifices they did. I think what emerged is that Cuba does not separate itself from the struggle of the people all over the world. That freedom is indivisible, that liberation is indivisible.

"We think that the people who are clamouring and screaming about the presence of Cubans in Africa do not understand how people feel who have been oppressed, exploited, subjected to racism and to fascism. In the final analysis the Cuban people came from Africa as slaves and may be it is time that they went back to destroy in Africa what remains of slavery."

O. R. Tambo speaking in Cuba, 1978

"In Angola, the imperialists, the racists, the aggressors symbolized by the CIA, the South African troops and the white mercenaries, did not win victory nor did they occupy the country; victory was won by those who were attacked, the revolutionaries, the black and heroic people of Angola.

"The people who were attacked received the solidarity of the revolutionary movement, and the imperialists and racists could not dismember the country nor divide up its wealth nor assassinate its finest sons. Angola is united, integrated, and today it is a bulwark of liberty and dignity in Africa. The swastika of the South African racists does not fly over the palace of Luanda.

"No country of black Africa has anything to fear from Cuban military personnel. We are Latin-African people—enemies of colonialism neocolonialism, racism, apartheid, which Yankee imperialism aids and protects."

Castro

"The lesson of our history is that the key to freedom is a united people fighting for a single goal. We must build the unshakeable unity of all. We must deepen the unifying national consciousness of all our people—African, Coloured, Indian and democratic White—which is a pre-requisite for a nation-wide uprising and victory along the lines of our Freedom Charter. In this year 1979, we march forward to further develop the process of mass political mobilisation—bringing together of all organisations, groups and individuals opposed to apartheid—unity in opposition to all aspects of the inhuman system of apartheid, laying the basis for a Peoples War in which we combine armed actions with all forms of political struggle. In this struggle the working class has the central role."

Dr. Dadoo, 1979

"We have set ourselves one task and one task only—to seize power from the fascist regime. We shall pursue the arms struggle not merely for the abolition of racial discrimination or for amendments to the apartheid system. We fight to transfer political power into the hands of the people.

"The ANC, the vanguard organisation of the broad liberation forces of our country, remains unwavering in its determination to carry out its historic mission of heading all these forces to victory.

"Since its foundation it has fought tirelessly to ensure the unity in action of all the oppressed people. Today the fruits of that labour are evident to all."

O. R. Tambo addressing the UN, 1976

"I should like to issue this appeal to the youth of South Africa: At this hour of destiny your country and your people need you. The future of South Africa is yours and it will be what you make of it.
"Remember our heroes who are today sacrificing their lives for the Freedom of persecuted, terrorised and tortured people. Our gallant and heroic fighters expect every young South African to join the struggle for the freedom of our fatherland and our people. . . . It is only through a grim and bitter armed struggle that the system of apartheid can be overthrown by the oppressed people of South Africa. We must fight."

Kotane, 1968

"Instead of submitting to an already disproved invincibility of the fascist army, the best sons and daughters of our people have responded with enthusiasm to our call to swell the ranks of M.K."

O. R. Tambo, 1979

"Today we are beginning the long journey home, home to those we left behind with a promise to return. We must each be determined to see our task through to the end. The enemy is strong, we must not underestimate his strength, but we too are strong. We are now trained and will meet their bullets with our own."

M.K. militant before going on mission

"There were occasions when our comrades barely managed to carry their knapsacks. They were starving and tired, but their morale and determination was never shaken. We all cherished the hope that we will reach home and carry on the armed struggle. Despite the weight on our backs we never once thought of reducing our ammunition. Our dreams were ever with our oppressed people. Our hearts were filled with their love. The difficulties we met were but the realisation that there was no easy way to freedom."

M.K. militant fighting in Zimbabwe

Umkhonto We Sizwe (ANC, Peoples Army) in training.

EXHIBIT D


THE STORY
OF SIMON
AND JANE

SIMON WORKED FOR A BAKERY DELIVERING BREAD
ERY
JANE WORKED IN ONE OF THE EUROPEAN HOUSES

WHEN IS YOUR AFTERNOON OFF, BABY?
THURSDAY
SO, NEXT THURSDAY.
WHAT DO YOU WANT BOY?
YOUR FATHER IS YOUR BOY! I'VE COME TO SEE JANE.
CATCH HIM FIDO!

BUT JANE CAME OUT TO MEET HIM..
LET'S GET MARRIED NEXT MONTH
THINGS MOVE'D FAST AFTER THAT
BUT, WHERE WILL WE LIVE?

WE'D LIKE TO HAVE YOU HERE MY SON, BUT WE'RE FIVE IN TWO ROOMS.
I'LL GET A HOME OF MY OWN
OK. JIM, I'LL PUT YOUR NAME ON THE WAITING LIST
HOW LONG DO I HAVE TO WAIT?
ABOUT FIVE YEARS!
HOW LONG DO YOU WHITES HAVE TO WAIT FOR A HOUSE? -AND NEVER CALL ME JIM. I'M NOT YOUR DOG!
A CHEEKY AGITATOR, HEY! YOU WON'T GET A HOUSE IN MY LOCATION
NEVER MIND. I'LL ASK THEM IF YOU CAN LIVE WITH ME IN MY ROOM.

MY HUSBAND MUST STAY WITH ME OR I MUST GO
HUSBAND? I KNOW YOU PEOPLE AND YOUR HUSBANDS HOW MANY HUSBANDS HAVE YOU GOT?
I HATE ASKING FOR FAVOURS FROM THOSE INSULTING PIGS THEY SAID THEY WOULD THINK ABOUT IT.
EGBERT, WE CAN'T LET JANE GO - SHE'S SUCH GOOD COOK
OH, ALL RIGHT THEN - AS LONG AS HE DOESN'T MAKE ANY NOISE...
SO SIMON AND JANE WERE MARRIED.

SO SIMON WENT TO LIVE WITH JANE —

WAT MAAK JY HIER KAFFIR?
UNTIL-ONE NIGHT

BUT SHE IS MY WIFE AND I WAS TOLD I COULD LIVE THERE!

EX UNITATE VIRES
YOU KNOW THAT IS NO EXCUSE. YOU WILL GO TO JAIL FOR FOURTEEN DAYS


THAT IS YOUR LAW, NOT MY PEOPLE'S LAW

TAKE HIM OUT!
I GO TO JAIL FOR LIVING WITH MY WIFE- YOU CALL THAT JUSTICE?

FOURTEEN DAYS LATER BACK AT THE BAKERY.
WE DON'T WANT CRIMINALS LIKE YOU. YOU'RE SACKED!

SO HE HAD TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER JOB.
THERE ARE TOO MANY OF YOU BANTU HERE YOU ARE ENDORSED OUT.
I AM A PERSON NOT A BANTU! WHERE MUST I GO?
I SUPPOSE YOU'VE GOT A HOMELAND SOMEWHERE.
THIS WHOLE COUNTRY IS MY HOMELAND - ALL OF IT!
THAT SCUM WAS ON THE POINT OF HITTING ME. IF HE HAD TOUCHED ME HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DEAD.
THEY MAKE NE SICK. YOU CAN HIDE HERE

A FEW DAYS LATER
THAT'S A VERY BIG LUNCH FOR YOU, JANE
THE OLD CON WANTED TO KNOW WHY I WAS HAVING SUCH A BIG LUNCH!
MEANWHILE INSIDE THE HOUSE..
EGBERT, I AM SURE THE GIRL'S GOT ANOTHER BOY IN HER ROOM
THEY'RE ALL THE SAME A DIFFERENT HUSBAND FOR EVERY DAY IN THE WEEK
IS THAT THE POLICE? I THINK MY GIRL'S GOT A BOY IN HER ROOM...
GOD, SKEPSEL, DIS ALWEE JY!
MINUTES LATER.

YOU BANTU MUST LEARN TO RESPECT THE LAW. THREE MONTHS IMPRISONMENT.
SO- BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE AGAIN.




I AM A MAN. AN AFRICAN NOT A BANTU!

JOU LUI DING. OUS MOET JOU PLAAS TOE STUUR
ON ARRIVAL AT THE PRISON.

AT THE FARM
THIS IS SAMSON, YOUR BOSS BOY. WHEN HE SAYS JUMP YOU JUMP!!


THE NEXT DAY- OFF TO THE FARM

IN THE POTATO FIELDS.
DIG, YOU LAZY BASTARD!

AT SUNSET – THE EVENING MEAL.
THIN MEALIE MEAL! IS THIS ALL WE GET?
YES BROTHER THAT'S ALL
WHY DON'T WE DO SOME THING ABOUT IT? WE GET ZERO. LIKE ANIMALS AND EVEN PIGS GET BETTER FOOD.
I AGREE BUT WHAT SHOULD WE DO?


WE CAN DO ANYTHING IF WE STICK TOGETHER IF WE'RE HIT WE MUST HIT BACK AND WE MUST DEMAND BETTER FOOD.

YOU'LL DO NOTHING, YOU LITTLE SHIT!
LET US KILL THIS TRAITOR.
GET BACK OR I'LL SHOOT
HE'S YOUR BLOODY PAL IS HE? GET HIM READY FOR WORK TO-MORROW OR 'LL KILL YI'
YOU ARE A BRAVE MAN.
WE MUST STAND UP TO THE WHITES AND THEIR DOGS. AND THEIR DAYS WILL END.

AFTER THAT, SIMON AND JAMES BECAME FRIENDS. THEY OFTEN TALKED TOGETHER.
THERE IS NOT A BLACK MAN WHO DOESN. WANT TO DO SOMETHING, BUT WHAT CAN BE DONE?
WE ARE MANY-SAMSON IS ONLY ONE. THE PEOPLE HE WORKS FOR ARE ONLY A FEW.
BUT AREN'T THE WHITES TOO STRONG. EVERYTHING BELONGS TO THEM. THEY HAVE SOLDIERS AND POLICE TO KEEP US DOWN.
YES, THEY ARE WELL ORGANISED. BUT WE ARE STRONGER IF WE BECOME ORGANISED TOO.

AT LAST, THEIR SENTENCE WAS OVER.
WHERE WILL YOU GO NOW?
BACK TO TOWN I HOPE
WHAT A HOPE!
BACK TO TOWN? WHO THE HELL DO YOU THINK YOU ARE? YOU'VE BEEN ENDORSED OUT - AND YOU STAY OUT.
MY WIFE IS THERE AND THAT IS WHERE I BELONG.
LABOUR REGULATIONS
I DON'T CARE ABOUT YOUR WIFE. OUT YOU GO!

THEY HAD TO TAKE JOBS AT NASIONALE HEMPFABRIEKE BEPERK.
NHF
THEIR WORK WAS LOADING LORRIES.
NHF
AT THE END OF THE WEEK-
FIVE RAND FORTY CENTS FOR A WEEK'S WORK!!
NHF

WE MUST ORGANISE THE WORKERS. WE MUST STRUGGLE TOGETHER FOR MORE PAY. WE MUST GO ON STRIKE!!
HOW SHOULD WE GO ABOUT IT?
WE MUST CALL THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS GROUP TOGETHER AND PLAN EVERYTHING.

A FEW DAYS LATER
IF
THEY CAN'T SACK US ALL, AND WE KNOW THAT IT IS AN HONOUR TO GO TO PRISON FOR THE STRUGGLE IF WE HAVE TO.
SOME OF OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS ARE DYING IN THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM. OUR SMALL BATTLE HERE WILL TEACH THE WORKERS THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTION.
AND AFTER ANOTHER TWO WEEKS . . . . .
WHAT THE HELL IS ALL THIS?
THEY'VE COME OUT ON STRIKE, SIR.
GET BACK TO WORK, OR I'LL HAVE YOU ALL SENT TO GAOL!
IF YOU DO THAT YOUR FACTORY WILL BE CLOSED.
OH! YOU'RE THE RINGLEADER, EH? COME INTO MY OFFICE.

ALL RIGHT, WHAT DO YOU WANT?
ANOTHER 92 CENTS A DAY.
YOU MUST BE BLOODY MAD!
CHRIST, YOU WANT TO RUIN ME. O.K. THIRTY CENTS BUT THAT'S MY LAST WORD.
MAKE IT FIFTY AND I'LL PUT IT TO THE WORKERS
WE'VE BEEN OFFERED AN EXTRA 50 CENTS A DAY. I THINK THAT WILL DO FOR A START. LETS TAKE A VOTE. HANDS UP EVERYONE WHO ACCEPTS THE OFFER.
SEE WHAT HAPPENS IF WE STICK TOGETHER
AFTER A WHOLE

THEY'RE GOING BACK SIR!
FINE! NOW TO PHONE THE POLICE AND GET RID OF THAT RINGLEADER
THAT AFTERNOON, AFTER WORK...
WE HAVE COME TO GET JAMES MOFOKENG. SHOW US WHERE HE IS.
YES BAAS!
NHF
THE POLICE! THEY'VE COME FOR JAMES!
THEY HAVE SECR. COMMITTEES. ANOTHER RINGLEADER WILL TAKE HIS PLACE. IT'S A BIT FRIGHTENING BECAUSE THEY ARE REALLY DETERMINED TO FIGHT US.
THE POLICE MUST NOT GET HIM!

NHF
YOU CANNOT ARREST JAMES!
YOU'LL BE SORRY FOR THIS.
THE POLICEMEN WENT BACK TO THEIR CAR....
SEND FIFTY MEN WITH GUNS AT ONCE.
WHAT CAN WE DO?
MEAN WHILE IN THE COMPOUND....
THEY WILL COME BACK WITH MORE POLICE AND GUNS.
OUR ANC BRANCH IS STRONG ENOUGH TO CARRY ON THE FIGHT. THEY HAVE DECIDED I SHOULD CARRY ON MY WORK ELSE WHERE!

YOU MUST REMEMBER THE LESSON OF TODAY AND BE READY TO FIGHT AGAIN WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE. ORGANISE TOGETHER AND STRUGGLE FOR YOUR RIGHTS. YOU ARE NOT ALONE OUR PEOPLE ARE MANY. OUR ORGANISATION THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IS EVER WHERE!
AMANDLA NGAWETHU MAATLA KE A RONA
NHF
THE WORKERS HAVE COLLECTED THIS FOOD AND MONEY FOR YOU. HAMBA KAHLE JAMES.

BUT JAMES HAD HARDLY MOVED OFF WHEN....
GOT YOU, YOU BLACK BASTARD!
LUCKILY SIMON WAS NOT FAR AWAY.
ZAP
WELL DONE! BUT YOU MUST COME QUICKLY WITH ME. IT'S NOT SAFE FOR YOU TO REMAIN BEHIND NOW!


BY SUNSET THEY WERE MILES AWAY.
I WILL HIDE YOU IN THIS HUT, BROTHER. WE WILL PUT GUARDS OUT TO WARN YOU IN CASE THEY COME
EARLY NEXT MORNING.
I HAVE FOUND AN INDIAN MAN TO TAKE YOU TO JOHANNESBURG
WE SEEM TO HAVE FRIENDS EVERYWHERE.
YES, THE INDIAN BELONGS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN CONGRESS. THEY ARE OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES
AS SOON AS NIGHT FALLS, I WILL TAKE YOU TO JO'BURG.
YOU WILL HAVE TO STAY LIKE THIS ALL THE WAY.

HE DROVE THEM TO SOME ANC MEN IN JOHANNES-BURG.
THIS IS SIMON A NEW MILITANT. SIMON, MEET JOSHUA, ONE OF OUR LEADERS.
JOSHUA TOOK THEM INTO HIS HOUSE.
THE POLICE WILL BE LOOKING FOR US. HOW BEST CAN WE CARRY ON OUR WORK?
JAMES YOU KNOW HOW TO ORGANISE. THE ANC NEED YOU HERE IN THE CITY TO CARRY OUR MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE.
YOU, SIMON ARE YOUNG AND STRONG. WE NEED MEN LIKE YOU TO TRAIN AND FIGHT WITH OUR QUERILLA ARMY.
YOU HAVE HONOURED ME I WILL GO AND TELL MY WIFE

LATE THAT NIGHT
WHO'S THERE!?
IT'S ME, SIMON.
I THOUGHT I WOULD NEVER SEE YOU AGAIN!
SIMON TOLD HER THE WHOLE STORY
SO YOU SEE - THE ANC SAYS I CAN GO AND JOIN UMKHONTO WE SIZWE.
IF I AM A MAN I MUST GO TO FIGHT FOR OUR PEOPLE
YES, I UNDERSTAND BUT WHAT ABOUT ME CAN I DO NOTHING TO HELP?
YES! THE QUERILLA SOLDIERS ARE NOT THE ONLY FREEDOM FIGHTERS. YOU CAN HELP JAMES IN HIS WORK RIGHT HERE IN TOWN.

TSELA TSEL, MY BRAVE SOLDIER
OUR CHILDREN WILL BE BORN IN A FREE SOUTH AFRICA.
SIMON JOINED A BATCH OF VOLUNTEERS
THEY TRAVELLED AT FIRST BY LORRY.
TOM WILL TAKE YOU PART OF THE WAY
THIS IS AS FAR AS I CAN TAKE YOU. GOOD LUCK!
SOME WALK'NG FOLLOWED..
THEY HAD SOME ANXIOUS MOMENTS..
AND TROUBLES ON THE WAY.
SOON THEY ARRIVED.

WE MUST LEARN EVERYTHING ABOUT THE GUN IT IS THE ONLY LANGUAGE THE ENEMY UNDERSTANDS
PISTOLS LIKE THIS, WHICH SIMON TOOK FROM THE POLICEMAN ARE GOOD FOR SELF-DEFENCE
KEEP YOUR WEAPONS CLEAN. THEY ARE PRECIOUS IN OUR FREEDOM STRUGGLE WITH THESE WE WILL GET MORE WEAPONS FROM THE ENEMY

THEY LEARNT MANY THINGS, INCLUDING ....
HOW TO AIM AND FIRE
① HOLD THE WEAPON STEADY
CORRECT INCORRECT
② TAKE CAREFUL AIM. THE FRONT SIGHT OF THE WEAPON MUST BE LINED UP WITH THE REAR SIGHT, AND BOTH SIGHTS MUST BE LINED UP ON THE TARGET.
THE TARGET MUST REST ON TOP OF THE FRONT SIGHT
CORRECT
INCORRECT
③ AIM AT THE BIGGEST PART OF THE TARGET; WITH A MAN, THE MIDDLE OF THE BODY, NOT THE HEAD.
④ CONTROL YOUR BREATHING SO AS TO KEEP THE WEAPON STEADY. TAKE A DEEP BREATH, LET OUT HALF OF IT, HOLD THE REST OF IT, THEN BEGIN TO SQUEEZE THE TRIGGER.
⑤ SQUEEZE THE TRIGGER GENTLY. DO NOT PULL OR JERK IT. JUST APPLY SLOW STEADY PRESSURE ON THE TRIGGER UNTIL A SHOT GOES OFF.
⑥ DO NOT FLINCH OR JERK IN ANTICIPATION OF THE GUN GOING OFF. DO NOT WASTE YOUR AMMUNITION MAKE EVERY SHOT COUNT.

THEY WERE TAUGHT TO MAKE AND USE SIMPLE HAND-GRENADES.

① TAKE A TIN CAN WITH A LID THAT FITS TIGHT.

② FILL WITH A MIXTURE OF BLACK POWDER METAL FRAGMENTS AND NAILS

③ PUT THE FUSE IN THROUGH A HOLE IN THE LID.

④ COVER THE TOP WITH CEMENT OR PLASTIC PADDING TO SEAL THE LID TIGHT AND HOLD THE FUSE.

TO MAKE BLACK POWDER:
TAKE:-
75 PARTS OF SALTPETRE
15 PARTS OF CHARCOAL
10 PARTS OF SULPHUR
GRIND EACH OF THESE SEPARATELY TO POWDER. MIX TOGETHER WITH WATER INTO A PASTE. WHEN DRY, GRIND CAREFULLY TO A POWDER AGAIN. HARD RUBBING, OR A FLAME COULD MAKE IT EXPLODE.

THE FUSE.
EITHER USE ONE FROM A FIRE CRACKER, OR MAKE ONE FROM A LENGTH OF COTTON CORD SOAKED IN SALTPETRE AND WATER. WHEN DRY IT WILL BURN. YOU NEED A LENGTH THAT WILL TAKE 3 SECONDS TO BURN.



THEY WERE ALSO SHOWN THE FREEDOM-FIGHTER'S SIMPLEST WEAPON — THE PETROL BOMB.

¾ FILL THE BOTTLE AS SHOWN IN THE PICTURE. THEN, EITHER ① CORK AS SHOWN AND FASTEN A FUSE (MADE LIKE THE GRENADE FUSE) TO THE NECK OR ② SIMPLY STUFF A RAG OR COTTON WASTE SOAKED IN OIL OR PETROL IN THE NECK TO SERVE AS BOTH CORK AND FUSE.
LIGHT FUSE WITH A MATCH AND, THROW.

THE SOLDIERS OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE HAVE ALREADY FACED THE ENEMY. WE ARE PROUD OF OUR HEROES AT WANKIE AND OTHER PLACES WHERE THE ENEMY WAS HIT HARD.

EVERYONE MUST BE A FREEDOM FIGHTER! LIKE JAMES AND JANE HELP TO ORGANISE THOSE AROUND YOU. ORGANISE WHERE YOU LIVE AND WHERE YOU WORK

WE ARE MANY
THEY ARE FEW
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS CALLS YOU TO ACTION!
NEVER SUBMIT TO THE WHITE TERROR!
ORGANISE AND PREPARE, FOR FREEDOM COMES AS SURE AS THE RISING OF TO-MORROW'S SUN.

EXHIBIT E

THE BATTLE OF THE MASSES AND OF THE IDEAS

The pre-occupation of the people's masses in Africa today is the struggle against imperialism and its ideology. (By the ideology of imperialism, we mean both monopoly capitalism and its appendixes of colonialism and neo-colonialism).

Our continent which has still to complete its liberation, experienced horrors of the imperialist domination. It is from this point, that we are here, to examine together with you, how imperialism has penetrated our continent, and why it is a concern of each of us who are participating in the current liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa.

During its first "exploration" of Africa, colonialists, the advanced contigents of the system of imperialism, came to Africa - in most cases, accompanied by soldiers, geologists, traders, administrators missionaries, false historians, and many elements of various descriptions such as racists, and other so-called experts. These inglorious missions brought untold massacres, plundering of the natural wealth, land theft, slavery, and later division of the spoil into what later to be known as colonies.

In their evil mission, some local chiefs collaborated to sell our people into slavery and signed unequal trities vaguely called "protoctorate" agreements.

To pasify our early ansestors, the colonialists imposed their superstition (religion) on our people, and called this "civilization". Priests and criminals of various descriptions brought Bibles to give our people the first poison of mind, while the soldiers wage wars of genocide against those who are resisting the new domination.

The colonialist called the resistence fighters as "rebels", "warlike", and which in modern time call "terrorists", agitarors", "desperados" or even "dupes" of the so-called international communism.

The colonialists sent into exile those fighters whom they capture, and often they execute whom they fear most, or demote the patriotic chiefs in order to replace them with the client chiefs obedient to the new rulers. Here, we have in mind kings such as Chaka and Digaana in South Africa, Witbooi and Maharero in Namibia, and many others in Africa. As it was before, the imperialist have sent into exile leaders of the liberation movement courageous men such as Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, Oliver Tambo, President of ANC. Our other leaders such as Comrades Herman Ya Toivo, (SWAPO), Nelson Mandela and other are confined to the prison-exile on the Robben Island, while other such as Commandante Tobias Hainyeko (the first SWAPO Commander-in-Chief) and Chief Albert Luthuli were assasinated in the battle field and in banishment respectively. While still discussing the early stages of colonialism, we have to examine the method they used to maintain their domination over the vast majority of our people.

Because of the bitter and uninterrupted struggle of the people's masses, colonialism was forced to a system of indirect rule - by training their agents, such as interpreters in order to communicate their orders to the people; clerks to run their elementary administration; police to harrass the people; teachers to teach their colonial ideology and other professions to sustain the colonial administration.

THE POSITION OF COLONIAL CADRES

Being native themselves, the colonial cadres are not equal to their colonial masters. The only difference they have with the general masses, are the petty privileges they receive from their masters. These privileges were in form of:-

(a) wages difference from the general masses, but very much below than the minimal wages of the colonialists;

(b) different living quaters - some times houses with electricity and internal water system;

(c) different passes - "Vreisteling" as against the ordinary "dompass" for the general masses;

(c) status - referred to as "good boys" "reasonable" natives or assimilados" as against "kiffirs", "indigina" etc.

These cadres, whom the people called "lost elements" in Namibia or "the situation" in South Africa receive these minimal" privileges" in return for being teeth of the repressing system.

Many of them such as Cornelius Ndjobas, Kapuuos, Kozonguizis, in Namibia or Matanzimas, and Butelezis etc. in South Africa has their minds turned out completely and have commited themselves to the colonial system. They have become what Tsombe was to Congo (Zaire), Roberto/Shavimbi to Angola, Ojuku to Nigeria, or Shimango to Mozambique. They are traitors to the people and countries which once were theirs. They did all these because they have accepted the "theories" of the so-called supremacy of the whiteman and for the minimal benefits they received from this system of humiliation and subjugation.

As a result of the introduction of commerce and industries, the colonial system of imperialism has created a class of the wage earners, the proletariat on the one hand, and has made the traditional peasants landless.

Because of the unemployment on the side of the growing proletariat and land hungry on part of the landless peasants, colonial capitalists were always beset with internal crisis.

To find temporal solutions to these crisis, colonial capitalists created new slave trading agencies to find temporal solution to the proletariat questions. These agencies, known as WETWATERSLAND NATIVE LABOUR ASSOCIATION (WENLA) and the SOUTH WEST AFRICA NATIVE LABOUR ASSOCIATION (OR NEW SWANLA) recruits workers for the period between six to eighteen months contract system for the most minimal wages in both South Africa and Namibia. As for the landless peasants, the colonial capitalists have found a solution in the Bantustan system, a criminal system in which the vast majority of the

people are forced to duel, in the Bantustans and where the soil is not neither good for agricultural production and nor is enough for these vast masses to live in. It is from these Bantustans again, where the colonial masters draw their labour force. Bantustans, therefore, are nothing but the reservois of forced labour.

The lesson to be drawn from these temporal solutions are thus; that workers continue to wage their bitter struggle for their just wages and decent life for themselves and their families, and on the other hand, the landless peasants continue to wage their bitter struggle for land to be distributed to those who are tilling upon its.

Such a situation of the ever growing crisis in the colonially dominated countries explains why the struggle is being collectivelly waged by both the proletariat on the one hand, and peasants on the other. The unity of these two friendly classes, has only one aim, to destroy once and for all time the system of the exploitation of man by man and for the creation of a just cause, in our case, a socialist cause as difined by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and which demonstrated that it is the only way for bringing harmony amongst the various classes, and which alone can destroy and eliminate the exploitation of man by man. By creating the class of the proletariat through the introduction of commerce and industries in Namibia and South Africa, and by robbing land from the peasants of the two countries imperialism has created, but its "own grave diggers", as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels have pointed out in the famous Commist Manfesto of 1848

THE INSTURMENTS OF IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGY

To propagate its ideology, colonial capitalists used the church to teach the people not to worry about the "earthly wealth" but only to concentrate on the Kingdom of Heaven. They teach further that our plight resulted from colonial aggression is nothing but the will of God.

Paralle to this dogma, are the swelling of the colonialists bellies, well-balanced banking accounts, good houses, cars, schools or in a word, better living condition which came up as a result of the exploitation of our labour power, theft of our minerals and our agricultural wealth.

Through the educational institutes which they set-up be they church or state, young Africans were taught how superior the whiteman is, the invincibility of the colonial system, the superiority of the colonial culture (their music, clothes, language and way of life). Our way of life and our culture were painted as either primitive, uncivilized or in a word, dirty.

But all these worked only temporally. They worked only temporally due to the fact that the whole concept of imperialism is based on mythology and unscientific beliefs that the more they lie to people, the better the people will remain calm.

The contradictions which were inevitable in the colonial system of imperialism resulted in some isolated revolutionary intelligencias, who by allying itself with the proletariat and peasantry, commited themselves to revolutionary struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

The revolutionary intelligencias left their privileges in order to learn and in most cases, to lead the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the peasantry. The principle task of the revolutionary intelligencia is to wage a bitter war in order to liberate the minds of the people in general and to help them to destroy both the ideology and the imperialist system as a whole. Thus, the struggle of the masses is also a struggle of the ideas, to destroy the myth of colonialism, and create both a new mentality or idea (the proletarian ideology) and strive for the real emancipation of the working people as the first step to create a society of the emancipated people.

Working with and for the masses does not need to write books, or hold rallies. What is necessary here is to go deep into the working class areas - compounds, workers' living quaters, villages, factories and schools in order to organize the people.

For you as both political and military cadres, you need to accomplish two tasks:

(a) To organize and politicise the people's masses along the political lines of SWAPO (in Namibia) and the ANC and CP (in South Africa);

(b) To fight for the liberation of the people's masses with arms you will receive after this course as a response to the racist violance against the people's masses.

INDEPENDENCE EXPECTATION OF VARIOUS CLASS STRATAS PARTICIPATING IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE

At the beginning of our discussions we have talked about the allience of the proletariat and the peasantry which came to

Namibia and South Africa as a result of the introduction of commerce and industries. We have also talked about the colonial cadres, but whom we did not give their scientific name. These colonial cadres are a stratum of both clerks, teachers, interpreters, policemen etc.

Because of the position they occupy as neither peasant or ~~nor~~ worker, ~~nor colonialists~~ or colonial capitalists, this in - between stratum run some business, such as shops, drycleaners, petrol stations, small hotels, caffès etc. This stratum which is neither rich, nor poor is therefore called petty-bourgeois.

In relation to the national liberation struggle, the petty-bourgeoisie participate in the struggle (although only a fraction of it) against colonialism. Its participation has a dual functions:

(a) To replace colonialism with its own rule or

(b) If the revolution will lead to socialism, it will still have time to enjoy some social privileges during the transitional period.

On the other hand, the people's masses (the proletariat and the peasantry) quite reasonably expected a change in their material, and social as well as economic life. They expect to be uplifted by being provided with job and educational opportunities, which in return, will give them chance to acquire houses, food, social welfare or in short an assured future.

COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OR NEO-COLONIALISM

We are specifically mentioning to you these things, because you belong to the armies of new type and to the freedom fighters of a new type.

A. AN ARMY OF NEW TYPE

Your armies are of new type, because you were not organized by the colonial masters as it was the case of some African countries who enherited colonial armies from the colonial masters. Whereas those armies were used as instruments to repress the people's masses and were apolitical, you are armies organized by the political movements, SWAPO (in Namibia) and ANC (in South Africa), and your duties are to defend and liberate the people's masses. Your duties therefore, are the fulfilment of the political demands of the masses, as stipulated in the "Political Programme of SWAPO" and the "Freedom Charter" of the ANC.

B. FREEDOM FIGHTERS OF A NEW TYPE

Whereas the old freedom fighters acquired their freedom through "constitutional talks" in London, Paris, and Bruxelles etc, you have to wrest your freedom from the oppressors with your guns.

What most countries in Africa have achieved through the so-called constitutional methods are nothing but flag independence with presidents, inherited colonial armies, national anthems etc. The economies of such countries remain within the control of the former colonialists, and because of the fear of both the discontented masses, these countries have to sign unequal military pacts with the imperialist countries for the protection

of the pretty-bourgeois rule. Such independence is called neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism is the most difficult system to fight in the struggle against imperialism. It is difficult, we say, because most people get confused with the colour of the skins of the new rulers, who from time to time go around making slogans such as: "IT IS BETTER TO OPPRESS OURSELVES THAN BY FOREIGNERS" etc.

In a book entitled "NOT YET UHURU", Oginga Odinga, a Kenyan politician and statesman writes:

> "The stage following independence is the most dangerous. This is the point after which many national revolutions in Africa have suffered a setback..... National governments have left too much in their countries uncharged, have not built for effective independence by tranfering power and control to the authentic forces and have forgotten that internal elements of exploitation are closely related to the reactionary external pressures."

Resulting from the afore mentioned factors are our conclusions, that it is better for us to fight for a total and definitive independence now.

PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTIVES ABOUT OUR REVOLUTION

A. PERSPECTIVES

What are the perspectives of the independence movement in Namibia and South Africa?

Because of the relationship of the forces following the independence of Angola and Mozambique, and as a result of the heroic armed struggle waged by the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe on the one hand and the ever growing fierce battle of the workers, youth and students in the South Africa's urban areas, we can safely say that all the ground works have been done which satisfy the conditions of the victory of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid revolution in Southern Africa. Rascist South Africa is today undergoing a crisis, which is both threatening its economic prosperity and its political stability. There is a crisis in the gold price, and internally, the political foundation is shaking.

Within the ruling class, the fascist Nazionale Parteir (NP) and its government quarrels on the policies are imminent. Their quarrels range from the defeat of their military adventures against the People's Republic of Angola to their aggresive aims of creating their "defende" frontiers to be South of the Equator.

These contradictions and misunderstanding on both internal and external policies have been brought about by our common struggle in Namibia and South Africa.

2. PROSPECTIVES

As regards to the prospectives of our struggle, we can safely say that our victory is not far off.

Only few years ago, South Africa did not share frontiers with any independent country. Today, she is sharing these frontiers

with the People's Republic of Mozambique on the Indian Coast, and on the Atlantic Coast, (through Namibia which she occupies) with the People's Republic of Angola.

The existence of the two People's Republics and their devotion to the continuation of the armed struggle in Namibia, Zimbabwe and ~~are~~ South Africa are the guarantees of our common victory.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, let us sum up our discussions. Our revolution against racist South Africa is a continuation of the best revolutionary traditions of our peoples - first against the Boers or what the capitalist historians call Kiffir/Boer War in South Africa, during the last half of the 17th century or the German - Herero/Nama Wars against the German in Namibia at the first quater of this century.

The old and present fights are aimed at the destruction of the same system, colonialism, an appedix of imperialism. The goal of this difficult, but noble struggle is to built a just new social and political system, whose ultimate aim is the creation of a classless society.

The classes taking part in this confrontation are the allience of the proletariat and peasantry, organized by SWAPO (in Namibia) and the ANC (in South Africa). Opposite to this allience is an allience of colonial fascists supported by the local puppets and world imperialism.

The struggle between the two opposing forces cannot end in reconciliation or concessions, but on the contrary, it will end with the victory of the people's masses.

In our struggle, we shall not forget for the single moment for the support that we have received so far from the fraternal People's Republic of Angola, and especially, from its heroic armed forces; FAPLA!

At the same time, we must not forget our friend commandante Iko, the Minister of National Defence of Angola for his personal advise and encouragement he has given to us, although he is very much pre-occupied with the heavy responsibility as the head of the Defence Ministry!

Our thanks also go to our ever patient Internationalist instructors, drivers and all the comrades who have made it possible for this course possible. to be successful

As from here, we are going to our respective battle fronts, but in each case, in each trenhes, ambushes or wherever one finds himself, we should bear one thing in mind; that millions throughout the world fighting for a just proletariat cause.

Long live proletariat internationalism!

Viva SWAPO!

Viva ANC!

Viva FAPLA!

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

Homateni Kaluenja

ORGANISING SECRETARY

EXHIBIT F

ADDRESS OF SWAPO PRESIDENT, COMRADE SAM NUYOMA
TO THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF (SWAPO) OF NAMIBIA.

28/7/76 LUSAKA, ZAMBIA.

Fellow Compatriots of our Party,
Comrade and Friends,

I whole-hear-tedly welcome all the delegates to Lusaka and to this historic meeting of the SWAPO Central Committee, SWAPO Representatives abroad and Party functionaries. But before I proceed further, may I call on all the Comrade and fri friends here to join me in observing a minute of silence in memory and remembrance of those gallant heroes of Namibia and other freedom fighters who selflessly laid down and dedicated their lives for the liberation of Namibia and mankind.

Comrades,

Allow me to pay my sincere tribute and to extend congratulations to all the delegates who, because of their patritic service and unshaking loyalty to the Party and the Namibian revolution, have been entrusted by the Party, as a leading vanguard of the Namibian people, to sit under this roof charged with a hefty responsibility of historical importance in the life of our Liberation Movement and Namibia' destiny, namely:

(a) to critically and seriously review the activities and programmes of the Party since the Tanga Consultatives Congress in 1970;

(b) to streamline the structural, administrative and political rank and file and set up of the Party machinery;

(c) to discuss and deliberate on questions and issues of topical significance with a view to formulate and work out further concrete proposals and guiding principles to guide and direct the Party's liberatory activities towards national liberation and independence.

I also extend salutaions to the Party Officials, functionaries, cadres and all the SWAPO members who, althoggh not with us here remain committed and loyal combatants of the Party. The courageous and determined efforts of our men, women, workers, youth and students who, despite the enemy fascist repressive machinery, are today carrying a formidable political and military resistance inside the country need our admiration a and tribute. Same is true with those of our comrades who are languishing under fascist, dehumanising conditions on the Robben Island, in prisons and concentration camps in Namibia and racist South Africa.

And, on behald and in the name of SWAPO and hhe people of Namibia, I would like to express our highest gratitude to His Excellency, President

Kenneth Kaunda, the Party (UNIP), the Government and people of Republic of Zambia for making it possible for us to meet in this beautiful, brotherly independence African country. Zambia, under the dynamic leadership of President Kaunda, deserves a special mention in the pages of contemporary history.

Dispite constant armed and political provocations and aggressions by the fascist forces of John Vorster of racist South Africa and rebel Ian Smith of Rhodesia costing many lives and properties, Zambia remains committed to the principles of Majority Rule and the liberation of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This progressive position and unity of purpose explain the inseprable link which today exists between UNIP and SWAPO.

On your behalf I address our appreciation to the Government and People of the other frontline states of People's Republic of Angola, Botswana Mozambique and Tanzania and other OAU member states which continue to give consistent and redoubled political, diplomatic, material and moral support to the national liberation Movements, including SWAPO. It is still fresh in the memories of all fighters that the frontline states as well as other OAU member states rendered unfluching political, material and moral support to FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC to defeat the joint forces of reaction, fascism, imperialism and their stooges. I would like to pay special tribute and express sincere appreciation to the OAU members States which give concrete material and moral assistance to our Movement.

Assured of the same support and encourgement, SWAPO, shall carry out and intensify the armed and political struggle in Namibia until the illegal, racist administration is deslodged from our country. It is, however, imperative to point out here that now that history is heralding in the eminent collapse of the fascist administration in Namibia and South Africa itself, racist South Africa has resorted to desperate and extraodinary tactics of subterfuge aimed at hoodwicking the world opinion that this recalcitrant regime si doing something towards and acceptable solution of the Namibian issues.

Among these manoeuvres is the so-called Constitutional Talks now going on between racist South Africa and its selected puppets and tribal chiefs in Windhoek.

As natural idealogical allies in the anti-imperalist, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle, the Socialist countries especially the Soviet Union, the German Democtratic Republic, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Cuba, Peoples Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which gives us concrete meterial assistance.

political,diplomatic and moral support. We sincerely appreciate and applaud the international task and commitment of the socialist world towards thecomplete elimination of all vestiges of the system of colonial appression, infringment of human rights and equality and all forms of colonialism, racism and exploitation. It is also important to mention the support which SWAPO enjoys from the progressive countries and peoples of Asia, especially Republic of India - Latin America, the Carribean and Arab World as well as Nordic countries - namely Sweden, Finland and Norway.

The policies of the Western imperialist countries, namely the U.S.A. West Germanyy Britain, France, and Japan etc. remain and continue to be a really serious danger and threatening impediment agninst our people's afforts to liberate our country. As our struggle become more and more advanced,and the prospects for national liberation become excellent, the main concern of the imperialists, working hand-in-glove with racist South Africa now is to place on pay-roll those who are willing and easily corruptable to play along their imperialistic, economic, political and strategic interests, and continue to exercise their veto power in the Security Council to frustrate the efforts of the international community in support of our struggle for national liberation.

In Namibia, these enemies of peace and social justice are nowdays working desperately to divide our people, using their puppets, tribal chiefs and paid agents such as Kapuuo, Ndjoba, Ben Africa, Kloppers and others. These treacherous elements who enjoy no support among the Namibian population, are now being paraded and propagated locally by the Western imperialists with a view to imposing them on our people.

What it more, the racist regime in Pretoria in close collaboration with its Western allies, under pressure of the effectiveness of SWAPOs armed and political activities, is now busy drawing up a diabolic scheme which aims at turning Namibia into a confedebation of tribal mini-states. This design expected to be announced soon entails the creation and setting up of a puppet Government under a titular black Prime Minister controlled and directed from Pretoria and to serve the interests of the Western imperialists. Like in the case of America's "Vietnamisation" programme in Indo-China, this scheme aims at the "Africanisation" of the War in Namibia. To popularise their schemes and their puppets, the imperialists are now busy lobbying and trying to put pressure on SWAPO to talk to the puppets. This is and will never be acceptable to SWAPO; and until SWAPO's preconditions

to any discussion which seek among other things, the recognition of our people's right to independence, the inviol^bility of Namibia's territorial intergrity as one and indivisible; withdrawal of all South African military and policy forces and recognition of SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, are met, SWAPO will continue to intensify the armed struggle as the most affective method towards the realisation of genuine and meaningful independence of Namibia.

Comrade,

During the years since Tanga, we witnessed a significent number of events, developments, successes and of course, like in any war situation some set back of very limeted significance. What is obvious, however, is t the fact that our Party, SWAPO, continue to grow in its fighting and combat force especially in its military and political scope, capability and effectiveness. Our military wing - the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) inflicted heavy casualities and losses on the enemy. Our force also captured large quantities of arms, ammunitions and bther war materials from the enemy. It suffices to mention only a few instances of the success by our guerrilla cadres. For example, in April last year alone our men destroyed completely and enemy camp in the Caprivi Strip wiping out more than 200 enemy troops and capturing large quantities of arms and ammunitions And within the period between May 25th and end of June this year our military cadres operating in Northern, North Western and Central regions wiped out over 76 South African soldiers, attacked enemy military installations within the vicinity of Grootfontein, Okahandja, Windhoek, Ondangua, Onuno etc. destroying and capturing boxes of ammunitions, military trucks arms and ammunitions and most important gunning down 3 enemy helikoptera. Important to say here is also the fact that during these operations among those enemy soldiers killed or wounded were high ranking army officers including a Brigadier. Still important to note is the fact that the racist South Africa regime, recalcitrant as it, has came to admit SWAPO's effectiveness in military combat and fire power.

Hard hit by the effectiveness of SWAPO's armed liberatory and political activities the racist regime embarked on aggressive methods which could be categorised into two: (a) armed invasions of the independent states which shares borders with occupied Namibia under the so-called "hot pursuit" tactics, and (b) infiltration of its agents into the rank

and file of our Party. Here, it is very important to inform this meeting that, racist South Africa, working closely with Western imperialist countries especially West Germany tried to infiltrate its agents into the rank and file of SWAPO.

Because of the unfriendly, deliberate and imperialistic activities of the West German, hostility exists between SWAPO and Bonn. SWAPO maintaining its principles that:

- Bonn withdraws its Conculate from Windhoek;
- Bonn serverse all economic and military links with South Africa and
- Bonn abrogates and cancels all Cultural, trade and economic treaties which South Africa purported to sign on behalf of the Namibian people.

All these demands of SWAPO are in conformity with OAU, U.N. position and resolutions and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of justice on Namibia in 1971. However, West Germany adamantly kept to her colonial approach on Namibia. Instead of Bonn adhering and implementing the OAU, U.N. resolution and the ICJ advisory opinion, West Germany in collusion with racist South Africa embarked on a policy of supporting and financy counter-revolutionary elements in SWAPO with a view to [illegible] causing a split and division within our Movement and thereby delay the independence of Namibia.

Through its Consulated in Windhoek, FRG sponsores trips of Namibian traitors in Bonn. Outside Namibia, the Government, in collusion with South Africa, sponsores and financed counter-revolutionaries in SWAPO, led by Andreas Shipanga.

It is importnat to mention here that treacherous Shipanga and his collaborators worked in close link with renegades like Kazonguizi and Emil Appolus who had since made efforts to go back home and participate in the Tuthhalletribal constitutional talks. It is logical to understand, therefore, that the joint efforts of these reactionaries were directed at the weakening and destruction of SWAPO as the only organised, effective fighting force capable of rendering futile the Turnhalle tribal talks now going there in Windhoek, poland, together with racist South Africa to turn Namibia into a confederation of puppet tribal mini-states. These counter recolutionaries who formed part of the BOSS's well-organised conspirary against SWAPO, sough to undermine SWAPO after which they were to go back home to join the tribal constitutional talks after fulfilling their master's poisonous assignment.

Comrades,

It becomes very imperative here for me to pay highest tribute to SWAPO Commanders, the Officers of PLAN, all the cadres and those members of SWAPO who, due to their vigilance, displine, unity of purpose and loyalty to the aims and goals of our struggle helped to identify the counter-revolutionaries easily and uprooted them from the rank and file of our Party. However, I should warn all members of the Party that the enemy cannot lay down its arms peacefully without making desperate efforts to avange its losses and defeats. For example, the death sentences illegaly passed on two of our militant members, Aaron Mushimba, SWAPO Organising Secretary, and Hendrick Shikongo on May, 12th, and increasing cases of detentions, impresonments, restrictions torture and intimidations are all situation expected from a collapsing fascist institution such as Voster's regime of Hitler type.

Thus, it is required from each and every member of SWAPO: discipline, unity and vigilance to prevent and to thwart any enemy reprisal, infiltration or intriques.

In conclusion, comrades, I would like to make one point clear in addition to what is expected from this meeting here. You are all aware that at the beginning of June this year our Comrades inside the country held a SWAPO Congress at Walvis Bay. It is delighting to say that the comrades came out of this historic event with laudable resolutions, dicisions and results, all within the principles of SWAPO and aspirations of our people. What is very important is the fact that the Walvis Bay Congress demonstrate once more the unbreakable unity and oneness of all cadres and members of our Party whether inside or outside the country, and destroyed the myth, deliberately created and promoted by the enemy and imperialists, that two SWAPO exist; one inside or so-called "internal" SWAPO and one outside or so-called "internal" SWAPO. We is SWAPO are one, united and e equally dedicated to the liberation of our country, as an indivisible, united, one entity.

Therefore, I suggest to this meeting to endorse the resolutions of the Walvis Bay Congress.

Comrades,

Lstly, allow me to express our unflinching solidarity with the combatants and fighters of ANC of Zimbambwe, so-called Somali (DJIBOUTI), Western Sahara, ANC of South Africa who are carrying out an equally protracted armed and political resistance against racist colonialism, imperialism and oppression of the majority African People in their countries. The struggle

being waged inside South Africa by school children, students, Youth and people of that country against the racist South Africa regime, is indeed heroic and a source of encouragement to all lovers of freedom, peace and social justice. We condemn the massacre of thousands of defenceless Africa people of South Africa. We also express our unrelenting support for the struggles of the peoples of Palestine and our Arab people against aggressive zionist occupations of their territories; and with the peoples of Latin America who are carrying out a popular resistance struggle against fascist dictatorship and CIA machinations. And, one again I call on the indepen Africa the Socialist and proggressive countries and people to still give increasing and concrete material assistance; political, diplomatic and moral support to SWAPO to fulfil its obligation and historic responsibility, that is, the liberation of Namibia.

LONG LIVE OUR GREAT PARTY, S W A P O
LONG LIVE THE O A U
LONG LIVE THE NAMIBIAN REVOLUTION

Thank you.
Lusaka, July 26th, 1976.

EXHIBIT G

CHAIRMAN OF THE SYMPOSIUM.
Esteemed Comrade Director
Distinguished members of the ~~presidium~~ CHAIRS OF INTERNATIONAL REVOL. MOV.
Comrade Internationalists and Comrades

Allow me on behalf of the present Namibian national group and indeed on behalf of our embattled people of Namibia in particular, to express our heartfelt and profound cordial hospitality thanks to the administration of this International Institute of Lenin for this opportunity rendered to us to acknowledge you of the prevailing revolutionary situation in our country.

We are full of exuberent and delighted to share this occassion with you to exchange the revolutionary exprience that you have acquired during your revolutionary process and the contemporary situation we all facing

We deem the contemporary revolutionary situation in Namibia coincides with the onslaught of the reaction of international imperialism as the statutory 26th Congress of the CPSU have emphasised.

The international policy of the USSR outlined in the 26th Congress of the CPSU confederated the hopes of the embattled nations of Africa, Latin America and Asia, its designed goals and destination of achieving peace, freedom and security all over the world is the beacon that the ~~at~~ present struggling people of Namibia and South Africa puts ahead its march towards freedom and social liberation.

The decaying imperialism of USA and its (young) Moribund reactionary allies are in a position to utilise their economic potentiality, they illigally posses in oppressed nations of Namibia, South Africa Elsalvador, in order to challenge and deliberately provoke the war of human distruction (under the pretext of fighting inter. ted. terrorism.)

Thus the revolutionary situation in Namibia ~~at~~ contemporarily acquires very diversity perculiarities as regards the international reactionary forces.

The situation in Namibia at present is being extravagantly deteriorated by the position ~~of the present position~~ of the United States towards the Democratic revolutions.

Very recently the present American administration under Reagan announced the National Liberation Movement as "International Terrorism".

It goes without saying that, the conduence given by the Chineese Regime to the racist, appartheid regime of South Africa and its han hegemonism policy points clearly fully to the brim of the world reactions' position towards endangering of peace and violation of the Namibian peopleS' human rights and its attempts to torpido ~~down~~ the revolutionary spirit of the Namibian partriots,

Comrades,It goes without saying that,meanwhile the slandereous activities of international imperialism has been and is under way to reverse history,the balance of forces of democracy has and is being constantly increasing in favour of freedom,progress, peace and national security.
Comrade Leonid Brezhnev,at the 26th Congress of the CPSU out-lined that in Africa the Caribean and Oceanea ten new states got their indipendence within the past five year period and they were recognised by the Soviet Union and all progressive Socialist Countries,and the birth of the new republic of Zimbabwe, the monating intensity of the liberation struggle in Namibia and now also in the republic of South Africa are graphic evidence that the rule of"Classic" colonialists and racist is approaching its ends.

Comrades,to dwell upon the conteporary situation in Namibia,we can say the present situation has acquired an alofty degree of its acuteness as a result of South Africas' appartheid,racist and fascist regimes' deliberate corraboration with international imperialism.
So far the acuteness of the situation can be viewed from the policy of the regime which is"So-called policy of Militarization".
Consequently of this policy to day in Namibia we can observe the following situation;
- Schools and hospitals are militarised.
- Years old marsial law and curfews had been introduced.
- Consentration camps(Gestapos'type) are built.
- Thus the war in Namibia has been Namibianised.

Comrades,the appartheid regime has resorted itself to all forms of brutal and sadistic unhiliation of the un armed civilians, conscription of young Namibians under its army with the pretext of the so-called"the struggle against Communism in SouthernAfrica" and the attempts to create in Namibia the so-called Constituent assembly to contest against SWAPO. DTA

Since the struggle waged by SWAPO has and is increasingly gaining momentum,the South African regime has committed itself to the support campaign from western international imperialism,
As a result of this corraboration,South Africa recently signed relations with China in exchange of arms and other materials, including military personnel experts,all aimed at punitive and aggressive operations against the sovereignity of indipendent states of Angola,Mozambique,Zambia,including the newly born republic of Zimbabwe,
Besides this,South Africa extends her corraboration with internationsl imperialism deep in the arsanels of NATO,consenquently of which the appartheid regime has been awarded the right of possesing nuclear weapon,aimed at threatening of front-line states and heightening of tension in the Southern zone of Africa-Namibia as the centre

target. The Israeli Zionist regime and the Chilean junta are nothing at face but bitter enemies of the Namibian people, who instead of supporting the regime materially, actively participates in the physical extermination of the innocent Namibian civilians and fighting in battle zone against SWAPO patriots.

Dear Comrades, it goes without saying that, while South Africa and the junior allies of world imperialism are fighting physically against the Namibian people, the so-called big five are fighting deplomatically to torpido the rising spirit of the Namibian patriots. The recent and even the previous proposals being drafted by these "Economy Mongers" under the Gang of Five are aimed at nothing else rather than the creation in Namibia a Neo-Colonialism Government which would comouflage their long economic sucking trunks.

Worth to mention the condition of the workers in Namibia albeit there are immigrant workers under the so-called "Contract Labour system" that is deteriorating heavily daily whereas these semi- workers are turned into extractor of their own mineral riches and loading full to the brim the foreign cargoes to the United States, and Britain.

All at the same time they are turned into hawers of wood and drawers of water.

Comrades, despite all these many faced and perplex situation in our country, our indifatigable leader Comrade President Sam Nujuma has more than once declared that, "the heavy burden that lies upon our shoulders was to be commited, devoted to the course of the emancipation of the Namibian nation, to roll away the horrible stone of suppression from our people thus to fulfill the historic mission as it remains our task for ever."

Dear Comrades, in order to carry out this mission successfully SWAPO has fully mobilised the Namibian man and women to the course of their struggle where as today we cannot be erroneous to declare openly that South Africas' created monument DTA has not even 15% of the supporters in Namibia at present.

Consenquently of the South African regimes' conscription policy, thousands upon thousands Namibian youth, old women and children has fled from the country to join the Liberation struggle abroad.

Combatants of PLAN military wing of SWAPO has fully achieved and scored a number of successes in Namibia to such an extent that the South African regime today does not manage to stand face to face with the combatants of PLAN.

We extend our operational areas deep in the South of the country where the enemy has created the so-called defence settlements (Camps in civilian locations).

We have established in the Northern part of the country strong embasement positions which the enemy has already recognised since she has failled to go through these lines.

Dear comrades, despite these we fully rely on the international support from Socialist countries of which the Soviet Union ranks the first, including the support from the Socialist Oriented countr-

ics of Angola, Mozambique, Socialist Ethopia, Congo, Socialist Rep. of Yemen and Madagascar.

SWAPO enjoys the over whelming support from all international Communist Movements and all progressive individuals all over the world.

Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, in his report addressing the 25th Congress of the CPSU said, I quote "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom, in so doing the USSR does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience our Communist conviction."

Comrades, it goes without saying that, the policy of peace that is being pursueded by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries was mentioned by Cde Vladmir Ilijich Lenin when he stressed after the great October Socialist Revolution about the idea of peace and security of nations.

Comrades allow me to use Cde Lenins' words: // Now the struggle for peace is on. It is a difficult struggle, we are not going to be detered by any-ones' anger or slander. We are not going to be detered by the bourgeoisiefiers', hatred for us and for our movement towards peace. //

The decleration of support and devotion to the course of peace defined by Cde Lenin and further stressed by Comrade Leonid I Brezhnev is the touch stone which shows that all people fighting for indipendence, freedom and peace are not alone in their struggle but with all peace loving forces of the globe.

The proposals put foward by Comrade Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU which are aimed at curbing the arms race, and preservation of peace and security are incompartible to the desire and interest of the imperialists since only to the simplest reason as to perpetuate its colonial, national oppression and provocation of predetory wars against sovereignity states in Africa, Latin Americ and Asia.

We Namibians under our vanguard SWAPO extends our recognition to the proposals of Cde Brezhnev as already stipulated in our programme that SWAPO holds higher the banner of Anti-Imperialist Solidarity and works together in solidarity with all progressive forces through out the world.

In conclussion comrades we say the will of revolutioneries will not be destroyed by anything and our indipendence as a result lies in the conner.

The theory and Ideology of Marxism-Leninism will be the beacon that will keep on illuminating our way towards indipendence.

LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

STRUGGLE CONTINUES
VICTORY IS CERTAIN.

EXHIBIT H

25th January, 1978

GENERAL BRIEFINGS

BY R. KAAKUNGA

FOR THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTATIVE SECRETARY.

Dear

Comrade Secretary for Defence, (if Present)
Comrade Commander of the Armed Forces, (if presen-t)
Comrade Chief Political Commissar, (" ")
Comrades Officers of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia.

Dear Comrades,

I am here today, to brief you on the decisions and proceedings of the first annual meeting of the Central Committee of our movement held in Luban go, People's Republic of Angola, from 21 to 24 September 1977. My colleague, the head of our department has performed the same duty to both the Eastern front, Nyango camp, members in Lusaka.
Comrades can any one of you tell us

What the central Committee is?

It is quite imperative that each and every Namibian in general and a SWAPO member in particular should know the significance of this organ of our Party. The SWAPO Central Committee is, briefly, the Supreme organ in the period between two congresses. It is composed of 45 members elected by a SWAPO congress for a minimum period of 5 years.

It meets annually and is the organ which elects the Political Bure of theCentral Committee, the National Executive Committee.

The central committee has the power to expel any member from the organisation.

It is in this regard concerning the central committee, that I inform you that the opening session of the Lubango meeting was glorified by the presence of the Presidents of two Revolutionary sister Republic of Angola and Comrade President Luis Cabral, of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and later the presence of the Soviet and Cuban military representatives at the same opening session, demonstrates these countries total support to SWAPO, and the harmony our Revolution has with significant events in the history of the world like, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Cuban Revolution e.t.c.

Now Comrades, before I proceed with my briefing, who can tell me how many departments are provided for in our Party's structure?

The constitution of our organisation provides for 16 Departments in our Party Structure.
Let me enumerate them:

(a) Department of Presidency
(b) Administratition
(c) Treasurer
(d) International Relations
(e) Defence
(f) Information & Publicity
(g) Transport
(i) Legal Affairs
(j) Education & Culture
(k) Organising Secretary
(l) Labcur.
(m) Youth.
(n) SWAPO Women Council
(O) Elders Council
(P) Health Social Welfare.

May I proceed with my briefings by dealing very briefly with each department.

PRESIDENCY:

I would stress the fact that apart from its Constitutionally defined role the President is the Head of The Presidency- composed of the President, Vice-Chairman and the Chairman.

The Presidency, I would stress, is responsible for contacts with Governments at the Highest level. Only the Presidency, through the President can contact other Presidents.

I would always keep The Presidency to the last.

ADMINISTRTION:

Comrades, who heads this department, and who is his deputy?
- Moses M. Garoëb - Secretary.
- Riundja Kaakunga - Deputy Secretary.
(a) All Departments (except one) are now functioning from the Provisional Head Quarters in Lusaka, Republic of Zambia. This has greatly facilitated the smooth operation of the organisation's machinary. However many Heads, of departments were until recently representatives in various countries and hence, could not take up their posts at the Provisional Head Quarters.

The Lubango meeting of our Central Committee, has decided to further strengthen the Amdinistration of the organisation by convening the first meeting of the secretariat soon after the C.C. meeting.

Comrades, before I go further, what do we understand by the secretariat of SWAPO?

- Composition of all heads of Departments or deputies in the absence of the heads/
- A representative from each wing (SYL, SWC, SEC)
- Specialised Technical cadres/ and this organ's important task is to assist the National Executive Committee in the implementation of the decisions, resolutions and directives of the congress and the central committee.

The said, first meeting of the secretariat was ~~xxxxx~~ scheduldd for the 13th January, 1978 but had to be postponed because many heads of departments were absent on various missions from Lusaka.

(b) The other important aspect concerning the functions of our Administration is the process of National Registration. It is decided that all SWAPO members starting from the President, will be issued with new membership cards as soon as possible. The Central Committee has laid down certain codelines for the issuing of membership cards, and that my mission, part of it, is to carry out a national registration campaign of all members of the Party wherever they are.

Once the registration is completed, then, membership cards will be issued. Each one must however take a formal oath allegience to the party before he or she is issued with the membership card. The meeting of our Central Committee has taken a decisión to allocate between 75 - 80 % of all our resources to PLAN, be it in the form of money, materal, training e.t.c.

In this respect, the meeting expressed its gratest appriciation and happiness about the successes scored by the heroic forces of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia over the racist troops i n our country. A typed programme of the Namibia Day commemoration held in Windhoek on the 26th August 1977, and brought by PLAN cadres who attended the proceedings in Windhoek, was played at the meeting. Here I ask you on behalf of the commander-in-chief of PLAN our President comrade Sam Nujoma and central committee of our Party, everybody to clap hands for:

(i) the commander of the Armed forces
(ii) all officers in PLAN
(iii) all cadres in PLAN

Forward with the struggle.

Comrades, at the enlarged SWAPO central committee meeting held at Nampundwe 1976, in the Republic of Zambia a People's military Revolutionary Tribunal (PMRT) was created. This tribunal, until the Lubango meeting~~x~~, was ~~xxxxxxx~~ constituted; and at Lubango the name was changed to the Peoples Revolutionary Tribunal and formally constituted. It is composed of seven (7) members and its chairman is Dr. Ernest Ngarikutuke Tjiriange.

Here again can I ask you, which department Tjiriange is heading?
- Legal Affairs.

A further decision is taken to create a speciall section of the Tribunal (military Tribunal) in PLAN in view of the fact that most crime committed against the organisation occured in PLAN e.g. the rebellion at the Eastern front.

This section of the Tribunal is compesed of nine (9) people and its chairman is comrade Salomón Hawala a commander at the Eastern front who substituded the late Hamutenya Ndadi. Four revolutionary decrees which define and prescribe the mode of punishment for the "crimes against the Namibian people" are adopted. The secretary for Legal affairs Tjiriange, has already laid proposals before the National Executive Committee for the appointment of a prosecutor and the secretariat of the court. As soon as these legal procedures are completed, all culprits will be brought to the dock. and before I conclude with this department can you tell us who is the Secretary for Defence and his deputy?

S.

Foreign or Internationalw relations:

The meeting decided to intensify the International campaign to
(a) isolate racist South Africa diplomat$cally, politically, economicàlly and to
(b) gain more support for our struggle - even to break new grounds.
All our representatives through the Foreign Relations office are ordered to intensify our campaign to isolate the facist republic and to gain more support for SWAPO.
At this juncture could you please tell us how many offices SWAPO maintain abroad?

- 13 offices in the following places:
1. West Africa in Senegal. 8. Cairo
2. Nigeria. 9. United Kinngdom & Western Europe.
3. Algeria. 10. Scandinavia countries.
4. Libia. 11. People's Republic of Angola.
5. East Africa. 12. Republic of Botswana.
6. Republic of Cuba. 13. Lusaka, Republic of Zambia.
7. United Nations.

SWAPO of Namibia gained a considerable grounds in the international areas. In 1976 we were admitted as an observer member to the United Nations General assembly and our President was accorded the honour to address the General Assembly. The only other leader accorded the same priviledge from anon-independent country was Jaser Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO).

Also in the same year, SWAPO central committee was admitted as an observer- member of the Inter- Parliamentary Union- a body

founded in the 1860's and which represents all the parliaments of the world. While dealing with the Foreign Affairs Department, may I give a short account on the talks between the "Gang of Five" and our Party. The central committee, while firmly believing and trusting that political, economical, cultural and social independence in Namibia will only come through the barrel of the gun today being carried out by the heroic sons and daughters of Namibia, has authorised the Political. Bureau of our party to persue these talks untill finally satisfied that it remained a futile exercise aimed at buying time.

What the Western countries demand from us is to lay down our guns and to go back home and participate in elections. SWAPO's standpoint is that the racist soldiers and paramilitary police forces should be withdrawn from our country before we could agree to participate in any meaningful elections and that the racists should stop its bantustanisation of our country.

Who is the secretary for Foreign Relations & his deputy?
- Peter Mweshihange & Aaron Shihepo.

TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT:

SWAPO will intensify its campaign for all kinds of transport (trucks, L/Rovers, Jeeps, Small cars e.t.c.) since these are vital to logistics- both in terms of the movement of cadres as well as of supplies to and from various points. In this regard we highly apreciate the hard work done by the drivers over long hours and for driving hundreds of kilometers month ins and month out without a rest. Lets clap hands for them.

The meeting has further decided to campaign for one or two SWAPO planes which would alliviate our transport problem. This would specifically enable us to move wounded comrades with speed, for medical attention.

Who is the head of the Transport department and his deputy?
- MAXTON JOSEF.
- KATEMBO

HEALTH & SOCIAL WELFARE

The party will embark on training more doctors, nurses, medical-assistants and other medical auxiliaries. Medical assistants in the above - mentioned categories will be asked from friendly and progressive countries. The kindergardens at Nyango and Jamba will be expanded and more additional staff will be trained to run these institutions. A special programme (prepared by the Head of the Department) of rehabilitation for those wounded at the front will

be carried out, to enable them to continue with active participation in the struggle.

Witchraft is condemned as being unscientific and a sign of backwardness/ also herbalism is descouraged provided it is being practided by approved persons. Who run this Department and who is the Deputy?

- Dr. Indongo
-, Drl Libertine Amathila.

EDUCATION & CULTURE:

The most important decision on this Department is to continue the training of technincal cadres (technicians of all kinds, administrators, scientists, teachers etc.) as well as the expansion and increase in secondary education (Form I - III) at our own centres. Furthermore it is emphasised that a programme of adult education and functional literacy will be embarked upon. In promating culture, the Party encourages our cultural heritage: our traditional dancers, songs, stories e.t.c. All these will be collected and compiled, our traditional arts and crafts will be encouraged, those who are able to read & write whether in English or vernacular should be encouraged to do so: poems, novels, songs histories e.t.c. should be promoted among the people. But in all these, we must find a refledtion of our struggle and the future we aspire to.

Who heads this department?
- Linekela Kglenga

WOMEN'S COUNCIL; YOUTH, AND ELDERS COUNCIL:

The only thing I will report here, is that the draft constitations of these wings (refered by the meeting to the Legal Affairs department), have since been adopted and sent home for the formal creation of these bodies.

LABOUR REPARTMENT:

Again here the decision was adopted for the creation of a National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). The constitution for it is still being worked on.

ORGAN-ISING SECRETARY:

An ideological school under the head of this department will be established and the organising secretary has already submitted a draft proposal to the National Executive Committee for approval. It is still being considered.

INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY:

On this Department, comrades, the meeting stressed the decision to intensify the political mobilisation of the Namibian masses through the radio and other means./

In conclusion of this department comrades, how many radio stations are broadcasting the Voice of Namibia, and from where?

- Four (4)
- Lusaka
- Dar - es Salaam
- Luanda and
- Brazaville.

In concluding my briefing comrades, allow me to quote a passage from a speech I delivered on behalf of the C.C. of our party and the Namibian People on the occassion of the 66 sniversaky of the formation of the ANC of South Africa.

On that day 8th January 1978 I said: "The People's Liberation army of Namibia (SWAPO'S military wing), the Youth and all sectors in Namibia will wage the struggle to its logical conclusion. We know that the liberation of Namibia is but only a small part of the entire process of liberation which is being waged today in the whole world. Our fait is shared by our brothers and sisters in Zimbambwe, South Africa and the progressiwe mankid. The struggle for Southern Africa is indivisible. It cannot be ceased, we can not surrender our Liberation, because we know that in the final analysis South Africa and the rebel Smith regime have to be destroyed in order to create a society free from racial oppression and colonialism in Southern Africa. Let's continue the struggle with more enthusiasm, with more determination and more faith.

Long live the Liberation of Southern Africa!
Long live Comrade President Sam Nujoma!
Long live Commander Dimo Hamaambo!
Long live the People's Liberation Army of Namibia!
Long live SWAPO of NAMIBIA!

INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH, WE SHALL WIN!
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUE !!!!!

EXHIBIT I


The African Communist
NO. 80 FIRST QUARTER 1980
FORWARD
TO PEOPLE'S POWER
THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITEE STATEMENT

LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM!

Resolution adopted at the augmented meeting of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party in November 1979

The revolutionary upsurge in Southern Africa in which the forces of reaction are locked in mortal combat with the forces of peace and progress is an integral part of the deepening revolutionary process taking place on a world scale. Everywhere we are witnessing a steady contraction of the frontiers of imperialism as the peoples of all continents surge forward on the road to freedom and independence, casting aside one reactionary regime after another. This century opened with capitalism firmly in control of the countries and resources of the entire globe, exploiting the labour of countless millions in both the metropolitan countries and the colonies in the interest of the tiny minority of the monopoly-capital ruling class. The vicious stranglehold of the exploiters was first broken by the great October socialist revolution of 1917, the most important landmark of this century, if not of all time. This revolution deepened the general crisis of capitalism, opened the way for the emergence of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonialism and the striking successes of the national liberation and working-class movement.

The events of the last decade further underline the thesis of our party that the main contradiction of the present era is between imperialism and socialism on a world scale; an era in which the balance of forces is inexorably changing in favour of the progressive forces. In this situation the most reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism are desperately seeking to reverse the tide by attempting to increase world tension, poison the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence and detente by their frantic efforts to revive the cold war climate, accelerate the arms race, undermine the SALT II AGREEMENT and consequently increase the threat of a nuclear holocaust. In contrast the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have consistently undertaken initiatives for the relaxation of international tension and the achievement of world peace.

Our Party hails the signing of the SALT II AGREEMENT between the USSR and the USA and regards it as a significant step towards curbing the arms race and therefore for strengthening detente, peace and international security. We welcome the announcement made by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev that within the coming twelve months up to 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and a certain amount of other military equipment will be withdrawn from the territory of the German Democratic Republic. This initiative clearly constitutes a genuine measure of goodwill and a concrete and tangible desire for peace by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty member countries. Our Party further calls upon all peace-loving forces to mobilize world public opinion with a view to exerting the maximum pressure to compel the NATO powers to respond favourably to these initiatives.

The reactionary ideology of anti-communism and anti-sovietism is part of the aggressive designs of world imperialism. The logical development of anti-sovietism is most clearly seen in the Peking leadership's alliance with NATO and the most belligerent circles of US monopoly capital. Unable to defend the capitalist system, which is patently failing to overcome its inherent contradictions and satisfy the needs of humanity, the imperialists seek every opportunity to undermine and discredit the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Whilst bearing responsibility for the mass murder, torture and repression committed by their own forces or those of their satellites in the cause of reaction they conduct a demagogic campaign of vilification against the socialist community under the guise of concern for human rights".

Nobody should be allowed to forget that it has been the strength and resolution of the Soviet Union and its allies which have saved not only the dream but the reality of socialism in this century, which enabled the world to survive the threat of Hitlerism, which have held back the forces of counter-revolution and war during the last 35 years. To succumb to anti-sovietism is to become a

victim of imperialist propaganda, to become detached from the world revolutionary process, to side with the enemy.

AFRICA

On our continent we witness the deepening conflict between the forces of imperialism and the forces of national independence. Within the context of the general crisis of capitalism and the increasing material strength and moral force of the socialist world, the patriotic forces of our continent are scoring new victories in the struggle to break once and for all the chains of imperialism and neo-colonialism; create conditions for overcoming the deplorable colonial legacy; secure national, economic and cultural advance; and strengthen anti-imperialist solidarity with the world's progressive forces and the liberation movements engaged in the fierce battles to overthrow the last outposts of colonial and racial oppression in the South of Africa.

The dramatic change in the balance of forces that has occurred in Africa within the immediate past is highlighted most of all in the emergence of the revolutionary people's democracies of Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. The effect of these historic revolutionary advances is not only to be seen in the heightened momentum of struggle in Southern Africa, but in the struggle for self-determination by the people of Western Sahara under the leadership of Polisario; in the important successes being achieved by the socialist-orientated states such as Congo Brazzaville, Madagascar, Benin and Algeria; and the upsurge of patriotic mass struggles in the capitalist-orientated states.

In response to the revolutionary upsurge in our continent, the imperialists are attempting to hold back and reverse the tide of advance. As we have seen in relation to their attempts to control the situation in Southern Africa, so too on a continental scale they seek to stabilise their crumbling system of neo-colonialism by increasingly resorting to military aggression and intervention, the crudest attempts to bolster corrupt and discredited regimes, and as in Ethiopia, the encouragement of counter-revolutionary forces and the criminal aggression launched by the ruling clique in Somalia. We express our profound solidarity with the communist and other democratic forces who are being persecuted by the reactionary regimes of Egypt and Sudan.

The danger represented by the aggressive forces of imperialism must not be underestimated. In Southern Africa they are at this moment conniving with the racist Botha regime and the minority clique in power in Salisbury to hold back the forces of revolution and social change. In the rest of the continent the imperialists have in defence of their interests resorted to the most barefaced

aggression and intervention as demonstrated in Zaire, Chad, Central Africa and in their support for Morocco's expansionist designs. Nobody should be in any doubt or harbour any illusions about the determination of the racists and imperialists to utilise their vast military resources at their disposal to answer the growing challenge of the anti-imperialist movement throughout the world.

We strongly condemn the aggressive and interventionist role of not only the reactionary French government, but of NATO circles under the tutelage of US imperialism. These reactionary forces seek to form politico-military blocs with the neo-colonial regimes, who act as their chief agents and pawns, in their efforts to legitimise imperialist aggression, undermine African unity and destabilise the young progressive and revolutionary states, in order to preserve our continent as an area for their domination, exploitation and plunder.

These desperate attempts of imperialism are and will be defeated through the determined struggle and unity of the people of our continent acting in concert with the world-wide anti-imperialist forces.

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

In the Middle East, Israel as the bridgehead of imperialism has been reinforced by Egypt through the treacherous Camp David Agreement. This reactionary alliance is designed to isolate the PLO, divide the Arab states and aggravate international tension. At the same time the growing economic, political and military alliance between the racist states of Israel and South Africa threatens the peace, security and independence of the African and Asian countries. Our Party supports the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO.

We condemn the criminal acts of aggression against the people and territory of Lebanon. In these regions the revolutionary struggles have reached new levels of success by the overthrow of the tyrannical Shah regime in Iran and by the policies of socialist orientation pursued by the Democratic Republic of Yemen and by Afghanistan. We call on the anti-imperialist world to intensify their support for democratic Afghanistan which is facing a determined imperialist-inspired counter-revolutionary offensive.

We fully support the communist and workers' parties in these regions in their struggles for national and social emancipation.

We unreservedly condemn the arrests, persecution and murder of communists and democrats in Iraq.

We demand the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus and pledge our support and solidarity for an independent, sovereign and democratic Cyprus.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The ignominious defeat of the American aggressors by heroic Vietnam was the most significant event of the last decade, marking the beginning of the end of US imperialist domination in many quarters of the world.

Under the leadership of Mao and his successors the Chinese regime has turned its back on socialism and openly allied itself with imperialism. Succumbing to the virus of chauvinism, the Chinese leadership proclaims the Soviet Union as its main enemy and as a result finds itself in conflict with the world revolutionary movement. For many years it has aided and abetted counter-revolutionary and chauvinist organisations such as the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, UNITA and FNLA of Angola, and has recently been exposed as having trade and other links with racist South Africa. It applauded the murder of communists by Pinochet, Numeiry and the Shah. It supported the racist-imperialist invasion of Angola; it seeks everywhere to separate the national liberation movements from their natural allies, the socialist countries; and actively pursues a policy of domination and expansionism.

At the beginning of 1979 it committed the most criminal outrage and treachery of our time by shamelessly invading socialist Vietnam, bringing death and destruction to a long-suffering people who after 30 years of sacrifice, had finally freed themselves from the shackles of imperialism. This crime of the Chinese leadership is no accident, no aberration, but the natural outcome of anti-sovietism and anti-socialist policies within China.

The reactionary Peking leadership also conducts a hysterical campaign of aggression against Laos and Kampuchea. Together with the international community we condemn the genocidal policies and actions of the former Pol Pot and Ieng Sary clique which resulted in the death of millions of Kampucheans. We fully support the revolutionary democratic government of Heng Samrin.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

On the fighting continent of Latin America, Cuba is a beacon of advance. It is fulfilling the noblest principle of proletarian internationalism by its militant solidarity with the forces of national and social liberation in Africa and other countries.

As with the African continent there is a general upsurge of the anti-imperialist struggle and this is reflected in the revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorial regimes of Nicaragua and Grenada, by the progressive government of Jamaica and the intensification of the struggles for democracy and social progress in Guyana and Brazil, and against the fascist and dictatorial regimes in Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

We condemn the dangerous conspiracy of the imperialists to set up a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) comprising South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile as an extension of the anti-people NATO alliance. We call upon the progressive forces in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa to conduct a campaign to smash the growing economic, political and military links between the reactionary regimes in this region and racist South Africa. We fully support all efforts at bringing about closer cooperation and solidarity of progressive and revolutionary movements of this region and Africa.

THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The SACP reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to the cohesion and unity of the world communist movement and the principle of proletarian internationalism. It is precisely because the desperation of the imperialists on the one hand and the adventurism of the Chinese leadership on the other contain within them the threat of war and the destruction of all the gains to humanity since the October revolution as well as the prospect of further social advance, that the maintenance of the principle of proletarian internationalism is of cardinal significance. It is the duty of every communist party, not only to fight for social transformation in its own country, but also to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and to consolidate the ranks of the international communist movement. We who are part of the liberation movement of South Africa must never fail to appreciate and insist that solidarity is a two-way process, that the aid and support which the socialist countries give so generously, and at the expense of their own material gains, to freedom fighters everywhere, can only be reciprocated by unswerving identification with the socialist community in the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism. There is no room for "neutrals" in the struggle to eliminate from the world the last vestiges of colonialism and racism, to win for all peoples the right to real freedom and independence, the right to live in peace and security from the cradle to the grave.

We fully support all initiatives leading to the further strengthening of the world communist movement. In this respect we reiterate our call for an international conference of the communist and workers' parties. Over the past few years there have been regional conferences of communist parties of the countries of Africa, Arab, Latin America and the Caribbean and of Europe, which have contributed to the further strengthening of the world communist movement. We endorse the document adopted by the historic first conference of the communist and workers' parties of Tropical and Southern Africa.

IMPERIALIST LINKS AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

Our Party vehemently condemns the Western imperialist powers of the USA, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan and Israel which, in violation of UN and OAU resolutions, maintain close and multifold links with the racist regimes of South Africa and Salisbury. It is the assistance from these countries that has equipped the police and armed forces of these murderous regimes with their modern weaponry. Direct help from the West, particularly from US, West German, French and Israeli monopolies has enabled South Africa to establish a nuclear industry. South Africa, which is now capable of producing its own nuclear weapons, poses a threat to world peace.

Fearful of the rising tide of revolution, fearful of the prospect of losing their highly profitable field of investment and strategic mineral resources, the Western countries continue to prop up the apartheid regime through their investments, trade, political and military collaboration.

We South African Communists call on all the progressive forces in Africa and the world, and we particularly appeal to the communist parties, working class, trade unions, democratic forces, students and youth of the imperialist countries to increase their invaluable solidarity actions with our struggling people and mobilise the greatest possible mass pressure on their governments and monopoly ruling circles so as to achieve the maximum possible isolation of racist South Africa and support for the SACP, ANC, Patriotic Front and SWAPO.

We express our deepest appreciation to the socialist community, the Non-Aligned Movement under the present dynamic leadership of Comrade Fidel Castro, the OAU, the Anti-Apartheid Movements and communist and progressive forces in the capitalist countries for their invaluable support for our struggle.

Despite all the dangers and conflicts which threaten us on all sides, the area of influence of our enemies has steadily contracted during the past few decades. Despite setbacks and desertions, the united front of the socialist countries, the national liberation movements and the international working class has steadily carried forward the banner of social and national revolution. The passage of each decade sees us nearer our ultimate goal, the creation of a classless society on a global scale in which the exploitation of man by man will be brought to an end and where, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

We stand firm by the tried and tested alliance which history has forged for the benefit of our cause and, armed with the ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism, march forward in the confidence that final victory is in our grasp.

EDITORIAL NOTES

TURNING POINTS IN OUR HISTORY

This year marks the 25th anniversary of two key events in the history of the South African liberation movement — the foundation in March 1955 of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), a component of the Congress Alliance and still the only genuine non-racial trade union federation on the South African scene; and the Congress of the People which adopted the Freedom Charter on June 26 of that year. In commemoration of these historic occasions, the ANC has proclaimed 1980 the Year of the Freedom Charter, while SACTU is calling for 1980 to be observed as the Year for the Mobilisation of the Workers.

The birth of SACTU and the Freedom Charter were high-water marks of the people's struggles for freedom, and we propose during the course of this year to

publish articles analysing their significance and more especially their relevance for freedom fighters today. The Freedom Charter, adopted by over 3,000 delegates from all over the country and embodying the demands of the people submitted from all centres in town and country, set out the framework of the new society for which our people have been struggling throughout this century as the only realistic alternative to the repressive apartheid state under which the mass of the people are exploited by the tiny minority of white racists. SACTU, formed as a direct result of the exclusion of African unions from the white-dominated S.A. Trade Union Council (now TUCSA), was set up by delegates from 34 trade unions representing 42,000 members who attended the inaugural conference in Johannesburg. The SACTU constitution adopted at the conference stated: "The future of the people of South Africa is in the hands of the workers. Only the working class in alliance with other progressive-minded sections of the community can build a happy life for all South Africans, free from unemployment, insecurity, poverty, racial hatred and oppression — a life of vast opportunities for all".

The fear which the Freedom Charter and SACTU inspired in the gangster rulers of our country can be measured by the frantic attempts which were made to destroy them. The Congress of the People was invaded by an army of police before its conclusion and the leading participants and Congress Alliance activists were later arraigned on a charge of high treason in a case which dragged on from 1956 to 1960. The birth of SACTU was followed by intensified persecution of its officials and those of the unions affiliated to it, most of whom were jailed, banned or driven into exile. Yet the ideas for which they lived and fought, and for which many died, are today stronger than ever, more firmly planted in the minds and hearts of the people, more dangerous to the enemies of the people.

It is not enough, however, to look back on the past with pride. If this year's anniversaries are to have any meaning, then we must accept the directives of the ANC and SACTU to turn 1980 into a year of mobilisation and intensified struggle to achieve the aims of the Freedom Charter and the SACTU constitution. The past 25 years have seen the consolidation of the authority and influence of the ANC and SACTU so that today both inside and outside the country they are accepted as the genuine representatives of the people. But they are more than spokesmen. They are also organisers and fighters. They have built Umkhonto we Sizwe and many trade unions, they have fought pitched battles with the enemy and organised a multitude of strikes for higher wages and better conditions. Internationally they have worked successfully to bring about the situation of isolation and ostracism from which the apostles of apartheid are struggling to extricate themselves.

As the struggle in southern Africa reaches new heights of intensity, the ANC and SACTU, as well as our own Communist Party, have sent out calls for the mobilisation of the people which must meet with a massive response if we are to achieve our goals. Mobilise, organise and fight — this is the only road to victory. The resolutions of the Central Committee of the SACP which we publish in this issue provide an invaluable analysis of the current situation and chart the road ahead. They deserve close study by all who love peace and freedom and want to see an end to the inhuman tyranny and oppression which has scarred our country for so long and which now threatens to plunge the whole of southern Africa into intensified conflict opening the way to a third world war.

A TRAGIC LOSS FOR AFRICA AND THE WORLD

The death of President Neto on September 10 last year was a sad loss not only for the people of Angola but for the whole progressive world. At a memorial meeting in London Dr Yusuf Dadoo, national chairman of the South African Communist Party and vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the African National Congress, delivered the following address:

We have gathered here to pay our last respect and homage to the memory of Comrade Agosthino Neto — the beloved leader of the heroic Angolan people, the architect of the People's Republic of Angola — founder and first President of the MPLA-Workers' Party, a Marxist Leninist vanguard Party to guide the destiny of Angola on the socialist oriented-path for the eradication of the evil legacy of dastardly Portuguese colonialism — poverty, hunger, backwardness, illiteracy — to fight back against the sinister neo-colonialist manoeuvres of imperialism, to end the exploitation of man by man — to lead and mobilise the masses in town and country for economic advancement and social progress — for a better life for the people.

Comrade Neto possessed outstanding qualities of leadership — absolute dedication to the cause of freedom, infinite capacity for suffering and sacrifice, undeviating belief in the power of the people, ability to maintain intimate contact with the masses at all stages of the revolutionary struggle and, most importantly, a clear and scientific understanding of the revolutionary process — qualities which placed comrade Neto in the front rank of the leadership of the national and the international revolutionary movement. He knew and understood that the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Africa was closely

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interlinked with the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa against the racist regimes.

He knew and understood that racist South Africa constituted the bastion of imperialism in Africa which not only terrorised and exploited the black people of South Africa but also presented a grave threat to the security of the African continent and the peace of the world.

He knew the nature and inner workings of the South African racist regime. We in the African National Congress have had the honour and pleasure of working with Comrade Neto since the sixties. He was truly a staunch friend and comrade-in-arms and our movement benefited immensely from our mutual association. Comrade Neto as the President of the Angolan People's Republic was unswerving in his support for the liberation movements of Southern Africa. I recall what President Neto said in 1976:

> "The liberation movements of the regions still dominated by the racists co-operated intensively with us in the tasks of liberation. Thus the ANC of South Africa, the Zimbabwean and Namibian liberation movements . . . always gave vigorous support to the MPLA. The Angolan people will not forget their international duty. We shall be unsparing in our efforts to support the struggle of our comrades in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe."

Comrade Neto was an outstanding internationalist. He gave his unstinting support and the support of his movement to the freedom-fighters in Vietnam, the Middle East, Latin America, indeed, wherever the people were fighting against imperialism and colonialism and for freedom.

It was the greatness of comrade Neto that he recognised that the balance of world forces had changed radically, that imperialism was no longer the decisive force capable of ruling the roost, that the growing unity of the three mainstreams of the revolutionary process, the socialist world, the national liberation movement and the working class and progressive forces of the capitalist countries was becoming the decisive force of world politics.

Thus it was that when the very existence of the People's Republic of Angola was threatened by the invading forces of Zaire and racist South Africa with their Angolan stooges — the FNLA and UNITA — masterminded by US imperialism, President Neto and MPLA, whilst relying on the people's armed forces FAPLA and the determination of the entire heroic Angolan people for the defence of the Republic, had no hesitation in calling to their aid the internationalist military and material support of the Soviet Union and Cuba backed by the moral and material support of the progressive forces of the world.

The well-equipped racist armed forces of South Africa not only received a bloody nose on the battlefields of Angola but the myth which the racists of South

Africa had harboured in the invincibility of their armed forces was ground to the dust.

The revolutionary life of comrade Agostinho Neto is a shining example of a true revolutionary — it will forever be an inspiration to all revolutionaries, to all freedom fighters the world over engaged in a life and death struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism and for peace, national independence, socialism and social progress.

The African National Congress and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe and all the freedom fighters of South Africa extend their condolence to the Central Committee of the MPLA Workers' Party, to the government and brave people of Angola, to the armed forces FAPLA and to the family.

On our part we pledge that our people will always remain loyal to the revolutionary cause that comrade Agostinho Neto set both for the Angolan and South African people. We shall not rest until the racist regime is destroyed and people's power won.

Hamba Kahle, dear comrade, leader of all peoples fighting for national and social emancipation. We shall always cherish your poems — giving inspiration and hope to the struggling masses.

Here are our hands
open to the fraternity of the world
for the future of the world
united in certainty
for right for concord for peace

A Lutta Continua!
A Vittoria E Certa!
Amandla! Power to the People!

The report presented by President Neto on behalf of the Central Committee to the first congress of the MPLA in Luanda in December 1977, together with the Theses on Education adopted by the congress, has now been issued as a booklet by the Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre, 34 Percy Street, London W1P 9FG, price £1.50. The report is a brilliant summary of the history of MPLA and an explanation of the way it has triumphantly applied the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the concrete conditions of struggle and reconstruction in Angola. — Ed.

HONOURED BY THE PROGRESSIVE WORLD

The Central Committee of the South African Communist Party has been deeply moved by the many messages of appreciation which it received on the occasion of the 70th birthday of its chairman, Dr Yusuf Dadoo, on September 5, 1979. The messages testify to the high esteem in which the SACP and its leaders are held by the international Communist movement and the whole progressive world.

In honour of the occasion, Dr Dadoo was awarded the Order of Dimitrov by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; the Order of Karl Marx by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic; the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; the Gold Medal of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation; the Scroll of Honour of the World Peace Council; and the Decoration of the Hungarian Peace Movement.

Messages of congratulation to Dr Dadoo and the SACP were received from the African National Congress (SA) and the SA Congress of Trade Unions, the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria, the Socialist Party of Australia, the Communist Party of Austria, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the Communist Party of Belgium, the Communist Party of Brazil, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Canada, the Communist Party of Chile, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Progresive Party of Working People (Akel) Cyprus, the Communist Party of Cuba, the Communist Party of Finland, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the German Communist Party, the Communist Party of Greece, the Communist Party of Great Britain, the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, the Communist Party of Honduras, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of Indonesia, the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Communist Party of Ireland, the Communist Party of Israel, the Jordanian Communist Party, the AKFM/KDRSM of Madagascar, the Progress and Socialism Party of Morocco, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the New Zealand Socialist Unity Party, the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Polish United Workers' Party, the Communist Party of Portugal, the Communist Party of Puerto Rico, the Rumanian Communist Party, the Communist Party of El Salvador, the African Independence Party of Senegal, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Sweden, the Communist Party of Turkey, the Communist Party of the USA, the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Messages were also received from the following national and international organisations:

M. Mainza Chona, Secretary-General, United National Independence Party of Zambia; The President of Panama in his personal capacity and as a member of the Presidential Bureau of the World Peace Council; the American Committee on Africa; the Anti-Apartheid Movement (UK); the Belgian Committee Against Colonialism and Apartheid; the Botswana Independence Party; the All-Britain Peace Liaison Group; the British Columbia Peace Council; Canadians Concerned About Southern Africa; the Colombian Peace Council; the Czechoslovak Peace Committee; the Movement of Peace, France; the Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council; the Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic; the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace; the Peace Committee of Guadeloupe; the People's National Congress of Guyana; the Guyana Peace Council; the Hungarian Peace Movement; the All-India Peace Solidarity Organisation; the Jamaica Peace Council; the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq; the Malagasy Committee for Peace and Friendship Among the Peoples; the Peace Movement of Mali; the New Communist Party (UK); the Polish Peace Committee; the Swedish Peace Committee; the Swiss Peace Committee; the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee; the Soviet Peace Committee; E.S. Reddy, Director, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid; the Vietnam Peace Committee; the Women's International Democratic Federation; the World Federation of Democratic Youth; the World Marxist Review.

Messages were also received from many other organisations and individuals. On behalf of Dr Dadoo and the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, we express our warmest appreciation of the fraternal solidarity demonstrated by our comrades throughout the world and assure them that our movement has been greatly encouraged and strengthened by their declarations of support.

Long Awaited

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

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
The African Communist
NO 86 THIRD QUARTER 1981
1982 • 1 •
60 FIGHTING YEARS
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
1921 – 1981

Smash the White Republic of Black Misery!

Statement by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party on its 60th Anniversary

The South African Communist Party was born on July 30th 1921. On that day those who gathered to launch our party of the working class pledged to struggle for a South Africa when its people

> **"shall no longer cower under the bludgeon of the oppressor, when the necessaries and amenities of life, the comfort and the culture, the honour and the power, shall be to him who toils not him who exploits, when none shall be called master and none servant, but all shall be fellow workers in common."**

It is this glorious vision which has inspired our Party in the 60 years of its life — 60 years of uncompromising struggles against racism, against capitalist exploitation and for a socialist South Africa in which the riches of our land will be returned to our people.

From the moment of its birth, our Party has been hated and feared by the racist ruling class and, in 1950, was the first organisation to be driven underground. Our leaders and members have in the last 60 years suffered unending persecution,

imprisonment, torture and even hanging.

In common with the capitalist ruling class in every part of the world the enemy continues to spread its poisonous anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda to make people believe that Marxism is an alien ideology and that communists are merely "foreign agitators".

Our party — the first Marxist-Leninist working class vanguard on the African continent — has earned this hatred from the enemy and its imperialist allies because its ideology and revolutionary practice have always struck, and continue to strike, at the very heart of racist oppression and its foundation, capitalist exploitation. In every class and national battle which has been fought in the last 60 years, communists — African, Coloured, Indian and White — were always there amongst those in the front line, giving their all to the cause of liberation. They are, and have always been, of the people, sons and daughters of the soil, patriots united by a common hatred of the oppressor and dedicated to the destruction of all forms of exploitation of man by man.

Today, on our 60th anniversary, we recall with pride our communist heroes whose names have come to symbolise the very spirit of resistance and defiance to all forms of oppression — men and women who dedicated and often sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom. Some fought and died in the fierce struggles waged by the working class in the early decades of this century. Some were members of Umkhonto we Sizwe who fought and died in Zimbabwe in 1967. Many of the new generation of Communists which has emerged since the Soweto upsurge in 1976 have joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and some have already died on the field of battle. Some were massacred by the racist murderers at Matola. Many are amongst the political prisoners on Robben Island and Pretoria Central Prison. Many of those who over the years have been murdered by the security police in detention were members of the Communist Party. Others continue to risk their lives in the Party and liberation underground.

These are the so called 'foreign agitators': African, Coloured, Indian and white revolutionaries, who live and die for the cause of the people and its most oppressed group, the black working class; workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals who became servants of the cause of all the oppressed working people; Xhosas, Zulus, Tswanas, Sothos, who broke with tribalism and regionalism

and have helped build the unity of the black oppressed; Coloureds and Indians who have made common cause with their African brothers; whites who have rejected the privileges of racist supremacy and have become comrades and brothers in the cause of liberation.

We Represent The Future

The enemy hates us because we represent a future South Africa of one united people in which 'none shall be called master and none servant'. They hate us because they know that our ideology — Marxism-Leninism — is the most serious threat to the system of capitalist exploitation which is at the bottom of race supremacy in our land. They hate us because, together with the working class of the world, we work for a socialist society which will bring peace and end all forms of social injustice and exploitation.

On this our 60th anniversary we celebrate not only the courage and heroism of so many individual communists but we also look back with pride at the contribution our party has made to the overall struggle for national liberation. In the 30s, under the slogan of a 'black republic', our party was the first to demand majority rule in South Africa. The great miners' strike of 1946, the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the squatters' movement, the Congress of the People in 1955, the anti-pass campaigns of the late 50s, the general strikes against racial oppression and the white republic, the bus boycotts — in all these heroic struggles the SACP played an important and key role.

From the days of the ICU to the Council of Non-European Trade Unions to SACTU, our Party has always been amongst those in the forefront organising trade unions, mobilising the workers and leading them in their battles against the capitalist class and its racist state. When the situation demanded a turn to organised revolutionary violence in the early 60s, our Party together with the ANC helped bring into existence the fighting arm of the liberation movement — Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Today the SACP is a vital part of the liberation forces headed by the African National Congress. This alliance aims to unite all sections and classes amongst the oppressed and other truly democratic forces for a revolution to destroy white domination. This revolution, whose main content is the national liberation of the African and other black oppressed groups, must put an end to race

discrimination in all its forms, restore the land and wealth of our country to the people and guarantee democracy, freedom and equality of rights and opportunities to all.

The Key Force — The Black Working Class

We believe that the immediate struggle to destroy racist colonialism and to win national freedom is an essential part of the struggle for a future socialist South Africa.

In this struggle the key force has always been, and will continue to be, the black working class in alliance with the masses of the landless rural people. It is this class which finds its most staunch champions in our South African Communist Party.

We celebrate our 60th anniversary against the background of mounting people's struggles on all fronts. Our working class is once again engaged in a growing strike movement and there has been an impressive growth of trade union organisation. Our youth has been in a continuous state of confrontation with the enemy for the last 5 years, in the schools, universities and in the locations. Pockets of resistance have arisen in the countryside against the Bantustans and the forced resettlement schemes. The black churches are showing an increasing determination in their rejection of the worst features of racism.

Despite unending intimidation, harassment and bannings, the people are ever finding new ways of setting up popular legal and semi-legal forms of mass organisation. The oppressed black women are once again moving towards the creation of organised levels of local and national resistance. Bus boycotts and resistance to rent increases persistently break out in widespread areas of the country. The blows of Umkhonto we Sizwe against the enemy have become more wounding and our people and the whole world recognise the growing sophistication and capacity to strike by our armed cadres. Workers in the political underground have made important strides and, through their revolutionary activities, the ANC and its allies stand today as the unchallenged leaders of mass resistance and the struggle for people's power.

Despite economic blackmail and murderous attacks by the racist army, the independent states of Southern Africa refuse to be intimidated. The smashing of the Smith-Muzorewa regime in Zimbabwe has now completely eliminated the chain of buffer

colonialist states which cushioned racist South African from the rest of our continent. With the intensification of the armed struggle of the Namibian people led by SWAPO, we can look forward to a speedy end to South Africa's colonialist occupation of that territory. South African Communists, whose party 60 years ago was the first to raise the red flag of Marxism-Leninism on our continent, are especially inspired by the newly born states of Mozambique and Angola led by liberation movements which have transformed themselves into Marxist-Leninist vanguards of their working people and are engaged in the continuing revolution to create conditions for the building of socialism in their countries. The spectre of socialism and communism, born of people's liberation struggles, now stares at our common enemy right in the face from the borders of Mozambique and Angola. And the enemy trembles at the knees.

Internationalism

The revolutionary advances in Southern Africa have been won through sacrifice and struggle and with the internationalist support of the socialist world and, more especially, the Soviet Union, the first society ruled by and for workers who captured power in the great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. We are proud that for 60 years our party has been part of the great international brotherhood of workers and Communist Parties which have always stood four-square behind our struggle against racist and capitalist tyranny. The enemy's intensified anti-Communist and anti-Soviet campaign is itself a tribute to the consistent support which our struggle has received, and continues to receive, from the world socialist forces.

Our people will not be taken in by the slander of the racists. They know that wherever oppressed people have been forced to confront the enemy, the AK, produced by Soviet workers, has become the feared symbol of the fight for freedom. They know too that it is the socialist world which is the biggest obstacle to the manoeuvres of the racists and their imperialist allies in their attempts to turn back the clock of history and to destroy the gains of the African revolution.

On this our 60th anniversary, the South African Communist Party pledges not to spare itself in the important battles ahead. We face the future armed with the legacy of our heroic past. We are inspired by the great South African Communist heroes and martyrs

whose blood has watered the tree of freedom in our land. We are reinforced by the liberating ideas of Marxism-Leninism. We are nationa! patriots, sons and daughters of the soil, who live and breathe proletarian internationalism.

We stand on guard against all forms of narrow and backward nationalism, tribalism, racism and regionalism. We represent that class — our working people — who have nothing to lose but their chains and whose future can only be guaranteed by the eventual destruction of capitalism and the building of a socialist South Africa in which "none shall be master and none servant."

On this our 60th anniversary we call upon all sections of the South African people — workers, peasants, youth, women, and the oppressed middle strata, to engage the enemy on every front, to strengthen the underground, to build and strengthen their mass organisations, to isolate the collaborators, to destroy the Bantustans and those who are attempting to sell their people's birthright, and to strike ever more wounding armed blows against the white republic of black misery.

On this our 60th anniversary we pledge to strengthen and cement even further the unity of the liberation forces headed by the ANC, and to spare nothing in the struggles ahead.

LONG LIVE THE SACP!.
LONG LIVE THE ANC!.
LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM!.
FORWARD TO PEOPLE'S POWER!.
FORWARD TO A SOCIALIST SOUTH AFRICA!.

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S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY ANNIVERSARY ON JULY 30

IN RETROSPECT — 60 YEARS ON

by Toussaint

How are the achievements of one party in a many-partied political struggle to be separated from those of others? How does one decide: this was *our* contribution and achievement, all else the achievement of others?

Such questions are unanswerable. The history of the past 60 years is like a rich tapestry, in which only some of the threads represent the special contribution of the Communist Party. But pulling threads out of the cloth destroys both the pattern and the real worth of the tapestry. Our history, then, is properly to be read and understood only within the whole weave of history — within the complex inter-relationships built up on our side between Communists, African nationalists, trade unionists and liberal democrats, against, on the other side, the interlinked forces of boer and capitalist reaction, white supremacism and imperialism.

There is, however, much of the Communist Party's history which is unique unto itself. It would be possible to recount, for example, the many meetings and campaigns launched, the protests and struggles undertaken. It would be possible to append a list of members martyred in prisons or

killed in struggles, or of resolutions taken and programmes framed. But these, all together, amount to far less than the total achievement of the Communist Party. They are the main part of what is special to us alone — our own, *separate* record in these 60 years. All else, all the triumphs and advances no less than the retreats and defeats, are the shared heritage of Communists and all who were our allies in the national liberation movements and the trade unions.

To assess these achievements one must look not to the history of the Party alone, but to the whole history of the South African movement in struggle. Such a history is beyond the scope of this article. It has been done elsewhere, in several books, better than it can be done here.

But neither does this article claim to review the whole achievement of the Communist Party over 60 years. What is attempted here is an assessment of only one aspect of the record — the really vital contribution made by the Communist Party to the joint struggle — the Party's development of a real understanding of the relationship between proletarian revolution and national liberation in South Africa. Or, put another way, the relationship between the fight for socialism and the struggle for national liberation.

The Communist Party cannot claim to have been alone in debate and policy-making on this matter. But the historical record shows that the Party opened up the trail for others to follow. It developed a theory for itself and the whole South African movement, painfully, step by step; and even now it is still evolving new depths to that theory.

Today the whole problem of socialism and its relationship to national liberation develops in an atmosphere very different from the days when the Party was formed. Years of Party history, Party debate, Party struggle and public Party educational and propaganda work have wrought a change. Where once the Party alone grappled with this problem, now a common understanding of it unites the revolutionary movement. If there is now near unanimity of approach, and a shared understanding of what socialism and the national liberation movement contribute to each other, that is a testimony to the Party's search for understanding, and its ability to learn from its own experience and from the experience and wisdom of its allies.

If there *is* a strand of Communist Party history which can be separated from the whole tapestry, this is it — the Party's struggle to reconcile socialist and liberationist aspirations which runs like a theme-song through the whole of its 60 years.

The Search for Understanding

How can the class aims of the industrial proletariat be integrated with the national aspirations of an oppressed population? And that within a single country? The question is of course not unique to South Africa. In many places where capitalism has developed within a colonial frame the same challenge is to be faced. But in South Africa the issue has been most acute, and the solution most difficult.

When the party was formed in 1921, those sharp class-national divisions which still make South Africa unique were already deeply entrenched. A white proletariat monopolised all the skilled, well-paid jobs in mining and industry, it enjoyed most of the privileges of the ruling class. And by its side was a black proletariat, confined by law and custom to the unskilled, poorly-paid jobs, denied all social and political privileges or rights. How then was the Party to interpret its mission to be ".. the party of the proletariat", and its aim to bring about ".. proletarian revolution"?

The complexities were immense. The white proletariat was largely composed not of native sons but the first generation immigrants from the industrial complexes of Britain and elsewhere. They had brought with them not just their skills but also the ideas and experience of the European working class; those ideas persisted, only marginally adapted to the new and very different problems and conditions of South Africa. The black proletariat too was largely composed of first generation wage workers, fresh from tribal societies of the hinterland, often still with strong family and property ties with the countryside, and often in the industrial areas only on short-term contracts of less than a year.

From its founding conference, the Party struggled to orient its attack to these complex conditions. There were some obvious and simplistic answers to the questions posed by these conditions. First simple answer: the white proletariat was organised, with trade unions on the British model; it had experience of fierce class conflict with the ruling class derived from several bitterly fought strikes of the first world war and the post-war period; it had a sizeable socialist element which had built the Labour Party, and a number of smaller socialist groupings which had come together to found the Communist Party. Therefore, that white proletarian minority was the best organised, class conscious and socialistically oriented section of the population; and the proletarian party and the proletarian revolution accordingly would come from amongst them.

Second simple answer: The black proletariat was unorganised, and still only temporarily proletarian between intervals as peasants; the black

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majority as a whole was largely pastoral, outside the class conflicts of the capitalist world; its nationalist aspirations were as yet only crudely formulated and supported only by a small, educated elite; its trade unions flickered ephemerally in struggle on single issues and then subsided into obscurity. Therefore, leadership of the proletarian revolution could not be expected from them.

Deep — Not Simple

But Marxism is not a science of simple and obvious conclusions drawn from the surface appearance of things. Marxism teaches people to look below the simple surface appearances to discover the real processes of growth and change going on underneath. From its beginnings, the South African Communist Party set out to build itself in the Marxist mould.

It was not simple. At the last conference in Johannesburg of the International Socialist League in January 1921, to which other organisations had been specially invited to discuss the formation of a single Communist Party covering the whole of South Africa, most of the 100 or so delegates who attended were white, though there were representatives from the Indian trade union movement in Durban and the African trade union movement in Johannesburg. This conference appointed a five-man unity committee which prepared the way for the founding conference in Cape Town in July 1921. The delegates at this our founding conference, which adopted a constitution and programme, elected the party leadership and applied for affiliation to the Communist International, were all white. Yet the records show that on the evening before the conference was opened, a public meeting in Cape Town at which the intention to launch the Party was made known was attended by an audience of over 2,000, the majority of whom were Coloured workers.

There were, at first, differences of emphasis and approach to the national problem amongst those who agreed to form the new Communist Party and adopted its programme. One group, mainly the skilled artisans of British origin, were influenced by their trade union experience and by the ideology of Tom Mann and Keir Hardie, as well as the more radical, syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) of America. The other group, mainly immigrants and refugees from Eastern Europe's tsarist persecution, took their inspiration from European radicalism — Social-Democrat, Marxist, anarchist or Jewish Bundist. The South African Communist Party was formed from the amalgam of these two different but

both almost entirely immigrant groups, in order — as its Manifesto said:

> ".. to hasten the time when mankind shall no longer cower under the bludgeon of the oppressor, when the necessaries and amenities of life, the comfort and culture, the honour and the power shall be to him who toils, not him who exploits; when none shall be called master and none servant, but all shall be fellow workers in common."

The very ring of phraseology is that of Europe's labour radicalism; and two trade unionist radicals, C.B. Tyler and W.H. "Bill" Andrews, were duly elected Chairman and Secretary.

Though there is little in the manifesto to indicate any real consciousness of the national problems of South Africa — or even that the overwhelming majority within the country were nationally oppressed by a master race — nevertheless the manifesto marked a new step forward for South African socialism. Up to now, socialism in South Africa had been represented chiefly: by the South African Labour Party, which proclaimed as *its* aim:

> ".. to secure for the workers by hand or by brain, the full fruits of their labour, due regard being had to the presence of an overwhelming majority of natives."

In breaking from the Labour Party mainly over the Labour Party's support for imperialist war, the founders of the Communist Party had been forced to confront not only the imperialist war, but also — in the arena of ideas — the nature of imperialism itself and of imperialist conquest of colonial peoples. Even before the Communist Party was formed, the International Socialist League had adopted a 'Charter of African Rights', and had begun the transition from abstract theorising about 'the overwhelming native majority' to the practical political work of opposing black oppression. In 1917 the ISL assisted with the formation of a general union of black workers, the Industrial Workers of Africa; and in 1919, during a strike of black workers on the gold mines, it had addressed the white workers:

> "White workers! Do you hear the new army of labour coming? The native workers are beginning to wake up. They are finding out that they are slaves to the big capitalists. But they want to rise. Why not? White workers! On which side you are you? . . . Your interests and theirs are the same as against the boss."

Seen through today's eyes, it seems little enough and scarcely touching basic South African realities of national oppression. Yet that little was in reality a tremendous pioneering break-through in white South Africa's political life. A new idea was launched upon the tide of struggle — that

black workers and whites could be allies in a common class front against capitalism. A new political direction had opened up. One of the profoundest Marxist thinkers and writers of his generation in South Africa, David Ivon Jones, said:

> "The ISL proclaimed the principle of industrial unionism... Craft unions were declared odious as dividing workers... And as part of this craft disunity, the exclusion of the native workers from part or lot in the Labour Movement was denounced as a crime."

Beyond Unionism

But even though caught in their traditional union-mindedness, Marxist thinkers could not rest content with that formulation. Their own anti-imperialist stance demanded that they face the fact of anti-imperialist organisations existing amongst the black population, however rudimentary they might be. Jones described the ANC of the time, somewhat short sightedly, as "... a middle-class organisation ... satisfied with agitation for civil equality and civil rights." But he foresaw the time, he said, when the organisations of the black *workers* would "... dominate or dispel the Congress." Then indeed there would be "... a revolutionary nationalist movement in the fullest meaning of Lenin's words."

It was in much this way that the early Communist fathers saw the ANC and the whole black nationalist movement of their times — as a 'middle-class' movement for justice, without revolutionary possibilities. They gave it what support and sympathy they could, and sought its co-operation wherever possible.

But beyond this, they were prisoners of the ideological conviction that in South Africa, already well established on the capitalist path, the main contradiction within the society was that between capital and labour; and that in the battles being fought out between these two main contending forces, the national struggle was secondary, or even irrelevant. Unless, as Jones suggested, the working class was to come to dominate or displace it, and transform it to a revolutionary force.

The main current of Communist ideology was that the revolutionary force in the country was the proletariat — and that the main task to be achieved was the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule and the establishment of a socialist state; within that state all the problems of race and colour oppression would be solved.

It would be a mistake to assume that all Communists were totally agreed

on the precise formulations; some gave more emphasis to the role of national oppression and national liberation; some less. But clearly, in the period before and after the Party's founding all of them were moving steadily *against* the mainstream of South African politics to a new and deeper understanding. Each new move forward inevitably brought new contact and exchange of ideas between Communists, the ANC, and the rapidly developing general union of black workers, the ICU. Practical political work widened the Party's horizons; so too did contact, through the Communist International, with the experiences of revolutionaries of other countries; and so too did their growing access to and familiarity with the works of Lenin, then appearing, often for the first time, in English translation. Given time, new policy appraisals would surely have been made.

But time was something the new Party did not have; or at least not time of tranquillity in which to debate theories and develop long-term programmes. When the Party was being formed, the post-war economic depression had begun; the price of gold, mainstay of the whole economy, had fallen from 130 shillings per ounce in 1919 to 105 shillings in 1921 and 95 shillings by 1922. To maintain profits despite the falling price, the mine owners through the Transvaal Chamber of Mines decided to cut the costs of production by transferring some operations from white workers to black — thus changing the black-white ratio amongst the workers. That ratio, set by the Chamber by agreement with the white workers in 1917 had, characteristically, never been discussed with the black workers themselves.

The ratio established the basic pattern of South African labour policy. Changing the ratio meant different things for different people. For the white miners it meant that certain operations previously reserved for them would be lost, and handed to blacks at much lower rates of pay; for the black miners that some jobs from which they had previously been debarred on grounds of race alone would become open, even though at lower rates of pay than those earned by whites.

It was a time of turmoil. Radicalism, revolt and protest were in the air, fanned by the deepening depression, spurred on by the success of the Russian revolution, and by the failure of capitalists everywhere to produce that 'world-fit-for-heroes' which had been so glibly promised during the war. The white miners' unions had fought a succession of bitterly contested strikes since 1913; class consciousness and militancy was high. When the news came that the black-white ratio was to be changed to their disadvantage, the white miners struck work again.

Testing Time

Within a short space of time, other industries in the country's industrial heart joined the strike in solidarity, and the Witwatersrand was in the grip of a general strike of its artisans. Communists — leaders like Andrews as well as many rank and filers — held prominent positions in the leadership of the striking unions. Thus, while any strike would have called for sustained Communist agitation and leadership, this strike — posing in itself all the class and colour conflicts of South African society — was a specially critical challenge.

It was a peculiarly *South African* strike; The white artisans came out; but the black labourers stayed in, often locked into their compounds whether they wanted to be or not. For white workers it was a battle to maintain their working standards; but because these were racially privileged standards, the trade-union content of the strike was inextricably connected with its white-supremacist content. The slogan "workers of the world unite for a white South Africa" fully expressed that contradictory mix; and inevitably in a striker-versus-scab atmosphere ugly chauvinistic passions were roused. Inevitably for many of the strikers the enemy itself ceased to be just the bosses, and became a mixture of Chamber-of-Mines capitalists and threatening hordes of black workers.

Future generations of South Africans would have time and opportunity to debate, on the basis of principle and Marxist theory, whether the Communists of 1922 should have participated in the strike or not. But for *that* generation, the answers had to be given immediately, not in debating chambers but in the midst of widespread strike action against the most reactionary and dominant sector of the ruling bourgeoisie. In the atmosphere of the times, the Communists could perceive that militant revolutionary leadership could carry the strike well beyond a simple defence of established standards, and perhaps open up revolutionary potentialities so far-reaching that none could see where the limits lay. There is no evidence that the members of the party were in any doubt about what had to be done; nor, realistically, can they at that time have done anything other than they did without totally reversing their consistent belief in the role of the organised proletariat as the front-runner of the revolution.

The Party placed itself firmly with the strike ".. convinced that essentially this is a fight against the capitalist class"; but adding — in apparent reference to the 'white South Africa' slogan "... without necessarily identifying itself with every slogan heard in the strike."

Their course of action was clear; but there were certainly misgivings about the long-term consequences. In the midst of the actions that passed rapidly from strike to armed civil war, the Communists cannot have been unaware of the dangerous currents which the Chamber of Mines had let loose, and on which some white workers' chauvinism was feeding. Bill Andrews, a member of the strikers' Council of Action and one of its most prominent spokesmen, wrote privately to a friend about the strike for which he worked tirelessly and at great personal risk:

> "My private opinion is that it will inevitably be lost; it is ... impossible for the white workers in South Africa permanently to keep the natives out of any form of industry they are capable of undertaking."

Inevitably perhaps. Yet the strike had to be fought, and the Communists fought in it willingly, carrying a unique message: 'The black workers are not your enemies, but potential allies against the capitalist class.' How effective their message was in muting the tide of white chauvinism is not clear; nor is it clear whether the party, had it wished to do so, could have breached the police and army cordons round the mine compounds to reach out also to the black miners.

The development of the strike confirmed rather than undermined Communist beliefs in the revolutionary potential of the organised white workers. The strikers passed rapidly from picketing to the formation of armed detachments, 'commandos'; there was open war against the armed forces of the state, and martial law was proclaimed. What the bourgeois press had declared from the start to be a "revolt" became in fact a revolt against the bourgeois state; and all the armed might of the state had finally to be called out to crush it. The white miners returned to work beaten; but the Chamber of Mines refrained in fear from carrying though the changed black-white ratio which had caused it all.

Semanticists may argue whether the strike was therefore lost or won. It is no longer relevant. One thing is certain. The white proletariat had risen to challenge the bourgeois state alone; and it had been mauled beyond recovery. Whether the Communists knew it at the time or not, the summit of white revolutionary militancy had been passed, and the descent from the heights had begun. The white proletariat had ended its last act as a class, opposed to and independent of the ruling class. In the strike it had proved itself to be a stubborn, die-hard defender of the entrenched privileges of the white workers; and thus, willy-nilly, of the whole white-supremacist system of black oppression which the ruling class had built to serve its own interests. From here on, through an intricate web of laws,

compromises and concessions too detailed to be traced here, the white proletariat entered the long descent from the brink of revolution to become an agent of the ruling class.

The Communist Party's own re-appraisal of the role and revolutionary potential of the white proletariat could no longer be delayed. That class, once visualised as the vanguard of the South African revolution, drifted deeper and deeper into opportunism; it embraced a Labour Party-Nationalist Party coalition to sweep the architect of martial law, General Smuts, from office; it supported and urged on the new coalition government to entrench white supremacy more fiercely than ever. A 'civilised labour' policy was proclaimed, sacking blacks from state jobs and replacing them with whites; a colour bar in industry, reserving most skilled jobs for whites only; a Native Administration Act, debarring blacks from the general process of law and transferring them to the administrations of an army of civil servants; a Land Act to reserve 87% of the country exclusively for white ownership and occupation; and an Industrial Conciliation Act, which traded the right to strike in exchange for white union rights to organise and bargain with employers.

As the white working class passed over to opportunism, the Communist Party painfully sought to re-orient its ideology. As its isolation from the white workers grew, its association with the black workers through the ICU and with black nationalists through the ANC flourished. Its activity amongst the white workers declined; and its activities amongst the blacks increased. In 1924, the Party Conference rejected a proposal to follow the line of the British Communists and seek affiliation to the Labour Party; and decided instead to concentrate its work increasingly amongst blacks. That decision signalled the decisive break with former under-valuing of the revolutionary potential of the black workers, and was reflected in the election of two proponents of the new concentration, S.P. Bunting and E. Roux, as chairman and vice-chairman of the Party.

The 1924 Conference, nevertheless, remained heavily weighted towards industrial struggle, and still tentative and unsure in its stance on the role of national liberation struggle in the revolution. The Party, it declared

> "... aims at forwarding the industrial organisations of all sections of the workers, especially those hitherto unorganised. ... The problems of the working class can only be solved by a United Front of all workers irrespective of colour."

That new emphasis on organising amongst black workers produced considerable strains in the Party ranks. Some members deeply involved in

the white trade unions found the new emphasis difficult to adapt to; some drifted out of the party, others like Andrews retired from the leadership. The field was left to a new generation of Communists, including for the first time a generation of native South Africans, black and white, who had come up through the ranks of the Young Communist League. Andrews in a press interview at the time denied any split in the party ranks; he fully supported the decisions to organise amongst blacks but "... disagreed with the emphasis and speed with which the new leadership of the Party proposed to tackle the job."

The New Turn

From one point of view his disagreement might have seemed well founded. The new speed and emphasis of the Party's turn towards the blacks completed its isolation from a white working class which was drifting in the opposite direction. That isolation has never been healed. But in another sense, his fears were mistaken. The new line, for all the energy given to it, stopped short of a complete reappraisal of attitude towards the national struggle. Nevertheless, the new direction of work brought a first generation of black Communists to the forefront of the scene — Albert Nzula, J.B. Marks, Edwin Mofutsanyana, Moses Kotane and others; they opened the way to the real breakthrough, by combining membership and work in the Party with membership and work for national liberation in the ranks of the ANC.

Left to itself, perhaps, the whole Party would have made a complete reappraisal of the national struggle in due course, moved by experience of the new line, and by the new influence of black, thus nationally oppressed Communists in the ranks. But it was not left to itself. Outside intervention forced the pace of fundamental change. That intervention came from the Communist International, in a discussion initiated in 1927-28 on "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies." The Comintern thesis dealt with South African problems in a way which sharply challenged the traditional South African Party view of the role of class and national struggles. The South African delegation to the Comintern Conference was mandated to oppose that thesis, and reiterate its own.

Speaking for the delegation, Bunting criticised the CI distinction between the 'proletariat' in the advanced capitalist countries, and the 'masses' in the colonies. There was, he declared, no distinction. In both situations the class issues were primary, the national issues secondary. The only national struggle in South Africa had been that of the Afrikaners, not

the blacks. Practical demands for the end of race discrimination and for redistribution of the land would not be won by way of national struggle. "The class struggle is more capable of accomplishing the same tasks." He described the ANC as moribund, and declared that "The Communist Party itself is the actual or potential leader of the native national movement."

The Comintern disagreed. It declared that South African blacks "... suffer simultaneously from capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and oppression." It called on the S.A. Communist Party to struggle ceaselessly against inequality in society, and against race prejudice amongst the white workers and in the Party's own ranks, and for national liberation of the black majority. Finally it declared, in words which were to shock the Party into a decisive turn in its history:

> "The Party must determinedly and consistently put forward the creation of an independent native republic, with simultaneous guarantees for the rights of the white majority, and struggle in deeds for its realisation."

That decision, soon to become known as the 'Black Republic Resolution', provided a fundamentally new Marxist appraisal of the South African scene, ending the orientation which the immigrant Party founders had carried over from their European experience.

The South African Party accepted the Comintern decision as it was constitutionally bound to do; but not without difficulty and some formidable resistance within the Party. The times themselves were beset with difficulties — a world drifting into its deepest and longest economic slump, accompanied by collapse of parliamentary governments, and the rise to power of fascist dictatorships. It was a world of turmoil, with seething currents of revolution and of despair. The Party leadership struggled to carry the Comintern line of policy into their own ranks, beset by fierce internal disputtes. Factions formed — or were alleged to have formed — to campaign in the Party for one view or another; only to be denounced and expelled from the Party by other factions with other views. Superficially it might appear as a period of senseless internecine war. But in reality it was the birth-pangs of a new Party orientation coming to life from within the body of the old. The internal struggle was long, painfully prolonged, and devastatingly weakening of the Party's structure. Membership declined, publications withered.

In the worst, most destructive phase of the inner struggle, a doctrinaire attempt to "bolshevise" the Party led to the purging of all considered to fall short of "Bolshevik" standards of perfection. Before the storm passed,

many of the best of the old leaders, including Bunting and Andrews themselves, fell victim to the purgers. By the time the purge had exhausted itself, and the fiercest of the purgers had returned to their European countries of origin, Bunting was dead, but Andrews returned to the ranks. The Party, organisationally, was at its lowest ebb.

But even so something new had been born. The old concepts, the old dogmas which had been so sharply challenged by the Comintern had been exorcised from the Party's ideology. A single, clear line of policy had emerged and been accepted, grounded in South African reality. The surviving Party remnants had made the full turn — from rejection of the national struggle to close integration of class and national struggles. When the storm blew itself out, the Party members were fully part of the black national struggle, fully integrated in the national liberation movement, and for the first time truly a part of it — albeit a special, socialist part. A new generation of Communists helped revive national liberation organisations of the Indian and Coloured minorities, and rebuilt the black trade unions and brought them into a co-ordinating Council of Non-European Trade Unions.

A New Era

In the deep decline at the end of the internal strife, the 1938 Party Conference decided to remove its headquarters from Johannesburg — the storm-centre of the inner strife — to the calmer atmosphere of Cape Town. It was a measure of desperation, a retreat from the industrial centre of the country to its periphery, from the advanced centre of the black urbanised working class to an almost un-South African harbourage where, uniquely, Africans were not yet even a majority of the population.

That retreat made a new advance possible. Under the leadership of Andrews and Kotane the Party was rebuilt from the wreckage. New district committees were set up, new members recruited, and new publications started — their names *Inkululeko* and *Freedom* telling of the new orientation of the reborn Party.

Almost the entire membership was, for the first time, South African born, of a younger generation than the Party founders. The overwhelming majority of them were activists in the national organisations of the African, Indian and Coloured people, or in the black trade unions. White trade unionists were few, even though those few occupied positions of some influence and authority in the white union movement, especially in light manufacturing.

The new ideological directions were not proclaimed in any single sweeping manifesto or programme, but were adopted pragmatically, step by step, in response to problems which arose in practical work. Though the black liberationist content of the Comintern's line was the lodestar of its work, the reviving party moved from the 'independent native republic' slogan towards an increasingly articulate struggle for national liberation of the black majority as the first stage of a transformation towards socialism; and towards a new understanding that within the black liberation movement which was an alliance of classes, the working class was the best fitted to unite and to lead the rest in common struggle, because it was the most consistently revolutionary class.

The 1940s — the years of the second world war and its aftermath — were years of unbroken advance for the Party. That advance reflected itself in profoundly changed relations between the Party and the national liberation organisations of the oppressed, and through those changed relationships, in the vast upsurge of national consciousness and the spirit of struggle for liberation which marked the wartime and the post-war years.

In unity and co-operation with the most radical and devoted elements of the national movements, the Communists lent impetus to new leftward currents which re-inspired and revitalised the movements, rescuing them from the passivity and drift which were left after the setbacks of Hertzog's 'Native Laws.' In the national movements themselves, new leading cores reformed the antiquated constitutional forms of organisation and of activity, fossilised into routine and 'parliamentary' style strait-jackets.

Exclusive reliance on acceptable parliamentary forms of action, which had characterised the past twenty years of the national movement, began to come to an end. New leaderships launched new struggles — the first mass struggles for many years; passive resistance, mass defiance of law, strikes and protest marches became the order of the day. New leaderships, steeped in the spirit of mass struggle, took over from the old; gradually the inherited pattern of racial exclusiveness began to give way and the building of real organisational unity between African, Indian and Coloured movements commenced. That unity in action and in struggle culminated in the formation of an alliance, colloquially called the 'Congress Movement', whose political campaigns dominated the country's political scene in the post-war period.

In this fruitful new era, there was a unity of purpose and of outlook in the ranks of the Party such as it had seldom had before. It remained signally free of internal disputes under the leadership of its Cape Town

committee; and for fear of reopening new schisms the decision to return the leading centre to Johannesburg — so obviously called for by the country's political geography — was never taken.

The Crisis Reversed

In 1946, as in 1922, crisis erupted on the Witwatersrand mines. But this time it was a crisis turned on its head by the new balance of forces in the country. This time, white miners stood by as inert props of the reactionary mine-owners and government; and black miners led the assault against the heartland of capital, the Chamber of Mines. A trade union of black miners had been built up during the war years under the leadership of the veteran Communist J.B. Marks. It fought a mass campaign for better pay through a long series of Wage Board hearings, Commissions of Inquiry and localised demonstrations.

But in 1946, when the government — again, as in 1922, led by General Smuts — refused to accept even the wage recommendations of its own Commission of Inquiry, 75,000 black miners downed tools.

The reversal of history was complete. While black workers struck, white miners volunteered to keep the mines going. If ever Ivon Jones' prophetic vision of a black proletarian vanguard was realised, it was here. Once again, as in 1922, the Smuts government proclaimed the strike to be a revolt; but this time counter-action was not delayed. From the first day of the strike, a massive police force was turned loose against the strikers. Police baton-charged workers to drive them out of the mine compounds and herd them down the shafts. When workers sat down underground, police followed and batoned them back to the surface again. Strikers attempting to gather near compounds were fired on and savagely attacked, and those seeking to leave the compounds and the mines were driven back by baton and gunshot.

Within a week the strike had been crushed by virtual martial law. But that was not the end. Again, standing on its head the aftermath of 1922 where white miners and their allies had retaliated by ousting the Smuts government, now the Smuts government sought retribution for the strike by setting out to destroy the black miners' union and its allies — particularly the Communist Party. The Party had assisted the organising of the miners, it had participated in all their campaigns up to and during their strike. In Johannesburg the Party District Committee and many rank and file members were arrested together with all the officials of the African Mine Workers' Union, and charged under the Riotous Assembly Act. The

charge collapsed for lack of evidence, although the accused were convicted on a minor charge. Immediately afterwards, the members of the Cape Town Central Committee of the Party were arrested, and charged with sedition. That case, too, after some time collapsed.

It was a warning signal which should have been clear beyond mistaking; the party's legality was under challenge, and the end of twenty-five years of legal existence threatened. If the prosecutions did not alert the Party to the warning, the general election campaign shortly thereafter, in which Smuts, Hertzog and Malan vied with each other in promising anti-Communist action — should have.

But the party concentrated attention completely on tasks of the moment beating off the prosecutions, and campaigning for the right of all to vote. Consideration of the warning signs of approaching illegality and of preparations to meet that contingency were pushed aside, to prevent the organisation being distracted from the main, practical, task of mass mobilisation.

Even after the white electorate had voted into power the Nationalist Party representing the most chauvinist and fascist-minded section of the white population, the Party continued to act as a political party with legal rights to operate, almost as though nothing had changed. Its example of staying in the front line without wavering, even in the face of an imminent and powerful enemy attack, influenced the whole spirit of the opposition movement. In 1949 the ANC adopted a new Programme of Action, setting its course on mass struggle by way of strikes, boycotts and acts of defiance. In 1950, in answer to a joint call by the Party and national organisations the first mass political general strike was successfully organised on the Witwatersrand. But in yet another signal of what was to come, the government responded with a total ban on meetings and processions, mass police cordons around all black townships and armed attack on gatherings of 'stay-at-home' protesters, which left eighteen dead and over thirty seriously wounded.

It was in that atmosphere of violence and terror that the Government introduced legislation to suppress the Party, and to make all extra-Parliamentary action to change the social system a crime — "statutory Communism". The Party reacted to the now open threat with renewed mass public campaigning. The national liberation movements, recognising the Suppression of Communism Act as a patent threat to their own existence, joined in to organise mass protest.

It was characteristic of the Party of that time that it concentrated almost

totally on the practical tasks of the moment. Although the threat of suppression had been looming for months, perhaps even years, the first serious Party meeting to consider how to face illegality was held while the new law was already passing through the early stages of debate in Parliament. That emergency meeting of the Central Committee revealed all the weaknesses that grow out of narrow practicalism. The meeting decided (with two against) to dissolve the Party. The general view was that, since virtually all its members were known to the police and therefore vulnerable, the Party could not ignore the law and just carry on secretly underground. Nor could it hope to change its name and continue, since the terms of the law made that equally illegal. There was some — but too little — consideration of the implications for country and people if there was to be no Communist Party; and little consideration of whether the whole prospect of South African freedom would survive if the independent class party of the working class, inspired by Marxism, perished. The meeting turned its main attention to practicalities and the terms of the law; it decided that failure to dissolve the Party would render each member liable to prosecution; and it thus concluded that the Party could neither continue nor be allowed to wither away; it must be dissolved.

An End and a Beginning

No one, it must be said, ran away. The CC decided that dissolution would come into effect only on the day the new Suppression Act became law. Until that moment, the membership would continue mobilising mass resistance to the measure; they should not be diverted from that task by prior word of the dissolution. In fact it was only within days of the actual dissolution that the Party membership was informed. Many of them accepted the decision with a mistaken conviction that an underground apparatus *must* already have been prepared, but could not be spoken about for reasons of security. Before the membership realised that the CC had taken no such steps and had in fact decided not to take any because it did not believe that it could be successful so fully was it membership known to the authorities — the Party had been dissolved, its publications closed, its assets, archives and finances dispersed.

In its programme adopted in 1962, the Central Committee of the Party criticised the decision to dissolve the party as follows:

"Despite its great achievements and struggles, the Communist Party of South Africa proved incapable of surviving under illegal conditions. Legalistic illusions had penetrated into the ranks of the Party, including its

leading personnel. The Party was unprepared and unable to work underground. These errors culminated in the dissolution of the Party. . ." The dissolution was not a momentary aberration but the culmination of an era in which narrow practicalism had been given precedence over theory.

The Party had shown several times in its history a remarkable ability to rejuvenate itself, correcting both its mistakes and the legacy of those mistakes. Another remarkable demonstration of that ability was given in the reconstruction, shortly after the dissolution, of a new Communist Party — the SACP, distinguished from and yet indentified with and continuing the best traditions of the former CPSA. In the new underground organisation, the majority of the former Party members once again took up active work amongst the people, and specially within the still legal national liberation and trade union organisations.

Despite the formidable legal difficulties and the persecutions, the people's struggle maintained its advance. Mass political strikes, mass defiance campaigns and the first rural resistance struggles moving towards incipient armed revolt came to maturity in this period of new experience. Militant struggle brought the organisations into a closer unity, emphasised by the adoption of the Freedom Charter as the common aim of all the liberation movements in the Congress camp, so close in its concepts to the programme of the reborn Communist Party that, in this period, the whole South African movement for the first time had a single agreed immediate programme. That programme was for the revolutionary transformation of the South African state, through the abolition of all discriminatory laws and practices; and for the establishment of a people's democratic order in which the main fortresses of white monopoly — the land, mines and finance — would be returned to the people.

It was a period to test the inner fibres of the whole movement — with mass trials, jailings, torture and banishments commonplace. Police shootings grew more frequent, and mass reactions more fierce. In protest at the Sharpeville massacres, the ANC called for a national general strike of protest, and Chief Lutuli led a national campaign of pass burning. The government stepped up the repression, proclaiming a State of Emergency and substituting martial law for the rule of law. Amidst mass arrests and detentions, without trial, the ANC was outlawed.

Outlawing the opposition had ironically unexpected consequences. Outlawing the Communist Party and forcing it to reform secretly underground had eliminated any lingering nationalist fears that the Party was somehow a rival, trying to steal the thunder of the national movements

or usurp their leadership; it thus laid the ground for a closer unity between the liberation movements and the Communists. Outlawing the ANC removed a barrier in the way of constant and public co-operation of ANC and Communist Party, which had existed while one worked underground and the other remained legal and above ground.

The ANC decided to ignore its suppression, and to continue to work underground. But that work could not continue in the old way. The Government had shed the final pretence of Parliamentary democracy, and demonstrated that from here on every act of protest would be met with unrestrained force and violence. And the people were demonstrating that they were increasingly unwilling to resort to protest unarmed in the face of a violent armed state.

In this atmosphere of confrontation and incipient violence, the new Communist Party marked the end of the age of narrow practicalism in a long inner debate, leading to the final adoption of a new programme — without doubt the most penetrating analysis of South Africa's reality they had yet made.

> "As its immediate task the SACP works for a united front of liberation. It strives to unite all sections of oppressed and democratic people for a national democratic revolution to destroy white domination. The main content of this revolution will be the national liberation of the African people. Carried to its fulfilment, this revolution will at the same time put an end to every sort of race discrimination and privilege. The revolution will restore the land and the wealth of the country to the people. . . The destruction of colonialism and the winning of national freedom is the essential condition and the key for future advance to the supreme aim of the Communist Party — the establishment of a Socialist South Africa, laying the foundation of a classless, communist society."

That programme, adopted at an underground conference in 1962, dealt with the evidence that non-violent means of struggle could no longer be expected to be the only means.

> "The Nationalists are forcing a solution on South Africa in which patriots and democrats will take up arms to defend themselves, organise guerilla armies and undertake various acts of armed resistance, culminating in a mass insurrection against white domination. . . The Party does not dismiss all prospects of non-violent transition to the democratic revolution. This prospect will be enhanced by the development of revolutionary and militant people's forces."

By the time the inner discussion in the Party ended with the adoption of the Programme, the solution had already become a reality, by the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe as a broad people's armed force. The ANC and the Party together organised its first units, and launched them into action in sabotage attacks on state installations in December 1961.

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The new era, in which people's armed action takes an increasingly important part in the mass revolutionary struggle had opened; and we are still, in 1981, twenty years on, living through its maturing.

Full Circle?

The turn to armed action has tested the mettle of the South African Party and of its allies to the utmost. Perhaps the last lingering traces of earlier 'practicalism' helped to obscure the violent reprisals that the turn to armed struggle would provoke; or perhaps it was that adequate discussion of the likely reprisals, and thus of the preparations needed to meet them, was made extraordinarily difficult by the illegal and hunted nature of the Party's existence. Whatever the reason, many vital questions remained unanswered: how, for example, would the transition from sabotage take place? And how could the future of the movement be protected from the onslaught that would follow sabotage? In the event, the state resorted to a ferocity of reprisal which almost decimated the movement, which smashed the Party headquarters and penetrated deeply into its membership cells; and which finally made the retreat of the Party and the ANC leadership into temporary exile abroad essential if anything was to be saved for rebuilding.

It is not the purpose of this article to traverse the familiar ground of the history of the Party or the South African movement since 1961, its reconstruction outside the country, its building up of new cadres and a new guerilla army, its rebuilding of active revolutionary units within the country once again, and its launching of growing guerilla action against the South African state.

The establishment of leading Party and ANC centres abroad was always a temporary measure; it is still temporary. It was a retreat under fire, made in order to prepare for a new advance in the long battle which our people and our Party have waged against the white supremacist state. And now events show that the retreat has served its purpose. The steady re-advance of our forces inside and outside the country against that state is now the main feature of the South African political scene.

We are at the end of sixty years of Party history. And yet again at a beginning. History has come full circle. Once again, as in 1921 at its founding, the Party's task is to build up amongst the working people inside the country a Marxist Leninist party, based on the very highest standards of discipline and understanding — a party proving itself not by what positions it manages to seize but by how it mobilises the fighting spirit and

unity of the masses; a party drawn from within the real South African working class, which remains — as it always has been — the best organised, most resolute and most revolutionary section of our people.

And yet not quite full circle. For where the founders of the Party set out on that task with tenuous roots amongst the native population, black and white, with little experience to guide them, the Party today marches in the midst of a fraternity of our people, in the heart of an alliance with the national movements of all the people, and above all the black majority represented by the ANC. It marches with an army developed over the years, baptised in all the rigours of legal and illegal struggle, survivors of all the tests of imprisonment and torture. It marches with a morale born of confidence. Sixty years have shown that our movement is indestructible, and our programme a developing testimony to the truthfulness of Marxism-Leninism as a guide to revolutionary action.

It is not, indeed, a full circle we have come, but a spiral, moving constantly forward and up over sixty years. And now set on the road back, to our homeland and the victory of the revolution. In our lifetime!

§§§

26th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU:

THE VOICE OF REASON, PEACE, FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM

by Yusuf Dadoo, national chairman, and Moses Mabhida, general secretary of the South African Communist Party

Over the past year leading political and military spokesmen of US imperialism have made more and more bellicose statements and assumed ever greater threatening postures on international questions. Following the US elections of last November, the Reagan administration has intensified its strident war-like speeches and consequently contributed to a further deterioration of the international situation. Today some of them are propagating the view that a limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union is not only possible but also tolerable.

What a horrific and frightening point of view! For these people detente is a one-way street in which the imperialists may commit aggression with impunity against the working people of the world and behave as if the natural resources of our countries and of the oceans are the property of the US government and monopoly capital.

In this highly charged international atmosphere the voice of reason and peace is of the utmost significance. In total contrast to the strident, aggressive hysteria of US imperialism is the report of the Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, delivered by comrade L.I.

Brezhnev. This was indeed the voice of reason and peace. There was not the slightest note of threat or confrontation addressed to any country or people.

The report develops further the Peace Programme of the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, emphasising the need for world peace, detente including the military sphere, the curbing of the arms race and the relaxation of international tension. As comrade Brezhnev said:

> "A war danger does exist for the United States, as it does for all the other countries of the world. But the source of the danger is not the Soviet Union, nor any mythical Soviet superiority, but it is the arms race and the tension that still prevails in the world. We are prepared to combat this true and not imaginary danger hand in hand with the United States, with the countries of Europe, with all the countries in the world. To try and outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war, is dangerous madness."

The report contains a number of significant proposals. It stresses the need for a series of confidence-building measures, including a dialogue between the USA and USSR; the limitation of strategic weapons and of new and even more destructive submarines; an international conference to help find a solution to the Middle East question, in which the PLO would participate; to make the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf a zone of peace; a moratorium on the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe; the creation of an international committee composed of eminent persons to study and demonstrate the "vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe"; and finally the holding of a special session of the UN Security Council attended by the foremost leaders to examine ways and means of improving the international situation.

This voice of reason and peace gives hope to millions throughout the world that the warmongers and the most aggressive circles of world imperialism can be prevented from plunging the world into a nuclear holocaust. We cannot but endorse the words of Brezhnev when he said that the new measures proposed in the report

> "pursue a single aim, our one common aspiration — to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the danger of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace... To safeguard peace — no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world."

With the rest of the Soviet and foreign delegates we followed with rapt attention this profoundly Marxist-Leninist and realistic report. Every Congress of the CPSU is of immense significance for the Soviet Union, the socialist world and the world revolutionary movement. The Soviet Union

stands, as it has done for over 60 years, as the beacon and shield for all those fighting for a better life free from the scourge and ravages of poverty, ignorance, disease, illiteracy, racism, fascism, colonialism and the exploitation of man by man. This was eloquently expressed by Fidel Castro Ruz who declared to stormy applause:

> "The new world, where the old colonial empires have crumbled, a world where socialism is gaining strength and spreading, a world which has initiated an epoch of freedom and national independence hitherto unknown in history — this world has become possible thanks to the existence of the USSR, to its firm and principled Marxist-Leninist internationalist policy and, in the final analysis, thanks to its strength, which imperialism could not and cannot fail to take into consideration."

Representative Gathering

The historic 26th Congress of the CPSU took place at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses from February 23 to March 3, 1981. There were 5,002 Soviet delegates, of whom 1,370 were industrial and 877 agricultural workers. Over one quarter were women and 50 nationalities were represented. The latter point was vividly illustrated every day by the multi-coloured, multi-national faces, features and dress of the delegates. We saw the women and men of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other places dressed in their colourful national costumes symbolising the unity and cohesiveness of the CPSU. The Congress hall was filled with delegates who had, by their honest labour and toil for the common good, richly deserved the highest honours and distinctions which the CPSU and Soviet government could bestow on them. These delegates were no arm-chair theoreticians. They were the life and blood of the heroic Soviet people.

We were deeply moved by the revolutionary and militant enthusiasm of the CPSU delegates. We had to remind ourselves that they were representing a Party which had won power in November 1917. Here were the heirs of the great Bolsheviks, no less fervent in their commitment to create a better life, not only for their own people, but for all humanity. There is no other Party which has produced such selfless, devoted and disciplined communists, such tenacious fighters for peace, freedom and socialism.

We were truly privileged and honoured to be able to meet and discuss with these delegates as well as those from foreign countries. The high esteem enjoyed by the CPSU and the striking expression of international solidarity were reflected in the presence of 123 delegations from 109

countries representing the world working class and national liberation movements. From Africa alone there were 33 Parties, including the ANC and SWAPO. There were heads of states from the countries of the socialist community, Angola, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Afghanistan. In addition there were hundreds of journalists covering the Congress. Moscow was certainly the centre of world attention. In their speeches, the fraternal delegates, with a tiny exception, fully supported the positions of the CPSU on the most burning questions of our time.

This is not — as the hacks of the bourgeois press allege — because we are puppets of the Soviet Union, but because the class, principled, realistic, mature positions and attitudes of the Soviet Union strike a responsive chord amongst all those who love peace, freedom and social progress. The reports of comrades Brezhnev and Tikhonov, the contributions of the Soviet delegates are a model of Marxist-Leninist thinking and demonstrate the high level of theoretical understanding and maturity of the Party of the great Lenin. We wish to single out some of the important aspects of comrade Brezhnev's report, a report which should be studied in depth by communists and other revolutionaries throughout the world.

Economic and Social Development

The Congress unanimously adopted and approved the guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the period ending in 1990. Everything for the sake of man, for the benefit of man and for the steady and further improvement of the well-being of the Soviet people in all walks of life — consumer goods, housing, cultural and recreational facilities, working and living conditions — these are the central objectives of the new Eleventh Five Year Plan. Under this plan, national income is to increase by 18-20%; industrial production by 26-28% and agricultural production by 12-14%. Capital investments are estimated at 711-730 thousand million roubles.

The impressive socio-economic achievements of the Soviet Union, the confident tone and content of the Eleventh Five Year Plan naturally fill the communists and all Soviet people with pride. What a contrast to the capitalist world. There we find rampant inflation, endemic and soaring unemployment, reduced social services, and moral and ideological bankruptcy. All this and more indicates that capitalism has outlived its usefulness. It is a fetter to the further socio-economic and political

development of the people. As long as capitalism remains in operation, the peoples of these countries have only a bleak future before them.

A further proof of this can be seen in the budgets of the USA and Great Britain. Reagan and Thatcher have launched an attack upon the poor, the infirm, the children, pensioners, taking from those whom society should protect and giving to the rich. On the other hand socialism on a world scale — notwithstanding the problems in one or more countries — lives and is steadily developing and becoming stronger.

The reports of comrades Brezhnev and Tikhonov are also a model of Marxist-Leninist theoretical and practical approach to scientific communism. An all-embracing, multi-faceted survey of social and economic development including a programmatic analysis is a feature of both reports. But they do not only deal with their achievements. They also analyse in depth the omissions, mistakes and shortcomings. Every sphere of socio-economic life and activity: transport, energy, production of foodstuffs, production of quality consumer goods, distribution and exchange and the scaling down by some people of planned targets — all came in for a searching, self-critical analysis. There is in this a lesson for all communists; how to apply the method of criticism and self-criticism creatively.

Two excerpts from Brezhnev's report will demonstrate the serious and realistic way in which this question was treated. He said:

> "But not infrequently one still encounters intolerable delays in introducing promising innovations into production... Production has to be vitally interested in making quicker and better use of the fruits of the thought and work of scientists and designers. Solving this problem is, of course, not a simple matter — it requires breaking down outdated customs and indicators. But it is absolutely essential for the country, for the people, for our future."

And again:

> "Concrete concern for the concrete person, for his needs and requirements is the alpha and omega of the Party's economic policy. I am reminding you of this to re-emphasise a simple but very important point: the production of goods for the population and the expansion of consumer services are a prime Party concern. And that is how they should be treated."

Brezhnev's report also dealt with questions relating to the socialist community, the world communist movement and the national liberation movement. These aspects of the report demonstrate with the force of a whirlwind the class, principled, internationalist position of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Proletarian international solidarity was expressed with us and with the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO in the

struggle to liberate our countries from the yoke of racism, colonialism, apartheid and fascism. This was indeed the voice of freedom. How different from the demagogy of the Reagan administration which brands the freedom fighters of our country and others as terrorists. The real international terrorists are, to be sure, stalking around the corridors of power in Washington, London and Pretoria.

Support for Africa

We felt greatly heartened by the support expressed not only for our own struggle but also for the social progress of the independent African countries. Special mention was made of those countries which have opted for socialist development. All of the representatives of independent Africa expressed their warmest gratitude to the CPSU and the Soviet Union for their disinterested, all-round material and moral support. As José Eduardo dos Santos, Chairman of the MPLA-Party of Labour and President of Angola, said:

> "The 26th CPSU Congress will definitely provide a new impetus for the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples who have always received resolute support from the USSR. We received support and assistance from the country of Lenin throughout our 15-year liberation struggle and have been receiving it for the five years that we have been building up our country."

He also singled out the "contribution by the gallant Cuban internationalists, who went into battle shoulder to shoulder with the MPLA soldiers, not sparing their own lives so that Angola could uphold her independence and begin building a new society."

Concern for communists fighting in the most arduous and difficult conditions was vividly expressed in Brezhnev's report. When we listened to these words we thought about the freedom fighters in the ANC, SACTU and SACP who have fallen in the struggle or are languishing in the fascist dungeons. We thought of Johannes Nkosi, Vuyisile Mini, Solomon Mahlangu, William Khanyile and others recently brutally murdered in Mozambique, Nelson Mandela, Dorothy Nyembe, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Denis Goldberg and all other prisoners of war. We are confident that those in prison or in the underground will be greatly encouraged by the words of comrade Brezhnev. He declared:

> "Comrades, despite terror and persecution, despite prison and the barbed wire of concentration camps, in selfless and often very difficult everyday work for the good of the peoples, Communists in the capitalist countries remain loyal to the

ideals of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

"We express our deep-felt solidarity with our Communist brothers languishing in the dungeons of fascist dictatorships, with those persecuted by the police or fighting their hard battles underground. We express our solidarity with those subjected to discrimination and deprived of civil and political rights merely for their convictions, for belonging to the party of the working class. Honour and glory to Communists, courageous fighters for the people's cause."

The Role of the Party

We were highly impressed by the assessment and analysis of the role of the Communist Party in building an advanced socialist society and laying the foundations for the transition to communism. A Communist Party, if it is to fulfil its historic mission, must be the intellect, honour and conscience of the working people, must know and respond sensitively to the needs, aspirations and grievances of the masses. Communists should always be in the thick of the class struggle and know the thinking of the people. Only by the deeds of its members can the Communist Party emerge as the vanguard of the revolution. The resolve, commitment, unyielding dedication and discipline of the Soviet communists is an example to all communists wherever they may be.

Today the CPSU has 17,480,000 members, of whom 43.4% are factory workers, 12.8% collective farmers and 43.8% members of the technical, scientific and creative intelligentsia, workers in education, medicine, administrative apparatus, and members of the Armed Forces. The core of the Party remains the working class. To be a member of the CPSU requires the highest standard of communist thinking, discipline, ethics and work. Those who cannot measure up to these exacting standards are either expelled or not accepted as members. Since the 25th Party Congress (1976) 300,000 people have been expelled from the Party for "deeds incompatible with the calling of communists", and 91,000 probationers were not admitted as members. This is as it should be. Those who fail to live up to the calling of a communist have no place in the Party.

The inner life of the Party is governed by Leninist norms. That is, democratic centralism and the participation of every Party member in decision-making and the implementation of decisions. Before the 26th Congress took place election meetings of primary and shop Party organisations and Party groups were held. These meetings, conferences and congresses which assessed the work of elected Party organs, criticised mistakes and shortcomings and made valuable suggestions are, as the

report says, "the Party's collective mind. This is the Party's single will, an expression of the Communists' unity around the Central Committee." The CPSU as the leading force in Soviet life has an awesome responsibility, and we can say with confidence that its leading organs, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, have performed their tasks magnificently. We should here also pay special tribute to comrade Brezhnev, who, as General Secretary of the leading and most powerful Communist Party in the world, has made an outstanding contribution to the fight for peace, freedom, socialism and communism.

Lies and Distortions

The columns of the bourgeois press and the other forms of mass media heaped lie upon lie about the Congress and its deliberations. To take three examples.

1. They alleged that the CPSU delegates were no more than rubber stamps who endorsed decisions taken by the leadership. They deliberately ignored the fact that more than 121 million people took part in the discussions on the Draft Guidelines. Numerous suggestions and amendments were proposed which were later incorporated. Those taking part in the discussions represented the entire spectrum of Soviet society. The plan of the Party is truly the plan of the people.
2. They alleged that the delegates who spoke on the two main reports only heaped praise upon comrade Brezhnev and themselves. Regretfully, even one or two correspondents of the fraternal party press were guilty of this misrepresentation. Nothing can be further from the truth. The delegates, who represented a cross section of Soviet life, naturally took pride in their Republic, region or enterprise's achievements and the contribution of Brezhnev to national and international developments. But they also self-critically spoke about their mistakes and shortcomings. As honest Communists they undertook to rectify these and to work even harder to fulfil the new plans and the behest of the Party.
3. They alleged that *Pravda*, the daily newspaper of the CPSU, censored the speeches of a few guests which were critical of one or more aspects of the Soviet foreign and home policies. Again, this was another Goebbels-type lie, since the speeches of the foreign delegates were printed in *Pravda* without any comment or interference.

Whatever the bourgeois media may say, we know from our personal experience that the 26th Congress of the CPSU was an illuminating

manifestation of the enthusiasm, heroism and dedication of men and women who are deeply committed to the struggle for peace, freedom and socialism on a world scale. This Congress was a convincing manifestation of the magnificient achievements of the Soviet people, their profound proletarian internationalist positions under the leadership and guidance of the Party of Lenin. Every day of the Congress we witnessed the cohesiveness and indestructible unity of the CPSU and the Soviet people. Our class enemies are forever predicting the demise and collapse of the Soviet Union and the CPSU. A fitting rebuff to these views was given by comrade Brezhnev in his speech to the closing session of the Congress. He said:

> "How many times... have we heard the predictions of our inevitable failure? How many times have attempts been made to force us to give up our goals? How many times have our opponents tried to prevail on us that we were mistaken, that our path was wrong... But what has come of it? Most of the people who did so are long since forgotten, while socialism is alive and is developing. It is advancing steadily. And it is not that we simply believe. We know beyond a doubt. Our supreme goal, too, will be reached. Communist society will be built!
>
> "We are sure of this because we have faith in the sacred truth of our ideals. We are sure of this because we are aware of the inexhaustible powers of our people. We are sure of this because we know that our Party's Marxist-Leninist course is correct. So let us go boldy forward along the road leading to Communism!"

We emphasise that the profound ideas which permeated the work of the Congress are a source of inspiration for those who are already building socialism, for those who have recently embarked on the path of socialist development and for all those who genuinely seek to end the destructive and inhuman system of capitalism and the exploitation of man by man. It was for both of us a deep personal and political experience.

Long live peace!
Long live the Party of Lenin — CPSU!
Long live the World Communist Movement!
Long live proletarian internationalism!
Glory to the builders of Communism!

OTHER CONGRESSES

Since the 26th Congress, our delegation also attended the 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the 10th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. At all three Congresses we felt the great liberating force of socialism. The reports of the respective Central Committees delivered by comrades Zhivkov, Husak and Honecker were models of Marxist-Leninist thinking on the most pressing issues facing humanity today. They also show that whilst the paths and forms of socialist construction vary, depending on concrete historical and political features, the basic laws governing the building of new societies are the same. This includes the socialisation of the means of production, the indispensable and leading role of the Party of the working class and unswerving loyalty to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.

In all these countries the ruling parties reported with pride that over the past 5 years their people have experienced a consistent and steady improvement of their living, working and spiritual conditions. Moreover they could map out with confidence the new 5-year plan and future tasks.

As comrade Honecker said:

> "Armed with the benefits of new experiences and new insights we shall continue with the successful building of advanced socialist society, thus creating the vital conditions for the gradual transition to communism. In pursuing this aim the main task is to raise further the material and cultural standard of living of the people on the basis of a high rate of development of socialist production, enhanced efficiency, scientific and technological progress and the growth of labour productivity."

At all three Congresses the peace proposals and initiatives outlined by comrade Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress were enthusiastically and unanimously endorsed. The central role of the indestructible alliance with the Soviet Union and the CPSU was emphasised. The experience of these countries shows clearly that it is not possible to build socialism without the closest fraternal revolutionary alliance with the Soviet Union. The vital importance of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the defence and further strengthening of the socialist community is also evident from the documents and deliberations of these Congresses. In this respect the socialist countries are united in their efforts to defeat the plans of imperialism, local counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist forces to destabilise Poland. Poland was, is and remains an organic part of the socialist community.

In examining the role of the working class and its Party in the construction of socialism, special attention was paid to ideological questions and the raising of the political maturity and consciousness of the people. As comrade Husak said:

> "Our Party is aware of the importance of ideological work for strengthening its bonds with the masses, for enlisting the working people for its policy. An enormous creative force is embodied in the people's consciousness which is capable of mobilising society for resolving even the most complex tasks. Life once again proves the validity of Lenin's words that the strength of the socialist state lies in the consciousness of the masses."

In the documents and discussions of the main reports, the weaknesses, mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Parties were critically and self-critically appraised. As comrade Zhivkov pointed out:

> "The Party's Central Committee and the other Party leaderships have taken measures for overcoming weaknesses, for the timely solution of unsolved questions. We set great store by the candid talk about shortcomings and errors which have been allowed, not only because it helps to reveal more fully the causes of their occurrence, but also because it mobilises the entire Party, all working people in the drive to overcome them."

As was stressed at all three Congresses, the weaknesses and shortcomings can never obscure the tremendous achievements of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Their victories and successes are our victories and successes.

A notable feature of these Congresses was their loyalty to the theory and practice of proletarian internationalism. Our struggle against racism and apartheid and that of other people fighting for national independence, freedom and socialism was fully supported. This was most eloquently expressed in the Solidarity Appeal adopted by the 10th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. This appeal expressed the GDR's "firm and fraternal solidarity with all communists, with all revolutionaries and patriots who are being tormented in the jails and concentration camps of inhuman regimes." It also called for the release of Antonio Maidana, General Secretary of the Paraguayan Communist Party, Mohammed Farhad, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, General Liber Siregni, President of the Frente Amplio of Uruguay, and "Nelson Mandela, that outstanding fighter for freedom of the oppressed people of South Africa!"

Like the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the other three Congresses were of profound significance, not only for the socialist community, but for all those fighting for peace, freedom, national independence and socialism.

EXHIBIT K

The African Communist

No 87 FOURTH QUARTER 1981

LONG LIVE THE ANC-SACP ALLIANCE!

1982-1-11

HOW OUR ANNIVERSARY WAS CELEBRATED

The 60th anniversary of the foundation of the South African Communist Party was celebrated on July 30 inside South Africa, in all the main centres under the very noses of the security police, in Africa, Europe, Asia and America. Leaflet bombs which were exploded in Cape Town, scattering thousands of leaflets in the city centre and at the Nyanga bus terminus, were reported in the press to have "shocked city commuters". Reactionary racist commuters may have been "shocked", but all South Africans who long for an end to apartheid repression must have been greatly heartened by this demonstration. Nor were the leaflet bombs the only signs of activity. Thousands of copies of the Central Committee statement on the anniversary which we printed in the last issue of *The African Communist* were circulated in pamphlet form together with portraits of Communist Party leaders who had borne the burden of the Party's development over the decades. A variety of other forms of propaganda were employed to distribute the Party's message to every corner of the country. Commemoration meetings were held in many private homes. In one way or another millions of South Africans were made aware of the significance of our birthday.

Outside our borders the National Working Committee of the African National Congress, carrying out a decision of the National Executive Committee at its session in May, instructed all centres to "organise meetings, rallies, discussion groups, at which the significance of the revolutionary alliance of the ANC and the SACP is emphasised". In his circular letter to all ANC offices and units, the Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo, said:

"We must demonstrate with particular force that no amount of political and ideological subversion on the part of our enemies and their apologists will ever weaken the revolutionary alliance of the ANC and SACP".

Freedom fighters in the camps, activists of the liberation movement everywhere took part in these celebrations — in Maputo, Luanda, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and elsewhere in Africa; in America, Europe and Asia. Particular attention was given to the occasion in the socialist countries, with well-attended meetings in Moscow, Berlin (GDR) and Prague addressed by S.A. Communist Party spokesmen and Africanists of the host country. A special seminar was organised in Moscow by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Africa Institute.

In New Delhi a meeting to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the SACP was convened by the Communist Party of India and addressed by N.K. Krishnan, secretary of the national council of the CPI central executive committee, and S. Molifi, chief representative of the ANC in Asia. The meeting passed a resolution calling for the release of Nelson Mandela and the three MK members who are under sentence of death.

The main celebration meeting took place in London, where an enthusiastic gathering of over 500 people packed the Conway Hall to hear fighting speeches from our chairman and general secretary, comrades Yusuf Dadoo and Moses Mabhida, the President General of the ANC Oliver Tambo, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland, Michael O'Riordan, and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Gordon McLennan. Messages of congratulation were sent to the Party from the socialist countries, fraternal parties and organisations all over the world.

To all those who contributed to the success of our anniversary celebrations, and especially to our comrades of the ANC, we express our heartfelt thanks. In this, our 60th year, the warmth of support we have received from our allies and friends has been a great encouragement and has given fresh impetus to the struggle for liberation, peace and social justice in which we are all engaged.

We reprint in this issue extracts from the speeches delivered at the Conway Hall on July 30 by our general secretary Moses Mabhida and ANC President General Oliver Tambo. These extracts concern the relationship between the ANC and SACP in the struggle against racism and imperialism and are of great significance to all who are involved in that struggle.

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MUTUAL TRUST AND COMRADESHIP IN BATTLE

Extracts from the speeches of Moses Mabhida and Oliver Tambo at the 60th anniversary meeting of the SACP in London on July 30, 1981

MOSES MABHIDA

Our Party's stand as far as national liberation goes in South Africa is quite clear. It fully supports the same programme of liberation as the African National Congress, for the seizure of power and black majority rule. The National Liberation Movement, to quote Lenin, "is a necessary ally of the proletarian revolution". We say this despite the fact that in some independent African countries neo-colonialism persists, thus constraining national development. In these countries the international monopolies, finance capital and their corporations attempt to entrench themselves and perpetuate exploitation in these countries, thus denying them genuine independence. The role played by the leadership in the independent African states thus becomes very important in shaping the development of the said countries. We have examples of this quite recently when the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique decided on transforming these movements into Marxist-Leninist parties. This happened in countries which were previously victims of centuries of colonial plunder.

In South Africa colonialism was actually entrenched by industrial Britain. It was colonial Britain which decisively assisted the Boers in the wars of dispossession against the African kingdoms. It was British colonialism, and not the Boers, who actually conquered our people and expropriated land, seized cattle and forced Africans to work in the mining industry and farms. The total colonisation of South Africa by Britain was fundamental in the creation of the racist South African regime, and, in fact, if it were not for Britain the colonial, racist situation in our country would not be there.

After British colonialism, South Africa was never decolonised. Britain actually handed over power to the white racist settlers, and not to the indigenous colonised black South Africans. Today the uniqueness of South African racist colonialism lies in the fact that the colonisers and the colonised African people occupy the same territory and are integrated into the same economy. In all other aspects it conforms to the typical characteristics of classical colonialism: the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of colour and race, racial separation in all spheres of life, the wide gap of living standards between blacks and whites; suppression of national and proletarian organisations among the oppressed, and a ruthless police state employing fascist methods against its political opponents. The people's organisation the African National Congress, the main liberation force, founded 70 years ago, was organised to fight against this and since that time it has undergone many changes which resulted in the realisation that we were forced to resort to armed struggle against the oppressive white racist regime.

Our Party's relationship with the ANC is based on mutual trust, reciprocity, comradeship in battle and a common strategy for national liberation. Our unity of aims and methods of struggle are a rare instance of positive alignment between the forces of class struggle and national liberation.

Formation of the Communist Party

The sixty years of fighting and struggle of our Party rest on the clear determination of our people to free themselves from racism, colonialism, oppression and exploitation. Our roots go back to the early days of industrialisation in South Africa. From then onwards, and especially after the Anglo-Boer War, the Party established itself from such groups as the social democrats and the South African Labour Party, which was formed

to contest elections in 1910, the year of the formation of the Union of South Africa. The true socialists from the Labour Party of that time broke away and formed the anti-War League of 1914, which later resulted in the formation of our Party on the 30th of July, sixty years ago.

We would like to place on record our admiration of the revolutionary stand taken by these pioneers of scientific socialism, who also joined hands with the revolutionaries in other countries against the imperialist war. This history of our pioneers is well reflected in the International Socialist League and other International Socialist Organisations. Ours was the first Marxist-Leninist Party in Africa. At that time and now the Party has had to grapple with the complexities of the national liberation struggle in our country. Our role in the present phase of national liberation in our country is to identify ourselves with the struggle waged by our people led by the African National Congress, for a National Democratic Revolution. On these questions, our Party has always taken a clear stand.

Comrades, our policy is based on a long association with the ANC, which reflects our Party's attitude towards national liberation. We are clear about the priorities of our struggle, first National Democratic Revolution and then an advance towards socialism.

The Freedom Charter, our people's document and programme of the ANC, sets out a scheme for the desired democratic liberated South Africa. We know full well that the racist regime in 1956 shouted "Treason" when this programme was declared and it imprisoned 156 leaders of the liberation movement. This document is now widely accepted as the people's vision of a free South African society. As you know the Charter emphasises People's Power, it is against all forms of discrimination, it guarantees equal rights, freedom of movement, residence, occupation and religious affiliation.

Because our people, the ANC and our Party are intensifying the struggle, the enemy and certain circles in the imperialist camp are deliberately spreading distortions about the goals of our liberation movement.

Our Party, faithful to proletarian internationalism, appreciates and welcomes the support given to our fighting people by the socialist community and progressive forces the world over.

We express our full solidarity with the Afghanistan People's Democratic Party and the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in their determined and all-out efforts to defend the gains of the April 1978 Revolution. We condemn the imperialists who have refused to leave the

Afghan people to settle their own affairs and have strained every nerve to turn the clock back. We fully understand and support the timely assistance of the Soviet Union, and call upon progressive forces throughout the world to consolidate the ranks of the anti-imperialist forces.

We condemn the imperialist manoeuvres to reverse the gains of socialism in Poland by propping up counter-revolutionaries. Our Party fully supports the fight of the Polish Workers' Party to defend socialism.

We also condemn the Israeli aggression, backed by the USA, against Lebanon and the destabilisation of peace in the Middle East. We fully support the struggle of the Palestinian people, led by the PLO, against Zionism.

U.S. Conspiracy

We condemn in absolute terms the conspiracy between the Reagan administration and racist, fascist South Africa. This conspiracy is aimed against the struggling people of South Africa, the oppressed people of Namibia, the front-line states and indeed, the whole independent African Continent. The Reagan administration policy towards South Africa is aimed at securing and protecting imperialism, capitalist interests in Southern Africa, and further exploiting and plundering the human and material resources of this region.

The struggle of our people is thus a struggle against racism, colonialism, imperialist exploitation and oppression, for liberation, human dignity and peace.

Sixty fighting years of our Party have meant dedication to the national goals of liberation as reflected in the Freedom Charter, the document of the people of South Africa. It has meant the intensification of the liberation struggle on all fronts. It has meant the consistent struggle for the unity of the international communist movement.

Dear Comrades,

In the course of this long struggle covering the sixty years of our lives, the struggle has been bitter. It has resulted in the enemy capturing some of our courageous revolutionaries. The names of comrades Johnson Lubisi, Naphtali Manana, Petrus Mashigo are on the enemy's hangman's list; they are awaiting execution. In the course of the raid on our houses earlier this year the enemy killed and captured some of our leading cadres in Matola; from this rostrum, our Party and our people call upon all the working peoples of the world to demand the release and return of our people. As we

are here commemorating, some of the leading members of our Party, like Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada and others are languishing in the enemy's prisons. We therefore call for their immediate release and the release of all political prisoners.

We can all rest assured that the South African Communist Party will never fail in its contribution towards the total liberation of our oppressed people.

LONG LIVE THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY!
LONG LIVE THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS!
LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM!
LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM, PEACE AND SOCIALISM!
FORWARD TO A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT!

OLIVER TAMBO

Let me commence by thanking you, Comrade Chairman, and the South African Communist Party for inviting the African National Congress to be a party to this occasion and in particular, for the opportunity of sharing a platform with the Communist Party of Great Britain, represented here by the General Secretary Gordon McLennan and with the Communist Party of Ireland, represented by Comrade Michael O'Riordan.

These are our allies: they are part of the international movement of solidarity which gives us strength and confidence in the certainty of our victory. These parties, together wtih other communist and workers' parties around the world, are parties which we can always appeal to for solidarity in the conviction that they will respond.

It is a great pleasure for us, a great honour to participate with them on an occasion of great significance in our struggle in South Africa.

You Comrade Chairman and Comrade General Secretary of the SACP have shared hundreds of platforms together in our lifetime in South Africa and in many parts of the world outside our country. Today, we share a platform on an occasion which takes our reflections back across a span of

60 years, in which we can recall great names that have ensured that our struggle shall continue and is continuing today. . . names that shall always be honoured in our history.

We share this platform in another significant context, for me in particular. I have the great pleasure today of repeating on behalf of the African National Congress and our people in general, our congratulations to Comrade Moses Mabhida on his election some while ago to the position of General Secretary of the SACP.

We utter these congratulations with a sense of confidence, knowing his background, knowing his role in our struggle especially in the discharge of his tasks in the ANC, his absolute loyalty and his understanding — profound understanding — of the character of the South African situation and its problems. Confidence, because he succeeds one of the great giants of our struggle in the position of General Secretary of the SACP — Moses Kotane: whose contribution alone to the building up of the forces that can resist fascist onslaught on any scale is acknowledged by all who have worked with him, as I have, — by all who have read about him.

We are confident that you Comrade Moses, will prove yourself a worthy successor, and perhaps in the fullness of time we shall likewise name you among the giants of our struggle.

Comrade Chairman, I should like to pay a special tribute to you today. It is 60 years since the SACP was formed. It is several decades since you have been involved in the front ranks of our struggle, inspiring everyone around you, inspiring younger generations : first among the volunteers in situations that threaten arrest, torture, imprisonment; never missing where there is struggle to be waged. You were awarded the title Isitwalandwe by our nation not as a formality but in recognition of your services. This was more than 25 years ago. Your presence here, and chairmanship of this particular meeting enables us to recall with great clarity the various revolutionaries with whom you associated in your period of service to our people and our country.

Greetings and Good Wishes

On this the 60th anniversary of the founding of the South African Communist Party, I bring the greetings and felicitations of the NEC of the African National Congress, and the good wishes of all those engaged in the liberation struggle and all the oppressed in South Africa.

This year also marks the 25th Anniversary of the women's great march to Pretoria — the march of our gallant women. It is the year that carries

with it the 20th Anniversary of the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe. It is the Year of the Youth of our country. We hail the SACP in the name of these contingents of our army of liberation which together with the SACP comprise a fighting alliance that represents the power of the South African revolution in the making.

We salute the SACP, particularly in the name of the combatants who have fallen in the course of our struggle as well as on behalf of the national leaders and militants presently held in the enemy's prisons.

We congratulate the SACP on this occasion particularly for the dedication and commitment of its leaders and cadres that has ensured its survival these 60 years, despite intensive repression and desperate attempts to destroy it.

We applaud your achievements, for the SACP has not only survived, but is today stronger, and increasingly makes more significant contributions to the liberation struggle of our people.

The ANC speaks here today, not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign organisation. Rather we speak *of* and *to* our own. For it is a matter of record that for much of its history, the SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people against oppression and exploitation in South Africa. We can all bear witness that in the context of the struggle against colonial structures, racism, and the struggle for power by the people, the SACP has been fighting with the oppressed and exploited.

Notwithstanding that it has had to concentrate on thwarting the efforts to destroy it, cadres of the SACP have always been ready to face the enemy in the field. Because they have stood and fought in the front ranks, they have been amongst those who have suffered the worst brutalities of the enemy, and some of the best cadres have sacrificed their lives.

And so, your achievements are the achievements of the liberation struggle. Your heroes are ours. Your victories, those of all the oppressed.

The relationship between the ANC and the SACP is not an accident of history, nor is it a natural and inevitable development. For, as we can see, similar relationships have not emerged in the course of liberation struggles in other parts of Africa.

To be true to history, we must concede that there have been difficulties as well as triumphs along our path, as, traversing many decades, our two organisations have converged towards a shared strategy of struggle. Ours is not merely a paper alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement by leaders. Our alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle.

We have built it out of our separate and common experiences. It has been nurtured by our endeavours to counter the total offensive mounted by the National Party in particular against all opposition and against the very concept of democracy. It has been strengthened through resistance to the vicious onslaught against both the ANC and the SACP by the Pretoria regime; it has been fertilised by the blood of countless heroes, many of them unnamed and unsung. It has been reinforced by a common determination to destroy the enemy and by our shared belief in the certainty of victory.

This process of building the unity of all progressive and democratic forces in South Africa through united and unified action received a particularly powerful impetus from the outstanding leadership of Isitwalandwe Chief Albert J. Luthuli as President General of the ANC. The process was assisted and supported by the tried and tested leadership of such stalwart revolutionaries as Isitwalandwe Yusuf Dadoo and Isitwalandwe the late Moses Kotane, revolutionaries of the stature of J.B. Marks and Bram Fischer.

Common Objectives

Today the ANC and SACP have common objectives in the eradication of the oppressive and exploitative system that prevails in our country: the seizure of power and the exercise of their right of self-determination by all the people of South Africa. We share a strategic perspective of the task that lies ahead.

Our organisations have been able to agree on fundamental strategies and tactical positions, whilst retaining our separate identities. For though we are united in struggle, as you have already pointed out Comrade Chairman, we are not the same. Our history has shown that we are a powerful force because our organisations are mutually reinforcing.

It is often claimed by our detractors that the ANC's association with the SACP means that the ANC is being influenced by the SACP. That is not our experience. Our experience is that the two influence each other. The ANC is quite capable of influencing, and is liable to be influenced by others. There has been the evolution of strategy which reflects this two-way process.

In fact the ANC was quite within its right to tell the SACP that we are sorry we cannot release Comrade Moses Mabhida from his tasks in the ANC — find another comrade to be General Secerary. Yet we agreed he would make a good General Secretary for the SACP. He was not grabbed.

This kind of relationship constitutes a feature of the South African liberation movement, a revolutionary movement, a feature of the SACP which helps to reinforce the alliance and to make it work as it is working. It is a tribute to the leadership of the SACP.

We are therefore talking of an alliance from which, in the final analysis, the struggle of the people of South Africa for a new society and a new social system has benefitted greatly. . .

Within our revolutionary alliance each organisation has a distinct and vital role to play. A correct understanding of these roles, and respect for their boundaries has ensured the survival and consolidation of our cooperation and unity.

As stated in its programme, the SACP unreservedly supports and participates in the struggle for national liberation led by the ANC, in alliance with the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Trade Unions, the Coloured People's Congress and other patriotic groups of democrats, women, peasants and youth.

The strategy of the African National Congress sees the main content of the South African revolution as the liberation of the largest and most oppressed group: namely the Black population.

And by Black I do not mean what our enemies have elected to designate as Black — namely just the Africans. By Black, we mean all the oppressed, those who were formerly called Non-whites and whom we prefer to call Black.

Of course it does not suit the enemy to club all the oppressed and exploited together. It is better for the enemy that this vast majority be split up into what they call Blacks and then Indians and Coloureds. That fits their strategy — serves the interests of their strategy best. But I am talking about the oppressed population as the Blacks.

Whilst concerned to draw in, and unify, all progressive and democratic forces in the country, including those amongst the whites, our priority remains the maximum mobilisation of those who are the dispossessed, the exploited and the racially oppressed.

That is only a priority, for we recognise that victory requires that we build up maximum unity of the forces for progress. Indeed we need to break up this white racist clique, win friends from among the ruling class and isolate the fascists. Then a united people of South Africa can deliver the final blow, crush the colonialist structures and move to a new South Africa. . .

International Solidarity

The ANC has received and continues to receive international support and solidarity from a variety of sources. We must today acknowledge especially, with appreciation, the very significant support we receive from the socialist countries. You have mentioned many of these countries — all of them without exception have given freely by way of supporting our struggle and meeting our demands.

We appreciate in particular that they and some African countries have not hestitated to deliver weapons to peoples fighting for their liberation. The enemy likes to squeal that we have been fighting with either Soviet made weapons, or communist made weapons. It does not matter what weapons they are. But we are glad to have them, and shall continue to use them if they are effective — and they are.

This support has been given during the liberation struggles in southern Africa and the rest of Africa, and has been extended to the independent states that have been forced to defend their own victories.

On an occasion when we are observing the 60th. anniversary of the SACP, we are bound to give some thought to struggles, many of which have arisen since the SACP was established. Today, in the anti-imperialist struggle, we have won new allies like the struggling people of Palestine. We have thrown up new enemies of peoples, like those who murder civilians in Beirut. We have seen the unutterable brutalities of the junta in El Salvador — the ruling fascists in Guatemala.

We have seen how the US has sought its allies among these enemies of freedom and democracy and progress. And we send out on this South African day, our greetings, our solidarity and our support to those whose struggles place them in the same trench that we occupy.

We greet Polisario and Fretelin.

But finally, let us once again greet our South African Communist Party.

LONG LIVE THE SACP!

LONG LIVE THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE ANC AND SACP!

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF ALL PROGRESSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN OUR COUNTRY AND IN THE REST OF THE WORLD!

THE TWO PILLARS OF OUR STRUGGLE

Reflections on the Relationship between the ANC and SACP

by Sol Dubula

Sixty years have now passed since the pioneers of South African communism met in Cape Town on July 30th 1921, and made their inaugural appeal "to all South African workers, organised and unorganised, white and black, to join in promoting the overthrow of the capitalist system, the outlawry of the capitalist class, and the establishment of a commonwealth of workers throughout the world".

This first Manifesto of the Communist Paty of South Africa rang out with the language of militancy and revolt. It pledged that the newly-formed Party would henceforth act as the "revolutionary vanguard of the Labour Army of South Africa" and spread the "communist gospel" amongst the workers. It called for an end to "futile reformism" and for a "great push" by the industrial masses of all races in alliance with the rural toilers, to deliver a "knockout blow" to the system.

No other political organisation in our country, or indeed in the whole continent, had yet spoken with such uncompromising revolutionary zeal. It was here, in our land, that the first seed of Marxism-Leninism was sown in Africa.

Yet, looking back on this document with the benefit of hindsight there are some puzzling silences. Nothing is said of the foreign conquest, the theft of land, the ·'is· monopoly of the major means of production, state power, and politica. .gnts, which provide and protect the varying degrees of social and economic privilege which accrue to all with a white skin, to whatever class they belong. In short, the heavy weight of national oppression which every black, be he worker or not, carries like a millstone around his neck, seems to be missing from the scale of struggle.

But it would ahistorical to explain these omissions by the simplistic charge that these early communists were completely blind to the reality around them, or that, being aware of this reality, they were influenced solely by their class origins in the relatively privileged aristocracy of white labour.

Judged by the level of the political forces of the day, the manifesto soars to unprecedented heights, it constitutes an unconditional break with the reformist and opportunistic politics of the white labour movement. The manifesto calls for mobilisation against "the accepted skiet-skiet Native policy" and pledges support for "any genuine revolt of the masses against tyranny". It looks forward to a South Africa in which "none shall be master and none servant." Above all, it gives top priority to raising the consciousness of "cheap docile labour" (black) and regards its entry into the working class movement as "the most deadly blow South Africa can deal to world capitalism". This was certainly not the language of the sell-out labour leaders of the time; it was already clearly the language of the communist revolutionary. But it was the language of the communist revolutionary situated in a very specific moment of time.

The Historical Background

We must remember that South African communists were not alone in believing that, in the wake of October 1917, the world socialist revolution was imminent. In South Africa, the white worker, comparatively well organised and making up the bulk of the "industrial masses", had not yet won his seat at the ruler's table and still expressed a degree of class hostility towards capitalism. The newly-emerging black proletariat was small in number and lacked effective industrial organisation. Faced with what turned out to be a utopian perspective of a socialist breakthrough in South Africa (a breakthrough which Marxism told them could only be based on the industrial working class), these pioneers of South African communism nourished the forlorn hope that there still remained sufficient

revolutionary potential in the white working class to deliver a "knockout blow" to the capitalist system.'

How then did they bridge the gap between the two fundamental realities of the South African social structure — class exploitation and national oppression? Inspired by the Bolshevik example and by the hopes of a spreading world socialist revolution, they believed that the solution of the national question in South Africa would follow the seizure of worker's power which would provide the base from which to proceed to free South Africa's oppressed national groups. After all, was it not true that the Bolshevik victory was already on the way to transforming the Tsarist "prison-house of nations" into a community of free peoples?

To complete the picture as it presented itself to a 1921 Marxist revolutionary, we must also recall the character and level of the national movement of the period. The formation of the African National Congress nine years earlier — the first national movement of Africans on our continent — was an event of great revolutionary significance. But, as with the early communists, the new national movement remained, for some time, a hostage of other objective limitations.

By the early 20's, the ANC's leadership was still dominated by a small group of black intellectuals and traditional tribal leaders. The aim it had set itself of creating a single African (as opposed to tribal) consciousness, was yet some distance from being fulfilled. Examined in the light of the present-day revolutionary militancy of the ANC, its early approach to struggle had many of the qualities of a cap-in-hand nationalism. It stood for the encouragement of "a spirit of loyalty to the British crown and all lawful authority" and pledged "to bring about better understanding between the white and black inhabitants". Some of its leaders went as far as to acknowledge "the superiority of the white race". Even as late as 1923 the ANC continued to endorse the Rhodes white-supremacist formula of "equal rights for all civilised men". In 1928, its House of Chiefs resolved against cooperation with the Communist Party, swayed by the argument that "the Tsar was a great man in his country, of royal blood like us chiefs, and where is he now!"

It is against this background that the communists were tempted to dismiss the ANC as a "bourgeois Congress". The formative limitations of the national movement were thus an additional factor which helped to blind socialist thinkers to the revolutionary potential of black nationalism and stood in the way of the correct elaboration of the key question of the South African revolution — the relationship

between class and national struggle.

These then were the imperfect beginnings of the Communist Party and the ANC; bodies which were fathered by the two most important determinants in South Africa's socio-economic structure — class exploitation and national oppression — and which reflected the two complementary streams of revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary organisation.

It is necessary to study the early period, not as a mere historical exercise but because the history of the struggle in the last sixty years and, indeed, the coming struggle for people's power, revolves around the very questions which posed themselves from the first day in the life of the Party. It is these questions which, throughout the whole period, continued to surface in one form or another; they had, and continue to have, a most direct bearing on the movement's ideological formation and, even more importantly, on its revolutionary practice.

Ideological Advance

The Party began to swing away from its exclusive "class against class" position within a short time of its formation. The early shift of emphasis towards African liberation rapidly reflected itself in the changed composition of the membership. By 1928 it was no longer an all-white affair and its African membership made up 90% of the total. Influenced by its own experience and by Comintern discussions and directives, the Party was, in 1928, decades ahead of any other organisation on the continent of Africa in advancing the concept of black majority rule under the slogan of an "independent Native Republic" as a stage towards the overthrow of capitalism. But it was to take many more years before the strategic implications of the relationship between class and national struggle were to be more adequately synthesised in the form of the 1962 Programme of the South African Communist Party (The Road to South African Freedom) adopted at the Party's sixth underground Conference in Johannesburg.

The ANC also travelled a long road of internal debate and contradiction before it reached its present level of revolutionary nationalism. One of the major catalysts of the ideological leap forward was the 1948 crop of militants in the ANC Youth League led by men like Tambo, Sisulu and Mandela, and supported by leading communists in the ANC leadership like Kotane, Marks and Mofutsanyana. In the Indian Congress too the old moderate leadership was ousted and men like Dadoo not only succeeded in

radicalising the politics of resistance amongst the Indian community, but also helped set the scene for the growing all-black unity which characterised the rousing mass struggles from the early 50's onwards.

In programmatic form, all these advances had the fullest expression at the 1969 Morogoro Conference which adopted the ANC's Strategy and Tactics — a document which goes further than any other mass national movement has gone in the linking of social and national liberation and in highlighting the dominant role of the black working people in the struggle for national liberation.

It was natural that, despite earlier contradictions and confrontations, the maturing of the ideological content of both the national and working class movements (a process which has its basic roots in changing socio-economic conditions which cannot be elaborated here) should have resulted in a growing collaboration between them; a collaboration which, amongst other things, led to the 1961 joint decision by the Party and the ANC to create Umkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the liberation movement. Today the ANC and the SACP are embraced in the common front of liberation. In the words of the ANC spokesman at the 1969 joint meeting of representatives of the two leaderships, these organisations constitute "the two leading pillars of our struggle".

Unity Grows

The evolution of this collaboration has a history of its own which cannot be dealt with in any detail here. But a few general observations are in order. As was emphasised in the 1970 report to the augmented meeting of our Central Committee, the relationship could not be described in the form of any rigid constitutional formula or structure. Externally, until 1969, it did not even express itself in joint meetings and formal agreements. What made this collaboration of the special type possible, especially in the post-Rivonia period?

In the first place, by then no significant differences existed between the two organisations on the immediate content, strategy and tactics of the South African revolution. This was in a large measure the result of the loyal devotion and hard work of so many communists who were also members of the national organisations. None of them hid their identities either as communists or as ANC cadres. Those who functioned at both levels were not doing so to "capture" either organisation for the other, but to achieve a maximum political impact for our common immediate aims. The views, mood and argument of ANC leaders influenced the form-

ulation of Party policy, and the process also worked the other way about.

At the 1969 Joint Meeting the main Party spokesman, referring to the 1961 decision of both leaderships at home to chart the new way of armed struggle, said:

> "In this historic step — as in many others — we have worked together as intimates, as brothers and as equals. This is not surprising for nothing separates us from the immediate and foremost tasks — the destruction of white domination and the winning of the national democratic revolution whose main content is the liberation of the African people. . .
>
> "Only the vulgar or those who wish to make mischief see in our collaboration a white-anting process. They cannot understand how two political parties can work so closely together without stabbing each other in the back. Above all they cannot grasp — as I think we all do — that if either organisation were to disappear or be weakened, the struggle would be all the poorer for it.
>
> "Why so? It is because the national struggle in our conditions cries out for the organised participation of the working class and its class political organ — the Party. And equally, the struggle for socialism cries out for a vigorous and strong national movement of the African people which heads the liberation front. . .
>
> "Experience has proved over and over again that in our revolution, collaboration between our two bodies has raised the level of the struggle and has been a mutually reinforcing influence. Both organisations are necessary and both serve the struggle otherwise neither should be perpetuated for the sake of mere tradition or emotion".

These sentiments remain as valid today as they have ever been. Yet, the very fact that our country can boast of "two leading pillars of our struggle" which have so little which separates them in relation to the immediate strategy and tactics of the South African Revolution, continues to arouse discussion on their respective roles both as independent organs and as part of the liberation alliance.

Amongst the questions which merit discussion are: How does the Party exercise its role as the vanguard of the working class in a situation in which it has accepted the leading role of the ANC in the liberation front? Given that every revolution has its own strategic and tactical stages, how do we view the present connection between the struggle for liberation and for socialism? What, in other words, is the relationship between the national and class struggle in present conditions? What role can the Party play in safeguarding the ideology of our revolution and protecting it against petty-bourgeois and backward nationalist tendencies?

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General Approach of SACP

Before posing the questions in more detail, it is essential that they be situated in the Party's overall approach to the relationship between the present phase of our revolutionary process and the perspective of a socialist South Africa. This approach can be summarised as follows:

a) The *strategic aim* of our Party is to destroy the system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and to replace it with a Socialist system in which the ownership of the means of production will be socialised and the whole economy organised to serve the interests of all the people. Such a society can only be achieved if political power is placed firmly in the hands of the working class in town and countryside in alliance with the poor peasantry.

b) The *immediate aim* of the Party is to win the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution, more particularly to win national liberation for all the black oppressed and to destroy the economic and political power of the existing ruling class. At the same time it is the duty of our Party to spread its ideology of Marxism-Leninism, to underline unceasingly the connection between true national liberation and the building of a socialist society, to organise the working class to play a leading role in the National Democratic Revolution, and to attract the most advanced elements, especially from the working class, to the ranks of the Party.

c) The achievement of the aims of the National Democratic Revolution demands a broad alliance of all classes and strata, especially amongst the racially oppressed, who can be mobilised in support of these aims. Although all classes amongst the black oppressed have an interest in ending national oppression, they do not share the same goals of the fundamental social transformation of a liberated South Africa. The inevitable victory of the national liberation movement can only be truly meaningful and guaranteed if the capitalist system of exploitation, which is the true foundation and purpose of racist oppression, is destroyed. For this reason the Party believes that within the broad alliance for national liberation the working class must be the leading revolutionary force. *This means that the Party, together with other forward looking forces, must ensure that the end result of the present phase of our struggle is the winning of People's Power and the creation of a state in which the working class in town and countryside in alliance with the poor peasants will be the leading force.*

d) In organisational terms the Liberation Alliance is expressed through the liberation front headed by the African National Congress. The ANC is

a broad mass national movement which attracts to its ranks all Africans and other revolutionaries, whatever their class origins, who accept the programme and are prepared to fight against the racist regime by all means, including armed struggle. The Strategy and Tactics of the ANC also assigns a special role to the working people in the national struggle. But the ANC correctly continues to retain its character as a broad national movement which has room in it for cadres with differing ideological beliefs.

The above is only a very general summary of the Party's ideological perspectives which are spelt out in greater detail in the Programme and many other basic documents, a selection of which is contained in the book "SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNISTS SPEAK 1915-1980" published on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary.

Against the background of these perspectives and the changing conditions of struggle, we can proceed to reflect on the questions raised above.

The Vanguard role of the Party

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the Party of the working class has the leading role in the struggle for the elimination of the exploitation of man by man and the building of a socialist society which will eventually be transformed into a communist society. Of all classes in our society, it is the proletariat which has nothing to lose and everything to gain by the destruction of the system of capitalist exploitation. In addition, the role which the proletariat plays in the relations of production makes it best suited politically and organisationally to carry out this historic mission. It can only carry out this mission if it is organised and guided by its political vanguard — the Communist Party.

But a party does not earn the title of vanguard of the working class merely by proclaiming it. Guided by a correct application of Marxism-Leninism it achieves this position by the degree to which it organises the class which it represents, the calibre of its day-to-day leadership, and its devotion to the revolutionary cause. The need to give correct guidance to the revolutionary cause does not imply that the party must insist on projecting itself as the public "leader" of every step in the unfolding of the conflict.

We must not confuse form with substance. *We must be on our guard not to mix up the role of the Party as the vanguard of the working class and its role as a representative of this class in specific alliances of class forces which*

are required at various stages of the struggle. The question of whether it is correct for the Party to strive to place itself exclusively at the head of the different stages of the revolutionary upsurge depends upon the conditions of a particular struggle at each of these stages and the precise role of the class which it represents. In specific conditions, to attempt to do so may not advance but rather retard the Party's true exercise of its role as a vanguard of the working class. This most advanced class of our epoch can rarely, if ever, bring about a revolutionary transformation on its own. It works at all times with social forces.

Both the Party's Programme and the ANC's Strategy and Tactics accept that, within the alliance of class forces which is demanded by the present stage of our revolution, the workers have a special place as the most consistently revolutionary force. But this is not the same as saying that the working class through its political vanguard must demand a monopoly of control of the revolutionary alliance or organisational supremacy in the decision-making bodies which make up the alliance.

In the case of our situation the problem can be posed in another way: Are we doing violence to the vanguard principle when we talk in our Programme of the ANC leading the liberation alliance? Is not this formulation inconsistent with the formulation in the very same Programme that "the central and immediate task of the Communist Party is to lead the fight for the national liberation of the non-white people and for the victory of the democratic revolution"?

Not at all! If correct leadership of the democratic revolution requires the strengthening of the national movement as the major mass organisational force, then this is precisely the way in which a party exercises its leading and vanguard role in the real (and not vulgar) sense of the term. This is the way in which Vietnamese Communists exercised their vanguard role in relation to the FLN during the liberation struggle, and it is also the way in which the early Cuban Communists related to Fidel Castro's July the 26th Movement. As long as the party does not lose its independence and its separate identity as a political vanguard of the working class, its projection of the ANC as the body leading the alliance of class forces in our struggle is in no way inconsistent with the Party's role as a vanguard organisation of the working class.

To maintain the Party's independence means that it must be seen, especially by the working people, to be acting as an effective advance guard which is visibly a part of them. Of course, one of its primary tasks is to spread the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and, more particularly, an

understanding of the relationship of the national struggle and the struggle for socialism. But we would cease to be a Party in the real meaning of the term if we restricted ourselves to general education about some future millenium. It is our duty to engage in public activities in the Party's name on issues affecting the people, and especially the working class, in their daily lives. This in no way undermines the ANC's role as the accepted public head and key spokesman on behalf of the liberation front. The Party's public interventions are not competitive but reinforce the common approach of the alliance.

In any case, the Party's mobilising propaganda will have a special content which the ANC's intervention should not and cannot have. There is no daily problem facing the working people, whether in town or countryside, which cannot be linked to the ravages of capitalism; and it is only our Party which can present this connection in an undiluted way. This is not to deny that there are certain areas of national campaigning which can more appropriately be initiated and pursued by the ANC as the head of the Liberation Alliance. But even here, supporting activity by the other independent sectors of the Alliance — whether it be the South African Congress of Trade Unions or the Party — is not out of place.

The Stages of our Revolution

The 1962 Programme of the SACP states that "the *immediate* and imperative interests of all sections of the South African people demand the carrying out of a . . . National Democratic Revolution which will overthrow the colonialist state of white supremacy and establish an independent state of national democracy in South Africa. . . The main content of this revolution is the national liberation of the African people". The Party sees the achievement of these democratic aims as laying "the indispensable basis for the advance of our country. . . to a socialist and communist future".

There are two ways of reading these formulations and the distinction between them has a crucial bearing on the role of a party of the working class and its relationship to the national movement.

The one interpretation would argue that the South African revolution can be divided into two distinct and compartmentalised stages; the aims of the first stage are to create a kind of non-racist bourgeois democracy, and it is only when this is achieved that the movement will turn its thought to the struggle for a socialist order, i.e. to the second stage of the revolution. It is this dualistic approach which has been attributed to the Party by a

number of left-wing critics who allege that it has thereby abandoned its role as the working class vanguard and has moved awa/ from the politics of class struggle in favour of a form of so-called bourgeois nationalism. If this interpretation is correct, it would indeed put in doubt the very need for a separate working class party at this *stage*; at best, such a party would have to maintain itself in a sort of cocoon ready to emerge when the struggle for socialism is on the agenda.

There may have been moments in the life of the Party and the occasional loose formulation which suggest a lack of precision in the understanding of the relationship between the struggle for national and social emancipation. But reading the Programme as a whole and examining the way it has been applied in the revolutionary practices of the Party, there can be no doubt that this portrayal of the Party's perspectives is a distortion of its true position.

As outlined earlier, the Party has, in the process of time, moved away from the approach contained in its first Manifesto in which the national factor is so completely underplayed that it resulted in a virtual dismissal of any significant role for a mass national movement in the unfolding of our revolution. But this extreme of a one-stage revolution based on the slogan of "class against class" has not been replaced by the opposite, equally mechanical, extreme of two distinct stages which are totally sealed off from one another.

What is meant by "Stages"?

Our formulations do, of course, refer to "stages of the struggle", "stages of the revolution", etc. What do these phases signify? They signify what every revolutionary practitioner experiences, which is that every political struggle has specific phases and stages which determine the application of strategy and tactics at any given moment of time. But there is no Chinese Wall between these stages; they flow from and into one another, and the dominant ingredients of later stages must already have begun to mature within the womb of the earlier stage. This is what Marxist dialectics teach us.

Our revolution is one continuing process. Its immediate emphasis and the chief mobilising factor is black liberation. But this immediate objective has strategic relevance in the struggle for social as well as national emancipation. The ANC's Strategy and Tactics correctly states that the national character of the immediate struggle must dominate its approach. But it goes on to say that:

"It is a national struggle which is taking place in a different era and in a different context from those which characterised the early struggles against colonialism. . . in a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the elements which make such control meaningful — economic emancipation. It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa; in which there is a large and well-developed working class whose consciousness and independent expressions of the working people — their political organs and trade unions — are very much part of the liberation front. Thus our nationalism must not be confused with the chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass. . ."

Some commentators have described the immediate emphasis on the black liberation in our revolution as a bourgeois-democratic deviation which encourages the working class party to drag at the tail of the national movement. In its classical meaning the term "bourgeois-democratic" suggests a struggle which is led by the bourgeoisie and is primarily in their class interest, but in which the working people also have a stake since it introduces a degree of political "freedom" and destroys feudal and other pre-capitalist modes of production. There is thus the tendency to indiscriminately characterise all struggles which concentrate on democracy and against national oppression as essentially bourgeois-democratic.

The term "bourgeois-democratic" in the context of our own struggle to achieve the aims of the national democratic revolution is misleading and there is good reason why it does not appear in the Party's Programme. But if we do choose to use it merely to describe the immediate concentration on the struggle for democratic aims, then we would do well to remember Lenin's words that, even in a bourgeois revolution, the bourgeoisie is not necessarily the "chief factor" (*Agrarian Programme of the R.S.D.P.*, page 125) and, even more in point in relation to our present discussion:

"We all counterpose bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution; we all insist on the absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing between them; however, can it be denied that in the course of history individual particular elements of the two revolutions become interwoven?"

(*Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, page 82)*

The Continuing Revolution

Lenin was describing a situation in pre-October Russia in which the liberal bourgeoisie constituted an important sector of the struggle against the Tsarist autocracy. In this day of our struggle in South Africa it would be wrong to attribute this role to our Oppenheimers and others who form a vital bastion of the very racist autocracy. But the relevance of Lenin's remarks to our discussion remains of great force in other respects. For, nowhere more than in South Africa is the struggle for political democracy and against national domination so interwoven with the struggle for eventual social emancipation. As stated by Zanzolo (*The African Communist* First Quarter 1963 page 22), "under South African conditions the national democratic revolution has great prospects of proceding at once to socialist solutions". The reasons for this assertion are spelt out by Slovo (*South Africa — No Middle Road*, page 140):

> ". . . No significant national demand can be successfully won without the destruction of the existing capitalist structure. It is precisely because in South Africa capitalist production relations are the foundation of national repression that the national struggle itself has an objective coincidence with the elimination of all forms of exploitation.
>
> "The elimination of national inequality, if it is to be more than a mere gesture, involves a *complete* change of the way in which the country's wealth is appropriated. . . If every racist statute were to be repealed tomorrow, leaving the economic status quo undisturbed, white domination in its most essential aspect would remain. National liberation, in its true sense, must therefore imply the expropriation of the owners of the means of production (monopolised by a bourgeoisie drawn from the white group) and the complete destruction of the state which serves them. There can be no halfway house unless the national struggle is stopped in its tracks and is satisfied with the cooption of a small black elite into the presently forbidden areas of economic and political power."

This assertion of what true liberation in our country means does not, of course, imply that the revolution will inevitably move in the direction indicated. It merely suggests that there is an objective basis for such an outcome. Whether or not it happens in practice depends on many other considerations, the most important of which is the role played by the working class in the alliance of class forces during the first stage of the continuing revolution.

The high level of capitalist development in South Africa has given birth to a distinctive form of class stratification not only in the enemy camp but also amongst the black oppressed. The economic foundations for the emergence of petty-bourgeois nationalism are already solid and are being made more so as the enemy proceeds with its deliberate policy of

stimulating the creation of the bigger black middle strata with a stake in the periphery of the capitalist system. The political representatives of such tendencies have, in the past, included such groups as the PAC, the "Group of 8", sections of the "Black Consciousness Movement", some Bantustan leaders, etc. And, as the national liberation struggle approaches its climax, we must expect a stronger urge from the non-working class black forces to stop the revolution in its tracks and to opt for a bourgeois solution.

The historically-evolved revolutionary nationalism of the ANC is, of course, a major obstacle to the ascendancy of such tendencies. Particularly in recent years the ANC has demonstrated its capacity to combat them within its ranks. The Party as an independent force, and individual Communists who also became leaders of the ANC, have undoubtedly contributed to this process. Today the ANC's Strategy and Tactics talks of "economic emancipation" as a key element in its understanding of what true national liberation means; of a "speedy progression from formal liberation to genuine and lasting emancipation"; of a perspective which "is made more real by the existence in our country of a large and growing working class whose militancy and political consciousness as a revolutionary class constitutes a distinct and reinforcing layer of our liberation".

It is this narrowing of the ideological gap between the ANC and the SACP in relation to the immediate perspective of our revolution which arouses discussion on the respective roles of both organisations in the area of public mobilisation. But the fact that the ANC has recognised the primary role of the working class in the coming social conflicts does not mean that it is, or should become, a vanguard party of the working class.

Distinct and Complementary Roles

The ANC remains a mass national movement. It is not an organisation which is guided by, and propagates, the integrated ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It correctly welcomes within its ranks all liberation fighters, whatever their class affiliation, who support its revolutionary nationalism. Whilst its policy for the future, as set out in the Freedom Charter, is not inconsistent with an advance towards socialism in the post-liberation period, the ANC does not and should not demand a commitment to a socialist South Africa as a pre-condition of membership. It must clearly retain its character as the mass organisational instrument of all social

forces who can be won over to fight "the first battle".

Conversely, the Party is not a mass movement; it represents the aspirations of a single class — the proletariat. This class not only participates in the struggle as part of the alliance which is represented by the national movement, but also fights as an independent class contingent with aims which are not in conflict with the democratic revolution but go beyond it. As part of the alliance it cannot demand that all other classes amongst the black oppressed submit to its Marxist-Leninist ideology and its organisational hegemony.

At the same time the Party must guard its character as an independent vanguard of the proletariat and lead it in its class battles. *But we must remember a fact which is often overlooked by purely academic analysts: In South African conditions it is false to counterpose the national and class struggle as if they are two separate forms of struggle. In a situation in which the main immediate interests of the proletariat are served by an assault on racist autocracy, its participation in the fight for national liberation is precisely one of the key ways in which it engages in class struggle.*

There is thus, at one and the same time, a complementary and distinct role in our revolution for the two pillars of the contemporary struggle — the ANC and the SACP. This role, as we have tried to show, is rooted not only in our specific history, but also reflects the relatively advanced state of class stratification of both black and white.

What of the future? It is perhaps unwise to speculate about the emergence of a single organisation out of the various strands of the liberation front which will guide the continuing revolutionary process at a stage when the first objectives of the national liberation struggle have been achieved. However, it may be that, by then, the tasks of the continuing revolution will, as in Cuba, demand a unified political force which will consolidate the national liberation victory and create conditions for the building of socialism. Whether this happens or not will depend upon the role which is played by the working class in the immediate build-up towards such a victory; a victory in which we must ensure that the working class in alliance with the poor peasants emerges as the leading force.

(The subject of this article is under continuous discussion in the South African liberation movement. Further contributions to the debate are invited from members of the ANC, SACP and other fraternal organisations. — Ed.)

FOUR WHO WERE COMMUNISTS

A PERSONAL REFLECTION BY ALEXANDER SIBEKO

Ever since the formation of the first communist association by Marx and Engels, communists have been vilified, persecuted, imprisoned, murdered. As the truth becomes more evident that 'you can imprison a man but not his ideas' so the anti-communist propaganda war waged by the ruling class intensifies. The aim of this propaganda is to prevent the people knowing what communism stands for and who the communists are. 'An Attack on Communism is an Attack on You' was a slogan painted up in South Africa 31 years ago when our Party was banned. The enemy attempts to distort the true meaning of communism in order to hide from the working people the fact that communism stands for their best interests.

In its anti-communist crusade the enemy uses the Hitler technique of crude lies and horror stories reinforced by jack-boot and torture squad. The Party is held to be an 'alien threat'; a 'bogey man'; the 'Kremlin agent'. In a society permeated with racism the central propaganda ploy aims to project the Party as essentially an organisation of whites that in some sinister and mysterious fashion is able to lead the blacks by the nose.

This line of propaganda would actually have us believe that the mass of our people are incapable on their own of finding the path to communism. Of late, with a desperate battle taking place to perpetuate white domination, the racist politicians and police chiefs have actually arrived at the stage where they claim to be protecting 'black nationalism' from being tainted with a 'red brush'.

Our people have always rejected the anti-communist nonsense of the enemy. They have known the communists by their sacrifices and their deeds. They have known our party as an organisation of outstanding patriots and fighters such as Bill Andrews, Jimmy La Guma, Johannes Nkosi, Moses Kotane, JB Marks, Bram Fischer, Govan Mbeki, Yusuf Dadoo, Moses Mabhida, Joe Slovo and Ahmed Kathrada. Far from seeing our Party as being composed purely of whites, our people have seen that the Party ranks and leadership are composed of all sections of the community. Far from seeing the communists dominating the national liberation movement the people have witnessed how the Party, throughout its long history, has helped to strengthen the ANC and its allies.

The people see the communists not through the eyes of the racist rulers and the bosses but through the eyes of sweated and exploited labour. They listen attentively and with inexhaustible hope to those who champion their rights; to those who talk of an end to exploitation, oppression and for a socialist South Africa. Above all they see how the oppressor fears the communists and attacks them and that is the best recommendation for the workers. Little wonder that the communists enjoy such prestige amongst the exploited masses in South Africa. The enemy has long lost that ideological battle but struggles to make some headway amongst sections of the intellectual youth and black professional class, sensing in them a source of 'exclusive nationalism'. However, they are losing that ideological battle too, just as they fail in their efforts to inject that brand of counter-revolutionary poison into our liberation movement.

Our Party is growing. Into its ranks are flowing a young generation of workers, students and professionals. The great national and class conflicts shaking our country and the continent of Africa are arousing the consciousness of our people. Many patriots seek a class analysis and are attracted by the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

The Four:

Four such members of our Party died recently. Three of them died in the Matola raid and the fourth in a Soweto gun-battle with police. Between them they were a representative cross-section of our people and of our

Party: one was a young worker; another a trade unionist; the third a student; the fourth a lawyer. They were all loyal and devoted mmbers of the ANC and this was in no way contradicted by their membership of the Party. They are all heroes of our struggle and died for their beliefs. Within them can be found all the elements that make up the character of our people. Of course it is not only the communists who are the heroes. There are the Solomon Mahlangu's, the Silverton trio, the Joseph Mdluli's, Abraham Tiro's and scores of others. We write up for the record, however, these four who were members of our Party, because we owe them this right and because it is our historic duty, where we can, to let the people know who are the communists, especially in the light of the enemy campaign to distort the true character of our Party.

Petros Linda Jobane ('Gordon Dikebu')

He died on the 21st November, 1980, in a shoot-out with the police in the Soweto suburb of Chiawelo. He died on active service for Umkhonto we Sizwe. The enemy besieged the house where he was hiding in the early hours of the morning and called on him to surrender. Gordon fought to his last bullet. Witnesses say that he put up stern resistance; that "he fought like a lion", that the police — and there was a huge force present — had to keep a respectful distance and that some were seen to be hit. He died in a 'grenade' explosion. He was determined not to be taken alive.

The story of the "lion of Chiawelo" has inspired our people at home as well as the comrades who trained and worked with him. To them his devotion and fighting spirit come as no surprise. Gordon was in his mid-twenties. He came from a background of real poverty. He was born in Soweto and was brought up by his mother, a washer-woman. His father died whilst he was very young. His mother could only afford to keep him in school until Standard Five. After that Gordon worked to help his mother keep the family going. He worked for various firms as a messenger. He worked hard and learnt from practical experience the meaning of class exploitation. He was a deep thinking, quiet young man, who seldom smiled.

In fact I cannot recollect ever seeing Gordon smile but this did not bother one. He was warm and compassionate and at ease with his fellow comrades and leaders alike. You felt that he did not smile because of his single-minded devotion to his training as a revolutionary and a combatant.

You saw this on the football field where it was a joy to watch him. He knew what to do with that ball; how to distribute it; how to shoot with telling effect. He never celebrated his goals; never celebrated his achievements; accepted the jubilant slaps on the back from his team mates and supporters with no sign of emotion. His was the stoicism of the worker to whom discipline comes naturally. A tough, nuggety revolutionary whom you would have chosen immediately to be on your side, be it for a game or on a dangerous mission.

His working class experience and the 1976 Soweto convulsions led Gordon on a single minded track into the revolutionary movement. It was natural that a man like Gordon found himself in the Party. From his class background he had been seeking a class answer. Somewhere he shared accommodation with an old worker and communist. There were many questions and long discussions. There was no sign of emotion when he joined the Party. Just that quiet, determined resolve. What emerged from his combat unit, after his death, was that they called him "ikommunis" because of his discipline and determination.

William Khanyile

His whole life was devoted to the struggle. I remember him as a young worker just out of his 'teens' selling *New Age* in Pietermaritzburg twenty years ago. Come rain or sunshine he was out on the streets selling our newspaper and he used to walk great distances on his rounds. Already in those days he was keenly interested in Marxism and we participated in some discussions in a study circle. Many years later we found ourselves in a Party unit together. He still retained that very serious way of discussing problems affecting the working class. He strove with great deliberation and earnestness to apply Marxist principles to our situation.

His face had become very lined in the intervening years and expressed the suffering he had experienced but never complained about. That included eight years imprisonment on Robben Island for ANC activity; a banning order on release; further arrest without trial in 1975 when he was held for a year in solitary; a trial in 1977 which collapsed; and then exile. He was brought out of the country to work for SACTU externally. In that period of time he had married but he and his wife Eleanor, a fellow activist, had hardly any time to enjoy one another's company. In five years of married life the couple spent little more than a year together. They were bound to each other by their shared beliefs and their common devotion to the struggle.

In Maputo he worked hard at his SACTU tasks. May Day 1980 saw him and his close comrade, John Nkadimeng, leading a SACTU contingent, red flags flying, on the massive march of workers through the streets of Maputo. He was thrilled to be working in Mozambique and to experience at first hand the building of a socialist country on African soil so close to South Africa.

He died in a SACTU residence when racist killers from South Africa fired a rocket at point-blank range through the wall of the room in which he was sleeping. In his early forties he was a virtual father to the youth who worked with him. From his lips they learnt the lesson of internationalism. He never tired of pointing out the strength and superiority of the Soviet Union over the capitalist west, nor of what powerful allies we have in the socialist camp. He liked to discuss the war against Hitler and the story of how the Red Army had torn the guts out of the Nazi war machine. Ironically the killers who came to Matola, that fateful night of January 30th, had daubed swastikas on their helmets.

William knew from his own experience, however, and from the life of his mentor, Harry Gwala who went back to Robben Island for a second term of imprisonment — a life sentence — that the struggle required sacrifice. For this he was always prepared. He was simply interested in doing his duty. He was always anxious that the working class must lead the struggle. That is the reason he gave for joining the Party.

Motso Mokgabudi

He was fondly known to one and all as "Obadi". A colourful character of 29, with a great zest for life and playful streak of humour, he had a deep, thoughtful intellect. He came from Orlando, where his mother, a matron in a hospital, worked hard to give him a good education. He studied law at Turfloop, dropped out as a result of student unrest, and turned his capable hands to many things from teaching to installing TV sets in white houses. He became involved in ANC activity with some of his friends and left the country six months before the 1976 'uprising'.

He learnt easily and quickly, but pondered deeply about political problems. He questioned incessantly. He liked to think things over; to gestate; and then come back for further discussion. He had qualities of leadership and commanded tremendous respect amongst his peers. He epitomised the Soweto generation and radiated their energy, confidence, wit, style, bravery.

William Khanyile

Petros Jobane

Motso Mokgabudi



Mduduzi Guma

He wrestled with the self-same inner contradictions as his fellows; together with them was finding the answers and the path ahead; was maturing and transforming as an individual. He continued to project that township image: the clever slang; the studied 'cool'; the attire of skipper, dungarees and tackies. Intellectually he had bounded way ahead but carried with him the challenging stance and optimism of youth.

The two aspects gave him an intriguing personality. His was the spirit that was formed in the schools and colleges; in the township streets and the heady days of 'black consciousness'; in the triumphal assaults on master race indoctrination. His was the intellect that Bantu Education could never warp. He was fascinated with the lumpen side of township life because he knew he could easily have escaped into it. Like his generation, however, he responded — perhaps exploded is a better term — with dynamic force to the call of the higher ideals of life. He studied, debated, fought — to clarify within his mind the distinctions and relationship between race and class oppression. It was no easy struggle but when he had climbed those lofty slopes he was confident and relaxed.

He was flushed with pride and joy when he was finally accepted into the party ranks. He was a serious and devoted member of his party unit; learning and developing all the time. His contribution to the ANC and the liberation struggle was consequently strengthened and reinforced. It is clear that his development had not been easy. It was not well known that his father had joined the PAC many years ago and had left home whilst Obadi was still very young.

The racist killers lined Obadi and his comrades up outside a house in Matola and machine gunned them down. Obadi staggered away with his guts ripped open. He died in hospital a week later. His mother and sister were at the funeral proud to discover how respected he was. He once said that if he died he would like it to be known that he was a communist.

Mduduzi Guma ("Nkululeko")

Whilst the houses where Obadi and Khanyile slept were being surrounded, racist killers were levelling their weapons at a third Matola residence. Here six of our comrades were butchered including Mduduzi Guma, a former Durban attorney aged 34, who was widely respected at home and whose wife and two children lived in Swaziland. He died instantly in an upstairs bedroom which was hit by a rocket. Sleeping in the same room were his old friend from Durban, Lancelot Hadebe, who also died instantly, and Krishna Rabilal, who staggered from the blazing room badly wounded, to

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be sprayed with bullets at point-blank range — Krish, with whom Mduduzi had coined the term 'Halal' for things that were 'super' or 'going great'.

Mduduzi had a close relationship with these two comrades. He was concerned about his comrades' problems and welfare. When morale was low he would buck them up with profound political analysis and with convincing talk about the inevitability of victory. He was extremely well liked and respected as a leader. He had a very good brain, was highly capable, sociable, persuasive, ironic in his sense of humour, well read, dedicated.

He came from a rather well off family. Had a strict, religious upbringing. He studied law at Ngoye and practised as an attorney in Durban. Educated, sophisticated, with a liking for good suits, he cut an elegant figure around town. He had a wide circle of contacts: professional, religious, student, worker. He made a good impression on all and was very influential. He enjoyed socialising. He was quietly spoken and interesting. He knew much about history and rural culture. He could speak a pure, deep Zulu.

He had joined the ANC and was steadily building up an underground network. No one suspected him even though by 1976 he was defending students caught up in protest and rebellion. He used his position well. He cultivated his image skilfully. He was a good underground worker. It was about this time that he was working with Lancelot Hadebe and another extraordinary figure, the Reverend Mandla Msibi ("Blackman"), with whom he shared many experiences and dangers. 'Blackman's' sudden death in Swaziland last year hit him deeply. They say you can judge a man by his best friends. Those two had a special quality and brilliance and were attuned to each other. The risks they took led to exposure, near arrest, flight.

"Nkululeko" settled in Swaziland — a political refugee. He was an avid reader of political tracts and paid much attention to the Marxist classics. He helped translate our Party programme into Zulu. He was an energetic crusader for *The African Communist* and did good work in distributing it. He wrote well too. Some of his articles can be seen in the MK journal Dawn under the name of "Conqueror Ntswana".

It was a great day for him when he was admitted into the ranks of the Party. Religious schooling, university, the legal profession: there have been many revolutionaries and communists who have entered the struggle from that avenue. "Nkululeko" was immersed in the idea and task of our

people's liberation. He chose the pseudonym "Conqueror" because of his implacable belief in victory. The Party for him represented the vanguard for the total liberation of our people and of mankind from all forms of exploitation.

Ships in the night

The above profiles are offered by someone who had only slender knowledge of the backgrounds of the four, but who worked with them at one time or another. This is the way of our revolutionary struggle in these hard and often sad times. We are frequently like ships that pass in the night. We go to and fro throughout our embattled country; or on the continent of Africa; even the four corners of the world, scarcely getting to know each other. A long dusty journey on the back of a truck; a shared room in some out of the way place; brief intervals during some long, drawn out meeting; maybe on some rare occasion a few cold beers and jocular story-telling well into the night; more often than not illegal border crossings and close shaves. Such are the occasions of often chance meetings and moments of getting to know each other; of discussing childhood, families, sweethearts, music, poetry, philosophy and a hundred and one other things. Before you know it, someone in the movement you have only met a few times becomes dear to you. You look forward to seeing him again. Then the news of arrest, torture, death. All you have to offer are a few pencilled sketches when what is needed are oil paints and a huge canvas.

"The times are sad when it is necessary to be a hero" wrote Bertolt Brecht, "but these are the times in which we live". How many unknown and unsung heroes have died in the struggle to liberate mankind? Our centuries old struggle to liberate South Africa has had its fair share. In this way, then, we record some typical heroes of our time, devoted members of both Party and ANC, whose names we can fortunately set down even if some of their actions cannot yet be revealed. Unlike the passing ship, they and all the heroes of our liberation struggle, without exception, must not be forgotten. They were all ships on a common journey, moving to a common destination. When we reach that destination their names will be recalled and their outstanding deeds revealed. We dip the banner of the ANC and the red flag of the Party in proud salute.

20th ANNIVERSARY OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE

THE ROAD OF STRUGGLE THAT LEADS TO FREEDOM

by M.K. Mtungwa

'The people's patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices — submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa'.

On December 16th, 1961 units of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) carried out a series of bomb attacks against government installations in South Africa's main cities. The targets were connected with the policy of apartheid and racial oppression such as pass offices and government departments concerned with African, Indian and Coloured affairs.

In a manifesto distributed on the same day MK declared that it was a body formed by Africans, but included in its ranks South Africans of all races. MK made its political allegiance quite clear by stating that it 'fully supports the national liberation movement, and our members, jointly and individually, place themselves under the overall political guidance of the movement.'

These historic and dramatic acts of sabotage, over 150 of which were recorded over the next two years, were the first planned and organised acts of violent resistance to white minority rule since the Bambata Rebellion of 1906.

The oppressed people of our country had long experience of the violence and brutality of the racist state. White supremacy was imposed by force and is maintained by force. The question we therefore need to consider is 'Why in 1961 had that time now come?'

A decision to adopt revolutionary violence and armed struggle does not come out of the blue. Neither is it a decision that is lightly taken. In the Rivonia trial Nelson Mandela and our other leaders explained that the historic decision was arrived at after great deliberation. Such a decision has far reaching consequences. 'In the long run we felt certain we could succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the country?' These were the issues that had to be weighed.

Armed struggle is the highest form of political struggle, requiring as it does greater demands and sacrifice from the vanguard organisation and the people. Any miscalculation can result in untold tragedy and disaster and can set a revolutionary movement decades back, if not cause its total collapse.

Serious revolutionaries therefore carefully weigh up all conditions before embarking on armed struggle. They particularly bear in mind their responsibility to the people. Our leaders do not regard the people as mere pawns in a game, who are simply to be used as a staircase to personal power. The people bear the brunt of ruling-class violence and leaders cannot gamble with their lives. Of course revolution entails suffering and loss of life, but the leadership must soberly assess what course of action best serves the interests of the people. The masses do not easily forgive so-called leaders who have misled them, and extracted sacrifices from them in the service of some half-baked adventure (e.g. PAC-POQO violence of the early 'sixties).

Repression and armed struggle

What then are the conditions that must influence a decision to adopt armed struggle? What factors did our leaders have to take into account?

The manifesto of MK declares:

> 'We are striking out along a new road for the liberation of the people of this country. The government's policy of force, repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only. The choice is not ours; it has been made

> by the Nationalist Government which has rejected every peaceable demand by the people for rights and freedom and answered every such demand with force and yet more force.'

What MK's manifesto so eloquently expresses is a universal statement of all revolutionary movements: that in every case of revolutionary struggle the resort to armed struggle is a response to the use of violence by imperialism and its allies.

This process confirms one of Marxism's profound propositions that 'revolution progresses by giving rise to a strong and united counter-revolution, i.e. it compels the enemy to resort to more and more extreme measures of defence and in this way devises even more powerful means of attack.' (Lenin: '*Lessons of the Moscow Uprising*').

In South Africa for example we see how the mass militancy of the 1950's was met by the extreme repression of the apartheid state climaxing in the Sharpeville massacre and the outlawing of the ANC. This act of counter-revolution gave rise to the formation of Umkhonto, as an 'even more powerful means of attack' when compared to our methods in the previous period.

We can see from events in Africa how the extreme violence resorted to by the racists and colonialists in order to ward off the challenge to their rule by the oppressed masses compelled those masses to take up arms:

* In Guinea-Bissau the shooting of fifty striking dock workers in August 1959 signalled the new phase in the struggle;
* In Mozambique it was the 16th June, 1960, Mueda massacre of 600 at a peaceful meeting;
* In Angola it was the 1961 killing of 30 and wounding of 200 at a meeting protesting at the arrest of Dr. Neto;
* Similar repression in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Algeria prompted the change from peaceful to armed struggle.

It is clearly as a result of such brutal outrages that the liberation forces declare, as MK did; 'The Government's policy of force will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only'.

An expert on revolutionary armed struggle, William Pomeroy, has written:

> 'Popular armed struggle has had its origin in the outlawing of trade unions and peasant unions that have sought to gain for workers and peasants a greater share of the super-profits that imperialists extract from their labour. It has resulted from the suppression of nationalist political parties that have advocated full independence and control over the natural resources of their own countries,

including the arrest, the torture or the killing of those who have protested peacefully against such denials and the use of force against the people and their legally constituted organisations.' (*Guerrilla Warfare* p14).

All the countries we have referred to, including our own, fit into this pattern. But armed struggle is not born of repression alone. There are other factors and conditions to consider.

Violence and Non-violence

Prior to the creation of MK the forms of struggle used by the ANC and its allies were *non-violent*. After December 1961 we employed *violent forms* of struggle; namely sabotage and armed struggle. A question which is often raised is that since violence is often linked with revolution (in some people's minds at any rate) the ANC must have been a "moderate" organisation prior to 1961. Nothing could be more erroneous.

It is the oppressor who seeks to implant in people's minds the image of 'Revolution and Bloodshed'. Many revolutions have in fact been carried out with a minimum loss of life (e.g. the overthrow of fascism in Portugal). The eruption of violence and slaughter is generally caused by the attempts of counter-revolution to regain power. The ruling classes seek to project the image of 'Revolution and Bloodshed' in order to make the masses frightened of change.

In South Africa this takes two forms both aimed at maintaining the present set-up. On the one hand 'Africans will be cannon fodder in an armed struggle to overthrow white supremacy'; and on the other hand 'the whites will be driven into the sea'. The effect on the oppressed of the first is to disarm them; the effect on the whites of the second is to frighten them into supporting the system.

Furthermore it is a grotesque distortion to equate Revolution with armed struggle the way the Maoists, Red Brigades of Italy, Japan etc. do. This plays into the hands of the ruling classes. 'Violence' is a particular form of struggle and so is 'non-violence'. There are times when 'violence' can advance a struggle or retard it. The same applies to 'non-violence' Genuine revolutionaries are never wedded to a particular form of struggle. They use their *revolutionary judgement* to assess the most appropriate time for the use of a particular form of struggle.

Forms of struggle are tactical methods and techniques which help us to advance our struggle and attain our goals, in our case a liberated South Africa based on the Freedom Charter. Therefore they are means to an end. If a particular method is useful in advancing the struggle we employ it

as part of our arsenal; if not we discard it.

Marxism-Leninism is categorically opposed to a mechanical and inflexible approach to this question. In a celebrated article on 'Guerrilla Warfare' Lenin asked: *What are the fundamental demands which every Marxist should make of an examination of the question of forms of struggle?'* In his answer Lenin gave two theoretical propositions by which revolutionaries must be guided:

> 'In the first place Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism by not binding the movement to any one particular form of struggle. It recognizes the most varied forms of struggle. . . In the second place, Marxism demands an absolutely historical examination of the question of forms of struggle. To treat the question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism. . .'

The Maoists and Red Brigade groups constantly display a wilful ignorance of the need to dialectically relate various forms of struggle to each other. They dogmatically counterpose violent methods to all other forms, and disregard the concrete historical situation. For example the attempt to enforce violent tactics (kidnapping, hijacking, bombing) in a situation where the mass movement is making advances through the use of 'peaceful' forms of struggle such as strikes and demonstrations and the electoral process.

In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels declared that the ends of communists 'can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions'. Force, in their view, involved the whole range of forms which working class struggle takes: mass demonstrations, general strikes, boycotts and armed uprisings. They particularly stressed the combination of all of these. Depending on the prevailing *objective* economic conditions (i.e. external to and independent of our will) there are periods of so-called 'peaceful' development or (where profound crises occur) periods of 'stormy' revolutionary development of the mass struggle. It is in the latter period where much more active and vigorous forms of struggle occur.

A people's struggle that is rich in historical experience will have progressed through various periods and phases — both peaceful and stormy. Ascribing the Bolshevik party's maturity to its experience in the 15 years prior to the revolution, Lenin wrote:

> 'No other country knew anything even approximating to that revolutionary experience, that rapid and varied succession of different forms of the movement — legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, underground and open, local circles and mass movements, and parliamentary and terrorist forms'. (*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*)

If we relate the above quotation to our own struggle we see too that the wide range of methods our people have employed constitutes a rich storehouse of experience in the possession of our liberation movement.

Exhausting Peaceful Means

Whilst we have shown that 'non-violent' forms of struggle are a necessary part of the revolutionary arsenal of methods of struggle, we must make an important point in this regard. *In all revolutionary struggles it is imperative to exhaust all peaceful means of struggle before embarking on armed struggle.*

This was the case with Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Vietnam, Zimbabwe etc. The reason for this is the plain and simple fact that the people are not inclined to support or resort to violence *unless they see that there is no other way out.*

The people must see the justification and necessity for violence. They must see that it is in their interests. This is particularly important because the masses must bear the brunt of the enemy's counter-violence by placing the blame on the so-called 'agitators'. The people must be able to see through this falsehood. They must see that the revolutionary movement has attempted to advance the struggle through all peaceful avenues, but has been forced to resort to arms because the oppressor has imposed a war situation.

Thus the selection of the form of struggle — peaceful or violent — is not dependent on the people, but rather on the oppressor. This is what gives revolutionary violence its moral justification. The people do not embark on violence because they wish to see people injured. They do so when they come to learn that the only possible way to overcome the violence of oppression is through revolutionary violence. Furthermore, because every liberation movement must base itself on the people's support, peaceful and legal means are preferred as the way of winning that support and building organisation, unity and strength.

This shows the tactical necessity of using non-violent means in order to build up organisation and develop consciousness, where the situation allows. The non-violent path can lead to a serious challenge for power by the people. It can lead to a revolutionary situation. Lenin consistently held that revolution could come about through armed uprising or the peaceful way. But the revolutionary movement must always be ready to seize power by arms for the seizure of state power can only take place when the balance of power swings in its favour.

Evolution of our Armed Struggle

For almost fifty years the ANC followed a policy of non-violent struggle to achieve its aims. We have posed the question 'why had the time come' in December, 1961? In order to fully answer this question we must understand the *concrete historical situation* that faced our people and our leaders at the time. We must examine this situation in two parts:

1) the historical background (which will show how peaceful forms of struggle were exhausted and how our methods of struggle had to change); and

ii) the subjective and objective factors (which will weigh-up the internal and external balance of forces; the mood of the people; and the possibility of resorting to armed struggle in 1961).

Since 'forms of struggle' are related to our *strategy and tactics* we should make clear what we mean by these terms.

Strategy is a term derived from warfare and signifies an overall plan of battle; the art of directing the campaign. *Tactics* are the manoeuvres within that battle plan; devices for gaining the end. In politics strategy is also an art of planning and is linked to our goals. *Strategy* means to define those principal goals in such a way as to distinguish the main class or national enemy against whom revolutionary effort must be directed. The Freedom Charter defines the goals of a liberated South Africa in such a way as to isolate the main reactionary forces against whom our blows must be directed and creates the broadest possible unity of progressive forces.

Tactics in the political sense is the totality of forms, methods and means of attaining the main goal in concrete circumstances: eg. strike, demonstration, ambush, raid, sabotage etc.

The strategic goals of a movement will depend on the historical period; the nature of the oppressor regime; which class leads the struggle; whether the struggle is for national or class aims etc.

The choice of methods of struggle will depend on the existing conditions: on the methods of rule of the oppressor classes; and on the readiness and organisation of the people.

The strategy and tactics of our resistance struggle have changed over the centuries, growing more scientific and revolutionary.

Historical Background

Our history of resistance falls into three periods:

(i) The Wars of Resistance 1652-1906
(ii) Non-violent struggle 1912-1960
(iii) Violent struggle 1961-?

The Wars of Resistance 1652-1906

In the first period the strategy of our people was to defend the ancestral lands and hold white invasion at bay. The struggle was over control of the land and the colonisers aimed to seize as much territory as possible by robbery and plunder. Our people used diplomatic means where possible and where these failed were always ready to resort to armed resistance. Co-ordinated resistance was difficult in 19th century South Africa. So brave and tenacious was the resistance, however, that it lasted for 250 years. Regular as well as guerrilla methods of warfare were made use of.

In the end it was Great Britain, the world's leading power at the time, that finally crushed resistance in a series of bloody wars in the 1870's and 1880's. This aggressive policy was spurred on by the discovery of diamonds and gold and the imperialist 'scramble for Africa'. The Boers had been defeated by our people on many occasions and could not have conquered the country on their own. Names such as Makana, Moshoeshoe, Dingane, Sekhukhuni, Mzilikazi and Cetshwayo stand out as landmarks in this period, as do epic battles such as Isandlwana.

The Bambatha Rebellion of 1906 represents the last brave attempt at armed resistance, and marks the close of an era. Apart from the fact that it was clear that the spear and shield were no match for the rifle and cannon the military institutions of the African chieftains no longer existed. Our people had no alternative but to search for new forms of struggle.

In passing we should note that the spirit of resistance of the past is of great importance to us and serves as a powerful rallying-cry to mobilise our people behind the warriors of Umkhonto.

Non-Violent Struggle 1912-1960

In this period of resistance the strategic aim of the ANC was the building of a national body as the means of mobilising and unifying the African people. The ANC realised from the outset that the problem of forging unity was the key to freedom.

Whilst the struggle to control the land had determined state policy in the previous period, with the mining and industrial revolution the struggle

for cheap African labour became the main determinant of state policy. In order to keep us disorganised and weak, the successive white capitalist governments applied vicious laws backed by coercion and force. It was no small achievement for the early pioneers of the ANC to build the first steps of national unity. If the early tactics they employed seem moderate to us we must bear in mind the conditions of the time. Uprooted from the land, in a stage of transition from peasants to workers, our people were initially in a state of disorganisation.

It is with the development of a stable African working class and the emergence of young revolutionary intellectuals during the Second World War, when national consciousness was fanned throughout Africa and Asia, that our methods of struggle became more militant and mass based, our general strategy was broadened to include both national and class dimensions, and the ANC and Communist Party grew much stronger.

With the advent to power of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948 the scene was set for the mass struggles of the 'fifties. These struggles, making use of such methods as strikes, boycotts, civil diobedience and militant demonstrations, turned the ANC into a mass movement; steeled and disciplined our people; raised their national consciousness to new heights; and forged powerful class and national alliances.

In all these campaigns the emphasis was on non-violence; a policy which proved extremely successful in advancing the struggle. It was essential to make full use of all legal channels as long as these remained. This was a tactical necessity in order to build organisational strength and raise the fighting mood of the people. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, the masses always prefer to make use of peaceful forms of struggle where these exist. As the challenge to white rule became more powerful so the government resorted to more violent repression. Bannings and restrictions, the imposition of severer penalties for defying unjust laws, baton charges and shootings became the order of the day. Rebellion and unrest amongst our people flared up in town and country; in New Brighton, Cato Manor, Alexandra, Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, Pondoland, Northern Natal.

The Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the ANC illustrated that the government had declared total war on our people and was preparing to crush our liberation movement by all means.

This finally closed all channels to non-violent prospects for change. The violent crushing of the national protest strike against the declaration of the racist republic in May, 1961 was the final proof that armed forms of struggle were becoming necessary.

The Turn to Violence

'How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country?' Nelson Mandela asked at the Rivonia trial, indicating the question our leaders faced when they decided to break with the policy of non-violence. 'And how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day?'

It had become clear to our leaders that where no democratic liberties existed, where all forms of protest were met by violence, the only way of going forward was by armed struggle. This was a decision the people would support for they had experienced the exhausting of peaceful means; had seen the government close down all legal and peaceful channels of resistance. What had happened elsewhere in the world (Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria) was happening in South Africa: *namely that the people's movements are compelled to use violent means in order to overcome the use of repressive violence by the state.* 'The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices — submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa' was the way this point was expressed in Umkhonto's manifesto. That the mood of the masses was in keeping with the thinking of our leaders (and strongly influencing the leadership's carefully considered judgement too) is illustrated by the fact that there were increasing numbers of violent clashes between our people and the police in numerous township incidents, as well as open rebellion in Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, Natal and Pondoland. If there already existed a tendency towards armed struggle, then the outlawing of the ANC was the final necessary condition; for operating in an underground situation meant it was now free from legal constraints and could issue any call it saw fit.

The outlawing of an organisation, however, does not automatically lead to a decision to embark on armed struggle. Neither do massacres eg. Bulhoek and Bondelswarts. It must be possible to satisfy other necessary conditions, especially the possibility of arming and training the people. Just as leaders must take into account the historic situation so they must carefully weigh up the objective and subjective conditions before judging that the situation is ripe. What are these conditions?

Objective conditions exist independently of our will. They are the conditions which are beyond our immediate control and can be favourable or unfavourable. For example prior to the Great October Revolution when imperialism dominated the world it was difficult for the oppressed nations to struggle against colonialism. In the period after October 1917, when the

Soviet Union emerged to aid the oppressed peoples of all lands, conditions for struggle became much more favourable. Objective conditions relate to the internal and external situation; balance of forces between rulers and oppressed; and the material economic conditions in a country. These determine the people's mood; level of crisis and contradiction; whether the rulers are in control of the situation; whether a particular period is 'stormy' or 'peaceful'.

Subjective conditions relate to our will; to our preparedness and readiness to embark on a certain course of action. To fulfil the subjective conditions means that there must be in existence a party or movement with a political programme and clearly defined strategy and tactics. This vanguard movement must be closely linked to the masses; capable of mobilising and leading them; able to put its will into practice.

In 1906 Bambatha and his followers had the will to take up arms but the objective conditions were unfavourable. By 1961 the objective and subjective conditions were maturing. This realistically raised the possibility of armed struggle. What precisely were these conditions in the concrete South African situation?

Objective Factors

(i) The international situation and world balance of forces was becoming more favourable to the national liberation struggle. Eg: defeat of Nazism; growth of socialist countries; collapse of colonialism. Imperialism was faced by the general crisis of capitalism and growing challenge to its rule (Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria etc.)

(ii) Africa's 'wind of change' was strengthening the forces of freedom and independence; threatening the racists in the south; raising the hopes of the people.

(iii) South Africa was becoming isolated whilst world support was swinging behind our struggle.

(iv) As a result of its growing isolation, and increasing socio-economic contradictions aggravated by the racist system, the crisis of the regime was mounting. This was expressed in the growing clashes between the rulers and oppressed, e.g. the Sharpeville massacre.

(v) Relying more and more on brutal force the regime left us with 'no choice but to hit back by all means within our power'. All peaceful means had been exhausted and the masses were showing their disillusionment with non-violent methods alone.

(vi) With the changing situation in Africa the possibility of receiving arms and training abroad was becoming real.

Subjective Factors

(i) Our movement and cadres had become steeled and disciplined in the struggle. We had the necessary organisation, experience, links with the masses and programme of aims to enable us to meet the challenge of the new historic situation and embark on the rigorous road of armed struggle.
(ii) Despite the fact that our people had been totally deprived of the knowledge of guns and military training we had the ability and will to master all techniques as long as these became available to us.

Given these conditions our leaders decided that "the time had come" to embark on new forms of struggle in which popular armed force would become the key element. The 1962 Programme of the SACP summed up the situation:

> "The Communist Party considers that the slogan of 'non-violence' is harmful to the cause of the democratic national revolution in the new phase of the struggle, disarming the people in the face of the savage assaults of the oppressor, dampening their militancy, undermining their confidence in their leaders. . . today they (the people) are left with no alternative but to defend themselves and hit back, to meet violence with violence. The Nationalists are forcing a solution upon South Africa in which patriots and democrats will take up arms to defend themselves, organise guerrilla armies and undertake various acts of resistance, culminating in mass insurrection against white domination".

From the outset the Party collaborated with the ANC in the formation of Umkhonto and Party members have played a role at all levels in conducting the operations of Umkhonto.

Victory or Death!

It was recognised that the new path would not be an easy one and would require exceptional demands and sacrifices. The twenty years that have passed since those historic initial blows of Umkhonto have seen the struggle becoming more intense and violent. Those twenty years have witnessed 'calm' and 'stormy' phases; periods of mass activity and violent bloodshed such as during the Soweto uprising which in a flash illuminated for an entire younger generation the necessity to resort to arms.

Those years have seen the militarisation of the apartheid state and its unbridled aggression and war against our own people and our brothers and sisters in the neighbouring independent states. Those years have seen the dramatic swing in the balance of forces and the changing of the map of

southern Africa as a result of the victorious armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and the advances in Namibia.

Those years have inevitably seen set-backs and problems too, which at times have seriously slowed down the pace of our advance. For almost 18 of those years many of our key leaders, responsible for adopting this historic path, have been incarcerated on Robben Island. For a period we had to grapple with the problems of leading the revolution from exile.

After that momentous decision twenty years ago, however, nothing could ever be the same again in our embattled country or for that matter in the entire southern African region.

Thanks to that decision Umkhonto we Sizwe, the People's Army, is today, at a time when our situation so urgently requires armed force to reinforce and stimulate the mass actions of our people, a fighting force of experienced freedom fighters with a proud combat record. The actions of those first brave units, self-trained and making use of simple home-made devices, are linked by a glorious road that runs through the Zimbabwe battles of 1967-68 to the audacious and spectacular blows of today such as Sasol, Booysens, Fort Jackson etc. etc. which have inspired our people and shaken the enemy to his bootstraps. In this twentieth birthday year the struggles of MK are showing greater levels of success and potentiality.

At a time like this we pay tribute to the glorious combatants of Umkhonto and homage to our eternal heroes who have fallen in battle. We have in mind our unforgettable martyrs such as Vuyisile Mini and Solomon Mahlangu, Looksmart Ngudle and Babla Saloojee, the men of Zimbabwe such as Patrick Malao, Basil February and Johannes Sibanyoni, and the young MK fighters of today such as the Silverton heroes Thami Makhuba, Wilfred Madela and Fanie Mafoko, those who fell at Matola and those who have fought it out to the last bullet or hand grenade such as Linda Jabane, the lion of Chiawelo and Khuduga Molokwane, the Dobsonville schoolteacher.

Eternal honour to them! In the words of President Tambo, which ring like a clarion call to all MK combatants:

"Our battle cry is and shall continue to be: Victory or Death! We shall win!"

EXHIBIT L

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EDITORIAL

YUSUF DADOO: 70th BIRTHDAY

This month our liberation movement is celebrating Dr. Dadoo's 70th birthday. This is not a normal practice in our movement. Besides Comrades Moses Kotane and Nelson Mandela whose birthdays were observed internationally, Dr. Dadoo is the third person who is honoured in this fashion. There is enough reason for this.

Comrade Dadoo has dedicated his adult life to the struggle for the liberation of the nationally oppressed Blacks in South Africa. Since 1937 when he came back to South Africa from studying in Britain he was involved in all the struggles of our people. He was arrested and banned many times. That was not all. He gave form and content to the politics of the then reformist Transvaal Indian Congress and later became the President of the South African Indian Congress. He also joined the Communist Party of South Africa and functioned in its leading organs and after the death of Uncle J.B. Marks, he became its National Chairman.

One of his greatest merits was the role he played in bringing the Indian community closer to the Africans — no easy task those days — and this found expression in the Xuma-Naicker-Dadoo Pact of 1947 (a pact of the ANC President-General, Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress Presidents). This was not just a pact of the leaders but unity in action of the oppressed which found expression in the joint struggles of the 50's (African, Coloured and Indian) and the adoption by all oppressed and by the democratic Whites of the Freedom Charter. The climax of these early endeavours was the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (armed wing of the ANC) in 1961 and the Morogoro Conference which cemented on a higher level the unity of the oppressed begun in 1947 by Drs. Xuma, Naicker and Dadoo. The

Comrade Yusuf Dadoo

Morogoro Conference which declared that all South Africans — irrespective of their "racial" origin can join the ANC — symbolised the far sightedness and internationalism of the Africans who extended a hand of friendship to all genuine South African revolutionaries. Dr. Dadoo played his role also in this respect.

It is these qualities which we are celebrating: his fearlessness, courage, determination, non-racism, unity in action and internationalism; qualities which have come to characterise our movement and inspire the younger generation — the generation of Soweto and Gugulethu and other revolutionary centres in our country. The African National Congress which has declared war against racism in South Africa is the home, shield and spear of all genuine, patriotic South Africans.

DR DADOO- THE NATION SALUTES YOU

On September 5, 1979, Dr Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo, national chairman of the South African Communist Party and Vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the African National Congress of South Africa, celebrated his 70th birthday. The occasion was of importance not only to him as an individual but also to the organisations he has led and the principles for which he has fought throughout his political career. At a time when the white racist regime in South Africa is trying to divide black from white, Indian and Coloured from African, to separate each racial group in its own Bantustan or ghetto for the greater glory of white supremacy, Dr Dadoo and his comrades stand and fight for a non-racial united South Africa in which there will be equal rights and opportunities for all peoples, and in which colour bars, race oppression and the exploitation of man by man will be abolished for ever.

Yusuf Dadoo's career has been one of struggle and sacrifice for the cause of national and social liberation to which he has devoted his life. Born on September 5, 1909, in Krugersdorp, Dadoo like all other black people experienced the harsh realities and humiliations of racism from his earliest days. After receiving his secondary education in India, he went to Britain to study as a medical doctor, qualifying at Edinburgh university. It was whilst he was a student at Edinburgh that his political horizons were widened. It was then that he first read the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels which made a profound and lasting impression on him, opening up a whole new world. He began to understand more and more clearly that true liberation can only come about under socialism. He returned to South Africa in 1936 fired with a burning hatred of colonialism, imperialism and racism and with a steel-like determination to make his contribution to the struggle for a new and better life for all in South Africa.

Patriot

In 1936 the National liberation organisations of the oppressed were weak and isolated from eachother. The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) was in disarray. The "moderate" and conservative TIC leaders made rhetorical denounciations of racist legislation but in practice they consistently pursued a policy of compromise and sell-out.

Dadoo fought with grim determination to fundamentally transform the Indian Congress and so create a more secure basis for the unity of the black oppressed. He und other militant colleagues set up the Nationalist Group of the TIC and later the Nationalist bloc of the Natal Indian Association.

During the period 1936-1946 Dadoo was intensely active, touring the Transvaal and Natal, speaking at mass meetings as well as house meetings and small discussion groups and persuading reluctant personalities among the Indian people to follow the new line. A great orator, he always sought in his speeches to reflect the grievances and aspirations of the working people.

At the same time Dadoo was extremely active on a broader political front. He was one of the founders in 1938 of the Non-European United Front (NEUF) which played such a dynamic role during the years of the second world war in South Africa. Speaking at meetings, writing articles and pamphlets and issuing and distributing leaflets, Dadoo and his comrades Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, Alpheus Maliba and many others did their best to mobilise and galvanise the people into action.

The white minority government of

Dr Dadoo with the late Indian Prime Minister Nehru

Smuts regarded Dadoo as "Public Enemy No.1". They arrested him in 1941 and he served four months with hard labour at the notorious "Blue Sky" prison in Boksburg.

They tried to muzzle him by threatening him with internment but in Dr Dadoo the racist authorities met a formidable foe who refused to be cowed into submission. By the mid-1940's Dadoo was a household name amongst the African and Indian people. Indeed at that time a square in Orlando which was used for mass meetings was dubbed Dadoo Square by the people.

In 1939 Dadoo joined the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The development of his political life and thinking matured rapidly. He not only grasped the essentials of the liberating ideas of Marxism-Leninism but became part of the party which gave life and meaning to the ideas of scientific socialism in South Africa.

He was active in the CPSA, Indian Congresses, NEUF and the wide-spread anti-pass campaigns of the time. He was not only a leader but an activist. In 1944, every morning during the buss boycott in protest against fare increases, Dadoo went to Alexandra township and marched into town with the heroic residents of the township.

Through hard work and their ability to reflect accurately the mood and thinking of the Indian people, Dadoo, Naicker and the other progressive and militant leaders became more and more popular. The battle to change the entire strategy tactics and principles of the Indian Congresses was on. The slogan was: "Militant Actions not Pious Resolutions! Closer co-operation with the other national organisations, particularly the African National Congress!" To achieve these aims, the militants and progressives under the leadership of Dadoo worked with tremendous determination, enthusiasm and energy.

Throughout the period 1946 to 1960 the Indians marked up a proud record of struggle. In all the mass militant campaigns organised under the leadership of the ANC, such as the Defiance Campaign, the stay-

at-homes, the strikes and the historic Congress of the People which adopted the Freedom Charter, the Indians stood side by side with Africans, Coloureds and democratic whites in the struggle for national liberation. Even though continuously banned from participating in any political activities Dadoo continued to guve guidance and leadership. In recognition of his dynamic role in forging the comradely alliance between the ANC and the SAIC and as tribute to the respect and affection in which he was held by all freedom-loving peoples in our country, Dadoo together with the late Chief Luthuli and Father Trevor Huddleston were awarded the traditional African decoration of Isithwalandwe — "wearer of the feather of the rare and legendary bird Indwe" — at the Congress of the People in 1955.

After the CPSA was banned in 1950, Dadoo and other Communists led by Moses Kotane reconstituted the Party as the South African Communist Party. Whilst performing his duties in the Congress movement, Dadoo was also an active member and leader of the illegal SACP. He and his comrades carried out their duties with meticulous care and attention to every detail and with great courage in the face of increasing surveillence and harassment by the Security Police.

In 1960, while working underground during the state of emergency which followed the Sharpeville shooting, Dadoo was sent overseas by his comrades to set up an external machinery and to promote solidarity work. While he was out of the country Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the liberation movement, was formed — a move which Dadoo greeted with enthusiasm.

Inside the citadel of racism the Indian youth responded magnificently to the call to arms. Revolutionaries like Billy Nair, Issu Chibha and Ahmed Kathrada are together with their African, Coloured and white comrades serving long terms of imprisonment in the fascist dungeons. Others such as Mac Maharaj, Indris Naidoo, Shirish Nanabhai, Reggie Vandeyar, George Naicker and Ebrahim Ismail also served long sentences. Two of the young militants Babla Salojee and Ahmed Timol — were murdered by the Security Police.

However, the Indians do not and cannot rest content on their laurels. As Dadoo said in a special message to the Indian people on the occasion of June 26, 1975:

"Our place in a free South Africa is going to be decided by the role we continue to play in the liberation struggle. It is by fighting side by side, arm in arm with our African and Coloured brothers and sisters — it is by our persistent and perpetual resistance to apartheid, by our willingness to make the supreme sacrifice, that we shall help to build a secure place for ourselves, our children and for all the oppressed people in a free, democratic South Africa. That is the guarantee of freedom and social well-being for all South Africans of all races and colours. Neither we, nor any section of the South African people can be free as long as the African people are denied fundamental human rights. Let us, on this our Freedom Day, take to heart the lesson of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guine Bissau and Indo-China — that a united and determined people can, with arms in hand, defeat even the most powerful enemy. The force generated by the determined will and endeavour of a united people is irresistable."

Internationalist

As a true patriot Dadoo understood already in the thirties that the struggle in South Africa is part of a much wider struggle against capitalism, colonialism and imperialism for national liberation, peace, democracy and socialism. Together with Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, Bram Fischer, O.R. Tambo and many others Dadoo, imparted to the national liberation movement in South Africa an anti-imperialist content which is widely appreciated and acclaimed throughout the world. They organised protest meetings and demonstrations, wrote articles and issued other propaganda material covering a wide variety of international problems. Some of these were: the Zionist-imperialist aggression against Egypt in 1956, the bloody French colonial war against the people of Algeria, the imprisonment of Kenyatta, the CIA-



Veteran mine workers and ANC leader the late J.B. Marks with Comrade Dadoo

inspired murder of Lumumba, the Portuguese colonial massacres in Mozambique and Angola and the fight for peace and disarmament. In the 1950's every conference of the Congress movement passed resolutions on one or other topical international issue. Fraternal links were established with international organisations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Council, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. Our people, whom the racists tried to isolate from the world, developed a fierce hatred of imperialism and a love and respect for the socialist countries and progressive forces throughout the world — thanks to the sterling work done by the leaders and members of the Congress Movement and the underground Communist Party.

In the course of his political work Dadoo has visited many countries and met and discussed with world-renowned leaders such as Nkrumah, Nasser, Nyrere, Balewa, Oginga Odinga, Sekou Toure, Mariam Ngouabi, Ben Bella, Mondlane, Amilcar Cabral, Neto, Machel, Gandhi and Nehru. In the socialist countries he has met and discussed with top officials and Party leaders including Dimitrov, Castro, Zhivkov and Giap. Dadoo has also attended on behalf of the SACP, congresses of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic, the Vietnam Workers' Party and other socialist countries. His fraternal addresses to these conferences, in which he showed a profound understanding of the problems of communist parties building socialist societies in the teeth of opposition and hostility from the capitalist world, were listened to with attention and widely acclaimed.

A fervent upholder of proletarian internationalism, Dadoo has shown in his life and work that one cannot be a true patriot without also being an internationalist. In combining the most noble qualities of a revolutionary, he has played and is playing an important part in stimulating the national and class consciousness of the oppressed and downtrodden. Throughout his life Dadoo has remained modest and unassuming, never seeking any personal gain or nurturing personal ambition. His tremendous warmth and humanity, great oratorical skills, capacity to listen to other people, depth of understanding of the situation at home and abroad have made a deep and lasting impression on the people of South Africa and on the world-wide progressive and anti-imperialist forces.

Today at the age of 70 he remains in the forefront of the struggle. With the same driving energy which has marked all his achievements in the past, he carries out his tasks as the chairman of the South African Communist Party and vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the ANC. That fierce, steel-like resolve never to rest until South Africa is free from the scourge of racism, fascism, apartheid and capitalism is as strong as ever. He is always at his post ready to do his duty.

There are two important lessons which emerge clearly for us in South Africa when we examine Dadoo's life and political work:

1. Revolutionaries are not ready-made. They develop in the course of the struggle, gain more experience and become more mature in their political consciousness. Those who exercise leadership must always remain in the closest contact with the mood, grievances and aspirations of the masses and clearly grasp that the main force for social change is the working class.

2. No matter how outstanding an individual may be, revolutionary work can only be carried to a successful conclusion through militant organisations which represent the interests and harness the energy of the masses. It is impossible to conduct a revolutionary struggle successfully without a revolutionary movement which has clear principles, programme, strategy and tactics. In South Africa the ANC and the SACP have proved in practice that they meet these requirements.

As we mark the occasion of Dadoo's 70th birthday we are at a crucial phase in the revolutionary struggle to liberate our motherland from the yoke of racism and apartheid. The unprecedented mass actions of the oppressed peoples in recent years, the growing capacity of units of Umkhonto we Sizwe to engage the enemy in battle on our own soil, seen against the background of the growing economic and political crisis in the enemy camp, have inexorably shifted the initiative into our hands. Now more than ever before we must fight every inch of the way for unity in action of all those genuinely opposed to apartheid.

This was an important theme in Dadoo's eloquent and fiery speech on the occasion of the centenary on January 22, 1979, of the Battle of Isandhlwana — a battle in which the Africans won a glorious victory over the invading British Colonial army. Dadoo said:

"The lesson of our history is that the key to freedom is a united people fighting for a single common goal: People's Power Over Every Inch of an Indivisible South Africa! Whilst deriving inspiration from the deeds and traditions of the past resistance we must build the unshakeable unity of all. We must deepen the unifying national consciousness of all our people — African, Indian, Coloured and democratic white — which is a pre-requisite for a nation-wide uprising and victory along the lines of our Freedom Charter.

"In this year 1979 we march forward to further develop the process of mass mobilisation — bringing together all organisations, groups and individuals opposed to

Yusuf Dadoo, stands with the ANC flag, at a demonstration in London.

apartheid — unity in opposition to all aspects of the inhuman system of apartheid, laying the basis for a people's war in which we combine armed actions with all forms of political struggle. In this struggle the working class has a central role."

A LUTA CONTINUA! THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!
ALL OUT IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE RACISTS AND THEIR HENCHMEN!
LIVE TO STRUGGLE! STRUGGLE TO LIVE!
LONG LIVE THE ANC, UMKHONTO WE SIZWE AND THE SACP!
AMANDLA NGAWETHU! MAATLA KE A RONA! MAYIBUYE! POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

ANTI-IMPERIALIST SOLIDARITY

At the invitation of the Governments, parties and mass organisations of the socialist countries of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the ANC visited the above-mentioned countries in June, 1979. The ANC delegation, led by President Tambo, met with the Bulgarian head of state, Todor Shirkov, Czechoslovakian President Gustav Husak and the Hungarian Solidarity Committee.

The trip, the first of its kind, was a very successful one; lively and fruitful discussions took place; a wide range of topics was handled and both sides reached mutual agreement on these.

The ANC was impressed with socialist achievements in all three countries and expressed its gratitude for the solidarity rendered by them to our liberation struggle. In Bulgaria, the ANC delegation issued a joint communique with our hosts, which we print below:

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, a delegation of the African National Congress of South Africa headed by its President, Oliver Tambo, visited the People's Republic of Bulgaria from June 20 to 23, 1979.

The President of the ANC Oliver Tambo was received by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The ANC delegation layed a wreath at the Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov, the leader and teacher of the Bulgarian people and eminent figure of the international communist and workers' movement.

During their stay in Bulgaria, the envoys of the ANC of South Africa visited the city of Plovdiv and the district, and had a meeting with Ivan Panev, First Secretary of the District Committee of the BCP. The ANC delegation visited the Scientific and Productional Complex "Georgi Dimitrov" and the shoe-factory "Peter Chengelov", where an enthusiastic solidarity rally was held in support of the struggle of the South African people against apartheid and imperialism.

The ANC delegation held talks with a delegation of the CC of the BCP headed by Alexander Lillov, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC of the BCP.

The President of the ANC told about the long years of hard struggle waged by the people of South Africa enslaved by the racist regime of Apartheid, for national liberation, for the building of a democratic state, and about the new stage of the revolutionary struggle opened for the country after the Soweto events in 1976.

The BCP representatives gave a high assessment of the ANC activities for rallying all forces in South Africa fighting against the criminal apartheid regime: They condemned the repression and terrorism to which the people of South Africa are subjected by the racist authorities, as well as their policy of bantustanization of the country. The unflinching militant solidarity of the Bulgarian communists and the Bugarian people as a whole with the manly struggle of the people of South Africa for winning genuine national independence, for freedom and social progress, was confirmed.

The head of the delegation of the CC of the BCP told about the successes reached by the Bulgarian people under the leadership of the Party in the construction of a developed socialist society in the PR of Bulgaria, about the foreign policies of the BCP and the PR of Bulgaria.

The ANC representatives highly evaluated

the historic successes of the Bulgarian people in the socialist construction as well as the peace foreign policy of the PR of Bulgaria aimed at strengthening the good-neighbourly relations in the Balkans, of security and peace in Europe and the world. They emphasized the extremely high assessment given by the ANC to the consistent and principled policy of all-round support and assistance to the fighting peoples, pursued by the BCP and the PRB. On behalf of the National Executive of the ANC, the head of its delegation expressed their sincere gratitude to the BCP and the PRB for the aid they render to the ANC and the South African people in their struggle against the racist apartheid regime in South Africa.

In exchanging views on the international situation, both delegations expressed their unreserved support for the policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community aimed at strengthening peace and cooperation among nations, at putting an end to the arms race and for real disarmament.

They greeted the signing of the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and expressed their profound conviction that it is a major step along the road of curbing the nuclear arms race, and corresponds to the interests of all nations in the world.

At the talks, special attention was attached to the African problems and the national liberation struggle waged by the peoples in Southern Africa. It was pointed out that in recent years the peoples in the African continent have achieved historic victories in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism, for national and social liberation. The two sides emphasized that these achievements are indivisibly connected to the successes and the consistent foreign policy of the socialist community countries and above all, of the USSR — the stronghold of peace in the world, the selfless friend of all fighting peoples.

Both delegations greeted the successes achieved by the people of Namibia under the leadership of the South West People's Organisation (SWAPO) — their sole and legitimate representative in the struggle for liberating their country from illegal occupation, colonial domination and economic exploitation by the South African fascist regime supported by imperialist countries.

Both delegations greeted the victories of the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative — the Patriotic Front — in their struggle against the racist regime of Ian Smith.

Both delegations condemned the so-called "internal settlement" in Zimbabwe and the sham elections in Zimbabwe and Namibia as an attempt to deprive the people of these countries of their legitimate right to genuine national independence.

The BCP and the ANC expressed their full-fledged support to the peoples of the "front-line" states who have become the target of most barbaric armed raids by the Pretoria and Salisbury racists, and called upon all states to express their solidarity with them.

Both delegations strongly condemned the policy of imperialism aimed at destabilizing the progressive countries in Africa, at neo-colonial subjugation of the continent and stifling the legitimate and just struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa. They are of the opinion that the political, economic and military relations maintained by the Western countries with the racist regimes, in defiance of the UN resolutions, are a challenge to independent Africa and the subjugated peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. It was underlined that the collaboration of the Western countries with the Pretoria regime in the field of working out nuclear weapons, and their intentions to set up a new military bloc in the area of the South Atlantic, are a particular threat to the African nations, to world peace.

The BCP and the ANC noted that through its policy China has become an open ally of imperialism. It was pointed out that the adventurist and hegemonic course of the Chinese leadership represents a most serious threat to the interests of all revolutionary and liberation forces and to peace in the world.

Both delegations strongly condemned the armed aggression and the continuous provocations of China against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and expressed their full-fledged solidarity with the heroic

Vietnamese people who decidely stood up to the aggressors.

The BCP and the ANC expressed their support for the fighting people of Palestine led by the PLO. They condemned the separate treaty between Israel and Egypt aimed against the interests of the Palestinian people and their legitimate right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state, and against the interests of all Arab peoples.

The BCP and the ANC expressed satisfaction with existing friendly relations of cooperation between them and confirmed their readiness to extend and enhance these relations in the interest of strengthening the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial front in the world.

...isandhlwana
(1879)

clarion call to..
PEOPLES WAR

african national congress
(south africa)

EXHIBIT M

NOVEMBER 1979

SECHABA

official organ of the african national congress south africa

Agostinho Antonio NETO
1922-1979

MOTA OUR EXAMPLE

Speech delivered by Comrade Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress, on the occasion of the 70th birthday of Comrade Yusuf Dadoo, London, September 8, Year of the Spear.

Dear Comrades,

We have met to join Comrade Yusuf Dadoo, affectionately known as Mota to all his comrades in struggle, on the occasion of his 70th birthday. This is indeed a joyous holiday not only for him and his family, not only for his closest comrades of the Communist Party of South Africa, but indeed for the whole revolutionary movement for national and social liberation led by the African National Congress.

It is a matter of great joy that the entire international progressive movement led by the Soviet Union has also joined us in commemorating this joyous holiday. On behalf of the National Executive Committee and the entire membership of the African National Congress I have been entrusted with the happy and at the same time responsible task of wishing Mota happiness and strength for the future and indeed, many more happy returns of the day.

The story of Mota's life which has been documented elsewhere, is inextricably bound up with the struggle of the oppressed black people of our country against the

ferociously oppressive regime in the history of the African continent, a successor to the Hitler Nazi regime of racist and fascist terror. It is pertinent to refer to some of the highlights of his contribution to this struggle.

As early as 1938 Dr Dadoo participated in the founding of the Non-European United Front (NUEF) in Johannesburg. Working as its secretary and together with other stalwarts of our revolutionary movement such as the late J.B. Marks, the Non-European United Front became an important instrument for taking up the vital problems agitating the African people. As secretary of this body, Dr Dadoo not only attended to its daily organisational problems, he was also seen at many mass meetings in the African townships which he addressed constantly on the theme of calling for united mass actions of struggle against the poor living conditions of the people.

The 1947 Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker Pact laid the important foundationstone for what was to be a powerful congress movement from the middle fifties involving the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Peoples Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The united mass struggles inspired by all the democratic organisations within the Congress Movement under a common revolutionary programme, the Freedom Charter, heightened the militancy of vast sections of the oppressed population. The decade of the fifties is particularly noted for this.

Mota joined the Communist Party in 1938. Working together with other leaders of this working class party, notably Comrade Moses Kotane, who held the position of General Secretary for almost 3 decades before his death in 1978, and J.B. Marks, both of whom were leading members of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress, the barricades seperating the national and class forces represented by the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, were over the passage of time, removed one by one. Today we have reached the position where the unity of these vital forces of our revolutionary struggle is indestructible.

The powerful impact of this political trend on the political developments in our country can be gauged from the fact that the enemies of our people, the apartheid regime of terror and its allies, international imperialism, spare no efforts in attempting to destroy the influence of the African National Congress and its ally the South African Communist Party. No weapon has been spared. Political and ideological subversion seeking to separate the African National Congress from the Communist Party and internationally to divorce the revolutionary forces of our people from their natural allies, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, has always been a trusted weapon of our enemies. Internally the enemy is engaging in a continuous reign of terror designed to break the back of the revolutionary movement. In the process hundreds of the best sons and daughters of our people are languishing in prisons; many of them have been physically eliminated while in custody.

Comrades, it is common knowledge that the major right wing factions that finally split away from the African National Congress have all danced on a common platform of anti-communism. Their activities both inside and outside the ranks of our movement objectively played into the hands of the vicious enemy by seeking to direct the energies of the people away from the real enemy confronting them — apartheid fascism — towards the so-called dangers of the growing collaboration between the nationalist movement and the Communist Party. This was the case with the African-minded block of the early fifties, the Pan Africanist Congress which broke away from the African National Congress in 1959, and the ill-fated "gang of eight" which attempted to set up an African Nationalist ANC. The reasons for the common tragedy which befell all these reactionary groupings is simple. The real life experience of struggle against fascism had taught our people to regard communists in our country and the international communist movement as their true and genuine combat allies. That is why we have every reason to say that the unity

of our movement is indestructible.

The political face of our continent has been changing right in front of the eyes of our people. Everywhere where internal reaction assisted by international imperialism, including South African imperialism, has attempted to raise its head, it has been crushed immediately by the people with the assistance of the leading revolutionary force of our time, the Soviet Union and other members of the Socialist Community. It has not needed any special political acumen for our people to realise that the victories of the national liberation movement of the African peoples assisted by their allies in the world revolutionary process, the Socialist community and the progressive and democratic movements in the capitalist countries, have radically changed the balance of forces in favour of those still struggling to defeat colonial and racist aggression and in defence of peace and security for the people.

The defeat of Portuguese colonialism saw the creation of genuine peoples power in Angola and Mozambique, and these new states together with other members of the African Front-line States grouping and the OAU are playing a militant role in support of our struggle. This has created favourable conditions for the advance of our revolutionary onslaught inside South Africa as is evidenced by the developments especially of the last few years.

Today the prestige and influence of our united revolutionary movement has grown the more as it continues to demonstrate its ability to punish the enemy through its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. It is without doubt that the advances we have made have been possible in response to the patient and diligent leadership of the Dadoos, the Tambos, the Kotanes, Marks, the Mandelas, Sisulus and a host of others who, during very difficult periods of our struggle, infused the defiant spirit of "No Surrender" which permeated throughout the ranks of our whole movement. It is in recognition of the qualities of his revolutionary leadership that Mota has been at the helm of the politico-military wing of our movement as vice-chairman of the ANC's Revolutionary Council since 1969. The Revolutionary Council was set up by a unanimous decision of the 1969 Morogoro Conference which marked a historic landmark on the route to the intensification of our struggle by a united revolutionary force drawn from all race groups comprising our population.

Mota is both a revolutionary patriot, a true son of our people, and an ardent proletarian internationalist. In recognition of his contribution to the international progressive anti-imperialist movement, Mota, on this occasion, has been given state awards by the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria. He has also been honoured by the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation. Messages of congratulations have come in from many communist and workers parties and other progressive forces of the world.

The association of so large a number of our allies with this important event is clear testimony not only of Mota's great stature as a fighter for the happiness of mankind, but also of the international prestige of the struggle of our people. From 1960 Mota, instructed by the underground movement to leave our country, has not spared himself in the efforts to build and consolidate the international image of our revolutionary struggle. The foundations that he and Comrade President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo laid at this time are now supporting an ever-widening movement of international solidarity with the oppressed people of our country.

The fascist regime of terror is today isolated as never before as people in various countries succeed to rid themselves of corrupt and oppressive regimes, notably in Iran, Afganistan, Nicaragua, Kampuchea etc. The World Socialist Community gives our revolutionary movement massive support. More and more groups in the western capitalist countries are coming forward, ready to contribute whatever is possible to assist our revolutionary movement advance forward. This has been an important contributing factor in sharpening our onslaught against the regime of oppression in our country.

However, it is not enough for our generation of revolutionaries to merely bask in the sunshine of the achievements of the

stalwarts of our revolutionary movement such as Mota. After all, these stalwarts have constantly cautioned us to sharpen our vigilance so that we are able to keep on our trek through the forest of imperialist and reactionary intrigue which manifests itself through the various so-called reformist solutions that the enemy constantly wishes to ram down the throats of our people.

Events in Southern Africa indicate the desperation with which our enemies and international imperialism are manouevering to ensure the permanence of their hegemony in Southern Africa. In persuance of this strategic goal:

a) The racist regimes and their allies aim to physically destroy and liquidate the liberation movements in Southern Africa both within their respective countries and in the areas of their sanctuary in African Front-line States.

b) Simultaneously they aim to compel the neighbouring independent states to turn against the liberation movements. To achieve this purpose as we all know, they have resorted to regular military raids deep into the territories of the Front-line States — Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana — killing hundreds of people and destroying property. The criminal aggression launched a few days ago by the Smith-Muzorewa regime represents a new and dangerous escalation

c) Imperialism is busy creating such forces among the Black oppressed as would replace the white minority regimes as the guarantors of the permanence of its hegemony in Southern Africa in exchange for high-sounding titles and a life of luxury for a handful of black traitors.

d) At the same time imperialism is continuing to pour military and economic support into South Africa and Rhodesia to ensure that the racist regimes in these countries, even under black skins, remain continuously the principal factor determining the content and pace of any process of decolonisation.

In the interests of the genuine national and social liberation of our people it is imperative that our sights must always be focussed towards the goal of defeating the enemy strategy by involving our people in mass struggles for revolutionary people's power. It is the task of all the committed revolutionaries in our country to work as tirelessly as Dadoo has always done to consolidate and defend the unity of our revolutionary movement as the apple of every one's eye.

It is this unity which will create the widest possibilities for the mass political mobilisation of all sections of the oppressed population — the workers, the rural masses, the youth, the women, the democratic intelligentsia — to sharpen the all-round confrontation of the masses of our people for the seizure of power. It is this unity which will defeat the enemies' strategic plans to perpetuate the oppression of our people through reformist solutions envisaged by the three-tier system of government and the Bantustan independence fraud.

The unity of all progressive forces in our country will ensure that our revolutionary movement continues to discharge its tasks of solidarity with the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, Swapo of Namibia, the Polisario Front of Western Sahara, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and all other peoples struggling for a better life, for world peace and international security.

We salute Comrade Yusuf Mohammed Dadoo, the holder of ISITWALANDWE, an award which is a mark of honour for only the bravest and the most dedicated of our heroes of the more than 300 year anti-colonial and anti-racist wars.

LONG LIVE THE INDESTRUCTIBLE ALLIANCE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY!

AMANDLA NGAWETHU!
JANA SHAKTI!
MATLA KE A RONA!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
A LUTA CONTINUA!
VICTORY IS CERTAIN!

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
SOUTH AFRICA

EXHIBIT N

DECEMBER 1979
official organ of the african
national congress south africa
1982 - 1 - 11
J.NKOMO

STATEMENT

by Comrade Oliver Tambo

PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (SOUTH AFRICA) TO THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates,

We have already had the honour and privilege of addressing this historic assembly of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on behalf of the national liberation movements. It now remains for me to intervene in the name of the African National Congress and on behalf of the objects of colonialism, apartheid, racism, fascism and brutal exploitation in South Africa.

The delegation of the African National Congress salutes Havana, this beautiful city of peaceful labour, social progress, enduring friendship and active solidarity. Today Havana, like the people of Cuba, has planted itself in the hearts of the hundreds of millions of people represented at this 6th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, because Havana this week carries within its city walls the potential power of more than 100 leaders of nations who, acting together in unity and with determination, can exert a positive influence on the course of world developments, especially when they have, as their helmsman and chief servant, the tried and tested leader of the victorious Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro Ruz.

What imperialism feared about the consequences of a Non-Aligned Summit being held in Havana, Cuba serving as chairman of the Movement, is precisely what gives the victims of imperialist domination great hopes about this Conference and the future.

We extend our warm congratulations to you, Comrade president, on your election.

Comrade President Oliver Tambo

History has entrusted you with the task of leading this great Movement into the decade of the 80's, confronting you with the challenge to set both the quality and the tempo of the struggle for that decade. Our confidence in your ability to meet that challenge is unbounded.

For the peoples of Southern Africa, the convening of this meeting in Havana has a

special significance. For we can never forget the first occasion in our history when troops crossed the oceans and came to our continent not to conquer, rob, pillage and plunder, but to help a people's fight for freedom, justice and liberation. The unique army that helped the people of Angola to repel the invaders from racist Pretoria came from Cuba and with their blood they cemented the bonds between Cuba and southern Africa, helped to defend the gains of our revolutionary struggles and laid the foundations for the greater victories which today, some four years later, we can justifiably claim.

In Southern Africa we are today engaged in wars of liberation necessary in order to achieve the realisation of the objectives which this Movement holds sacred and inviolate. The specific character of our struggle has been determined by the conditions in which we have had to conduct it. But the common objectives that link the peoples still struggling for liberation with those who have gained their independence arise from our shared experiences—experiences compounded of alien rule and economic exploitation.

All our peoples have without exception known the humiliation of living in a country which was our own, but which the superior power of alien and hostile forces had annexed and transformed into their patrimony. We have all known the indignity of living under rulers who tried to deny us a personality of our own, who decried our history and derided our cultural traditions; who allowed us no names and no future except to the extent that they chose, and such a future as accorded with the perpetuation of their own interests.

All our peoples also share the experience of resistance to colonialism. If we turn our minds back to the last decades of the 19th century and the opening years of the 20th, we find that with few exceptions we were all engaged in wars of resistance.

This was the period that saw the end of Spanish hegemony in Latin America and the early beginnings of the revolution launched by José Martí in Cuba. The people of Argentina, trying to end foreign domination of their economy, found themselves facing British gun boats. In Vietnam there was a people's uprising, following the refusal of the King to ratify a treaty establishing a French protectorate. Throughout Africa our people were engaged in wars defending their land and countries against alien conquerors. It was in the course of these resistance wars in Africa that the British army suffered its greatest defeat at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, exactly 100 years ago this year.

The forms our struggle took varied, the uniforms worn by our enemies were different, and the alien flags that flew over our countries were numerous. Yet in essence we have all been struggling against the same forces, and we have all been fighting for the same thing—the right of our peoples to self-determination, to control their own land and wealth, to establish their own political systems and govern their own countries; to organise the economic and social relations in their society according to their own precepts and ethic, to live in peace guaranteed by an equitable world system of economic relations.

These aims are no different from the objectives formulated 18 years ago when the collective strength of the peoples who shared this experience and won their independence was harnessed into the Non-Aligned Movement. These are the same objectives that we share today, though formulated differently.

For as alien flags came down in so many countries, we came to learn that the objective to own and control our own resources and wealth remained unfulfilled and required new struggles—or rather the continuation of the same struggle. The ending of alien rule did not automatically usher in economic liberation, for the newly independent nations emerged into an international economic order that had been established, and whose structures and institutions had been designed, to ensure that wealth and resources would flow away from our peoples, and out of our lands into the coffers of our exploiters.

Our experience of the past and knowledge of the present has shown that imperialism does not accept defeat nor does it vanish when it loses direct political control, but rather it seeks new ways to achieve its goals. As the 4th Summit declared:

"Imperialism not only hampers the economic and social progress of developing countries, but also adopts an aggressive attitude towards those who oppose its plans, trying to impose upon them political, social and economic structures which encourage alien domination, dependence and neo-colonialism."

From their own experience the imperialist powers have learnt that a victory achieved in any part of the world becomes not only a triumph for all peoples fighting to remove the shackles of imperialist domination, but also a material factor in the creation of new possibilities for fresh successes against imperialist hegemony everywhere.

Hence imperialism is implacably opposed to all the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement, whether they concern the struggles of the peoples still fighting for their independence or the efforts to create a new international economic order.

Thus the liberation movements and the independent countries of the Non-Aligned Movement are joined not only by their common experience, but also by the fact that they share the present with common objectives and a common enemy.

Those who wish to deride the Non-Aligned Movement choose to interpret the term "non-aligned" as something purely negative and suggest that the *raison d'etre* of our existence is to constantly assert that we belong to no side, to devote our efforts and our energies to walking a tightrope, to become a function of the changing relations between East and West, to submit ourselves to the constraints of a policy of avoidance.

Our submission is that the existence and strength of this movement lies in its consistent determination to stand firmly, unequivocally and unambiguously on the side of freedom, self-determination, and justice and to stand equally firmly, unequivocally and unambiguously against alien domination, dependence, economic exploitation, colonialism, racism, fascism and zionism; to be totally and uncompromisingly anti-imperialist.

Growth is the vital essence of a living organism. The Non-Aligned Movement has grown and continues to grow in a world becoming small as science and technology advances. In this process, non-alignment establishes new contacts, finds new friends, forges new alliances out of the necessity to live, grow, engage in successful struggle and advance its cause—the cause of the people. Its vocabulary becomes enriched with words and concepts which may have sounded alien, even objectionable on an earlier day. What will not change is its anti-imperialist character, not while imperialism exists. The Non-Aligned Movement has its great founding fathers. We know what it is because we know how they are.

In tracing the South African struggle from the era of colonial conquest experienced by members of the Non-Aligned Movement, we have, in so doing, pointed to the colonial nature of our oppression in South Africa. It is, however, necessary to make the point that so arrogant, so brutal, so comprehensive and systematic is this oppression that it offends grievously against the very humanity of the indegenous and black majority of the people of South Africa. In addition it denies the humanity of the delegates to this Summit because it despises and demeans not just this or that nation but whole races and peoples of entire continents, the overwhelming majority of mankind.

Apartheid South Africa, the only country in the world which has codified the doctrine of racial superiority into a statutory system and which has established it as the basis of state ideology and policy, therefore constitutes a laboratory and a nursery of international racism. Here there are formed and nurtured the bacilli which continually feed the diseases of racist arrogance and racial discrimination. This fact was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly when it inaugurated the Decade of Struggle against Racism. Furthermore, the extremely serious national and international implications of the incidence of racism were recognised by the world community when it adopted, at the United Nations, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination as well as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. To ensure the fulfilment of the aims of both the United Nations and the

world community, the seed-bed of international racism, the South African regime, must be destroyed. This is what our struggle seeks to achieve.

At the heart of the South African problem is the economic position of the black majority of our country. Our struggle aims radically to alter the status quo with regard to this issue also. It is no longer necessary within the Movement of Non-Aligned countries to argue the centrality of this question in the struggle to ensure genuine liberation and social progress for our peoples.

The decisive importance of economic questions was recognised in the decisions of the 3rd Lusaka Summit and rightly took pride of place in the 4th Algiers Summit. Correctly, this Summit drew attention to the role of the multi-national corporations, including in its Economic Declaration this resolution:

"The Heads of State or Government denounce before the world public opinion the unacceptable practices of transnational companies which infringe the sovereignty of developing countries and violate the principles of non-interference and the right of people to self-determination which are basic prerequisites for their political, economic and social progress".

As we all know, the decisions of the Algiers Summit and the Lima Declaration adopted in August 1975 served as the collective platform of the UN General Assembly in 1974 and 1975 which resulted, among other things, in the adoption of two documents which are of great importance to the future of our peoples, namely, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States.

We would like at this point, to pay our humble respects to a great African, an outstanding leader of the Movement, the late Houari Boumedienne, who worked so tirelessly to bring about the New International Economic Order. Our victories on this front will be a monument to his name, a tribute to a life dedicated to the upliftment of the children, the small men and small women of the world—the "wretched of the earth".

It is in the contrast with the intensified struggle for an equitable international economic order, especially in the last 5 years, that the iniquity of the South African apartheid colonial economy stands out in sharp relief.

Within the context of the struggle for the democratic restructuring of international economic relations, our peoples are fighting to put an end to their dependent and subordinate status; to regain sovereignty over their natural resources; to abolish the privileged status of the imperialist powers in the world economy which, as pointed out in the Lima Declaration, are striving to reinforce their position by exploiting our peoples through unequal terms of trade, the export by the multinational corporations of the revenues of their subsidiaries in our countries, the charging and repatriation of exorbitant interest and other financial charges, and the supply of goods to our peoples at high monopoly prices.

Exactly during these 5 years when the Non-aligned Movement has been formu-

Delegates in session at the Summit

lating these demands and struggling for their realisation, the multinational corporations, identified at the 4th Summit as the enemies of the political, economic and social progress of our peoples, have been tightening their hold on our country.

Acting in concert with the white minority regime, these corporations have been further entrenching exactly the forms of economic relations with regard to our people which this Movement is determined to alter fundamentally. All recent and current measures undertaken by the apartheid regime in the sphere of economic life have the express intention of strengthening the old colonial and exploitative economic order. This was the purpose and the result of the much publicised Rickert and Wiehahn Commissions. It is the aim of the continued implementation of the Bantustan programme, and the much publicised idea of a constellation of puppet states which would be chained to the Pretoria regime. It is also the reason for the intensified campaign of removals of thousands of our people from the towns and cities and from their ancestral lands, and the deprivation of their South African citizenship.

We fight for a new international economic order because the privileged status of the imperialist powers in the world economy is resulting in the continued and accelerated impoverishment of our peoples and the all-round regression of our countries. In apartheid South Africa these tendencies have an impact on our people that is multiplied a number of times over because the political authority that has seized control of our country is itself a representative, a product, and an ally of the world economic forces that are responsible for the despoliation of our natural resources and the fruits of our labour.

As a result of these circumstances which ensure the multinational corporations unique and stupendous profits, as well as strengthen their monopoly positions on the world economy, any South African directory of companies reads like a virtual "who's who" of the leading industrial and financial institutions of the western world.

In this connection, it is important to note that far from the demands of developing countries for an equitable restructuring of international economic relations being met, there is an inordinate transfer of resources to support and maintain the apartheid regime. Between 1972 and 1978 nearly 8 billion dollars went to buttress the apartheid economy through loans from western banks. Western countries have invested more in developing the manufacturing industry in South Africa than their total investment in similar enterprises on the entire African continent, and the transfer of all kinds of technology is on a still greater scale.

There can be no doubt that these transfers are not accidental but are a deliberate effort to strengthen apartheid South Africa at the expense of the developing countries, with the aim of enhancing our country's role as the spearhead of the imperialist powers and the multinational corporations, for the defeat of our efforts to establish the New International Economic Order.

Nowhere is the political and strategic motivation of western investment in apartheid more apparent than in the efforts to assist the regime to meet its oil needs. In 1976, West German banks, many of them state controlled, provided Pretoria's strategic oil fund with loans amounting to US$140 million. By early this year, such loans had exceeded US$440 million. The Governments of Britain, France and West Germany unhesitatingly provide export guarantee for equipment for the Sasol plants, facilities not easily extended to many developing countries.

It is against this background that the African National Congress hails the decision of Iran, freed from the Shah, to cut the supply of oil to South Africa, depriving the racist regime of 90% of its imported oil supplies. Likewise, the ANC salutes the Federal Republic of Nigeria which has acted firmly and decisively against oil companies acting in breach of Nigeria's policy. In the actions they have taken both these countries, member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement, have contributed to the victory of the South African liberation struggle and to the effectiveness of the Non-Aligned Movement. They have provided a dramatic example of the difference between rhetoric and action.

Comrade Castro receives President Tito of Yugoslavia

The people of Nicaragua, led by the Sandinista Movement, have scored an heroic victory against fascist domination and have promptly severed diplomatic relations with fascist South Africa. Nicaragua has become a worthy member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We greet the fraternal Nicaraguan people.

World wide support for the struggle for national liberation is a striking feature of international concern for justice, human dignity and peace. In turn national liberation movements feel a natural identity with the cause of liberation everywhere in the world. This explains the firm solidarity of the African National Congress with the struggle of the people of Peurto Rico and the Peurto Rican Socialist Party against United States colonial domination, for self-determination and independence.

In entering into an agreement with the POLISARIO of Western Sahara and abrogating the contract with Spain, Mauritania has retrieved something of the otherwise battered honour and image of our continent. The infinitely just cause of the people of Western Sahara will triumph.

The struggle of the fraternal Arab people of Palestine, led by PLO, will always be assured of the support of the African National Congress and the South African people. Likewise, we support the struggle of the island peoples of the Canaries, Belize and Mayotte.

The African National Congress reiterates its solidarity with the Vietnamese people, whose 30 years struggle against French colonialism and United States imperialism constitutes one of the greatest chapters in the history of national liberation struggles, and welcomes the end of the agony brought on the Kampuchean people by the deposed Pol Pot regime.

The people of East Timor under the leadership of Fretilin, are fighting for self-determination and independence, the causes espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement. We express our solidarity with Fretilin.

In Southern Africa, the sister movements of the ANC, namely SWAPO and the Patriotic Front, are waging fierce struggles

for the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively. Today the African National Congress congratulates the Patriotic Front on its admission to full membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, a status already enjoyed by SWAPO of Namibia. This ensures that the voice of the people of Zimbabwe will also be the voice of the millions represented in the Non-Aligned Movement. The African National Congress similarly congratulates all other new members, whose role in the Movement can only increase its international weight and advance the cause of unity and peace.

In South Africa, the national liberation struggle, developing within the very heart of the enemy camp, has assumed proportions and created a situation which the racist regime has described as a virtual state of war, particularly in the nothern part of our country.

Confronted with this situation, the apartheid regime is engaged in activities which can only be described as running very hard but remaining on the spot.

Within the ruling group, the military establishment is taking over all positions of political authority in the illusory hope that this will help save the regime from destruction. The so-called information scandal on the other hand has exposed to the white population what the oppressed people have known for a long time: that the regime was bound to rely on open criminal activities to save itself since in any case the apartheid system is itself criminal.

The regime also finds itself compelled to accelerate its already discredited separate development and Bantustan programme, changing the language it is using to make this programme appear attractive, setting up all manner of advisory committees, all

18 *Fidel Castro with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia*

intended to salvage the political option that the enemy forced upon us, an option that has been rendered bankrupt by its consistent mass rejection by the people.

The perspective in South Africa is quite clear. It is one of a mounting offensive by the masses of our people waging political, economic and military battles. There is no way in which the enemy can stop this. But we know that the racists will seek to exact a high toll in the lives of our people. All the manouevring that he is engaged in is intended to increase his murderous power to slow down our progress to victory. Yet our victory is certain.

The support of the Socialist countries, like that of certain countries in Western Europe, particularly the Nordic community of states, has been indespensable in ensuring the rapid progress of the South African struggle. The ANC warmly acknowledges their support as also that of member states of the Non-Aligned countries, and of organisations and peoples in other parts of the world.

The countries of Southern Africa, especially those, such as Mozambique, Zambia, Angola and Botswana, who are frequently targets of armed aggression by the Rhodesian and South African fascist regimes, have made enormous sacrifices to ensure victory for the total liberation of Southern Africa. We re-iterate our call for concrete and effective support for all these countries to enable them to implement national development plans while continuing to give full support to the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

In view of the growing and dangerous threat posed by the apartheid regime to the peace and security of Africa and the world, it becomes more urgent for the international community and in particular the Non-Aligned countries, to act decisively to eliminate this threat to mankind. The African National Congress has always maintained that the world community should impose comprehensive sanctions against the regime. Although these efforts have continuously been blocked and undermined by the Western powers, some of the countries represented at this 6th Summit are vigorously implementing the decisions of this body, the OAU and the United Nations General Assembly. We should like once again to cite the exemplary case of Iran and Nigeria in relation to the oil embargo.

It is our hope that the power of this Movement will express itself decisively in the effective isolation of the racist regimes of Southern Africa and determined support for the liberation movements fighting these regimes, as well as all peoples fighting colonialism, apartheid, racism, zionism and fascism.

A LUTA CONTINUA!

DECEMBER 16

HEROES' DAY

YEAR OF THE SPEAR

EXHIBIT O


JANUARY 1981
SECHABA
official organ of the african
national congress south africa
O.R. TAMBO WITH
E. HONECKER IN BERLIN

WAR AND PEACE

Statement of O.R. Tambo, President of the ANC (SA) to the International Preparatory Committee of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, Sofia, Bulgaria, September 23-27, 1980.

On behalf of the African National Congress and the people of South Africa, I wish to greet the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Government and people of the Socialist Republic of Bulgaria, the land of Dimiter Blagoev, Georgi Dimitrov, the land of comrade Todor Zhivkov.

We greet the World Peace Council and congratulate you on bringing together this great assembly of peoples. Our congratulations go particularly to you, comrade President Romesh Chandra, who hase built the WPC into a mighty world force for peace.

Likewise we salute this great and historic assembly sitting as the World Parliament of the peoples for peace.

I wish at this early stage of my contribution to acknowledge the support and assistance the ANC and the fighting masses in South Africa received from you gathered here from different parts of the globe, together representing a cross-section of the world.

We take this opportunity to extend our solidarity with all peoples fighting against colonialism, racism, zionism, fascism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, for national liberation, peace and social progress.

In this connection, let me declare on behalf of our oppressed masses — the fighting children, youth, workers, women, churchmen, peasants, patriots of South Africa — our firm solidarity with the Palestinian people led by their vanguard, the PLO and its indomitable leader, Yasser Arafat. Together we share the common obligation to defeat the growing and dangerous racist-zionist alliance of South Africa and Israel.

As we have done before, we re-affirm our solidarity with the people of Western Sahara and the POLISARIO; FRELITIN of East Timor and the gallant peoples of Latin America, including the heroic Nicaraguan people, the people of Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, North America and revolutionaries in Indo-China and other parts of Asia.

Finally, we salute the heroic Namibian people – our allies and comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the fascist regime of Pretoria. In no way could I more fittingly underline the unity in struggle between SWAPO and the ANC, than by adopting in this statement, that portion of President Sam Nujoma s; address to this World Parliament which dealt with the situation in Southern Africa, in the course of which he correctly described the struggle in South Africa.

This World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace convenes at a crucial and opportune moment in world politics when the international forces in favour of peace have great need to get together to examine once more the fundamental question of war and peace globally.

It is clear to all of us present here and millions besides, that international tension has increased sharply in recent times. The Prospects for the maintainance of world peace seem much dimmer today than they were only a little while ago.

We have convened here to examine this dangerous situation so that individually and collectively we can understand it better. Out of that understanding must come a response from this historic gathering aimed at saving mankind from the horribly destructive fury and the unimaginable consequences of a thermo-nuclear war.

But whence this threat to international peace and security? It would seem to us that the world is entering a period not dissimilar to that which characterised the world scene for a quarter of a century prior to the end of the Second World War.

World War II represented the most determined offensive by the forces of reaction to halt the progress of mankind towards a better life free from national and social oppression. Millions of people paid with their lives to save humanity from a reign of tyranny that would have been unparalleled in its savagery and brutality.

Thanks to these sacrifices, the Second World War ended with the confirmation of the historical inevitability of man's national and social emancipation. Among its most important results were the destruction of Nazism — the spearhead of international reaction, the wrenching from the oppressive and exploitative world imperialist system of a number of countries and the alteration of the international balance of forces in favour of the national liberation movement in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The period of the "Cold War" after the Second World War represented an attempt by world imperialism to negate these results and to retain and reimpose its hegemony over the peoples. Thanks to the strength of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, and the vigilance of the world peace movement, the intentions of the imperialists to impose their will on the world by force of arms were foiled. For 35 years now mankind has managed to stave off a Third World War.

The atmosphere engendered by the forces of reaction during the period of the "Cold War" [illegible]r created the possibility for internation[illegible]perialism to unleash a destructive arms ra[illegible], to conduct local wars, to intervene phys[illegible]ily in many countries and to resort [illegible]o gunboat diplomacy as a matter of cour[illegible].

This period saw the military occupation of South Korea by the United States, brutal United States aggression against heroic Vietnam and the people of Indo-China as a whole, the Bay of pigs invasion and the policy of blockade, military confrontation and provocation with regard to Cuba, and the expropriation of vast Arab and Palestinian lands by the Zionist regime of Israel.

The invasion of the former Congo Kinshasa, now Zaire, the overthrow of Mossadeq and the installation of the Shah in Iran, the destruction of progressive governments in such countries as Guatemala, Brazil, and Dominica in South America all expressed the naked resolve of international imperialism to impose its diktat on the world.

To this period belongs also the policy of the opening of military bases in many countries outside the imperialist countries themselves, as well as the formation of aggressive military alliances such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO.

The historic victory of the Vietnamese people against the occupation forces of the United States and their puppets has a significance which goes beyond the fact that Vietnem is today free and united. Vietnam represented the all-round defeat of the bellicose policy of the imperialist in the post-war years in its entirety.

Vietnam confirmed that the international balance of power had shifted irrevocably in favour of the forces of national independence and social progress, whatever reverses these forces might suffer here and there. Vietnam proved to the forces of reaction that the socialist community of nations, the rest of progressive mankind, and the world anti-imperialist movement, had sufficient political will and strength to resist and defeat the most desperate machinations of these forces of reaction. The rout of the U.S. forces in Vietnam represented also the collapse of the policy of nuclear blackmail followed by the United States since Hiroshima. Vietnam opened the eyes of the ruling groups in the imperialist countries to the fact that vast numbers of their own peoples were no longer prepared to be dragged to the slaughter as feckless combatants in imperialist wars. Representing the views of the saner circles within the U.S. ruling class, Senator Edward Kennedy has observed that "the lesson of Vietnam" is that the United States must shed the cumbersome mantle of world policeman.

In place of that mantle, the perspective

that peace-loving mankind offered the United States and its allies was that of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states with different social systems, the limitation of strategic arms and the reduction of already existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, detente and the solution of international conflicts by peaceful negotiation, and the recognition in practice of the right of each people to determine its own destiny.

For a short while it seemed that imperialism had accepted that this perspective was the only rational one. It appeared that the "lesson of Vietnam" to which Kennedy drew attention was at last beginning to form the foreign policy of the major Western countries.

In this context, the vast majority of mankind welcomed the growing strength of detente which was exemplified and reinforced by such agreements as SALT I and II and the Helsinki Accords on European Security and Cooperation.

At the same time, this period, characterised by movement towards the relaxation of international tension, saw a quickening of the process leading to the national emancipation of the peoples, the strengthening of democracy and the enhancement of the prospects for social progress in many parts of the world.

Accordingly, not only were the countries of South East Asia liberated. That process also found confirmation in Africa with the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the birth of new independent African states, and recently, the birth of the new Zimbabwe. During this period, democratic revolutions took place in many parts of the world including Ethiopia and Madagascar, Afghanistan and Iran, Portugal and Nicaragua.

At the same time the movement for a new and equitable international economic order gained in strength, characterised by just demands for greater control over national resources, against domination and exploitation by the transnational corporations, for less exploitative terms of trade which favoured the industrialised Western countries at the expense of the raw material producers, and for a redistribution of the world's productive capacity to enable the poor nations to feed, clothe and house themselves.

All these political and economic developments confirmed the correctness of the thesis that a secure, just and stable world peace favours the movement for national independence, democracy and social progress.

The fact of the matter however, is that the forces of reaction have themselves learnt this truth. They learnt it practically in such countries as Afghanistan, Iran, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Grenada in the West Indies; In those countries they have found it impossible to repeat what they did in Chile. They learnt it also in Cyprus, where a combination of Turkish military invasion and an attempted coup d etat by internal reactionary forces has failed to transform Cyprus into a NATO staging post.

U.S. President Carter describes this situation as "turbulent" and the world as "a dangerous place". In his address on May 9th this year to the Philadelphia "World Affairs Council" he said: "The central reality that confronts America today is that of a complex world — a world that is turbulent because it is politically awakened for the first time in its collective history".

Recognising that the fact of the awakening of the peoples of the world constitutes a danger to continued imperialist domination, the forces of reaction are trying to find ways to impose their own version of tranquility on the world scene. According to President Carter at the same Philadelphia meeting to which we have referred, the contemporary world:

> "requires confident, stable and powerful American leadership to shift the trend of history away from the spectre of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace."

Earlier in the year Carter's National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, had expressed the same sentiments when he said that 85 per cent of the world's population is seeking "a significant redistribution of political and economic power." He went on to say that:,

> "If (in this process) American power is overshadowed, there is the real danger that this process of global adjustment

which is so far-reaching, and which is of unprecedented magnitude, will gradually degenerate into anarchy and violence and can be exploited by our adversaries for short-sighted ideological ends."

Representing the view of powerful American business interests, the US magazine "Business Week" observed in an issue during March 1979 that between its collapse in Vietnam and the fall of the Shah, the United States had been "jolted by a series of shocks signalling the accelerated erosion of its power and influence."

"Business Week" went on to point to the absolute independence of the United States on international markets and foreign raw materials, and said that U.S. leaders were convinced that the "reaffirmation of American influence was necessary if the U.S. was to preserve theway of life that had been built after the Second World War." (See: Afrique Asie: No. 220, 1980).

Speaking for the military circles of the United States, Defence Secretary Brown told the New York Chamber of Commerce in June of this year:

"There is (today) among the U.S. public a better recognition than in recent years that the United States does have vital interests extending well beyond our shores to distant and sometimes unfamiliar parts of the world. There is a greater willingness to protect these interests and to assume our proper role as a world leader. There is renewed understanding both of the need for the military and the needs of the military. Indeed public opinion polls show the highest level of support for increased defence spending since 1950."

For his part, Samuel P. Huntingdon, former assistant to Brezinski and now Director of the Harvard University Centre for International Affairs, speaking in the same vein as an important section of U.S. academics specialising on strategic and foreign policy questions says that:

"the general (US) public is clearly unhappy with (the) decline (of US power and influence) and wishes the United States to reassert itself in world affairs ... There is renewed support for the military forces and related instruments necessary to support a firmer stand against the Soviets." (The Washington Quarterly", Autumn 1979.)

We have quoted at this length from U.S. sources to give this Parliament a view of what constitutes what the ruling group in the United States calls a "new national security consensus", and because we believe that the prime source of the present international tension and threat to peace is exactly this ruling group.

The United States, leader of the world imperialist forces, constitutes today the spearhead of the international forces of reaction. According to the calculations of Washington, the only way to fashion an international order that accomodates the interests of imperialism, and especially U.S. imperialism, is openly to resort to the threat or the use of force to an extent equal to or surpassing that achieved at the height of the Cold War.

In pursuit of this policy, the Carter Administration has decided inter alia on the following measures:

(a) the abandonment of military detente in Europe through what the U.S. describes as "modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons" (Muskie. U.S. News and World Report, August 18, 1980). In fact this means the introduction of new weapons into Europe, especially the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. This has been accompanied by attempts to strengthen NATO and to enhance its aggressive stance. As part of this operation special attention is being paid to Turkey to reinforce her as a NATO base. Further, there are ongoing discussions to increase the importance of Portugal within the NATO deposition of means and forces and to bring Greece back to the NATO fold. In this process the United States has taken many steps which effectively seek to turn many countries of Western Europe into vassals of the United States, compromising their sovereignty and using them as instruments for heightening confrontation with the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries;

(b) the further enhancement of the military power of the U.S. in the Middle East through a policy which aims to strengthen Israel as well as integrate a number of Arab countries into the military schemes

of the United States. Already Egypt has been ensnared into these schemes. The United States is arming Morocco, enabling her to continue her illegal occupation of the Arab Democratic Republic of Sahara. The support given to Morocco however also aims at giving the U.S. the possibility to use the Moroccan armed forces and Moroccan territory in its global strategy. Reinforcing these forces is of course the U.S. Sixth Fleet based in the Mediterranean;

(c) the transformation of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean into a vast military base of the United States. According to the international press there are, in the vicinity of the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, the largest concentrations of U.S. air and naval forces that this century has seen. (Afrique Asie, No. 213, May 1980). Oman is being transformed into a principal strategic base. Military facilities have been sought in some East African



countries. Most important, also, the U.S. and Britain are cooperating to build the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia into a huge air and naval base for U.S. forces. Already the U.S. has placed large forces in the Indian Ocean and continues to raise their strength. France also has, according to the U.S. Defence Secretary Brown "a powerful naval force in the Indian Ocean". (Speech to the "World Affairs Council", Los Angeles, April 7, 1980).

Needless to say, apartheid South Africa forms part of the imperialist build up in this area. Certainly, as U.S. Presidential candidate observed recently, "nobody can doubt South Africa's strategic importance" which is confirmed by the continuing contacts between the United States and Pretoria in the nuclear field.

(d) the domination of South East Asia and the Far East through a continued U.S. military presence in the area and the incorporation of military powers in Far East Asia as allies of the U.S.. As the then Assistant Secretary of State for South East Asia declared in February last year: "I believe that the essential fact is that, for the first time this country, the United States has established bonds of cooperation with the two giants of Asia: Japan ... and China ... This is of great strategic importance which is truly colossal. The position of the United States in South West Asia is today stronger than it has ever been for twenty or thirty years." (Afrique Asie, No. 205: Jan-Feb, 1980).

(e) the frustration of all genuinely progressive change in the Caribbean and South America. For this purpose the policy of confrontation with socialist Cuba is being refurbished. The United States is once more resorting to the promotion of coups and the support of the most reactionary regimes in this area to defeat the struggle for the social renewal of this region. The most recent and current results of this policy are the coup in Bolivia and U.S. arms deliveries to the reactionary regime of El Salvador.

(f) the deployment of U.S. troops so that they are availble on the spot or can reach quickly any area that Washington may determine. In August this year United States Secretary Muskie announced that "the (NATO) allies agreed in May to give us greater flexibility in deploying our forces outside the NATO area". (U.S. News and World Report, August 18, 1980.) Consequently the U.S. has constituted a "Rapid Deployment Force of 100,000 men capable of reaching any part of the world quickly and at short notice. This has reactivated the policy of acquiring bases and other military facilities to service its mobile air and naval intervention forces. The mobility of other U.S. forces is also being enhanced. This includes such measures as the prepositioning of equipment, especially naval vessels.

The totality of these measures has raised alarmingly the military profile of the United States and its allies in international politics. Many countries are faced with the direct and immediate threat of Western military intervention.

By these actions the forces of reaction led by the United States have considerably increased international tension in the hope that in this atmosphere it will be possible for imperialism to impose a path of evolution on the peoples that will not threaten its exploitative and oppressive interests.

It is this which threatens world peace, and not some fictional "expansionism" of the Soviet Union. It is to the defeat of this aggressive stance of international imperialism that this World Parliament must address itself.

It would seem to us that among the issues to which we must address ourselves as a matter of urgency are the following:

1) the building up of the peace movement especially in the imperialist countries in defence of detente in Europe, between the Soviet Union and the United States and throughout the world, for disarmament and the ratification of SALT II:
2) the launching of a struggle for the with-

drawal of U.S. forces back to their bases in their own country;
3) the intensification of the struggle for the transformation of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf into a Zone of Peace by the withdrawal of imperialist troops and bases from the area;
4) further reinforcement of the struggle for a just and lasting solution of the Middle East problem including the fulfilment of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO;
4) the intensification of the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and the destruction of the apartheid regime of South Africa as part of the struggle to restore peace in Africa and to demilitarise the Indian Ocean;
3) the strengthening of the movement for

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THEBEHALI SPEAKS AT U.S.A. CONFERENCE

MEN ON THE MOVE

solidarity with all the peoples such as those of Indo-China, who are daily being confronted with acts of aggression aimed at restoring imperialist hegemony over their countries;

7) the raising of the level of support for the peoples of South America and the Caribbean who are threatened by the re-activisation of the "Monroe doctrine" which seeks to maintain this area as an extension of the U.S. economic and political system;

8) the strengthening of the struggle for a new international economic order which would benefit from the implementation of an actual programme of disarmament and would itself add immensely to the securing of world peace and security.

We believe that victories in our common struggle on all these fronts would achieve the purposes for which we are gathered here — the bringing into being of a world order in which the policy of war has been relagated to the past. This World Parliament has the task to find the ways and means of achieving these victories.

ALL ROADS LED TO BERLIN

An International Scientific Conference was held in Berlin, capital of the GDR, on October 20-24, 1980. The theme of the conference was:

"The Joint Struggle of the Working Class Movement and the National Liberation Movement Against Imperialism and for Social Progress".

In Berlin there were representatives of 116 communist and workers' parties, other revolutionary parties and national liberation movements. In those 5 October days more than 195 people spoke about the fundamental questions of our times, about our common goal, common struggle and common destiny; about world peace, democracy, national independence and struggle for it; social progress of the peoples of all continents; about imperialism, neo-colonialism, threat of war, arms race, unemployment, racism and apartheid. We listened to speeches on the unity of the three component parts of the world revolutionary process — existing socialism, the international working class movement and the national liberation movement. The atmosphere at this conference, which was organised jointly by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party and the World Marxist Review, was characterised by equality of all participants, mutual respect, friendship and internationalist solidarity.

ANC Speaks

This theoretical conference took place at a time when in the practical-political field developments were taking their own course. There was the Iraqi-Iran war. At that time an Ethiopian delegation led by Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia and Chairman of the Commission for Establishing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia, signed in Moscow a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It was also at a time when Antonio Maidana, First Secretary of the C.P. of Paraguay and his comrades Alfredo Alcorta and Emilio Roa were kidnapped from Buenos Aires to Paraguay, where the Stroessner regime — an ally of the Botha regime — tortured, if not killed them.

The ANC delegation led by President O.R. Tambo came to Berlin to voice our opinion on the most burning issues of our times, to listen to opinions of others about the struggle for national liberation; about the necessary measures to secure world peace and to cement our common actions against international imperialism.

Comrade O.R. Tambo was driving this point home when he said that the unity of the three revolutionary elements of the revolutionary world process is a vital pre-condition for the final victory over all forces of imperialism, colonialism, racism, zionism and exploitation of man by man. He stated that the apartheid system is an expression of the system of imperialist domination. Now the task which faces us is the unity of all the national and class

forces which are interested in the overthrow of the racist Pretoria regime. The ANC is striving for the creation of unity in action of all oppressed Blacks and democratic Whites.

The Influence of World Socialism

The spreading influence of world socialism, successes of the national liberation movement and the mass base of the peace movement was dealt with by Ponomoryov, Candidate of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU:

"Lenin and the communists were the first who were able to see the tremendous revolutionary potentials of the peoples oppressed by imperialism and who consistently upheld the rights of those peoples to independence and to independent development."

This was emphasised by Erich Honnecker, General Secretary of the CC of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and Chairman of the GDR Council of State:

"If one looks at the facts as they are one finds that the weight carried by the socialist community in the world is a powerful factor in the solution of the crucial issues facing mankind. The more socialism brings the advantages of its profoundly humanist order of society to bear the more stable it becomes and the greater is its international influence. The socialist revolution ... is a prolonged historical process of fundamental socio-economic changes... Nobody can deny the fact that the successes scored by socialism are of historic importance in the confrontation with imperialism."

Mozambique Speaks

Sergio Vieira, member of the C.C. of Frelimo — Party, made a thorough analysis of the Mozambican revolution in the context of our epochal developments characterised by the revolutions in Vietnam, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Nicaragua, Iran, Afghanistan and Zimbabwe.

He was followed by Maxime Gremetz, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the C.C. of the French C.P. who discussed French reality in the context of developments in Western Europe.

Commissions Meet

On the following days the conference participants met in three commissions (they were called sections) on Security of World Peace, Disarmament and Imperialist War Policy; another one was on Neocolonialism and the third was on the Struggle for National Liberation and Social Emancipation. In these commissions the aggressive policies of imperialism in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, Indo-China, Southern Africa and Latin America were exposed; unemployment, neo-fascism, racism militarism and aggressiveness of the Western European and North American imperialist countries was discussed. NATO and anti-communism were under thorough scrutiny. But this was not all. The successes of world socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement were appreciated.

Internationalist Spirit

Such a conference with such a topic and so wide a participation — the biggest and broadest conference of this nature in the history of the revolutionary movement — gave a new impetus for action and became a platform for exchange of ideas; it helped to uplift the consciousness about the identity of our interests especially in those parties and movements which were participating at such a conference for the first time or those who were visiting a socialist country for the first time.

The other important aspect of the conference were the bilateral discussions — we had a fruitful and interesting discussion with Henry Winston, National Chairman of the CP of the USA and his delegation — and the contacts with other parties and organisation e.g. Sierra Leone and Guyana. It was interesting to listen to comrades from El Salvador telling us how they captured and later executed the racist South African ambassador in their country.

One of the moving moments at the conference was a meeting between Erich Honecker and Oliver Tambo — they were not meeting for the first time. The two

Erich Honecker addresses the scientific conference

anti-imperialists met to assess the conference, to exchange ideas on the anti-imperialist struggle — ideas which were identical, and comrade Honecker reassured us of the unqualified support the GDR renders to our movement.

Such an atmosphere was possible thanks to the hospitality and thorough organisation and preparation by the host country, the GDR, its people and their party the Socialist Unity Party. The spirit and success of the conference were summarised by Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of the C.C. of the CP of Uruguay when he said in his toast:

"Our conference does not end with resolutions. It is a scientific conference, no international proclamation, to work out a single strategy, a single tactic, which will be binding to all. But besides the limitations which the realities in our countries set for us, the declarations, the contributions of the comrades, the participation of so many forces, of so many liberation movements, of the socialist countries, of socialist parties, of communist parties and liberation fronts — are the best resolution in life — the resolution of unity."

Kathrada and L. Forman at WFDY

EXHIBIT P


SECHABA
JULY 1981
official organ of the african national congress south africa
60 YEARS OF STRUGGLE!
Moses Mabhida-Secretary General
South African Communist Party

EDITORIAL: This is Time for a Political Mvuselelo

This month our movement is commemorating, indeed celebrating, an important event in the history of our movement. On July 30 the South African Communist Party will be 60 years old. It was founded in 1921 as the Communist Party of South Africa and in 1953, after it was banned in 1950, it reorganised itself as the South African Communist Party. It was the first detachment of our movement to go underground and therefore has a wealth of experience in underground work in South Africa.

But what happened before that?

When the Communist Party was formed—even before that i.e. since 1915 when the International Socialist League broke away from the South African Labour Party—it was an organisation of white workers and intellectuals. Looking at the South Africa of those days and at the strength of international socialism during that period, the reasons for this become immediately obvious. It is true that there is one African, T.W Thibedi, who joined the Party before 1921—during the days of the International Socialist League. Those days he was more of an exception than a rule—but a pointer to a new direction.

Shortly after its formation the Communist Party began active work among black workers, it organised black workers into trade unions of their own; it began recruiting the African workers and intellectuals into its ranks; it organised night schools to teach black workers not only to read and write but also about socialism and the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. It was very difficult for the African workers to master the heavy stuff from the classics, but they learnt a lot from the masters of scientific socialism.

By 1928—in barely seven years—the Communist Party was completely changed. Out of 1,750 members, 1,600 were Africans. In other words its membership was African, Indian, Coloured and White. These were mainly workers, but not only workers. These were days of intense national and class struggle—a good school for revolution but at times the fees were high: Johannes Nkosi, an active communist organiser, was murdered in Durban on December 16, 1930.

Those Africans and Blacks who joined the Party were not just 'fellow travellers'; they were and are still dedicated communists and national liberation fighters. They were highly respected personalities in their local communities; some had even acquired a national status. In the Party itself they held high-ranking positions—Albert Nzula, Moses Kotane were (and now Moses Mabhida is) Secretaries General, and leaders like J.B. Marks (the white press deliberately misspelt his name as Marx, something which, ironically, Uncle J.B, might have regarded as an honour) was for many years National Chairman of the Party until his death in 1972 when he was succeeded by Dr Yusuf Dadoo.

The black communists, together with the white communists, played an important role in working out the relationship between the national liberation struggle and the class struggle. Not that there was any differentiation between black and white communists, the problem is that the South African racists are very 'colour conscious' and there is another, more sinister, aspect of this, namely the attempt by the enemy (and this includes narrow nationalists) to counterpose black to white communists, and if this tactic fails they resort to their 'Big Gun': the black communists are

'stooges' of 'white communists' or even more crudely they are 'dupes'—and in the characteristic racist vein and logic—they are the riff-raff.

This is the mentality of the racists. This attempt to play down the role of the black communists and their invaluable contribution to the national liberation struggle has an ideological and political purpose. Firstly, the aim is to 'inform' the Blacks in South Africa that the communists are white and therefore by implication they are irrelevant to our struggle, and secondly, the racist ideology has to be the 'general outlook' of everybody. This anti-communist slander is meant to drive home the point that whether you, (an African) are in the movement or not, it is immaterial—there is no difference—'white domination' is everywhere. This is meant to demoralise our people, to dissuade or 'persuade' them not to join the liberation struggle because, after all, they will find the same situation existing everywhere—'white domination'.

But our people, knowing what our movement stands for, are reacting and responding differently from the white racist expectations. They know that our movement, led by the African National Congress, consists of people—of all South African people irrespective of colour and ethnic origin, who are united by their commitment, conviction and realisation of the need to destroy apartheid. They are united in this spirit of brotherhood and togetherness by the realisation that unity of all revolutionary forces is a precondition for our victory. They fully accept the leadership role of the African people in our revolution—hence the specific leadership role accorded the ANC in the revolution. This 'formula' corresponds perfectly with the South African reality and the content of our revolution at this present stage is the national liberation of the largest and most oppressed African majority and other nationally oppressed Blacks.

Comrade Yusuf Dadoo, Chairman SACP

On this occasion of the 60th anniversary of the SACP let us raise the struggle for national liberation to even greater heights; let us intensify the mobilisation of our people. Surely this is time for a political mvuselelo (mass mobilisation)—a mvuselelo which will culminate with the celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the ANC on January 8, 1982.

PROFILE:
Raymond Mphakamisi Mhlaba

Raymond Mhlaba was born on February 12, 1920 at Holy Trinity Mission, in the district of Fort Beaufort. He is of peasant origin and since there is no irrigation system in the African rural areas the people depend entirely on rain. His parents were not educated, his father passed Standard 3 and his mother could only read and write Xhosa. His father joined the police force in 1916 and remained with them until he was pensioned off in 1940. This had a double impact on Raymond's young mind: he "came face to face with the system" at an early age and he therefore grew up under his mother's care and influence because his father was stationed at various different places.

Raymond went to Healdtown High School - a missionary institution near Fort Beaufort and studied up to Junior Certificate. There were, as usual with African students, financial problems. At Healdtown he joined the Mayibuye Students Association, an organisation of students from Victoria East and Fort Beaufort districts whose activities included the education of the youth in these districts about their Motherland and organising picnics. He was also a member of the Christian Students' Association.

In 1942, he went to Port Elizabeth, where in 1943 he joined the Communist Party and shortly thereafter, the Laundry Workers' Union. In 1944, he joined the African National Congress. Those were the years when he was living at Sidwell, a mixed area of Coloureds, Indians and Africans, that is, before he was transferred to New Brighton Location, an entirely African township. In New Brighton he became a member of the New Brighton Residents' Association which catered for the interests of the residents.

From 1943, he and his colleagues were very active in the trade union movement with the result that by 1948, they had a solid Laundry Workers' Union, which covered all the Dry Cleaning and Laundry Factories in Port Elizabeth and was affiliated to the National Headquarters in Johannesburg. As an active trade-unionist, he was arrested during a successful strike in 1948 and his employers subsequently sacked him. He was later employed by a firm of concrete specialists until the Defiance Campaign in 1952 in which he served a term of 47 days imprisonment. Then he was sacked again. In August 1953, Mhlaba joined a firm of solicitors who employed him until October 1961 - when he went underground.

Ray (as he was popularly known) held leading and significant positions in both the ANC and the CP: from 1946 he was District Secretary of the Port Elizabeth Branch of the CP until its dissolution in 1950 - when the Party was reorganised at an underground level as the SACP. Mhlaba joined the underground Party. From 1947, he was Branch Chairman of the ANC in Port Elizabeth until June 1953. This ANC Branch became prominent in 1950 and undertook to revive other branches in the area. In 1950, he was elected to the Advisory Board to test its futility or otherwise as a body run in an advisory capacity. At the end of that year the residents asked him to resign as they felt that it was a waste of time. Since 1953, he has received numerous banning orders: the Minister of Justice debarred him from being a member of a number of organisations and also prohibited him from attending gatherings.

Mhlaba's philosophy is simple, down-to-earth and working class:

> "As early as May 1943, I realised that my people were suffering from both class and national oppression in this country. This is why I took an active part in the Trade Union movement as well as in the African National Congress ... ..
> The fact that the African has no political, economic and elementary human rights in this land of his birth, is the major reason why I am at present involved in the Rivonia Trial. Hitlers come - Hitlers go".

Mhlaba's involvement in the Rivonia Trial is a fascinating story and an instructive lesson for all those who are fighting the fascist beast today. Though today this story may take a form of an anecdote in the political life of Mhlaba, it was a very serious matter those days - a life and death matter. It does illustrate the courage with which our people face imprisonment and their refusal when captured to plead for mercy or to minimise their sentence when this can only be achieved by revealing to the enemy at the time of their trial, information which may be useful to the enemy but harmful to the movement.

Mhlaba (and the enemy now knows this and therefore we are not revealing any secrets) was part of one of the first groups to go out for military training. This was way back in the early 60's. This group included Mkwayi, Mlangeni and others and unfortunately Patrick Mthembu. We say unfortunately because he later sold out. The enemy then had no information about this group when the Rivonia arrest took place. Raymond had left the country illegally as part of this group around August/September 1961 - before the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe. . He, like other members of the group, completed his training, returned clandestinely to the country in February/March 1962.

The important point is that Raymond was not in South Africa when through a series of sabotage acts in all the main centres of South Africa, including his home town Port Elizabeth, Umkhonto we Sizwe publicly announced its existence on December 16, 1961. Mhlaba was eventually captured at Rivonia in 1963 but at the time the police could find no evidence outside the fact of his presence at the Rivonia farm during the raid, of the degree of his involvement in the underground movement (the ANC, the CP and Umkhonto we Sizwe) nor of what he had been doing ever since he disappeared from public life in Port Elizabeth in August/September 1961. The police and state included Mhlaba in the Rivonia trialists and cooked up charges against him. The main burden of these charges rested on their producing false witnesses including the notorious Port Elizabeth sell-out Kholisile Mdwayi whose false evidence sent Mini, Khayingo and Mkhaba (also from Port Elizabeth) to the gallows. These false witnesses testified that Raymond personally supervised and participated in the Port Elizabeth blasts of December 16, 1961.

The State Prosecutor in the Rivonia trial, the notorious Percy Yutar, was very much aware that the evidence against Raymond Mhlaba was false and despite the array of false witnesses of evidence against Ray, the Special Branch was desperately keen to know of Raymond's involvement in the underground. The Special Branch had failed to extract this information from Ray when he was in detention. They now made another desperate bid to elicit this information - they framed Ray for acts of sabotage purportedly carried out by him at a time when he was not in the country; at a time when they could not establish where he was! This is racist South Africa's justice!

They hoped that Ray would either 'defend' himself (and in the process reveal where he was at the time of the sabotage acts of December 16, 1961) or under an intense barrage of cross-examination by the fascist prosecutor, Percy Yutar, in court, would crack. In the trial, Ray answered the charges against him by "denying" that he had participated in any sabotage on December 16, 1961 - which in any case was the truth!

When it came to Yutar's turn to cross-examine him, Yutar, doing the job of the police, pressed home the point and demanded from Ray that he (Ray) substantiate his alibi by revealing where he was during that crucial period. Ray's response to Yutar's relentless pressure was his infectious, high-pitched laugh and firm retort: "I am not going to tell you that".

Ray was convicted and sentenced to life - which in South Africa means "until the end of your life", until you die. After their sentence the Special Branch were aware that if Mhlaba and Kathrada, who was also sentenced to life on thin evidence (and often false evidence) were to appeal against their sentence, they would probably have their sentences reduced to the minimum of 5 years which is the mandatory sentence on conviction under the then Sabotage Act or the present day Terrorism Act which has since replaced the Sabotage Act.

The defence in the Rivonia Trial was led by the late comrade Bram Fischer and shortly after the Rivonia trialists were taken to serve their sentences on Robben Island, Bram Fischer went to visit the comrades in prison in order to receive their instructions about the possibilities of the Rivonia trialists appealing against their conviction and sentence. The keynote of the attitude of the accused to the trial had been expressed by Comrade Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela in his statement from the dock whose main content was:

(a) to turn the trial from one of defending themselves on a capital charge to that of using the courtroom to indict the racist regime led by the then Verwoerd; to turn the court into an ANC political platform; to use the court to address our people and inform them about the policy of the ANC;

(b) even on conviction by the court to maintain this position and refuse to plead for mercy from the oppressors' courts.

As a result, Raymond and Kathrada who had the best chances of having their sentences drastically reduced and avoiding life imprisonment, adhered strictly to this position and when Bram Fischer consulted them on Robben Island about their appeal all accused unanimously and voluntarily chose to stand by their political convictions, to live with their integrity and dignity, intact before their people and refused to appeal against the conviction and sentence.

In the process of his political involvement and activity in the ANC, CP and Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mhlaba was forced to make tremendous sacrifices. We are talking about family sacrifices. Perhaps Mhlaba is the best person to express this.

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EXHIBIT Q

EPTEMBER 1981
official organ of the african
national congress south africa
JOE NZINGO GQABI
1929 - 1981

'Our Alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle'

President O.R. Tambo on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the South African Communist Party, July 30th, 1981

On July 30 1981, the South African Communist Party organised a meeting in London to celebrate its 60th anniversary. Chairing the meeting was Comrade Yusuf Dadoo, SACP Chairman. Solidarity messages were given by the General Secretaries of the British and Irish Communist Parties. Giving the key-note speech on behalf of the SACP was the Party's General Secretary, Comrade Moses Mabhida. Below we publish the address by our President Comrade O.R Tambo.

Comrade Chairman,
Your Excellencies,
and Comrades,

Let me commence by thanking you, Comrade Chairman, and the SACP for inviting the African National Congress to be a party to this occasion and in particular, for the opportunity of sharing a platform with the Communist Party of Great Britain, represented here by the General Secretary Gordon McLennan and with the Communist Party of Ireland, represented by Comrade Michael O'Riordan.

These are our allies; they are part of the international movement of solidarity which gives us strength and confidence in the certainty of our victory. These parties, together with other communist and workers parties around the world, are parties which we can always appeal to for solidarity in the conviction that they will respond.

It is a great pleasure for us, a great honour to participate with them on an occasion of great significance in our struggle in South Africa.

You Comrade Chairman, and Comrade General Secretary of the SACP have shared hundreds of platforms together in our lifetime in South Africa and in many parts of the world outside our country. Today, we share a platform on an occasion which takes our reflections back across a span of 60 years, in which we can recall great names that have ensured that our struggle shall continue and is continuing today ... names that shall always be honoured in our history.

We share this platform in another significant context, for me in particular. I have the great pleasure today of repeating on behalf of the African National Congress and our people in general, our congratulations to Comrade Moses Mabhida on his election some while ago, to the position of General Secretary of the SACP.

We utter these congratulations with a sense of confidence, knowing his background, knowing his role in our struggle especially in the discharge of his tasks in the ANC, his absolute loyalty and his understanding - profound understanding - of the character of the South African situation and its problems. Confidence, because he succeeds one of the great giants of our struggle in the position of General Secretary of the SACP - Moses Kotane: whose contributions alone, to the building up of the forces that can resist fascist onslaught on any scale is acknowledged by all who have worked with him, such as I have, - by all who have read about him.

We are confident that you Comrade Moses, will prove yourself a worthy successor, and perhaps in the fullness of time we shall likewise name you among the giants of our struggle.

Comrade Chairman, I should like to pay a special tribute to you today. It is

60 years since the SACP was formed. It is several decades since you have been involved in the front ranks of our struggle, inspiring everyone around you, inspiring younger generations: first among the volunteers in situations that threaten arrest, torture, imprisonment; never missing where there is struggle to be waged. You were awarded the title Isitwalandwe by our nation not as a formality but in recognition of your services. This was more than 25 years ago. Your presence here, and chairmanship of this particular meeting enables us to recall with great clarity the various revolutionaries with whom you associated in your period of service to our people and our country.

On this the 60th anniversary of the founding of the South African Communist Party, I bring the greeting and felicitations of the NEC of the African National Congress, and the good wishes of all those engaged in the liberation struggle and all the oppressed in South Africa.

This year also marks the 25th Anniversary of the Women's great march to Pretoria - the march of our gallant women. It is the year that carries with it the 20th Anniversary of the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe. It is the Year of the Youth of our country. We hail the SACP in the name of these contingents of our army of liberation which together with the SACP comprise a fighting alliance that represents the power of the South African revolution in the making.

We salute the SACP, particularly in the name of the combatants who have fallen in the course of our struggle as well as on behalf of the national leaders and militants presently held in the enemy's prisons.

We congratulate the SACP on this occasion, particularly for the dedication and commitment of its leaders and cadres that has ensured its survival these 60 years, despite intensive repression and desperate attempts to destroy it.

We applaud your achievements, for the SACP has not only survived, but is today stronger, and increasingly makes more significant contributions to the liberation struggle of our people.

The ANC speaks here today, not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign organisation. Rather we speak of and to

Comrade O.R. Tambo

our own. For it is a matter of record that for much of its history, the SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people against oppression and exploitation in South Africa. We can all bear witness, that in the context of the struggle against colonial structures, racism, and the struggle for power by the people, the SACP has been fighting with the oppressed and exploited.

Notwithstanding that it has had to concentrate on thwarting the efforts to destroy it, cadres of the SACP have always been ready to face the enemy in the field. Because they have stood and fought in the front ranks, they have been amongst those who have suffered the worst brutalities of the enemy, and some of the best cadres have sacrificed their lives.

And so, your achievements are the achievements of the liberation struggle. Your heroes are ours. Yours victories, those of all the oppressed.

The relationship between the ANC and the SACP is not an accident of history, nor is it a natural and inevitable development. For, as we can see, similar relationships have not emerged in the course of liberation struggles in other parts of Africa.

To be true to history, we must concede that there have been difficulties as well as triumphs along our path, as, traversing many decades, our two organisations have converged towards a shared strategy of struggle. Ours is not merely a paper alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement of leaders. Our alliance

is a living organism that has grown out of struggle. We have built it out of our separate and common experiences. It has been nurtured by our endeavours to counter the total offensive mounted by the National Party in particular against all opposition and against the very concept of democracy. It has been strengthened through resistance to the vicious onslaught against both the ANC and the SACP by the Pretoria regime; it has been fertilised by the blood of countless heroes many of them are unnamed and unsung. It has been reinforced by a common determination to destroy the enemy and by our shared belief in the certainty of victory.

This process of building the unity of all progressive and democratic forces in South Africa through united and unified action received a particularly powerful impetus from the outstanding leadership of Isitwalandwe Chief Albert J Luthuli, as President General of the ANC. The process was assisted and supported by the tried and tested leadership of such stalwart revolutionaries as Isitwalandwe Usuf Dadoo and Isitwalandwe the late Moses Kotane, revolutionaries of the stature of J. B. Marks and Bram Fisher.

Today the ANC and SACP have common objectives in the eradication of the oppressive and exploitative system that prevails in our country: the seizure of power and the exercise of their right of self determination by all the people of South Africa. We share a strategic perspective of the task that lies ahead.

Our organisations have been able to agree on fundamental strategies and tactical positions, whilst retaining our separate identities. For though we are united in struggle, as you have already pointed out Comrade Chairman, we are not the same. Our history has shown that we are a powerful force because our organisations are mutually reinforcing.

It is often claimed by our detractors that the ANC's association with the SACP means that the ANC is being influenced by the SACP. That is not our experience. Our experience is that the two influence each other. The ANC is quite capable of influencing, and is liable to be influenced by others. There has been the evolution of

Comrade Moses Mabhida

strategy which reflects this two-way process.

In fact the ANC was quite within its rights to tell the SACP that we are sorry we cannot release Comrade Moses Mabhidafrom his tasks in the ANC - find another comrade to be General Secretary. Yet we agreed he would make a good General Secretary for the SACP. He was not grabbed.

This kind of relationship constitutes a feature of the South African liberation movement, a revolutionary movement, a feature of the SACP which helps to reinforce the alliance and to make it work as it is working. It is a tribute to the leadership of the SACP.

We are therefore talking of an alliance from which, in the final analysis, the struggle of the people of South Africa for a new society and a new social system has benefitted greatly.

Within our revolutionary alliance each organisation has a distinct and vital role to play. A correct understanding of these roles, and respect for their boundaries has ensured the survival and consolidation of our cooperation and unity.

As stated in its programme, the SACP

unreservedly supports and participates in the struggle for national liberation led by the ANC, in alliance with the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Trade Unions, the Coloured People's Congress and other patriotic groups of democrats, women, peasants and youth.

The strategy of the African National Congress sees the main content of the South African revolution as the liberation of the largest and most oppressed group: namely the Black population. And by Black I do not mean what our enemies have elected to designate as Black - namely just the Africans. By Black, we mean all the oppressed. Those who were formerly called Non whites and which we prefer to call Black.

Of course, it does not suit the enemy to club all the oppressed and exploited together. It is better for the enemy that this vast majority be split up into what they call Blacks and then Indians and Coloureds. That fits their strategy - serves the interests of their strategy best. But I am talking about the oppressed population as the Blacks.

Whilst concerned to draw in, and unify, all progressive and democratic forces in the country, including those amongst the whites, our priority remains the maximum mobilisation of those who are the dispossessed, the exploited and the racially oppressed.

That is only a priority, for we recognise that victory requires that we build up maximum unity of the forces for progress. Indeed we need to break up this white racist clique, win friends from among the ruling class and isolate the fascists. Then a united people of South Africa can deliver the final blow, crush the colonialist structures and move to a new South Africa.

The poverty of our people, the incidents of malnutrition, unemployment and other manifestations of the criminal policy, the criminal system under which we live, demand that our people should fight with everything they have, all the time, to destroy the system. To this end the ANC has called upon the people to resist this oppressive and exploitative system at every level, using every occasion and every means at their disposal. And the response has been nationwide. People in all walks of life and races have banded together in opposition to the fascist regime. Almost every township has been faced with rent strikes and other forms of resistance. Fare increases are met with boycotts. Youth and students have maintained their action against the education system and found widespread support from parents.

Though many of these actions are local and focus on immediate issues, they are not directed at seeking piece meal and at best temporary redress. These actions are not an end in themselves but they are part of the struggle for a new social system in our country.

The ANC has called upon and encouraged workers to use their labour power, not only to improve wages and working conditions, but also to destroy the exploitative system itself. Workers have been and are responding to this call. In the process, employers have been dismissing large numbers of the poorly paid and brutally exploited strikers.

The right of the workers to withhold their labour is universally recognised as fundamental. The ANC is determined to defend the right of South African workers to strike - especially the Black workers. Firms which victimise strikers do so at their peril. They must be made aware that they dismiss their workers at the risk of dismissing their profits. The ANC intends to see to it, that the workers right to strike is defended.

The objective of our struggle in South Africa, as set out in the Freedom Charter, encompasses economic emancipation. It is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of the country to the people as a whole. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the roots of racial supremacy and exploitation, and does not represent even the shadow of liberation.

It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy; and our drive towards national emancipation must include economic emancipation.

Mr Chairman, exploitation and repression are brutal. But they have not deterred or cowered us. On the contrary, throughout the country, the struggle is generating a climate of defiance, in which

people are going into action without thought of torture, arrest or even death. They are asserting their right to freedom of association and speech, their right to strike, and most importantly for the right to govern.

They do so in the context of a mass struggle which demonstrates the success of our strategy of reinforcing popular actions with armed force - as was shown most forcibly during the nationwide campaign of boycott and rejection of the white republic in May of this year.

The ANC and its allies recognise that in our situation in South Africa armed struggle is an absolute imperative. But we have always seen mass mobilisation as essential to the growth and development of armed struggle. We acclaim it as an achievement, that in both areas of activity - the mass struggles as well as armed action, - there is now ample evidence of growth and expansion.

Umkhonto we Sizwe has emerged as a force to reckon with. And yet, we all know that before we can hope to bring the enemy down, the scope and scale, as well as the quality of the operations of this our people's army, must be greatly stepped up. Umkhonto we Sizwe has won its first great victory - namely, that the enemy has proved unable to stop its growth, its expansion and the increasingly effective striking powers of our guerrilla army.

That is a victory which we must build on. To say that, is to pronounce the challenge posed for our revolutionary alliance. Unless we build on that victory we will lose the victory itself.

For even as the unity of the oppressed has grown and strengthened so too has the offensive against us. As we stand poised for new advances, the onslaught grows more fierce.

As the apartheid regime has sought ways to preserve itself, power in South Africa has increasingly become concentrated in the hands of a particularly dangerous and authoritarian politico-military clique, which tries to retain control through the unashamed and overt use of institutionalised violence and the escalation of brutal repression. Not content with waging war against the South African and Namibian people, the regime has embarked upon an undeclared war against neighbouring states.

In repeated breaches of the UN Charter and of international law, the territorial integrity of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe is violated by the regime, the political stability of independent states subverted, and economic development retarded and sabotaged.

In opening this meeting, Comrade Chairman, you have drawn our attention to the new crime of aggression against the Peoples Republic of Angola. We should like to especially associate the ANC with the resolution adopted here today. And to add, that in our view Angola's closest friends should rally to her defence, and that Africa must act against the aggression against Africa. We consider the situation demands an emergency meeting of the OAU to decide upon concerted measures to be taken to drive South African troops out of Angola and out of Namibia.

We should not omit to emphasise and underscore, the special role of the new administration in the US, in relation to this aggression. There has been some consistency in the behaviour of the South African regime ever since Mr Reagan appeared on the scene. The first signs of a new arrival in the arena of international relations was the fact of the Geneva Conference being torpedoed.

A state had been reached when all concerned had agreed including South Africa and at that moment the Reagan Administration appeared on the scene. The first evidence of that was the collapse of that Geneva conference. It was succeeded by an attack on Angola; an attack, an invasion against Mozambique when our people were butchered and assassinated in Matola.

Now as pressure grows for the implementation of Res. 435 to resolve and finalise the Namibian question, the greatest ever invasion is mounted against Angola – the greatest certainly, since the mid 1970s. Backing all this up is surely that administration which proclaims itself as an ally of South Africa, which labelled the national liberation movement as international terrorism to be eliminated and liquidated. It is in pursuance of that policy that by way of liquidating SWAPO, the South African regime is being assisted and encouraged and equipped to try and

destroy Angola.

In condemning this aggression, we must also condemn with equal vigour the allies of the criminal regime in South Africa.

For our part, we declare our indissoluble unity with the people of Namibia in their struggles. We support SWAPO and we will do everything in our power to ensure the success of their struggle.

We have in the past declared our solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa especially when they come under attack by our immediate enemy. We proclaim this support today for the people of Angola.

The ANC has received and continues to receive international support and solidarity from a variety of sources. We must today, acknowledge especially, with appreciation, the very significant support we receive from the socialist countries. You have mentioned many of these countries - all of them without exception have given freely by way of supporting our struggle and meeting our demands.

We appreciate in particular that they and some African countries have not hesitated to deliver weapons to peoples fighting for their liberation. The enemy likes to squeal that we have been fighting with either Soviet made weapons, or communist made weapons. It does not matter what weapons they are. But we are glad to have them, and shall continue to use them if they are effective - and they are.

This support has been given during the liberation struggles in southern Africa and the rest of Africa and has been extended to the independent states that have been forced to defend their own victories.

The devastation wreaked in Southern Africa by the Pretoria regime places an added responsibility upon the liberation movement. For, it is only after the seizure of power in Pretoria, that the people of southern Africa will be able to concentrate all their energies and resources into consolidating their independence, furthering economic development and promoting social change. Until the Pretoria regime is defeated in Namibia and in South Africa, there are no prospects for peace and security in southern Africa .. .. and the defeat of that regime is precisely the task of the ANC, SACP and all the people of South Africa who have committed themselves to the struggle for total liberation.

For the revolutionary movement, anniversaries cannot only celebrate the past. We must recall and acclaim our history, but more importantly, we must use the past to arm ourselves for the future: to learn lessons and to strengthen our resolve and commitment.

The founders of the African National Congress vested in the organisation the historic responsibility of uniting the South African nation across the boundaries of colour, race and creed. That task has devolved upon each of our members and cadres, and to it, has been added the isolation of the Pretoria regime and the mobilisation of the widest possible support for our liberation struggle.

The ANC's capacity to unite our people and to lead a unified liberation struggle is one of our most formidable weapons, and it is consequently a prime target of the enemy.

It is only as a united force that we can move forward.

It is as a united people that we shall be victorious.

To move forward, we need to move forward toward victory. An essential of forward movement is that we should together work for the highest level of mobilisation of our people inside South Africa and of the international community. For the consolidation and expansion of our underground organisation in our country, we we should aim at planting Umkhonto we Sizwe and spreading it among the popular masses, so that the masses become the active expression of our armed struggle.

We need to work together for the fulfilment of the objectives elaborated in the Freedom Charter.

We need, in other words, to consolidate further our alliance and ensure its maximum effectiveness.

LONG LIVE THE SACP!
LONG LIVE THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE ANC AND SACP!
LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF ALL PROGRESSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN OUR COUNTRY AND IN THE REST OF THE WORLD!

OBITUARY: ELI WEINBERG

On July 18, 1981, Comrade Eli Weinberg left us, but for good. Born in the port of Libau on the Baltic Sea (in what is today part of the Soviet Union) in 1908, Eli experienced the harsh reality of the First World War and the liberating influence of the Great Socialist October Revolution in 1917. He was then still young.

At the age of 16 he joined a trade union and became involved in its activities. It was with this working class background and experience that he left Lativia in 1929 and arrived in Cape Town on the 9th December the same year. In 1932 he joined the Communist Party of South Africa and from 1933 to 1953 he was active in the trade union movement in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. By 1948, Comrade Eli had already incurred the wrath of the racist regime and he was restricted from carrying out his trade union work. From 1953 onwards he was placed under further banning orders and when the State of Emergency was declared in 1960 he was detained for a period of three months. In 1964, he was arrested together with the late Bram Fischer and held in detention for seven months. After a lengthy trial, Comrade Eli was found guilty of being a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. On his release in 1970 he was banned for five years and restricted to his house and was required to report daily to the police.

Comrade Eli made his name not only as a trade unionist and revolutionary but also as a people's photographer. His recently published book "A Portrait of the People" portrays our struggle and movement vividly. His photographs were reproduced by the people's press "New Age", "Guardian", "People's World", "Advance", "Clarion" and "Spark". His interest in photography goes back as far as 1926 when he as an assistant in a photographic studio and later as a professional photographer. He contributed regularly to exhibitions and in 1964 one of his photographs of a group of Sotho women won him a prize of a silver medal and 100 dollars.

Comrade Eli Weinberg

Comrade Eli also trained young photographers - one of his students being the late comrade Joe Gqabi who was recently assassinated in Zimbabwe.

In 1976, at the height of the Soweto uprisings, Comrade Eli was instructed by the ANC to leave the country for Tanzania where he was later joined by his wife, Violet. They lived in Dar es Salaam.

Comrade Eli has been involved in all aspects and phases of the work of the movement including the paste up and distribution of the announcement of the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe the military wing of the ANC, on the night of December 16, 1961.

The ANC dips its revolutionary banner to Comrade Eli Weinberg. We send our sympathies to his family especially Comrade Violet, his daughter Sheila and grandson Mark.

VICTORY IS CERTAIN!

Hamba kahle Qhawe lama Qhawe!

Andrew Mlangeni



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
new perspectives
1981—
the year of the
decisive offensive
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and the arms build-up

new perspectives

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EDITORIAL

World Peace Council Enters Its Fourth Decade

ROMESH CHANDRA

THIRTY years ago, on the closing day of the World Peace Congres held in Warsaw in November 1950, the World Peace Council was born. The decision to establish an organised mass movement for peace reflected the urgent need of the time.

A few months earlier, the first Stockholm Appeal against the atomic bomb had been launched. The cold war and the threat of a new war hung perilously over humanity.

What was needed was a mass movement of action embracing all countries in all parts of the world. The famous French scientist Frederic Joliot-Curie, who was elected as the first President of the World Peace Council, emphasized again and again in his speeches and statements that no one country by itself could defeat the forces which threatened humanity with war, but all countries and all peoples acting together certainly could.

During the thirty years that have passed since that historic moment in November 1950, great changes have taken place in the world. The outstanding characteristic of the World Peace Council during these three decades has been its capacity to orient its actions to the urgent needs of the changing international situation.

The thirtieth year of the World Peace Council was the year of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, held in Sofia from September 23 to 27, 1980.

The Appeal unanimously adopted by 2,260 deputies of the World Parliament from 137 countries and from over 100 international and 3,000 national non-governmental organisations states with confidence: "The peoples have the power to preserve peace—their basic right."

The thirty years since its foundation have seen the continuous growth of the strength of the World Peace Council and of the organisations and movements represented in it. The biggest international mass organisations of trade unions, of women, of youth and students, of religious circles, as well as organisations of lawyers, journalists, writers and scientists are represented at the highest level in the World Peace Council.

Among the members of the World Peace Council are leaders, members of parliaments, and other representatives of the overwhelming majority of ruling parties in the world. Major opposition parties and liberation movements are equally represented at the highest level in the World Peace Council.

Immediately after the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, a session was held to elect a new World Peace Council and, in its turn, the new Council elected its Presidium.

As we rejoiced in the fact that from country after country representatives of political parties and social forces which had not been represented in the movement earlier, had now joined it, we were able to look back and see how the World Peace Council had grown, how its main characteristics today correspond to the needs of the international situation, based on the strength derived from the victories and successes it has won during all these years.

We look back at the great campaigns for disarmament and against nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The first Stockholm Appeal was signed by 500 million people. The second Stockholm Appeal, twenty-five years later, was endorsed by 700 million people.

No other movement of our times has had the capacity to mobilise such vast international support for its initiatives and actions.

The campaign against the neutron bomb was the biggest international campaign ever carried out against any weapon of mass destruction. The campaign against the stationing of new U.S. missiles in Europe has brought into action millions of ordinary citizens.

And today, the imperialist arms build-up, which threatens the world with war and nuclear conflagration and annihilation, has become the rallying point for hundreds of millions of men and women from all parts of the world.

The Appeal adopted unanimously by the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace—the Appeal to end the war danger and the arms build-up—is gathering greater and greater support as the deputies to the Parliament carry the message of Sofia deep among the masses of their respective countries.

The World Peace Council in these thirty years has marked itself out as the biggest international solidarity movement of our times. The mass movements against the United States aggression in Viet Nam, against colonialism in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, against the fascist regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece, against the dictatorship in Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Guatemala and other Latin American countries—all these have given to the World Peace Council the everwidening influence which it commands today.

One can say correctly that the World Peace Council has become in this period the biggest international movement of the peoples fighting for the best causes of all humanity.

Every problem which affects human beings in any part of the world is the concern of the World Peace Council and of the national organisations represented in it today from over 135 countries of all continents.



These NATO countries have continued to do so despite protests and demands by the Namibian and South African peoples. These people have demanded that these countries stop supplying armaments of human destruction to a neo-Nazi regime which has arrogated to itself the right to attack any independent African state south of the Equator which in its view constitutes a threat to its racist existence.

Those countries and governments collaborating with fascism against our people must be condemned.

The world must be made aware that the weapons, mirage jet fighters, bombers, war planes and other war materials used by racist South Africa to massacre thousands of Namibian civilians at Kassinga in May 1978, and to kill South African school children at Soweto in 1976, have been provided by the NATO countries.

By their actions and motives, the regimes in South Africa and Israel have proved, beyond doubt, their militarist, bellicose and criminal nature comparable only to that of the Hitler-Mussolini gestapo clique.

SWAPO's Armed Resistance

Our commitment and determination to continue with our patriotic duty and historic task of dislodging racist South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia remain firm, unshakable and indestructible. For this purpose, our movement, SWAPO, continues to spearhead our political, diplomatic and military efforts at all fronts. The military confrontation between our guerrilla combatants of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and the forces of the racist regime remains tense.

Our fighters have gained combat experience which has enabled them to deploy new superior tactics and strategies more effectively against the enemy. As a result, the enemy has been thrown into a confusion.

Today, our forces are controlling large areas in the northern, north-western and north-eastern regions of our country while the districts of Tsumeb, Outjo, Okahandja, Otjiwarongo, Grootfontein and even Windhoek, the capital, have been declared "security areas". In fact, more than 50 per cent of Namibia's land area comprising 80 per cent of the population has been placed under martial law because of SWAPO's increasing military gains. These gains have been facilitated by the patriotic Namibians who provide succour and sustenance to our fighting cadres in both the countryside and urban centres. Our forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy both in men and material; large quantities of enemy's arms, ammunition and even its soldiers have been captured and a considerable number of its war planes shot down.

Let me now turn to the efforts of the international community to resolve the Namibian problem through peaceful means.

UN Plan for Namibia's Independence

It is now more than two years since the United Nations Plan for the decolonisation of Namibia was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978. However all the efforts to have the Plan implemented have been rendered ineffective by racist South Africa's intransigence, arrogance and unwillingness to cooperate with the UN Secretary General. While all the parties involved agreed to the speedy implementation of the Plan in its final and definite form, racist South Africa has sought to use negotiations as a respite for consolidation of its colonial intentions to perpetuate its domination over Namibia while destroying the letter and spirit of the Plan.

On our part, SWAPO remains willing and prepared to cooperate with the UN Secretary General for the speedy implementation of the Plan. In this respect, SWAPO is even ready to talk directly with racist South Africa. I would, however, like to make it categorically clear that SWAPO rejects the idea of a so-called all party constitutional conference where SWAPO is asked to sit with racist South Africa's surrogates on an equal footing. We also reject any efforts aimed at sidestepping the United Nations.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, SWAPO will have no other alternative but to continue with the intensification of the armed liberation struggle till final victory.

For many years now, racist South Africa has arrogantly defied and violated the UN resolutions and decisions on Namibia, and South Africa. It has done so in all cases with impunity because of the veto of its Western allies in the UN Security Council. It is now time that the international community takes effective enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

SWAPO strongly calls on all states and governments to support the imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions, and to strengthen other boycotts and embargoes, against racist South Africa and to increase assistance and support to SWAPO and ANC.

EVENTS IN MIDDLE EAST

Palestinean Liberation Struggle Bravely Facing Imperialist Hurricane

YASSER ARAFAT

OUR era has proved to be that of the collapse of imperialism, and the era of victory for the peoples' wills.

The achievements realized by the Palestine people in their political and military struggle are proofs of this decisive stage in the world where the peoples are opposing the aggressive forces. There are people who have helped and are still helping our small people to stand up against Israeli terrorism, international zionism and U.S. imperialism to take these accomplishments to final victory.

How could our people remain steadfast through the last 16 years under very complex and cruel conditions, except for the support that our people received from the friends and allies of progressive democratic and peaceloving forces fighting for freedom and social justice.

How can we remain steadfast without the continuing friendly support of the socialist states headed by that great friend, the Soviet Union, which stands with our people's cause as well as with our just right to return to our homeland, self-determination and establishment of an independent state. In this way we are going to realize victory, through such faithful friends and by our people's will, our nation's determination and by our fighting struggle.

This does not mean that the international imperialists as well as the military fascist and zionist forces headed by the U.S.A. have abandoned their greed and plans for thwarting our people's potential. It has begun to push the world again towards the policy of cold war. International tension has increased in all continents, especially in Europe and the Middle East. In Europe there is the project for putting Pershing and Cruise missiles in NATO countries which is a threat to international peace.

In the Caribbean Sea, naval military manoeuvres are taking place, threatening the people of that area.

Conspiracies against Palestinian People

In the Middle East the conspiracies against the Palestinian people's cause have increased through the continuation of the conspiracy of Camp David, the conspiracy of autonomy and encouraging Israeli aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. The imperialists have enabled the Israeli army to maintain military supremacy in South Lebanon.

At the same time, the U.S.A. has brought in three naval fleets capable of policing the Middle East area, the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. The U.S.A. has also built military bases in this area, such as the Diego Garcia nuclear base in the Indian Ocean, Berbera in Somalia, Masira in Oman, Mombassa in Kenya and Ras Nabbas, Quina in Egypt.

The U.S. has also deployed the Rapid Deployment Force in the region which has occupied several places in Oman and the Gulf. These are some examples of the general trend of U.S. imperialist policy in escalating the arms build-up.

Return to Cold War

The international situation is in danger of turning back to the policy of the cold war. The U.S. is continuing to plot against the peoples in which the revealed conspiracy against the Palestinian people stands in the forefront. This situation has made the democratic, peaceloving, and progressive forces all over the world to understand accurately the dangers of U.S. imperialist policies against the cause of peoples' liberation.

The situation in the Middle East reflects a concentrated image, a replica of the international situation, since we are witness to fierce U.S. imperialist attacks to crush the victories which we have realised in the



Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, addressing the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace in Sofia in September 1980.

YASSER ARAFAT, *Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Chairman of the General Command of the Palestine Revolutionary Forces*

area. The U.S. imperialists have been dealt severe blows, the most important being the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran which liquidated the largest imperialist bases in the area. The second blow is the isolation of Israel, which is imperialism's most advanced colonial base in the area. But imperialism's attacks are continuing against our people's opposition to the Camp David agreements, to the zionist and imperialist conspiracies of the autonomy plan.

In these conditions of brutal U.S. attacks, Sadat went and shook hands with the enemy, and at no gain, to himself. Then came the treacherous Camp David agreement which did not acknowledge the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and the interests of the Arab nation. It also created a very dangerous situation in the area by temporarily excluding Egypt, whose might in the Arab struggle is well known, from the process of liberation.

New Arab Phase

All this has created a new Arab phase. It has increased the dangers and pressures upon the Palestinian revolution and the Palestine Cause. As a result of this situation, the Israeli army has continued its campaigns of annihilation against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples.

The Israeli armed forces, which employ the most modern U.S. weapons, have escalated their land, sea and air campaigns, against the Palestinian people in the occupied areas. The Israeli forces are employing the ugliest means of brutal terrorism against our children, women and masses in these areas under a big zionist fascist plan, including attempts at assassination of national leaders and deporting others, by even murdering the political prisoners and detainess in the prisons of the Israeli occupation forces.

But a heroic struggle has been launched by the masses in the occupied areas to frustrate the conspiracy of autonomy and the Camp David accords. This has been done by intensifying the armed struggle of the Palestinian revolutionaries and the joint efforts of the progressive Lebanese and Palestinian forces. This has lead to the impasse in regard to the Camp David agreements and marked the end of the Camp David road.

On the other side, the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front began to play a very important role in exposing the conspiracy, and in strengthening the general Arab stand against Camp David. But these acts are merely a prelude to real confrontation because the conspiracy still continues, the U.S. military bases are increasing and Sadat is still following U.S. policies in the area. That is why the struggle will be fiercer in the coming months and will reach higher levels than ever before in view of the dangerous emerging situation.

Annexation of Jerusalem

The most important sign of this is the Israeli Knesset decision to annex Jerusalem. It is a dangerous decision because we consider it to be a time bomb in the area, and the Palestinian people will not allow that, whatever be the sacrifice necessary to undo this act.

This is also the time for the Arabs and Islamic nations, and all the good militant forces to unite in the world. So our Palestinian people, including Moslems, Christians and Jews, see the decision of the annexation of Jerusalem as a challenge to their existence, their history, their holy and sacred places.

Our people see the decision to annex Jerusalem as a natural result of the Camp David policies which we consider as one of the crimes of U.S. imperialism. Those who follow this path especially Sadat have to bear the full responsibility for such traitorous actions.

The annexation of Jerusalem has created an eternal tense situation in the area. It is meant to serve the interests of zionism and U.S. imperialism.

The peoples of the world searching for stable peace and progress understand that a lasting and just peace will not be achieved except on the basis of unity and freedom of the peoples.

The treatment of the Palestinian prisoners in Israel, according to reports of international organisations, shows the growing crimes which are committed against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. These crimes extend from mass punishment, destroying houses, killing during detention, arrests, and practising every kind of brutal fascist torture to the confiscation of land, compulsory emigration which imposes starvation, unhealthy conditions, unbearable living conditions, lack of educational facilities on the affected people. It also leads to the robbing of the Palestine inheritance, and aggression on the sacred places and ruins.

In international conferences of the United Nations, resolution after resolution has been passed exposing the zionist terrorist aggressions and calling for ending them. The resolutions support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people but the zionist ruling military forces are continuing in their crimes, paying no attention to all these international resolutions and the international consensus against their activities. Nothing can be more clear than the dangerous declaration issued by General Eytan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, in which he said: "Our war with the Palestinians is a war between two sides, which will never be ended unless one of the two fighting sides is finished."

This is the mentality of the terrorists, fascists, racists whom we confront in the front lines in which we are fighting to defend every liberal free progressive and honest human beings in our area and all over the world.

The battle that the Palestinian people are waging is an inseparable part of a universal battle, in which the people of the world are fighting against imperialism, colonialism, zionism, racism, fascism, and are looking for a better future, a future that has no colonialism, no zionism, no fascism, no monopolies, no imperialism. They are fighting for the future of social justice and social progress.

Palestinian People's Armed Struggle

The Israeli policy backed by the U.S.A. has been unmasked. It is an aggressive policy and an attempt to ruin people's rights, and mock at the will of the international community. This makes the peace which is spoken of in the Camp David accords, a peace of treason.

This gives our people full right to carry out the armed struggle, and to use every means of struggle, in order to stop the brutal and organised terrorism carried out by the Israeli army, and to put an end to the dangers threatening international peace, and to affirm the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which include the right to return, and to self-determination and to the creation of an independent state. Only then can there be a just peace, and it is for this peace that the Palestinian people are fighting.

Our approach to peace does not mean that we are compromising. We will never accept the schemes of the imperialists and the U.S. government. Our conception of peace complies with the interest of our people and of the people all over the world. It is the peace which serves just causes, for independence and liberation, democracy and progress.

We are bravely facing the imperialist hurricane in our area with a strong will and absolute hope in victory despite the unequal capacities because of the facilities and military equipment provided by the U.S.A. to Israel, to continue its terror, aggression and challenge to the international will. We stand facing the imperial hurricane with full confidence and support of our friends in the socialist countries and the nonaligned movement. We are sure that we will have the support of all the forces of peace and democracy in the entire world. And we are sure that the imperialist zionist attack will be crushed and our people will be victorious, as will be all other peoples.

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Translation (Russian)*

[Source: Pravda, April 24, 1978]

NAMIBIA'S JUST CAUSE

On April 24, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly is beginning deliberations on Namibia. The convocation of so authoritative an international body whose objectives include the discussion of the liberation of Namibia from occupation by the racist regime of the Republic of South Africa and the provision to its people of the right to self-determination is of great significance both for the future of that country and the solution of complex political problems in southern Africa.

The recommendations worked out by the U.N. Committee on Decolonization, the U.N. Council on Namibia, and the Organization of African Unity's Committee on Liberation on the eve of the present General Assembly session decisively demonstrate the necessity of forcing the government in Pretoria to immediately end the occupation of that country, release all political prisoners, transfer all power to the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people recognized by the United Nations--the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

However, these justified demands encounter stubborn resistance on the part of the government in Pretoria, which is feverishly engaged in efforts to retain the country in colonial subjugation. Following the failure of a series of talks with obedient tribal leaders, which in compliance with the plans of the racists were to culminate in the creation of a puppet government in Namibia, the rulers of the Republic of South Africa attempted to force SWAPO to agree to hold "elections" under the surveillance of their punitive army. Having received a decisive refusal, the racists are trying to discredit the just demands of the patriots, maintaining that the settlement of the problem, so it would appear, is being prevented by the "intransigence" and "militancy" of SWAPO leaders.

Neither do the maneuvers conducted in circumvention of the U.N. by the western powers, headed by the USA and England, who are trying to protect the interests of their monopolies in this country which is generously endowed with natural resources, by making deals with Forster, promote the favorable resolution of the problem. Talks conducted several days ago by the delegates from Washington and London with the head of the South African government reconfirmed the fact that the racists are ready to make only small concessions, while continuing to ignore the principal demands of the patriots contained in the U.N. resolution.

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*Subcommittee note.--The Pravda articles which CRS translated into English are retained in the subcommittee files.

The people of Namibia and its fighting avant guard SWAPO reject maneuvers directed at maintaining the colonial order on the territory of their country; they are fully determined to defend their right to freedom and the independence of their national government. The duty of the United Nations and all progressive forces in the world is to undertake energetic steps in carrying out these justified demands.

Valeriy Volkov

Luanda

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Translation (Russian)

Washington, D.C. 20540

[Source: Pravda, Jan. 19, 1977, p.4.]

NAMIBIA: A DIFFICULT ROAD TO FREEDOM

A. Babasyan (Yerevan), Ya. Kozinov (Omsk region), S. Pad'kov (Moscow) and other Pravda readers have asked us to report on the situation in Namibia.

"The war of liberation is gaining momentum and coming to a successful end; this is increasingly demoralizing our enemies." This statement made recently by the National Executive Committee of SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization, which heads the Namibian people's struggle for independence.

Indeed, since the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed and the borders of independent national states now directly adjoin the last remaining territories still under colonial racist control, the Namibians' armed struggle against the South African occupiers has intensified.

SWAPO, which has the overwhelming support of the nine hundred thousand strong African population, took up arms over ten years ago in an attempt to force the racist Republic of South Africa to leave the illegally occupied country. It should be pointed out that as early as 1966, the U.N. General Assembly deprived the Republic of South Africa (then known as South West Africa) of its mandate to govern Namibia, granted by the League of Nations in 1920. In 1967, the Security Council confirmed this decision. The United Nations recognized SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of Namibia.

Despite this, the racists to this day refuse to comply with the U.N. demand to transfer power into the hands of the Namibian people. In doing so, they lean on the support of the leading imperialist nations, which have large economic and strategic interests in this region. According to U.N. data, more than a third of the entire territory of Namibia has been handed over to western mining companies. English, American, French and West German capital, in connivance with South African interests, rapaciously and with great profit for themselves are exploiting uranium, tin, zinc, lead, copper and iron ore deposits, using cheap labor deprived of all rights.

In discussing the Namibian problem in the Security Council last October, England, France and the United States vetoed a draft resolution which contained a demand that the Republic of South Africa end the illegal occupation of Namibia, remove its armies from there, and hand over the power to the poeple. Wrecking the adoption of decisive measures with regard to

the Republic of South Africa by the Council, the western powers again revealed themselves as patrons of the racists. Delegates of the United States and other imperialist countries voted at the end of December 1976 against the U.N. General Assembly resolution which confirmed the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination, liberty and national independence.

As may be seen from the foreign press, the government in Pretoria is currently feverishly trying to keep the country under colonial control. Following the example of South Africa, enormous reservations for Africans -- bantustans -- are being created in the barren, desert lands. The part of the country where the natural riches and main economic centers are located is expected to be made into a special zone under the control of the present government. The army of occupation, which is continuously receiving support from the Republic of South Africa, has been increased to fifty thousand men. Police terror is being stepped up. In many areas, particularly in the provinces of Ovamboland, Okovango and Caprivi, an emergency situation has in fact been established and the local authorities have been empowered to arrest and hold all "suspicious" persons at their own discretion for indiefinite periods of time and to disperse meetings and demonstrations.

African newspapers are full of articles about the police secretly engaging behind prison walls in Windhoek and other towns in reprisals against resistance movement activists. Along the border with Angola, a "safety zone" is being established, from which thousands of peasants are being moved out and where all buildings are being razed and all crops destroyed. Any African arrested here may be shot on the spot. The racist authorities want to stop the expansion of the struggle for independence by using such barbarous methods.

However, despite the terror, the people's resistance to these racist procedures is not only not decreasing but even expanding.

Many facts indicate that the political influence and authority of the patriotic forces among the numerous tribes and peoples of Namibia is growing. During the last several months several parties representing various groups of the local population have dissolved of their own and have announced that they were joining SWAPO.

Under these circumstances the racists are obliged to maneuver. Attempting to create a semblance of change, they held a sort of "constitutional conference" in Windhoek in which tribal leaders and leaders of the white settlers participated. African tribal leaders supported by Pretoria and local racists, some of whom are former Nazis who had found shelter here after World War II, were instructed to prepare a " constitution" and form a "provisional transitional government." Even the date when "independence" is to be granted has been set -- December 31, 1978. Naturally, it is planned that all the machinery

of power and control over the largest part of the territory will remain in the hands of the white settlers and their South African patrons. Suffice it so say that Dirk Mudge, the present South African administrator of Namibia and a blatant racist, is intended for the post of prime minister. This "independence" would suit Pretoria quite well. But as they say, everything was smooth only on paper... For over a year now the conference has been getting practically nowhere. But is is not only that its participants are quarreling endlessly among themselves and that once the guards at the capital's Turnhalle sports center even had to pull apart the candidates vying for the post of minister of the "provisional government" who were pummeling each other. The fact is, and many of those who have now gathered in Windhoek recognize it, that without SWAPO's participation there can be no question of an overall solution of the Namibian problem which would be acceptable to the native population.

The fact that Pretoria made a number of concessions to SWAPO, inviting it to Turnhalle to the same table with the puppets, is indicative. Apparently the racists hoped to thrust upon this militant patriotic movement, which they cannot but take into account, a certain compromise variation. SWAPO, which from the very beginning boycotted the conference, recently reconfirmed that it would not take part in this "assemblage of puppets " in any shape or form.

"The Namibian people," stated SWAPO's president S. Nujoma, "categorically rejects the plans of the South African racists. We regard the ruses and maneuvers by racists of the Republic of South Africa, who ignore the decisions of the United Nations on Namibia, as a desire to perpetuate forever the illegal occupation of our country."

Nevertheless SWAPO by no means rejects a peaceful way of reaching independence for Namibia. More than once the leaders of the patriots stated their willingness to sit down at a conference table at any time to negociate directly with the government of South African Republic, provided that the subject of these talks would be the unconditional liquidation of the colonial occupational regime and the transfer of all power in Namibia to the real representatives of the people. In order that such talks begin, SWAPO demands, as a precondition, that the Republic of South Africa recognize the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, that it promise to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the country, that it free all political prisoners, that it remove its armies and security forces from the territory of the country, and that it recognized SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

The refusal of the racists to enter into negotiations with SWAPO leaves the patriots no other choice but to intensify the struggle for liberation. This struggle is entering a decisive phase.

The just cause of the Namibian people has the universal support of the independent African governments. The peoples of the socialist countries and all progressive people throughout the world are in solidarity with them.

V. Tyurkin

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[Source: Pravda, July 18, 1978, p. 4, col. 6]

HIGH REGARD

Khartoum, 17 (Tass). "It was indeed the socialist countries and other progressive states which gave all-around assistance to Angola in its struggle for national independence," said Paulo Teixeira Jorge, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Angola, to the Sudan News Agency (SUNA). The Angolan minister spoke highly of the material, political and diplomatic support given to Angola by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries to combat imperialist aggression.

Paulo Jorge exposed the attempts made by the imperialist nations to question the sincerity of the help rendered by the socialist governments to the African peoples. "The presence of Cuban armies and Soviet specialists in Angola," he said "is the product of bilateral agreements between our countries. And we regard all speculation about this presence," emphasized the minister, "as interference in the internal affairs of our country."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Angola confirmed the appreciation of the Angolan government and people for support to the national liberation movement and its struggle against white minority racist regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and the South African Republic. "Angola," he said "considers it its national duty to lend assistance to their struggle.

[Source: Pravda, July 18, 1978, p. 4., cols. 3-5]

HIS NAME INSPIRES STRUGGLE

Among the prominent revolutionary leaders of modern Africa, Nelson Mandela, a fiery fighter against the apartheid system and for the liberation of the Republic of South Africa, by right occupies an honored place. On July 18 he will be sixty years old. Mandela will be celebrating his birthday in a prison for those condemned to hard labor on barren Robbins Island, exposed to cold, stormy winds.

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For fourteen years this prisoner of racism has been languishing in prison. However, his name and work are not forgotten. When in June 1976 there was an uprising in Soweto, Mandela's portraits appeared on house walls

and excerpts from his speeches and letters were circulated. It was as though he was invisibly present among the demonstrators at meetings and gatherings of the inhabitants of the "black ghetto" in the Republic of South Africa. The racist authorities fell upon the prisoner's family -- his wife and children, who lived in Soweto, were banished to a distant village three hundred miles from Johannesburg. Nelson Mandela's very name frightens the rulers of the Republic of South Africa. But to the oppressed people of that country the image of this uncompromising African, his courage and fortitude, have become an inspiring example of the fight for freedom and human dignity.

A scion of an aristocratic family of a leader of the Tembe tribe in Transkei, Nelson Mandela obtained the possibility, rare for an African in the Republic of South Africa, of finishing a university and of becoming a lawyer. While still a student, he became active in the progressive movement. During the forties he was one of the leaders of the Youth League of the African National Congress, the largest anti-racist, democratic organization established back in 1912. All the subsequent political efforts of the young lawyer were associated with the African National Congress where he became the closest associate of Albert Lituli, chairman of the Congress.

Together with Oliver Tambo, the present chairman of the African National Congress, Mandela opened a law office in Johannesburg to defend the rights of Africans. He headed many important mass campaigns in the fight against a variety of refined forms of discrimination and the humiliation of the people of the Republic of South Africa. Mandela always considered the struggle for the unification of anti-racist and democratic forces to be one of his principal objectives. He always acted against attempts to drive a wedge between workers of different races and tribes and set them up against each other.

While in the underground and pursued by the police, Mandela addressed an open letter to all the citizens of the Republic of South Africa, calling upon them to stand up to the racist system of oppression and violence. "I made a choice," he wrote, "I will not leave South Africa, and I have no intention of giving in to the racists. Freedom can be attained only through difficulties, sacrifices and decisive struggle. I will fight for freedom to the end of my days." And he has remained true to this vow.

Mandela came to the attention of the South African police already twenty-five years ago. Since then his life has been a continuous series of arrests, trials, banishments, and imprisonments. He was tried in 1956, 1962, 1963-1964. During his last trial in Rivoni, the prosecuting attorney demanded a death penalty and the judges sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Before being sentenced, Nelson Mandela ended his last speech with the following words: "Our struggle is the struggle of the African people against its suffering and its way of life. This is a struggle for the right to life. I dream of a democratic and free society in which all peoples

live peacefully and have equal opportunities. For the sake of this ideal society I intend to go on living. But if necessary I am also ready to die for my ideals."

Fourteen terrible years in a racist prison did not break the spirit of this powerful man. The infrequent bits of information arriving from the island-prison speak of his exceptional fortitude and courage. He and his friends refuse to ask for indulgence from Forster's clique and behave with honor and dignity under the difficult conditions of a hard-labor prison, helping each other. Mandela's, Sisulu's, Mbeki's spirit and that of the other political prisoners has not been broken.

The example of Africa's heroic son, a legendary figure, encourages more and more people in South Africa to fight for freedom and justice. The anniversary of his sixtieth birthday has coincided with the International Year of the Struggle Against Apartheid sponsored by the United Nations. The world democratic public demands that Nelson Mandela and other prisoners of the racist regime be freed.

V. Korovikov

[Source: Pravda, July 18, 1978, p. 5, col. 6]

AFRICA'S COMMON CAUSE (Commentator's Column)

On July 18 several countries and governments -- members of the Organization of African Unity -- will begin attending an assembly in Khartoum. The African leaders will discuss a series of important and difficult problems associated with the Continent's further progress on the road to independence.

The Assembly of the Organization of African Unity will be taking place at a time when Africa is going through a complex period in its history. On the one hand, the liberation movement on the Continent is growing and the efforts to liquidate all vestiges of colonialism and racism and eliminate apartheid and neocolonialism are expanding. On the other hand, imperialism has recently sharply increased its interference in African affairs and neocolonialist intrigues have further complicated inter-African relations.

The Organization of African Unity came into being and developed during the past fifteen years, spurred on by anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It was specifically this that was responsible for its success in uniting

the African countries and in establishing cooperation and good neighborly relations between them. Under the present conditions, Africa's common cause is still the organization of opposition to imperialist attempts to infringe on the political independence of its peoples and the neocolonialist attempts to enslave the Continent; this movement is gaining in importance.

At a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, which took place on the eve of the Khartoum assembly and which prepared the Assembly's agenda, strong accusations were levelled against imperialism. The armed intervention of the Western powers was harshly criticized -- that of NATO powers into African affairs. Speaking at the meeting, the foreign ministers of several countries pointed to the danger arising from the creation of so-called "inter-African forces," a tool of colonialism, by NATO. Members of the meeting exposed the West's support of racist regimes in southern Africa which threaten the independence and freedom of African peoples.

The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist block have always supported the desire of the African countries for union, helping them indeed to defend their independence. This real solidarity was recently highly praised by many leaders of free Africa and given approval in several speeches at the Organization of African Unity.

Africa is an enormous continent whose differences in living conditions and development are being exploited by imperialism in order to divide the African peoples and to sow discord among them. Therefore, the defense of African unity and its reinforcement is extremely important to its advancement on the road to independence and progress.

Aleksandr Serbin

Translated by
R. Sheila Penners
CRS - Language Services
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NAMIBIA'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

A. GALYBIN

More than a decade ago, the patriots of Namibia (former South West Africa), illegally occupied by the Republic of South Africa, launched an armed struggle for the freedom and independence of their country. Despite the desperate attempts of the South African racists, who have the active backing of international imperialism, to preserve their rule over Namibia, her people are resolved to carry on their struggle to a victorious end.

The people of Namibia fell into colonial and racial bondage late in the 19th century when their country became an object of inter-imperialist contention and colonial rivalries among European powers, and was proclaimed a protectorate of Kaiser Germany. During the First World War Namibia was invaded by the Union of South Africa, a British dominion. When the imperialists divided the German colonies under the Treaty of Versailles, the South African Government succeeded in gaining the right to administer the country temporarily, under a League of Nations mandate, as a so-called sacred mission of civilisation.

The discovery of vast diamond deposits on the Atlantic coast and unique deposits of non-ferrous and rare metals in the mountains of Otavi, in Tsumeb, proved a veritable scourge to the people of Namibia. Using forced and almost free Namibian labour, British and German mining companies began the predacious exploitation of the country's mineral wealth to extract bumper profits.

After the Second World War, upon the dissolution of the League of Nations and the lapse of the mandate system, Namibia was to pass, like other non-selfgoverning territories, under the UN trusteeship system. However, the South African Government defied the UN Charter and set about preparing plans for the final incorporation of the former mandated territory with open support from Britain and the US diplomatists. It is interesting to recall that the first UN draft resolution on Namibia at its first session was prepared by John Foster Dulles, a leading proponent of the cold war, who was American Ambassador to the United Nations. Under Dulles's proposal, which was adopted due to the UN "voting machine" that was at the time a docile tool of the United States, Namibia was left indefinitely with the then obsolete status of a mandated territory of the League of Nations. The same ruling was handed down, under US pressure, by the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 1950.

In the postwar period, the imperialist scramble for the fabulous mineral riches of Namibia was marked by the sweeping invasion of Africa by US monopoly capital, to which the South African Government conceded, on easy terms, the ownership of the Tsumeb non-ferrous and rare metal deposit confiscated from the German companies. That was in payment for the American diplomatic support at the United Nations. Since then, the American monopolies, along with their British partner-rivals, have been chiefly responsible for the plunder of Namibia's minerals and the savage exploitation of cheap African labour. The US monopolies also have considerable interests in the Republic of South Africa itself. American investments in the RSA and Namibia now total more than $2,000 mln.

No wonder then that each time the question is raised of granting Namibia her legitimate right to national independence, the US resorts to demagogy, political manoeuvres and diplomatic trickery to preserve and consolidate South African domination in the country and impede the liberation of the Namibian people.

The colonial regime in Namibia was from the outset extremely brutal and racist in its methods. The German, and later the South African oppressors took the best lands from the Namibians and drove them into arid reservations, turning the scattered "black spots" of forced African settlements into police regions of the concentration and reproduction of cheap labour for the highly profitable colonial economy. Under the present racist legislation in the country, and in full accord with the theories and practices of apartheid, Namibians, like all Africans in the RSA, are segregated, are required to be registered with a reservation or Bantustan, and are treated as "alien citizens" in the places inhabited by other ethnic groups—Europeans, "coloureds", Asians, Africans and other tribal groups.

Poverty and cruel exploitation, the absence of political and civil rights, police repressions and punitive acts left Namibians no option but to take up arms.

The Namibians first began the struggle for independence early in this century, when the Nama and Herero tribes in the southern and central parts of Namibia tried to drive the German colonialists out of their land. The uprising was brutally suppressed. After the occupation by South Africa, the Namibians repeatedly rose in armed resistance but were defeated because they lacked unity while the invaders had artillery, armoured cars and aircraft.

The mounting wave of the national liberation struggle in Africa after the Second World War gradually spread to Namibia. Initially, the Namibians' hopes for liberation were pinned on the UN's trusteeship system. They sent petitions to the UN exposing the lies of the South African invaders who claimed that the indigenous population agreed to their country being added to the British dominion as a "fifth province". They demanded the application to Namibia of the trusteeship provisions of the UN Charter, and, after 1960, of the widely approved Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

In 1960, amid colonial-racist oppression and police terror, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) came into being. This broad-based politicalorganisation became the spearhead of the patriotic forces. SWAPO undertook to combine nonviolent methods with armed struggle. At its 1962 conference it proclaimed that the peaceful and armed forms of struggle should be mutually complementary and not mutually exclusive. The conference decided to set up a People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and introduced a military-training programme for patriots. Shortly afterwards, the first guerrilla base was set up and small mobile units were formed. The Namibian patriots launched military operations against the South African occupationists on August 26, 1966. Namibia thus became part of the common national liberation front in southern Africa.

In the early 1970s the Namibian 'patriots' armed struggle began to merge with the mounting strike movement of the African workers against crippling and discriminatory terms of employment, wretched labour conditions, paltry wages and poverty, as well as with the conscious political boycott by the bulk of the native population of the puppet self-government bodies, imposed by the South African authorities.

A powerful impetus to the national liberation struggle in Namibia was given by the general strike of African workers in 1971-1972, which paralysed the country's colonial economy. The South African regime committed

a wide range of means of suppression to deal with workers' unrest—mass arrests, torture and executions without trial.

The South African racists' reprisals against the Namibian workers who took part in the general strike caused a world-wide wave of protest. The independent African states demanded an emergency meeting of the Security Council. A visiting session of the Council was held in the Ethiopian capital in February 1972 and unanimously demanded that the South African Government stop illegal occupation of Namibia and withdraw its troops, police and civilian personnel from Namibia within six months. That important resolution of the Security Council, as all subsequent resolutions on Namibia, have not been implemented. The South African Government actually ignored them, alleging that Namibians were not ready for independence because they lacked the necessary political and administrative experience for independent statehood. Simultaneously it pledged readiness to cooperate with the UN in fostering the political development of the people of Namibia and proposed a "dialogue" as a concrete measure. However, the subsequent course of events has shown that the South African Government was just playing for time in order to put through its "Bantustan" programme in Namibia. To this end, it set up a Consultative Council of subservient tribal chiefs and headmen to prepare a farce of elections for puppet self-government bodies in Ovamboland (Northern Namibia).

"We reject any Council," wrote the patriots of Namibia to the United Nations with reference to the setting up of the Consultative Council. And the citizens of Ovamboland said "No" during the elections to local self-government bodies. This put paid to Pretoria's argument that the Namibians were politically immature and made irrelevant the "dialogue" between the UN and the South African Government about the future of the Namibian people.

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the last in Africa, the victories scored by the patriots of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau gave a fresh impetus to the freedom struggle of the Namibians, and confronted the South African racists with a new reality. Feverishly casting about for new political methods and diplomatic manoeuvres to meet the situation and hoodwink the independent African states and all enemies of apartheid, and to preserve its hold on Namibia, Pretoria decided to give a face-lifting to its policy of colonial and racial oppression of the Africans. To this end token relaxation of the apartheid regime was introduced in Namibia and inside South Africa. For example, wealthy Africans from amongst the tribal chiefs and elders were allowed to use the same coffee and beer houses as whites.

At the same time, there was much talk about the South African Government's intention to start an "internal dialogue" with the "genuine representatives" of the native population and even hold a conference with them on the country's future constitutional set-up based on the "Bantustan" policy and the revival of tribalism. Some freedom of political activity was allowed to the local splitters and collaborators who advocated division of Namibia by the ethnic principle. The more influential of them were allowed to make trips abroad and their collaborationist statements were seized upon and widely publicised by the reactionary press and official government bodies in South Africa. Meanwhile, thousands of Namibians suspected of sympathy or affiliation with SWAPO were driven out of urban and industrial areas into reservations, many patriots were arrested and subjected to electric shock torture and flogging, with some disappearing without trace. Any attempts at open protest by Namibians were brutally crushed by force of arms.

Carrying on its uncompromising struggle for national freedom and unconditional preservation of Namibia's territorial integrity, the SWAPO

delegation at the sittings of the UN Security Council held from May 30 to June 6, 1975, asked the Council to impose economic sanctions against South Africa and consider the question of expelling the racist state from the United Nations. Deeply concerned over South Africa's clear intention to "liquidate the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia", a group of developing countries that are non-permanent members of the Security Council proposed that internationally inspected free elections be held in Namibia not later than July 1, 1976. Reaffirming their support for the Namibian struggle for self-determination and independence, these countries demanded that no state should supply any arms or ammunition to South Africa. However, the leading NATO powers, guided by their long-term imperialist plans, openly sided with the South African racists and blocked the resolution.

In September 1975 the South African Government, bent on early Bantustanisation of Namibia, staged a "constitutional conference" in Windhoek, attended by much ostentatious display. The participants in the conference, handpicked and controlled by the racist regime, were presented with a Declaration of Intent drawn up in Pretoria. Under the document, a "constitution" was to be drawn up within three years which, it was stressed, would take into account the "tribal conditions" in the country and guarantee every ethnic group the broadest opportunities to defend its own and national interests. The Declaration took for granted that the indigenous population of Namibia unanimously supported South Africa's long-cherished plans of partitioning the country. And yet Pretoria is aware that the tribal chiefs in Namibia no longer wield the traditional power and that there is no traditional African society as a conglomerate of separate tribes and tribal groups living on their home lands. This structure has been destroyed by the colonialists and racists.

SWAPO proceeded from a deep understanding of this important circumstance when, on the eve of the "constitutional conference" of local puppets and their South African masters, it submitted for wide discussion its proposals about the basic provisions of the future Namibian constitution. According to SWAPO, the government and social set-up in a liberated Namibia would be based on the promulgation of a republic in a single and indivisible Namibia, the provision of political rights and civil liberties for all national minorities, including the European settlers, the establishment of a "rational system of local self-government" that would be a political antipode to the racist principle of "national regionalism", which means division of the Namibian people into long-outdated tribal communities and, finally, complete eradication of all the evils of racism, in the first place racial intolerance and racial discrimination. Special emphasis was laid on SWAPO's commitment to have a democratic constitution drawn up by genuine representatives of the Namibian people elected by free and universal ballot.

The SWAPO-led patriots of Namibia combine skilfully and to great effect armed and nonviolent struggle for national freedom. There is a growing strike movement among Namibian workers, the citizens hold protest meetings and demonstrations, boycott the puppet self-government bodies in the Bantustans, reservations and locations, subject to principled criticism the splitting and collaborationist trends in the national liberation movement, deny the "constitutional" functions of the so-called Consultative Council. A massive campaign is being conducted through written and spoken media to educate and organise Namibian workers, peasants, students and intelligentsia.

Ten years ago, when the Namibian patriots started armed struggle, they set up guerrilla bases to stage sabotage acts against the enemy military installations and bases. Now they have a well-trained People's Liberation Army of Namibia which engages South African police and

regular troops in major battles with the use of modern weapons and the experience of guerrilla warfare in the former Portuguese colonies.

There is no doubt that the successes scored by the patriotic forces of Namibia would have been far greater, if it were not for the interference of the forces of world imperialism, above all American, in the affairs of the African peoples. The United States has been rendering allround aid to the Pretoria regime, thereby encouraging it to go ahead with the unlawful occupation of Namibia, bringing pressure to bear on the independent countries of the continent to make them give up their support for the freedom struggle waged by the African peoples, including Namibians, and now it is trying to turn the course of events so that Namibia and Zimbabwe would be ruled by puppet regimes. In a word, US imperialism acts as a citadel for all reactionaries in Africa, as a force blocking a complete liberation of Africa from the fetters of colonialism and racism.

Among the recent highlights of the national liberation movement in Namibia were the National Congress of SWAPO held secretly in Walvis Bay (Namibia) late in May this year, and the enlarged meeting of the SWAPO Central Committee held in Lusaka (Zambia) in late July and early August. The resolutions and documents adopted by the SWAPO Congress and Central Committee provide a well-grounded analysis of the present political situation in Namibia, expose the imperialistic nature of the current political manoeuvres of the Pretoria regime, both at home and on the international scene, condemn the connivance of the leading NATO powers at, and their aid to, the South African racists, stress SWAPO's dedication to the struggle for an indivisible and independent Namibia and its confidence in final victory over the occupationists and oppressors, given growing international support.

The Vorster regime, emphasises the SWAPO Central Committee in its Declaration, is committed to the continued illegal occupation, exploitation, and plunder of Namibia. In particular, danger stems from the expanding nuclear cooperation between racist South Africa and the imperialist powers and their multinational corporations. The Central Committee of SWAPO vigorously condemns South Africa's policy of militarisation and Bantustanisation of Namibia and its use as a springboard of aggression against the neighbouring countries, in the first place Zambia and Angola.

Proceeding from the internationalist tasks of developing the national liberation revolutions, the Central Committee calls on all the peace-loving progressive forces to unite their efforts in order to fully reveal the imperialistic character of the nuclear cooperation agreement and other accords between the South African racists, on the one hand, and the FRG, France, the USA, Great Britain, and Japan, on the other. SWAPO rejects all the political manoeuvres of the South African racists and their agents conceived at the "constitutional" talks in Windhoek in order to saddle Namibia with a puppet neocolonialist regime. Genuine change in the country can only be effected by SWAPO, which enjoys wide support in and outside the country and is the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, its "legitimate government in the process of formation." In the concluding part of its Declaration, the Central Committee of SWAPO appeals to the Namibian patriots to cement their unity, be increasingly on their guard and intensify their action on all fronts of the liberation struggle.

The political programme adopted by the CC SWAPO at its Lusaka meeting restates with full responsibility that the Namibian patriots are far from discounting peaceful methods of liberating the country, and are prepared to have bilateral talks with the South African Government at any time, if a number of preliminary conditions are met: recognition of the right of the Namibian people to independence and national sovereignty,

the country's territorial integrity, the release of all political prisoners, return of exiled Namibians and withdrawal from Namibia of all troops and police.

This peaceful and constructive proposal of SWAPO remains standing. Accepting it could provide for the South African Government the sole reasonable way out of the impasse over the question of Namibia, whose people are resolved to put an end to the regime of colonial oppression and race discrimination. Failing that, the Namibian patriots are determined to fight for their country's independence. Addressing the 25th Congress of the CPSU Moses Garoeb, Member of the National Executive and Administrative Secretary of SWAPO, said the people of Namibia had taken up arms to gain their freedom. It gives the Namibian people joy and satisfaction to see that their liberation struggle has the permanent and all-round moral, political and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet stand on Namibia strengthens the position of the patriotic forces there and brings closer the day of its liberation. After the Second World War the Soviet Union put forward a just and well-grounded demand that temporary solution of the question of the former League of Nations' mandated territory—pending the right to national self-determination and independence—could only be found under the UN Charter, which obliged the South African Government to place Namibia under the international trusteeship system without delay to ensure strict control over the way it is administered. Subsequently, the Soviet Union consistently supported unconditional application to Namibia of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and repeatedly called to abandon the method of pursuasion with regard to South African racists and their imperialist masters in favour of practical measures to liberate Namibia. In doing so, the Soviet Union stressed that these measures could only be effective if used directly against South Africa as a racist and fascist state as a whole. For their part, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries maintain no relations with the colonial-racist regime of South Africa, advocate its complete international isolation, an embargo on arms sales to Pretoria obligatory for all countries and at the same time are committed to rendering all kinds of assistance to the fighting people of Namibia.

Recently the Soviet Union played host to a SWAPO delegation. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, who led the delegation, expressed deep appreciation to the Soviet Union for its constant aid and support of the Namibian patriots and all African fighters against colonialism and racism. Sam Nujoma told the spokesmen for the Soviet public that of late the South African racists had been feverishly working to set up a puppet "provisional government" in Namibia and rushing through their Bantustanisation policy, which means division of the country into several pseudo-states, the Bantustans. In these conditions, the Namibian patriots, lead by SWAPO—the sole legitimate and widely recognised representative of the Namibian people—are mounting an active struggle to prevent the division of the country and foil the designs of the South African racists.

The Soviet Union has always sided with the fighting peoples of southern Africa, it comes out against any attempts of imperialists and racists to maintain their rule in that region through direct violence or political manoeuvring. "We are firmly convinced," said Leonid Brezhnev, "that the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia should be solved by the peoples of those countries independently. The developments in Africa over the past years confirm that only in this way can such problems be solved in a correct and just way, truly in the interests of the peoples themselves."

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EXHIBIT U

Workers of all countries, unite!

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African panorama

THE SOUTHERN PIVOT OF THE STRUGGLE

The *WMR* has interviewed the presidents of the national-liberation organizations of three countries of Southern Africa — *Oliver Tambo*, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), *Sam Nujoma*, South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO — Namibia), and *Joshua Nkomo*, Zimbabwe African's People Union (ZAPU). They described the changes in the general situation in their countries since the summer of 1976 marked, particularly in South Africa, by the notable events in Soweto,[1] and stressed that their peoples' struggle today has risen to a new level and entered a crucial stage. Tambo, Nujoma and Nkomo also answered our correspondent's questions.

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER SOWETO

Oliver Tambo
President, African National Congress of South Africa

The events in Soweto and other parts of South Africa have become a significant milestone in the development of the liberation struggle. To assess these events and their impact on the future of our movement we must first consider them as one of the manifestations of the new revolutionary level to which the confrontation with imperialism has risen not only in South Africa itself, but in Southern Africa as a whole.

For the liberation movement in South Africa, in addition to the armed and unarmed struggle led by the African National Congress, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism has been of decisive importance. This applied particularly to Mozambique's winning of independence, the emergence of an independent progressive state directly on the South African border, and the victory of the MPLA in Angola over the aggressive forces of the South African regime. This victory had a tremendous mobilizing impact on the masses in South Africa. In the same period the national-liberation movements of Zimbabwe and Namibia, which are waging an armed struggle for independence, have increased their striking power and are bringing ever greater pressure to bear on the racist forces of Smith and Vorster.

The events in Soweto and other areas fit into the context of this

new stage that has arrived for the national-liberation movement in Southern Africa, and correspond to its demands. It may be claimed that since Soweto our struggle in South Africa has been at par with other countries of Southern Africa that have not yet freed themselves. It should be noted that the number of fighters who have perished in our country in clashes with the regime in the 18 months since the Soweto events is approximately equal to the number of guerrillas who died the death of the brave in the same period in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Our struggle has developed in two basic directions. The main one is mobilization of the masses, workers, peasants and young people. The other is stepping up of armed action. In South Africa in 1977 mass action with workers and young people participating was combined with actions by the military formations of the African National Congress, and both types of action were obviously coordinated in time. This demonstrates, on the one hand, the support of the masses for the armed struggle that is needed to bring ultimate victory, and on the other, the reliance of our underground organizations on the support of the mass of the people.

For many years the Vorster regime tried to prevent such coordination, such an alliance, resorting to various repressive measures, imposing long terms of imprisonment without trial, to assassinations and shootings, the victims of which were often young people. However, the scale and intensity of the struggle grew inexorably. In the autumn of 1977 the Vorster regime was confronted for several weeks by a mounting popular offensive. Realizing that the activities of the masses confronting the government were getting out of hand, Vorster imposed additional restrictions. He banned a number of moderate organizations and newspapers, prohibited the political and social activity of certain individuals, and later arrested some of them. Vorster must have known, of course, that such actions were bound to evoke the condemnation of international opinion, further isolate the regime, and force even the imperialist powers, verbally at least, to dissociate themselves from him.

But declaring political and other public organizations illegal means forcing them to go underground and leaving them no alternative but to take up arms against the Vorster regime. So intensified repression leads to intensification of the struggle, which in its turn evokes even more brutal repression. Despite all this, however, we still regard such a situation on the whole as a positive factor: the enemy is in considerable disarray. There are increasing opportunities for stepping up the struggle at all levels and in all spheres. More and more people are being drawn into it. A radical change is occurring in the people's mood in South Africa.

The ANC now has to put all its weight into maintaining the momentum of the struggle, the offensive against the regime. Armed action must be intensified, blows must be struck at the enemy from every possible direction. In this connection it must be stressed that we attach the greatest importance to international support, particularly in the form of material aid.

Although the situation favors us, the enemy is far from beaten. In South Africa vigorous attempts are being made to divide and weaken the forces that are working for revolutionary change. For instance, for the first time in the history of exploitation of an indigenous population the ruling regime is encouraging and is building up a black bourgeoisie, both in the rural areas, where the so-called bantustans[2] have been set up, and in the cities. This is nothing less than an attempt to create a 'shock-absorber' for the blows that the working class strikes against the capitalist system in South Africa.

The bantustan system, as we know, is calculated to divide the oppressed and exploited masses, who are forced into economically and politically weak ethnic formations, the idea being to facilitate exploitation of the whole people, with the 'independent governments' of the bantustans acting as its direct instruments.

Pursuing the same aims of splitting the exploited masses, the regime of the white minority is planning to create separate 'parliaments' (inferior and helpless, of course) for South Africans of Indian origin and 'colored people' (mixed blood). But to carry out these plans, Vorster needs time.[3] His imperialist supporters also need time to adapt to the changes caused by the rapidly developing revolutionary offensive in South Africa. This is one more reason why the African National Congress regards the intensification of the struggle as an absolute necessity at the present stage.

The ANC is also quite certain that the revolutionary movement in Zimbabwe and Namibia will press forward with the offensive against the racist forces and in the near future lead the peoples of these countries to final victory. And this is yet another factor contributing to our confidence in the ultimate triumph of our people's struggle for liberation.

Q. Couldn't the plan for setting up 'parliaments' for the Indians and Coloreds mislead the people belonging to these communities?

A. Of course, even among the exploited and oppressed there are traitors. Of course, even among the Indians and the Coloreds one can find people ready to collaborate with the enemy for personal gain, who will support Vorster's policy of perpetuating the enslavement of their peoples. Others, perhaps, may think, this is better than nothing at all.

However, people representative even of these Indians and Col-

oreds of South Africa who are working 'within the system' — I am not referring at the moment to participants in the revolutionary movement — cannot remain indifferent to the problems of their peoples and the revolutionary currents in their country. And they have already rejected Vorster's plan. They say quite rightly that it would perpetuate the domination of the white minority and help to stiffen racist policy. Vorster's plan is designed to separate, to isolate the Indians and Coloreds from the majority of the population. This would naturally put them at the service of the racist minority.

I am sure that the racist and imperialist puppets will agree with the Vorster plan, but the mass of the population will not. All the organizations representing Indians and Coloreds are exposing this plan. It is being fought not only by the ANC, but also, for example, by the Coloured Labour Party, which operates legally. Coloreds and Indians are taking part in the national-liberation and working-class movement of our country. Their opposition to racist policies is obvious. They are against any and every kind of ethnic and racist 'state' formations.

Q. What about the granting of so-called 'independence' to the bantustans?

A. Well, what is meant by 'independence' of the bantustans? It means privileges for a few — big houses, cars, and so on. But such 'independences' gives the masses nothing. The people who live in the bantustans are usually unemployed and with a very few exceptions are unable to find work locally. They have to go to the cities, which belong to the white minority. But even there they are often unable to find a job and, if they do, the conditions amount to semi-slavery. The bantustans cannot help the people living in them to overcome poverty, give them an education, and meet their other needs. On the contrary, in formally becoming 'citizens of independent states,' the people in the bantustans lose all rights in South Africa — their citizenship, right to travel, and so on. They are subjected to new, unprecedented restrictions. They are herded together in quite small territories, whereas before they were at least able to travel anywhere in the country. The 'citizens' of Transkei, for example, are severely restricted beyond the Transkei borders, which means throughout the rest of South Africa.

But there is another important side to this situation. The policy of worker migration pursued by the South African regime means that every year thousands of Africans are driven out of the cities into rural areas, while thousands more are forced into the cities. So the rural areas are being steadily enriched with the political experience of proletarian struggle. Today the Africans living in rural areas have become semi-proletarianized. They actively oppose the bantustan

system and this is a significant factor in the development of the revolutionary struggle in our country.

Q. A lot is said in so-called liberal circles about the 'moderate leaders' of the Black population, who could help to reduce the tension, act as a safety valve, so to speak.

A. They are yet another shock-absorber that the regime is trying to create. But they have thought of it too late. The 'moderate leaders' will be swept off their feet by the mighty tide of revolution, and this is already happening. On the other hand, some of the moderate leaders who had been so highly praised by the South African liberals were arrested in the autumn of 1977 because, in the view of the regime, they could not be moderate enough in the present situation.

In general, South African liberalism is in crisis. It has lost its self-given mandate to speak for the oppressed and exploited masses. Today they speak for themselves, by their actions and often at the cost of their lives. And the politicians who want to build their careers on 'defense of the grievances of the oppressed,' now find themselves out of a job. Hence the confusion in the ranks of the South African 'reformists,' the disappearance of one of their parties and the formation of new parties that are also doomed to split and disappear. Amid the working people's mounting struggle for national and social liberation, the contradictions in the ranks of the exploiters become even more acute.

Q. The press in the imperialist countries writes a lot about South African businessmen who because of their need for a steady flow of new manpower have an interest in some relaxation of apartheid and might bring pressure to bear on the government. What is your view on this point?

A. The hopes of the so-called liberal South African businessmen are pinned on certain minor reforms that could, so they believe, help to put things right and lift some of the restrictions of apartheid. They think that this would satisfy the people enough to hold back the revolution. But it is unrealistic today to imagine that the actions in Soweto were intended to achieve only partial improvements and reforms in minor matters. If this were so, it would have been all over in one day, after the first shooting. But the staunchness, the unbending will shown by the people proves that they are fighting for complete liberation, and not against 'petty-apartheid,' not for 'pleasant exploitation,' but against all exploitation of man by man.

The social content of the national-liberation movement in South Africa has now come much more clearly to the fore, because the regime's racist policy means that the most exploited are those who are most oppressed in the national sense. This is what has determined the social content of our national-liberation struggle.

Q. The murder of Steve Biko[4] and the banning of a number of moderate organizations in South Africa was followed by a big uproar in the press of the imperialist powers and some government leaders spoke out against the regime. Does this signify any real change in their attitude toward Vorster?

A. The growing power of world progressive opinion, which opposes racism and supports the struggle for national liberation, tends to isolate the imperialist powers that are helping the Vorster regime. Their role as accomplices in the racist crimes against the peoples of South Africa is becoming increasingly clear. World opinion is concentrating the fire of its criticism on these powers as the force that is behind the executions in Soweto and other crimes of the Vorster regime. The masses of the people in these countries do not want to see their governments on the side of the regimes of the white minority.

Even the argument that South Africa must be defended as an anti-communist bastion does not hold water nowadays, although the South African regime clings to it for lack of anything better. The South African racists have sung the anti-communist tune for a quarter of a century and are still singing it. But in the present situation there is hardly anyone anywhere who takes it seriously.

These factors compel the governments of the imperialist powers to present matters as if they are siding with world opinion with regard to the South African regime. So the protests against the murder of Steve Biko and other repressive measures do to some extent express the feelings of ordinary people in these countries, which are similar to those of ordinary people the world over. And this is certainly a sign of the growing power and influence of the progressive forces on the world scene.

And there is another aspect to all this. Imperialism today is incapable of crushing the revolution by force, as it did in the past. But it is trying to control and contain it. And if imperialism starts speaking the 'language of liberation,' some see this as a 'change of flag.' But experience has shown that one can attack apartheid in the fiercest terms and call it a crime against humanity — and still give it military, economic and political support. So the loud protests that we have been hearing lately from a number of government leaders in the imperialist countries do not necessarily mean the end of these countries' support of the racist regime in South Africa.

NAMIBIA AT THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE

Sam Nujoma
President, South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Namibia

Political developments in Namibia have reached a crucial stage. This is evident, first of all, in the intrigues and maneuvers to which South Africa's racist and fascist regime resorts, with support from the principal imperialist states, to save the situation. Another factor is the growing struggle in Zimbabwe and South Africa inasmuch as the fight for a free Namibia cannot be isolated from the liberation struggle of our brothers and sisters in the other countries of Southern Africa. The racist regimes, for their part, invariably back one another. In Zimbabwe, the Smith regime has been able to defy the people for so long only because it has always been aided economically, politically and militarily by South Africa.

The imperialist powers support the Vorster regime's maneuvers and intrigues in their own economic and strategic interests. Namibia has a coastline about 1,000 miles long, which is of strategic significance and is washed by waters rich in fish. Its inland areas abound in diamonds, uranium and other minerals. All this is exploited by transnational corporations belonging to imperialist powers. They therefore help the Vorster regime as best they can, in particular by supplying it with arms and ammunition. France, for one, is the main supplier of arms for South Africa, which it has provided with helicopters of various types, Mirage fighters and submarines. Other imperialist powers do the same.[5]

The imperialist powers which supply Vorster with arms assert that they do so to enable South Africa to defend itself against 'attack from without.' Yet Namibia's experience shows that the helicopters and fighters obtained by the Vorster regime are used, not for defense against the mythical 'attack,' but against the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military arm of SWAPO, that is, for putting down a popular movement which demands self-determination and independence for our country.

At this crucial hour SWAPO, a national-liberation movement, has no alternative but to step up its struggle. Faced with a fascist regime like Vorster's, which is backed by imperialist allies, we must use armed force as the only dependable way of ending the illegal occupation of our country.

The liberation struggle in Southern Africa was crowned not long ago with victories for the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. This changed the geopolitical situation in our region and provided more favorable conditions for the liberation effort in countries still oppres-

sed by racist regimes. The primary task if we want to effectively combat colonialism, fascism and racism is to break the backbone of its main force, the Vorster regime.

For as long as Angola and Mozambique remained under Portuguese colonial rule, the Caetano regime put them at South Africa's service to fight against liberation movements in other countries of Southern Africa. South Africa seemed to be the continent's most powerful military might unchallenged by anyone. The point is, however, that it used the two territories as buffer zones against the tidal wave of the liberation struggle. By now this wave has swept to the frontiers of South Africa itself and this has changed the situation in both Namibia and Zimbabwe. SWAPO's courageous guerrillas daily win new victories over the enemy. Our brothers in Zimbabwe, in turn, are intensifying their struggle. The South African regime, driven by despair and fear, is becoming more and more violent. It realizes that it is directly threatened with liquidation.

In Namibia, too, the Vorster regime is stepping up repression. Thousands of people are moved at gunpoint from their home villages, especially those skirting the Angolan frontier, to places that are called 'fortified villages' but are nothing short of concentration camps. Namibia is still under a state of emergency reinforced by martial law. Under this law even new South African recruits are allowed to open fire and kill anyone they suspect of being 'terrorists' or concealing the whereabouts of 'terrorists.'

But we are now in a position to strike back. SWAPO guerrillas are operating in the northwest, north and east of the country. And we are extending our operations to the central and southern parts. Racists have also been attacked in Windhoek, the capital, and vicinity, as well as in Grootfontein, Tsumeb and other cities.

Our party, SWAPO, enjoys popularity all over the country. There is no denying, of course, that certain elements, mostly tribal chiefs, were misled or bribed by the South African regime. They were inveigled into attending the deceptive Constitutinal Conference in Windhoek. However, many of the misled have since stopped backing the 'conference' and joined SWAPO. They have come to realize that there are only two opposed forces in Namibia: SWAPO and SWAPO-led PLAN, which are fighting for national independence and an end to South African colonialism, and South Africa's racist regime, which wants to preserve its colonial domination and perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the Namibian people.

We are certain, therefore, that we will achieve final victory very soon with the support of primarily the socialist countries, African states and progressives the world over.

Q. But the Vorster regime affirms that the SWAPO-led armed

struggle in Namibia is restricted to a small area known as Caprivi Strip.

A. In 1966, when we started our armed struggle, we did confine our operations to the Caprivi Strip adjoining the frontier of Zambia, then the only independent African state neighboring on Namibia. This is why South Africa kept sizable forces in the Caprivi Strip. We, however, used it to infiltrate our forces into Namibia and supply our forces operating there. The fact is that at the time neighboring Angola was still dominated by the Portuguese colonialists, who made common cause with the South African regime and were backed by it. This made the situation anything but easy although we had cooperated with the MPLA in the past as well, using its bases and positions in Angola to a certain extent. But now that Angola has won independence, we are able to operate deep inland and to score gains.

The political consciousness of the Namibian people is growing. PLAN is joined by young people — students, workers, peasants. When, in 1966, the armed struggle began we had no more than platoons at our disposal, but now we have battalions. Our army's fire power has increased and the racists are finding it harder and harder to counter us. This is acknowledged even by the official press. The *Windhoek Advertiser* carried the story of a South African army commander who had served in the Kantimamuri camp, in the north of the Caprivi Strip. That big land and air base of the South African army had been attacked by PLAN units using up-to-date guns and bazookas.

We are resolved to carry on our armed struggle until our country is completely free from the forces of fascism, oppression and capitalism. We see this as the only road to the formation in Namibia of a revolutionary government based on scientific socialism.

Q. How would you comment on the talks which the ambassadors of five imperialist powers[6] have been having with Vorster on a peaceful solution of the Namibian problem?

A. In the late 50s, when SWAPO was formed, we began to organize strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and other actions. We appealed to the common sense of our South African oppressors in an attempt to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to our people. But or peace initiative proved fruitless and was, indeed, countered with armed force.

In 1959 we carried out a boycott and strike campaign in protest against the forcible removal of Africans from an old township of Windhoek to a new settlement built in line with the apartheid policy and separated from the homes of whites by a buffer zone 500 to 1,000 yards wide. We organized a peaceful demonstration but the South African police sent tanks against the demonstrators and opened fire.

Twelve persons were killed and numerous others wounded. Nor was that a unique incident. As there was no hope of settling the problem by negotiation SWAPO formed a military organization to free the country.

The imperialists and Vorster now realize that Africa's peoples, in particular the people of Namibia, are determined to fight to total victory. So they are trying to confuse people by alleging that they favor peace talks and want no 'racist bloodshed' in southern Africa, including Namibia. It is indicative, however, that the same powers simultaneously block the adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa by the Security Council.

What peaceful means of solving the problem can there be in these circumstances? They do exist, of course; they are envisaged by the UN Charter, in particular Chapter VII and Articles 39, 41 and 42.[7] However, the imperialist powers in question have nullified the opportunities provided by the Charter.

It is our opinion that diplomatic and political activity is supplementary and complementary to military operations. We consider that the basic form of action for the liberation of Namibia should be armed struggle. However, we will continue to take part whenever possible in various diplomatic and political struggles. This is precisely why SWAPO has agreed to the main imperialist powers searching for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. We favor such a settlement. But we consider that it should be conditional on the withdrawal of all South African occupation forces from Namibia. In the meantime we will carry on our armed struggle along with our political and diplomatic activity to isolate the South African racists and free our country.

There can be no doubt about the necessity for diplomatic and political activity. For instance, the South African regime cannot at the moment take part in the deliberations of the UN General Assembly because the credentials committee concerned refuses to recognize that regime's credentials. SWAPO has an observer status at plenary meetings of the General Assembly. This means that we can speak out and present the case of Namibia's oppressed people to world opinion.

All this is important, of course. However, the main thing is still armed struggle and we are set on continuing it, just as the Namibian people are set, we are sure, on overcoming difficulties and making still greater sacrifices to eliminate South Africa's colonial rule in our country and achieve genuine independence in democratic conditions.

Q. But the imperialist press has claimed that the plan adopted by the Windhoek Constitutional Conference and flatly rejected by SWAPO subsequently underwent favorable changes under pressure from the ambassadors of the imperialist powers mentioned earlier.

A. I don't think the ambassadors of the imperialist powers should

be given credit for Vorster's renunciation of the idea of an interim government,[8] which he had wanted to impose on our people following the Constitutional Conference. Vorster had to give up that sinister plan because the liberation struggle was intensifying and there was mounting opposition to the plan inside the country, an opposition led by SWAPO supporters. The 'conference' itself was very unpopular. The tribal chiefs who had attended it feared liquidation of their own people. At present they are under the protection of South African police and troops.

It follows that credit for the rejection of plans unacceptable to us is due to the Namibian people, who have made sacrifices to do so. Our people are resolved to fight on under the leadership of SWAPO until they are in a position to decide their affairs as they see fit. This aspiration is supported by the whole of progressive mankind.

Q. What about the split in the white community of Namibia, in particular the breakaway of the 'Liberal wing' led by Dirk Mudge.

A. Mudge is by no means a liberal. He was a deputy of Namibia's South African administrator, that is, a representative of Vorster's repressive machinery. But he was unable to achieve the results he had wanted to present to Vorster. SWAPO thwarted all his attempts. As a result, he became unpopular among the whites and lost his post in the leadership of Vorster's ruling National Party. And then he formed the so-called Republican Party, whose aim is to win over a number of whites and reactionary Africans, especially tribal chiefs who attended the Constitutional Conference, such as Clemens Kapuoo, Cornelius Ndjoba and others. Mudge wants to rally them together in a common fight against SWAPO. However, he has not a single member of the oppressed people on his side. In other words, his party hardly represents anybody and is bound to be completely defeated in any truly democratic election.

Q. The imperialist press oftens contends that in the event of free elections in Namibia, SWAPO would only win in Ovamboland, in the north.

A. There is not a word of truth in that. Right now it is clear to anybody that the whole south of Namibia is fully controlled by SWAPO.

To be sure, we concentrated at a definite moment on the northern district bordering on Angola. We had to mobilize the masses because there was a danger of the South African regime trying to set up a Transkei type of bantustan there. Vorster had chosen that district as a showcase — he wanted to make the UN believe that the idea of bantustans could also be put into effect in Namibia. And so we turned the country's northern part in to the main arena of action against treacherous plans to divide the country on the ethnic principle. As a

result of our struggle, the very first man appointed by Vorster to be 'chief minister' of Ovamboland was rejected by the people, and in the end was liquidated. After all, the people saw him as a representative of the Vorster regime's repressive machinery. It is not accidental that the state of emergency and martial law were first imposed precisely in Ovamboland. However, even that proved useless.

Today SWAPO enjoys popular support throughout Namibia. Everybody knows this. They also know that the struggle under the leadership of SWAPO is the only way to win real independence and freedom for Namibia.

Q. What do you think of South Africa's intention to keep Walvis Bay?

A. SWAPO regards Walvis Bay as an inseparable part of Namibia. In the colonization period Walvis Bay was a British enclave in South-West Africa — a German possession. But we refuse to recognize German, British or Boer colonialism, now or in the future. We are fighting to rid our territory of every manifestation or vestige of colonial rule. Vorster is free to delude himself and his white minority fascist regime by claiming that he will keep his hook in Namibia with the help of Walvis Bay. We will go on fighting to victory, to the day when the last inch of Namibian soil is free.

Q. How do you visualize the future of Namibia?

A. Our chief task at the moment is to abolish South Africa's colonial rule in our country and win national independence. It is a priority task. Its accomplishment will be followed by an economic and social reorganization of the country, so that Namibia's resources may be protected and used for the good of all its people. We intend to end once and for all the economic exploitation of our country by foreign monopolies, as well as the exploitation of man by man. We are going to end the domination of transnational corporations owned by imperialist powers, which are now sucking the Namibian people's blood. We are fighting to bring about a people's government that will serve the whole population irrespective of race or origin.

Q. How would you define the connection between the movement for national liberation and the movement for social emancipation?

A. The struggle for liberation from foreign domination is prompted by the desire to achieve social justice. This implies that the means of production must be controlled by the people themselves, through the mechanism of the state. We plan to establish a system of social justice on the basis of scientific socialism. This is the only way, as we see it, to carry out social changes beneficial to our people. I think this is true of any country which has freed itself from colonial domination.

Capitalism is like an incurable cancer. If it is allowed to establish itself in Namibia, our people's sufferings will never end and they will

be exploited, as in the past, by foreigners who deny them basic human rights. Unless capitalism is rejected, the Namibian people will remain a slave of foreign capital.

Q. What do you think of the future place of an independent Namibia in the international anti-imperialist front?

A. SWAPO is the vanguard and leader of the Namibian people's national-liberation fight, an inseparable part of the anti-imperialist forces of the world. We support all people on earth who are fighting against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and fascism.

Our country will be a member of the Organization of African Unity. This is natural, for we support its Charter and feel that Africa can really be free from colonial intrigues only if united, politically free and economically independent. Africa cannot be strong if divided, as it regrettably is today.

Namibia is a small part of Africa. If it became independent but isolated itself from other countries it would be manipulated by imperialists, who would use the method of economic coercion and strangulation. They would go on exploiting us as they exploit a number of nominally independent African states, which are entirely at the mercy of imperialists.

Our country will also be a member of the UN so as to contribute its modest share to the progress of mankind. The UN plays an important role in the struggle against colonialism and exploitation. Its progressive member nations will always lay bare imperialist exploitation of other countries, and this is very important.

Needless to say, we will also participate in the non-aligned movement. It is a very authoritative movement helping the countries that have gained freedom to resist colonial and neo-colonial exploitation.

Thus Namibia will be a component of the world anti-imperialist front.

Q. What is your opinion of the international solidarity of progressive forces with your struggle?

A. We would be unable to carry forward our armed struggle without the practical and concrete material aid which our people get through SWAPO. I mean, first of all, arms supplies, without which it is impossible to wage a liberation war. We are very grateful for this to our friends, primarily the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, the Organization of African Unity, national and international democratic organizations of capitalist countries, and the governments of some of them, such as Sweden, Norway and others. These governments supply us with humanitarian aid, medicines, food, clothing and other necessities.

We feel that we are not alone but have powerful forces, first of all the socialist countries, backing us. All this makes us confident that we

will very soon be able to achieve final victory over our enemy. And then we will have a progressive state which will be part of progressive mankind.

ZIMBABWE: A TURNING POINT

Joshua Nkomo
President, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU);
leader, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe

The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe has taken a very serious turn. After all, at the time of the Geneva Conference, which then proved to be a fiasco,[10] we made it quite clear: if the conference failed it would mean war to the end. And this is a natural stand to take, for it is rooted in the whole history of the liberation struggle in our country.

Whenever we tried to negotiate with the colonialists, the white minority took steps to strengthen its position in Southern Rhodesia. That is what happened back in 1940-45, before Smith's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and then in the 50s and the early 60s, when our party was banned and its leaders arrested. We had to spend long years in prison. Meanwhile, Smith continued further to usurp the country for the benefit of the white minority and proclaimed his 'independence.'

When we were released from detention in 1974, we tried once again to negotiate, and this we did even after Smith had tortured us for 11 years. We expressed our readiness to negotiate, also because our brothers in the front-line states believed that after 10 years of war the Smith regime was prepared to talk. We tried to negotiate in Vorster's presence aboard a train on the bridge across the Zambesi River and in Salisbury, and finally at Geneva in the presence of the British. But we discovered that U.S. imperialism was operating behind the scenes. The then Secretary of State Kissinger tried to save Smith, and in particular to get us to help Smith to secure recognition of UDI.

When the Geneva Conference opened, it seemed as though the British were talking the same language as we were, but it later became obvious that they were trying to force us to share power with Smith. That is why the collapse of the Geneva Conference was inevitable, and we said there and then that the outcome would be a struggle till final victory. This called for a step-up in the armed operations above all, and that is what we have been doing since January 1977.

We have called on the young people of our country to join in the armed struggle. They responded to our call and have been flocking to our ranks in growing numbers.

We urged our friends in the world to cooperate with us and to

supply us with weapons. Socialist countries, the Soviet Union in the first place, responded to our call as usual and are helping us.

Meanwhile, the imperialist powers have continued to help Smith and pretend to be offended when we say so. But it is a fact which everyone knows: Western financial institutions — banks and insurance companies — broadly collaborate with the South African fascists, which also means helping the fascists in Southern Rhodesia. It is also common knowledge that there are secret agreements between the Western oil companies and the Smith and Vorster regimes, and under these, oil is being supplied to the Smith regime via South Africa, in defiance of the UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia. The governments of the United States, Britain, France and Holland prefer to turn a blind eye to the facts, which show that their companies have been supplying Smith with oil. Despite the declarations of support in the United Nations for the liberation movement, the imperialist powers have continued to help Smith in the war which is raging between him and our people.

It is clear, therefore, that we are fighting not only little Smith but also the powerful imperialist concerns, the Western governments.

The military situation is now such that the British imperialists can no longer stand by and watch, because they realize that we mean business and that 75 per cent of Rhodesia's territory now consists of what the military call 'operational areas,' where the war is being fought round the clock. Nor are these only rural areas. They also include Salisbury, Bulawayo and other major cities.

The British imperialists feel that they must intervene for fear of the situation completely turning in our favor. They are aware that if we do carry the struggle to the end, we shall establish a government of the Zimbabwe *people*, and that is something they don't want to see. That is why the British government now says: we are prepared to give Zimbabwe an independent government elected on the 'one man, one vote' principle in democratic elections after a six-month transitional period. But a close look at their proposals[11] makes it quite obvious that they merely want to 'hijack' our independence because they realize that we are about to win it. They want us to accept the transitional arrangement that would give Britain absolute power in the country for six months. Give the imperialists six minutes, and they will rob you of everything that you had imagined you had won. Give them six months, and you may be quite sure that you are giving them enough time to rig the results of any 'democratic elections' held at the end of six months in their favor.

Britain is now prepared — and there is no doubt at all on this score — to set up a 'Black government' in Rhodesia but not a people's government, merely a Black government.

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The imperialists realize that it is impossible to maintain a white government in a country in which almost 97 per cent of the population is Black. They intend to set up a Black government on their pattern.

In the past few years, the imperialist powers have suffered a number of major defeats. We have in mind the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, which was the major link in the system of exploitation of the peoples of Southern Africa. The imperialist powers now feel themselves to be vulnerable in Africa, which is why they have been regrouping their forces in an effort to mount a counter-offensive and to retaliate for the round they have lost. They want to form Black governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but imperialist, neo-colonial-type governments. If they manage to set up two such governments they will feel themselves to be a real force in Southern Africa, and from that bridgehead they will mount a war of revenge against Angola and Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, against all the countries neighboring on the South African 'bastion.'

Such is the problem we are facing: the war, which outwardly appears to be purely local, is in fact an international one. Our enemy enjoys the support of the big Western powers.

Q. The imperialist press keeps spreading rumors about a split in the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, between ZAPU and ZANU, between Nkomo and Mugabe. Will you comment on these assertions?

A. This provocative campaign, fanned by the imperialist press, is led by the British newspapers and the BBC. For them, there will never be any Patriotic Front. For them, it was divided even before we began to work to unite ZAPU and ZANU. For the imperialists this kind of unification spells disaster, for it kills their hopes. After all, they have always played up any differences among the people of Zimbabwe. But when they saw the prospect of unity, they began to shout about a split, even before we signed our agreement.

I can assure you that ZAPU and ZANU have agreed to work as an alliance of two organizations for the purpose of pooling our armed efforts to storm the Smith regime, to liberate Zimbabwe and to administer it after the victory is won, and we are sure that we shall win: this is now a matter of months.

Of this the imperialists are aware, and are prepared to clutch at anything and invent anything you like so as to convince the world that ZAPU and ZANU are divided in the Patriotic Front. They will quote their own visions and dreams as revelations. They dream that Mugabe and I have fallen out, and then slap great headlines on the front pages of their newspapers: 'Nkomo has quarreled with Megabe.' But, as I say, that is just so much wishful thinking.

In the autumn of 1977, the imperialist papers carried a statement

which they attributed to Mugabe. They quoted him as saying that the meeting in Lusaka between Smith and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was also attended by Nkomo and that this meant a split in the Patriotic Front. But the imperialists know that they are lying.

Because I happened to be in Zambia when Smith and Dr. Kaunda met, they jumped at the opportunity of insinuating that I had attended that meeting. But the imperialist propagandists should know that I am not in the habit of doing things under cover. If I had attended that meeting, I would have said so. When I met Smith in Salisbury, I met him openly and said as much. I did that to find out whether Smith was actually a sane man with whom it was possible to negotiate. After two months of negotiations I told the world that he was mad. I also added that henceforth I would meet Smith only on the battlefield. That is what is happening just now. But if Smith decided to surrender, I would be prepared to meet him to accept the surrender — and nothing more.

That is why those who have visions of a crack in the Patriotic Front are mistaken. They claim that that is what Mugabe said, but when Mugabe has something to tell me he does not have to turn to the press. He and I are together in the same organization. What he has to tell me, insofar as it has a bearing on the Partriotic Front, he tells me when we meet or in letters addressed to me. This did not happen on that occasion, and various people, in fact, spread about rumors launched by the imperialists, above all the British press, rumors which gladdened their hearts.

Everyone knows that since then Mugabe and I have met, and together met the Presidents of the front-line states, as leaders of the Patriotic Front. So where is the threat to it? This is an illusion, a dream. The imperialists will never have the satisfaction of seeing this happen.

Q. What is the present stage of unification of the ZAPU and ZANU armies?

A. For us it is more than just a unification of the armies. We are working to unite ZAPU and ZANU within the Patriotic Front, with the view to setting up one political party. Some of the things we have been doing are not publicized for the time being, in particular those concerning the structure we are working on. We have made it quite clear that we are starting out as an alliance of two organizations and seek to set up one party. We are advancing along this path and will say in the not too distant future where we are.

Q. In its commentaries, the imperialist press frequently suggests that Nkomo is a more moderate leader, who is more suitable to the Western powers, as contrasted with Mugabe. Similarly, it is suggested that President Kaunda is a moderate African leader, as

contrasted with, say, Samora Machel, a 'leftist.' What do you think of this?

A. How is it possible to hand out tags like 'moderate' and 'leftist?' President Kaunda's country is firmly confronting the Smith regime and they call that moderation? That is the language of the imperialists. Everyone else needs to be very careful to avoid falling into the trap of such claims by means of which the imperialists try to pigeon-hole people.

President Kaunda has sacrificed his country's economy and the lives of his citizens in defense of the rights of the Zimbabwe people. Who will dare say that he is a moderate? That is nonsense, and it only deserves contempt.

Nkomo, a moderate? I was in detention for 11 years for moderation. This sounds good, doesn't it? Who says that I have to be acceptable to someone in the West, or to anyone else? Is there anyone in general who wants to be acceptable to the West, or to be assessed by it.

They lay claim to assessing me. But I will be assessed only by the people of Zimbabwe. And if I do lead my country this will be only because my people have decided so, and not because a decision had been taken by someone outside the country.

Q. You have rejected the above-mentioned Anglo-American plan for settling the Zimbabwe problem. But it was not rejected by the five front-line Presidents, or by the UN Security Council. Could you explain your stand on this.

A. That is a contradiction. The Presidents of the front-line states cannot either accept or reject something that has to do with Zimbabwe. Their stand is clear: they support the Zimbabwe people's position. Their role does not consist in accepting or rejecting decisions which have to do with Zimbabwe. That is the role of the Zimbabwe people. The Presidents of the front-line states can merely express their standpoint like everyone else. It is up to us, it is up the people of Zimbabwe to take the decisions. And we have clearly expressed our stand in the document adopted at Maputu and signed by Mugabe and myself. The Presidents of the front-line states voiced their opinion.

Nor has the United Nations the task of agreeing or disagreeing with what the Zimbabwe people want. In this case, the Security Council clearly emphasized that the appointment of a UN representative in accordance with the Anglo-American plan did not in any sense mean the Security Council's endorsement of the proposals contained in the plan.

The import of all these steps was to create a mechanism, which we in the Patriotic Front decided neither to accept nor reject, a

mechanism making it possible to discuss the character of the transitional structure proposed by the Anglo-American plan. We said: let it be created to show how serious Britain's intentions were about decolonizing our country. If it turned out that it agreed with our proposals for a transitional structure, this would mean that it was aware of the real situation in Southern Rhodesia, that it was aware that it was up to the people to decide the country's future. If Britain rejected what in our view was the right plan, it would show that it was trying to mislead the world, and it would then be exposed by means of the very mechanism it wanted to set up.[12]

Q. What are the present positions of Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Sithole? How popular are they among the people of Zimbabwe, as the imperialist press has been strongly suggesting?

A. Who now talks about the popularity of this or that Zimbabwe leader? A war is being fought in the country, and we do not talk of political games but of war. In order to carry on the war, there must be men fully resolved to give their lives, not thoughts, emotions, or dreams, but life itself, their very blood, and do this to make the country free. Everyone knows that men will not give their lives for something they do not believe in.

The relatives of the young people fighting in our ranks will not allow them to give their lives for what they do not believe in. Our country's population will not sacrifice hearth and home, or risk their lives, helping the guerrillas, unless they believe in their cause.

There are thousands of young men now fighting on our side, giving their life and blood — and that is popularity in the struggle! It is demonstrated by the influx of thousands of young men into the ranks of the guerrillas. It is shown by the resolve of people who help them to leave the country to train for the struggle, and who provide them with food and shelter upon their return. These people are being arrested in their hundreds and publicly hanged and publicly shot for supporting the guerrillas. But the population has continued to support the guerrillas, because it believes in their cause.

That is the popularity in the struggle!

If someone does want to seek popularity in the streets of Salisbury, where people wave to Muzorewa upon his return from yet another trip to the United States or some other place, that is not important.

What is important is when men give their lives, and that is just what is called popularity in the war.

Q. What is your view of the future of an independent Zimbabwe?

A. It will be a society of the Zimbabwe people, a state of the Zimbabwe people in the modern world.

We are a people with a past. We are a people with traditions, with our own language and culture. And our future will be based on our

people's foundations and traditions. But we live in the modern world. We shall adopt from the world, that is, from other people, from other states, that which suits our people.

Our people are socialist by nature. They do not believe that individuals should have possession of, say, the land. By its very nature, the land is the people's social property. The land and everything in it belongs to the people. That is the basis on which we in Zimbabwe will build our future state. ZAPU has a program — The Party's Ideological Concept. We shall make it known to the people and urge them to abide by it.[13]

Q. How important is international solidarity with the Zimbabwe people's struggle?

A. It is very important. We are waging a war and we need support, we need real assistance in weapons, in ammunition and military equipment. We need the cooperation of the whole world, of all the countries. To win, we need friends at home and abroad. All the progressive forces, wherever they may be, are fighting against imperialism. This means that they are fighting against the same evil: fascism, racism and exploitation. They are fighting because the bearers of this evil want to live by the blood of other people.

The imperialists have always sought to oppress people and to suck them dry. That is how the blood of the Russian people was sucked before the October Revolution, and in this context I should like to emphasize the great significance of the October Revolution, which showed the way to the oppressed peoples all over the world. It helped them to understand that they can win freedom and independence and work for the common good. Consequently, we are fighting one and the same evil. It is the same evil against which the world fought from 1939 to 1945, in the war against fascism, which wanted to rule the world. Then the whole human race rose up against it. It is a lamentable fact that now that we in the south of Africa are confronted with the same enemy, the Western powers support the South African fascists. They do this because from there they get their earnings and dividends and exploit South Africa's wealth. But fascism is, after all, always fascism, and those who support it are, in fact, its accomplices.

We have said as much to the representatives of the above-mentioned powers. We told them that that is the same enemy with the same character, and one may call things various names, but one should not forget that the same evil is still there.

Q. What is the importance of international détente for the national-liberation movement?

A. Détente means peace and coexistence. But coexistence does not mean accepting an evil. It means coexisting with the evil and fighting it with methods other than military ones.

The socialist countries have been pursuing their policy of détente and peaceful coexistence, while helping the forces in the world fighting against exploitation and fascism. Consequently, the socialist countries have themselves been fighting against these evils. Détente and peaceful coexistence do not mean that the evil is accepted and then condemned. In pursuing their policy of détente and peaceful coexistence the socialist countries block the way for truly devastating wars. But they support the forces in various regions and parts of the globe which are fighting to destroy the evil. Of course, it could have been destroyed in a world war as well, but only at the cost of tremendous calamities for the whole of mankind.

Q. Will you comment on the relationship between the ideals of the national-liberation movement and the international communist and working-class movement.

A. What is the communist movement? 'Communism' is a word imperialist propaganda has tried to denigrate in every possible way, presenting it as a terrible beast, a monster. But going below the surface of the word itself you will find that communism means everything that is good. Communism means that men live side by side as brothers, working together, not exploiting each other, living in peace, harmony and accord. The imperialists depict communism with a terrible face because they are afraid of the truth the word contains within itself.

What is the world national-liberation movement? We are not engaged in a struggle for its own sake. We are fighting to secure for the people that for which the communists work, fight and die. This is a question of words, but for us they mean the same things.

This has terrified the imperialists. If communism seeks to destroy their system of exploitation, they naturally want to depict communism as an evil. They will always try to scare people with 'world communism,' but if one explains what this means, people begin to understand. Here is one example of how the imperialists present communism in their propaganda. My people are aware of the goals of our struggle — self-determination and independence — a struggle to return to the people their land, their rights, their human dignity, and so on, and also all the 'little things' which mean so much to the common man — and I mean the fields, goats, fowls, and so on. Our people are aware that that is what we are fighting for. And so our enemies, the imperialists, keep saying: 'Nkomo, the Zimbabwe liberation movement are inspired by world communism. They are communists.' Our people reply: 'If these men fighting for what we want are communists, then they must be good men.'

After all, simply saying 'communist' does not mean very much. The main thing is what the communists stand for! If they stand for

what my people want, they my people have the right to say: 'The communists are good men, they want the same things as we do.'

That is what the imperialists fail to understand; they do not understand that in a sense they themselves acted as propagandists for communism, as the ideology of a superior type which struggles for human rights.

I don't put trust in an ideology for its nice sounds, but for what it really brings to the people.

1. Youth uprising that signalled mass and continuing action against the Vorster regime. For further details, on these events see *WMR*, August 1976 and April 1977. The last series of interviews with ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU leaders was published in *WMR*, June 1976.

2. Bantustans — reservations for African ethnic groups, which the Vorster regime has begun to proclaim 'independent states.' — *Ed.*

3. On November 30, 1977, the regime held an early election, in which only the white minority may participate. Most of this white minority voted for Vorster's National Party. This allows Vorster to make the required constitutional changes. — *Ed.*

4. Steve Biko — an organizer of the Black Consciousness Movement, which advocated peaceful methods of changing the system. See *WMR*, January, 1978 — *Ed.*

5. In November 1977 the UN Security Council passed a resolution banning arms deliveries to the South African regime. However, press reports indicate that today South Africa manufactures the greater part of the arms it needs on licences from imperialist powers. — *Ed.*

6. The United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada. — *Ed.*

7. These articles list the measures which the Security Council can take to remove a threat to international peace and security, including economic and political sanctions, as well as a display of armed force, such as a blockade. — *Ed.*

8. On the understanding that South African troops would stay on in Namibia. — *Ed.*

9. Seaport and naval base. — *Ed.*

10. Called in late 1976 under the sponsorship of the United States and with the participation of Britain, various organizations of the African population in Rhodesia and the Smith regime. It failed because Smith refused to discuss African majority rule. — *Ed.*

11. The so-called Anglo-American plan proposed the establishment of a transitional administration in Rhodesia for six months with a Briton presiding. There was no provision to disband the Smith regime's racist army, as the Patriotic Front demands. Elections were to be held at the end of the period, after which power was to be handed over to an African government. — *Ed.*

12. After the present interview, Smith began talks on an internal settlement with representatives of conciliatory circles among the African population in Rhodesia. Accordingly, the Patriotic Front and the front-line states announced that the Anglo-American plan had become meaningless. — *Ed.*

13. See *WMR*, May 1973. — *Ed.*

EXHIBIT V

Subcommittee note.--The following question was submitted to the Department of State subsequent to a subcommittee hearing on March 12, 1982, entitled "The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion." Since the answer deals with Cuban activity in Africa, it is included as part of the record of this hearing.

[redacted] Q. What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department's complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.

A. Angola

The elite Ministry of Interior units (Tropas Especiales--Special Troops) that were hastily introducted into Angola in November 1975 were the first Cuban combat units sent to fight there. Their immediate mission was to prevent the South African and local forces from overrunning some 2,000 Cuban military technicians and advisory personnel who had arrived in Angola in late September and early October to assemble and maintain the large amounts of Soviet weapons that had been pouring into Angola since March and to train the MPLA in their use. The ultimate objective of Cuban military involvement was of course to install a pro-Soviet/pro-Cuban faction in power.

This initial group of about 2,000 advisors--apparently made up primarily of cadets in their

final year at Cuba's military academies--was to provide advice and technical assistance, not engage in combat. Rapid and unanticipated changes in the battlefield situation, however, found this group caught literally in the front lines within days of its arrival and the Castro regime was faced, in late October, with the decision of either writing it off, trying to evacuate it, or reinforcing it heavily.

President Castro could not write it off. The First Party Congress was coming up in December 1975 and he could not admit to the Congress that he had abandoned the graduating classes of the military academies. Neither could he evacuate the force. He had no shipping in the area to accomplish an evacuation. He, thus, chose to reinforce, and he used the most combat-ready troops -- also the most readily transportable--available in Cuba, which were the Special Troops. They were airlifted to Angola in November with the mission of buying time until other Cuban combat units, composed largely of reservists, could be sent by sea and air. By the time the Special Troops came home sometime in the spring of 1976, Cuba had shipped some 36,000 military personnel to Angola.

The Special Troops seem to provide a variety

of unique services from protecting Castro himself to fighting secretly alongside the Sandinista forces in the latter stages of the revolt against Somoza in Nicaragua. They are the troops Castro has used, for example, to storm foreign diplomatic missions in Havana that have been seized by armed Cubans willing to use desperate measures to emigrate. The Special Troops are in excellent physical condition, are trained in a broad range of weapons and tactics, and most are karate experts. Although critical circumstances required their deployment as combat units in the Angolan experience, they apparently are normally intended to be used in small teams. They probably are headquartered in the Havana area and we suspect a number of them are used to train foreign insurgents in the skills of guerrilla warfare.

Most Cubans who have served in Angola in the armed forces are reservists and many have served more than one tour there. The losses Cuban units sustained in Angola in late 1975 and 1976 caused them to reduce their role in combat--a reaction that has been the source of some friction with the Angolans. Cuban forces remain well disciplined but morale reportedly is low. Conditions for Cubans serving in Luanda especially are grim and relations with the Angolan population in general are not good. Conditions for troops

in the field, although primitive, are acceptable. There have been only a few defections by Cuban personnel. There are not many opportunities to defect. Personnel (both military and civilian) are transported to Angola by Cuban aircraft; the one refueling stop--Cape Verde--is very secure. There are always Cuban security personnel interspersed with the regular "internationalists" and soldiers, which keeps defections to a minimum.

At the present time we believe there are 20,000 - 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola. There was an increase last fall after South Africa launched Operation Protea. The Cubans have established a defensive line in southern Angola to protect against South African incursions deep into the country. However, South African forces operate at will against SWAPO guerrillas south of this line, and Cuban forces have not been directly involved in combat against South African forces.

Cuban forces play an important role in providing logistical and direct combat support to Angolan forces in the ongoing struggle with UNITA. Cuban forces may have become more involved in combat against UNITA forces during the past few months, and the Cubans are apparently taking

and increasing number of casualties. Cuban civilian presence in Angola is believed to be between 5,000 to 9,000. This number is expected to increase during 1982. These personnel are construction workers, transportation workers, teachers, and medical personnel.

Ethiopia

There are now between 11,000 - 13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The military presence is down from a high of about 17,000 troops in early 1978, when Cuban forces played a decisive role in the successful Ogaden campaign. After completion of these operations, Chairman Mengistu tried to persuade Havana to help Ethiopia with the fighting taking place in Eritrea. Castro refused, partly because he wanted no further casualties and partly because he believed the political costs would be too heavy and cause friction with Cuba's radical Arab allies. (Havana also had had ties with the Eritrean Liberation Front for many years.) The Cuban military presence was reduced in late 1978 and remains at about 11,000 - 13,000 today. Cuban forces do not see much action now, play mainly support and logistic-support roles and remain in garrisons most of the time.

Havana would like to increase its civilian role in Ethiopia, mainly to earn hard currency, but so far these efforts have been unsuccessful. There are several hundred (perhaps 600 - 700) Cuban civilians in Ethiopia.

Zaire

In January 1981, Havana appointed it's first ambassador to Zaire since 1977. (At that time, President Mobutu suspended diplomatic relations after accusing Cuban military personnel of leading an invasion force into Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province from Angola.) Because of the underlying distrust of Havana by Mobutu, the relationship is a wary one. The Cuban presence in Zaire is small although it expanded in 1981 with the arrival of the ambassador and several staff people. Although Zaire maintains a very healthy distrust of Cuban activities and goals in Africa in general, and Zaire in particular, Zairian-Cuban relations superficially could be described as a thawing somewhat from the earlier freezing point . As a result of the Cuban presence in neighboring Angola and Cuba's continued support of the FLNC, Zaire keeps a very close watch over the Cuban mission in Kinshasa. Despite this climate, Zaire received a delegation of Cuban technical experts last fall for exploratory discussions on possibilities

for bilateral cooperation in agriculture, sports, culture, etc. No agreements were signed.

Zimbabwe

After Zimbabwean independence and after the election of Robert Mugabe, Cuba has been very cautious in its dealings with the government. Havana's support during the revolutionary struggle for Mugabe's rival Joshua Nkomo put Cuba under a cloud as far as Mugabe was concerned. Because of this support, and probably because of Mugabe's underlying suspicion about Cuban intentions, the relationship between the two countries can now be described as friendly but not especially close. Havana has attempted on several occasions to broaden the relationship, but so far has been unsuccessful. There is a small Cuban diplomatic mission in Harare and there have been a few low-level visits exchanged, but there is no Cuban technical or military presence in Zimbabwe.

Zambia

Cuba and Zambia have had diplomatic relations since 1972 and there is a Cuban diplomatic presence of about 20 in Lusaka. There are no Cuban civilian or military advisors in Zambia.

The visit in February of a senior delegation from Cuba's Communist Party and Havana's recent

decision to fill its long-vacant ambassadorial post in Lusaka reflect a modest warming in relations. Bilateral ties declined after Cuba intervened in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and sided against a faction Zambia supported. In the past few years, Zambian-Cuban relations have gradually improved as Lusaka has come to accept the Cuban-backed regime in Angola. Presidents Castro and Kaunda, moreover, have made common cause on a number of Third World issues in recent years, including that of majority rule in Southern Africa.

Botswana

Cuba and Botswana established diplomatic relations in 1977, but an ambassador was not actually accredited until 1979. He is resident in Lusaka, Zambia. We have no information on other bilateral matters. There is no Cuban military or civilian presence in Botswana, and none is foreseen.

Mozambique

Relations between Cuba and Mozambique are cordial. The two countries established diplomatic relations on 25 June 1975, the day Mozambique became independent. There has been a Cuban civilian technical assistance program in Mozambique since 1976. The program has increased over the years to include public health, education, fishing,

agriculture, communications, and transportation technicians. We estimate there are at least 500 Cuban civilian personnel in Mozambique.

In addition, there are at least 2,000 Mozambican students studying on Cuba's Isle of Youth, and a few hundred more are in Cuban universities and technical schools. The two Chiefs of State are personal friends. President Machel has made two visits to Cuba, most recently in late May 1982.

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THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:40 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. This hearing will come to order. Good morning.

Today, we continue with the hearings of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on the role of the Soviet Union, through its puppets in Cuba and East Germany, in fomenting and supporting terrorism in southern Africa.

On Monday, we heard the testimony of the Honorable Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Dr. Peter Vanneman, associate professor of political science at the University of Arkansas. In their testimony they explained the objectives of the Soviet Union in southern Africa and the importance of southern African resources to United States and Western interests.

Today, we will hear from two former members of the African National Congress, whose testimony, I believe, you will find both revealing and shocking.

After reading the prepared statement of Ms. Kave, I must say that although I have witnessed and experienced a good bit of suffering in a country behind the Bamboo Curtain and although I have often said that women could endure more suffering and pain than men in general, it was not until I read the testimony of Ms. Kave that I actually encountered a woman who has undergone more suffering than have I or any of my colleagues.

For those of you who may not realize the cost to these witnesses in testifying before this subcommittee, it is important to know that they are marked, marked for assassination. They are not simply outcasts among former associates.

After carefully weighing the risks, each made an individual decision that they would testify publicly because they realize the need to expose what is happening in southern Africa and to expose the

activities and motives of the Soviet Union in that part of the world. This decision was made with full knowledge of the fact that there could be members of organizations desirous of eliminating them, members of the ANC, SWAPO, the South African Communist Party, the DGI, or the KGB, present this morning at this hearing. As one who has lived under the Communist system, I am very sensitive to the pressures that each of them must feel, and I can assure all Americans, be they liberal, conservative, Republican or Democrat, that their courage and commitment deserve our deepest respect.

As I stated on Monday, it is not the purpose of these hearings to debate the appropriate U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Nor is it our purpose to analyze South African domestic policies. No one on this subcommittee condones or is attempting to justify, in any respect, policies of racial discrimination which may exist in South Africa, the United States or elsewhere.

What we seek to determine, through the testimony of today's witnesses and others, is the extent to which the Soviet Union has successfully penetrated and, in large measure, taken over, the direction of two organizations in southern Africa: the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). We are making a point to repeat that we recognize that the entire membership of these organizations is not Communist by any means. In fact, today's witnesses, both of whom were former members of ANC, were not Communists. But it should again be pointed out that the Communist Party does not require 100 percent membership of any organization in order to dominate it. As was previously noted, in the Soviet Union much less than 10 percent of the population enjoys the so-called privilege of party membership. The objective of the worldwide Communist movement is to assume leadership positions, key leadership positions, and thereby achieve de facto control over the organizations.

Our first witness this morning is Nokonono Delphine Kave. She was born in 1954 in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. She has been a leader in the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa.

I welcome you, Miss Kave. Please stand and raise your right hand and I will administer an oath.

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Miss KAVE. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated.

Do you have an opening statement, Miss Kave? Please, proceed.

TESTIMONY OF NOKONONO DELPHINE KAVE, FORMER MEMBER, AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Miss KAVE. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that you may excuse me if I speak with my African accent and I will try to speak slower and I hope you will try also, when you are asking questions, try to speak slowly because I am not yet accustomed—I do not——

Senator DENTON. May I ask the folks in the back of the room who did not hear Miss Kave to raise their hands?

[Show of hands.]

[Photo of Miss Kave follows:]



Senator DENTON. All right. Miss Kave, could you move closer to the microphone?

I would only reply, Miss Kave, that we are very impressed with your education and English. You need make no apologies about your accent.

Please go on with your statement.

Miss KAVE. Thank you.

My name is Nokonono Delphine Kave. I was born on November 12, 1954, in Peddie in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa.

I started schooling in 1960 at Port Elizabeth. I matriculated in 1972. In 1973, I went to the University of Fort Hare and studied for a degree in law. I had become an active member of the Black Consciousness Organization, increasing the political and cultural awareness of the black youth. I had been warned by Steve Biko to play a backward role as there was a lot of differences and insincerity in the South African Student Organization (SASO) leadership. After the 1976 uprisings in South Africa, I was not readmitted at Fort Hare for political reasons, and I had done very poorly academically as I could not concentrate on my studies.

Senator DENTON. May I ask you to clarify something for me?

The Black Consciousness Organization, the purpose of which is to increase the political and cultural awareness of black youth is, as I understand it, a nationalist, not a Communist organization. Is that correct?

Miss KAVE. Yes; it is nationalist.

Senator DENTON. With reference to the South African Student Organization that you mentioned that you were to play a backward role in. I suppose you mean a low-key role. You were warned by Steve Biko to do that because there were differences and insincerity among the leadership of that organization. And as I understand it, the South African Student Organization appeared to you to be a mixed proposition? It was not clearly one thing or the other, is that correct?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. All right. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I had been experiencing the political dishonesty of the black youth leadership that I was terribly disturbed. I had learnt from Steve Biko that Tiro, a black African leader who died in Botswana, and a Miss Qunta, who had also died in Botswana, had left South Africa before 1976, had informed him about the ANC having been taken over by SACP aided by Socialist countries.

Senator DENTON. Steve Biko told you that Tiro and Miss Qunta——

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON [continuing]. Had departed South Africa before 1976, informing him before they departed that the ANC had been taken over by the South African Communist Party aided by Socialist countries?

Miss KAVE. After they did—after they left the country.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In February 1977, I was advised by Steve Biko to go to Mdantsane or Dimbaza where there was some former ANC and PAC members and to learn more about ANC and SACP. I stayed at

Mdantsane and, within a short period, I was well informed about the exiled ANC and SACP members

Senator DENTON. You say you were well informed about the exiled African National Congress and the South African Communist Party members.

What kind of people were these? Why were they exiled?

Miss KAVE. These are two towns in South Africa, Mdantsane and Dimbaza. These are places where the prisoners from both ANC and PAC are banned in South Africa. So these people knew a lot about the history of the South African Communist Party.

Senator DENTON. Who exiled them, the ANC or the SACP? The Government of South Africa or did they just exile themselves because they were frightened?

Miss KAVE. Some had gone into political exile, and others were forced to go into exile. I am getting—there are others in Zwelitsha and from these I learned more about the ANC and SACP. Both these are banned in South Africa and you cannot learn much from the history of these organizations. So you have to get——

Senator DENTON. So these organizations were illegal at that point in South Africa?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And some were exiled and others wanted to leave. They desired to be voluntarily exiled?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I went to work at the magistrate's office at Zwelitsha in the Ciskei, and I did not have much problem as my uncle, Lennox Sebe, wanted me to be working. I was to be a senior clerk, but I did not want to take much responsibility as Steve Biko or me was to leave the country.

Steve Biko was detained by South African security and he later died in detention.

I addressed and organized the youth at Steve Biko's funeral. After the funeral, I was wanted by the South African security in the Ciskei, and I fled to Port Elizabeth.

Senator DENTON. Miss Kave, may I make sure that I understand you.

Your testimony is clear to those who understand the situation, but I am a student in this area. You say Steve Biko was detained by South African security and later died in detention?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And yet you indicated earlier that Steve Biko was really concerned about the Communist influence on the movement. So he was really caught between both sides, is that it?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In Port Elizabeth, I organized and directed the youth. We formed a strong secret network, an action committee and a reconnaissance group, which left Port Elizabeth in November for Soweto. They were finally to leave the country illegally. I later learned that they had left Soweto.

Senator DENTON. So you were organizing the youth in a nationalist—with a nationalist aim but not a Communist aim?

Miss KAVE. I am not a nationalist. I am a black consciousness—which is more than nationalist, which is nationalist in the African sense.

Senator DENTON. Multinational Africa, more or less——

Miss KAVE. If I am talking about blacks, I would mean go to the South Africa situation. Africans, coloreds and Indians. Those people who are not classified as whites, you know, in South Africa, we call them as blacks, and many people usually get the wrong impression that I mean Africans. Those people who are not classified in South Africa as whites, we call them blacks.

Senator DENTON. Black African, Indian and coloreds—you wanted to organize them because they were not properly represented or treated?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. The South African security was looking for me in Port Elizabeth and I was then forced to leave Port Elizabeth for Soweto in January 1977.

I was later joined by a girl from Port Elizabeth called Kukulayi and a boy called Mzi from Kagiso. On February 7, 1978, we traveled by train from Soweto to Mafeking. From Mafeking we walked across the border to Botswana.

Senator DENTON. All right.

So, even at that point, you were a fugitive from South African security?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Are you still a fugitive from them as well as a target of the Communists?

Miss KAVE. Yes, I am still.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. On February 8, 1978, we reached Botswana. We were taken by the Botswana Immigration Officer to a police station. At the police station we were made to choose between ANC and PAC as they were the only recognized political organizations from South Africa. We joined the ANC.

Senator DENTON. So in Botswana they do recognize the ANC and the PAC, and you had to choose between one or the other?

Miss KAVE. Did I what?

Senator DENTON. In South Africa, the ANC and PAC were not legal, but in Botswana you had to choose between two legal parties, the ANC or the PAC, is that correct?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And you joined the ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. An African National Congressman, Sidumo, came to fetch us from the police station. After learning that we were from the Cape, Sidumo started telling us that Steve Biko had been a CIA agent and was confusing the people inside South Africa. I protested at this unfounded accusation made by Sidumo about Steve Biko. He drove us to an ANC residence at Gaberone.

Senator DENTON. So the African National Congressman, Sidumo, picked you up and informed you or tried to tell you that Steve Biko

had been a CIA agent and was confusing the people of South Africa. You protested against this?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And then he drove you to a residence at Gaberone?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go on.

Miss KAVE. At the ANC residence, there were over 10 other ANC members. Among them there were two from Port Elizabeth whom I had left in Soweto, and they were bitter about that. They were Sthembiso Nogheyi and Ntombentsa Ndwandwa.

The following days we were being taken by ANC to the police station where we declared ourselves political refugees in Botswana. We were made to fill some forms.

Zakes, an ANC member in Botswana, came to the ANC residence and told us that we have to realize that ANC is not "Black Consciousness" and we have to learn ANC politics. After this day, we were getting lessons on Marxism-Leninism from another ANC man, Mlali. He was using "The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" and "The Class Struggle in Africa" by Nkrumah.

Senator DENTON. All right, I imagine that you were somewhat concerned at this point. ANC and African National Congress members in Botswana came to the residence and told you that you had to realize that African National Congress is not a Black Consciousness movement which you were interested in, and that you would have to learn African National Congress politics as it really was.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And you were getting lessons on Marxism-Leninism to accomplish that, using the book, "The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninism," which is here, and "The Class Struggle in Africa" by Nkrumah.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. At that point you must have been somewhat concerned about what you were going to do.

Miss KAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Please go on.

Miss KAVE. Problems developed with the youth refusing to learn Marxism-Leninism, and to bake some fat cakes that ANC leaders were selling. Makopo, an ANC representative, came and accused me of inciting others.

Senator DENTON. So many of you had problems with absorbing Marxism-Leninism, and resisted making cakes which the ANC leaders were selling, and the ANC and Makopo accused you of inciting the others?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go on.

Miss KAVE. In the middle of February I was told that Mzi and me were to travel to Zambia. We were put in a Botswana airplane without travel documents and we were detained on our arrival at the Lusaka International Airport as ANC had also not cleared us. I was taken to the Central Police Station and Mzi remained at the Lusaka International Airport. I learned the following morning that he had traveled to Angola.

Senator DENTON. OK. So you were told that you were going to travel to Zambia; you went on an airplane without documents, you were detained at Lusaka International Airport, because ANC had not cleared you; you were taken to the police station, while your friend remained at the Lusaka International Airport, and you learned later that he had traveled to Angola.

Why were you moved? Why do all that traveling?

Miss KAVE. Why did I?

Senator DENTON. Why did they move you from Botswana? For what reason did they make you travel, or do you have any idea?

Miss KAVE. Because they were saying——

Senator DENTON. Because you were inciting others?

Miss KAVE [continuing]. It was a big thing in Botswana. I even went to the police station trying to get away—some went to the police station to take me back to the African National Congress, and the following day I was told that it was orders, to go to Lusaka, to the headquarters, I was following orders.

Senator DENTON. So you were following orders?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. At the Lusaka Airport I had been met by an ANC man from Port Elizabeth called Shuta. He told me that he had already heard from other boys from Port Elizabeth about me, and we were to work secretly with another old man from Natal called Mr. Mkwanazi.

From the airport I was taken to the ANC women's residence at Lilanda. I was introduced to an ANC member called Tulani, and there was another woman, Christina, from Soweto whom I had already met in Botswana. We were later joined by Florence Maposho, an ANC National Executive member.

I learned a lot about the ANC and SACP from Florence Maposho, as she was very boastful of ANC and SACP achievements in South Africa. It was from her that I first heard about the SACP strategy of using the so-called "theory of confusion of forces" within South Africa. She brought Bridgette Mabandla who had been in the "Black Consciousness" movement to persuade me to joint the SACP and also to realize that Steve Biko had been a CIA agent. Bridgette Mabandla was telling me that she had also been a CIA agent inside South Africa.

Senator DENTON. So you are going through a very turbulent phase. You are joined by Florence Maposho, who is a National Executive member of the ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And she boasted about the ANC and the SACP achievements in South Africa, and you learned from her about the "theory of confusion of forces," which is an SACP strategy in South Africa; she introduced you to another woman who had been in your "Black Consciousness" program, who tried to persuade you to join the South African Communist Party and to realize that Steve Biko had been a CIA agent?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And she said that she had also been a CIA agent in South Africa.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In March 1978 I was asked by Sindiso Mfenyane to take his place at the Radio Freedom in Lusaka, and I was to translate scripts and broadcast in Xhosa. By this time we had already become bitter enemies with Florence Maposho and Tsebello Mtapanyane, an ANC youth leader.

Senator DENTON. You were bitter enemies with them. Was this an open enmity or secret?

Miss KAVE. An open.

Senator DENTON. An open enmity. All right, go ahead.

Miss KAVE. On the Sharpeville Commemoration Day in 1978, Diliza Masondo, an ANC and SACP Political Commissar, announced that it was a crime to be anti-Communist in the ANC, a person could be a non-Communist or non-Christian.

Senator DENTON. It was a crime to be an anti-Communist in the African National Party. You could be a non-Communist or a non-Christian, but you cannot be anti-Communist, that is what they announced?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Miss KAVE. In May 1978, Florence Maposho told me to leave the women's residence, as I was a tribalist and an anti-Communist element. I was taken by Shuta to the house of a Dane, Kay Janson, married to a South African, Mary Lubemba.

Senator DENTON. Florence Maposho tells you to leave the women's residence where you are staying, saying that you were a tribalist and an anti-Communist element, and you were taken to the house of a Dane, a man named Kay Janson, who is married to a South African woman named Mary Lubemba.

Was this charge that you were a tribalist and an anti-Communist element made on her personal behalf only, or was she representing the ANC at that point, when they condemned you?

Miss KAVE. She was representing the ANC, and she had brought other ANC youth leaders who said the same—and it was during this meeting.

Senator DENTON. Some other ANC leaders were with her in this accusation against you?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please continue.

Miss KAVE. Sometime in June to July 1978, a group of Danish students came to stay at Kay Janson's house. I learned that two of them were from the Communist Party of Denmark. Kay Janson arranged for me to take them to Namibia Institute where Billy Modise showed us around.

Senator DENTON. So some of these Danish students that came to stay at that house were known to be members of the Communist Party of Denmark?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please continue.

Miss KAVE. In July, I wrote a speech attacking the homeland leaders as I had learned that the SACP wanted to use them against the whites in South Africa. After the attack, Tabo Mbeki made an appointment for me to see Oliver Tambo. Oliver Tambo was very annoyed saying he had thought I was a relative of Lennox Sebe

and that I had placed him in a bad situation with the homeland leaders.

I reported Oliver Tambo's attack to Kay Janson, whom I had already learned was from the Communist Party of Denmark and was working with the SACP. He promised to report it to the SACP leadership. Kay Janson was teaching me Marxism-Leninism using the "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism," and he also gave me a gift of "The Communist Manifesto" and a book about the life of Steve Biko.

A black American came to Kay Janson's house from Botswana. I learned that he had met the independent youth members in Botswana and was going to the United States. In July 1978, the ANC Office issued me with a Tanzanian alien travel document and a ticket to travel to Tanzania to join other students.

I traveled by Zambian Airways to Dar-es-Salaam. On arrival in Dar-es-Salaam I was with a group of South African men from Angola. We were taken to an ANC military wing residence with these men. There were about 15 to 20 ANC members in this residence.

Senator DENTON. Is this travel still just in accordance with orders? In other words, were you still OK with the ANC, with only a few of the leaders accusing you of being anti-Communist?

Miss KAVE. I was not OK. That was one of the reasons I was taken, because I was removed from Radio Freedom, after I made, you know, some statements, attacking the homeland leaders, I was called by Oliver Tambo and other leaders of the ANC, and it was after those confrontations and my expulsion from Radio Freedom that I was given the ticket to go to Dar-es-Salaam.

Senator DENTON. Therefore, because of your behavior you were expelled from Radio Freedom, and now you are in trouble, and they are moving you around on that basis?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Oliver Tambo is now directing this operation with you?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I was at this residence for a week. The second week I was taken to the place of Ben Bella, an ANC and SACTU leader. His wife, Nozipho Tunyiswa, would be taking me out in the evenings to meet some PLO Arabs at the hotels in Dar-es-Salaam.

Senator DENTON. What does SACTU mean?

Miss KAVE. The South African Congress of Trade Unions.

Senator DENTON. South African Congress of Trade Unions.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Mendi, an ANC leader in charge of the students informed me in August that I was going to the Soviet Union to further my studies. I was issued with a ticket and an entry visa. I traveled by Aeroflot from Dar-es-Salaam to Yemen, Cairo, and then Moscow. On the first of September I was in Moscow, and we were taken with other students by bus to a University Hotel. At this University Hotel there were a large number of foreign students.

Senator DENTON. They told you that they were going to take you to the Soviet Union to further your studies?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I cannot help asking you at this point, how you regarded that prospect. Did you see this as something that was probably going to cause you trouble?

I mean, you knew that you were in trouble. Did you think that they were serious about furthering your studies?

Miss KAVE. I knew that I was in trouble, because I had already been admitted at the University of Zambia to complete my law degree, and at the University of Zambia law is offered in English. But they removed me, saying I was going to other cities, and would be sent to school there. In Tanzania they told me that I was not going to the University of Zambia, as they do not send their students there, they send their students to Socialist countries. Again I refused. I said I did not want to go to the Soviet Union. I had already started my degree in English, and I understand that the legal degree in the Soviet Union is more political than legal.

They said if you do not want to go to the Soviet Union, then you can travel to Moldavia, where they have a school. I said, I better travel.

I got some information that they had arranged an accident for me on the way. These people said "you are going to die in the Soviet Union, or die on your way tomorrow. You can choose whatever you want." So I felt that the one to the Soviet Union may take longer than the one tomorrow. So I decided to go to the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. So you knew you were in trouble, you knew you were being intimidated, you knew you were on the way to greater trouble. You protested and said you do not want to take part in this indoctrination?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. But you were helpless, beyond that, and you figured that you might live a little longer or have a better chance if you went along with the program?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Now, I knew that I was regarded as a CIA agent. Nobody was allowed to talk to me. It was only the ones that knew me from inside South Africa, the boys were coming secretly to tell me, I had been working with them, and they knew what we stood for inside the country. So they were the ones who were warning me about the danger.

At the University Hotel there was a Mosotho man called Sechaba, and some Namibian students. Sechaba brought two men whom he said were from the KGB. They ordered me not to be seen with one white Namibian student. After that evening I never saw that white Namibian student.

Senator DENTON. So you assumed that he was also in bad repute. He was not favored by them, and he disappeared. You were told not to see one white Namibian student, and after that you never saw that student again?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. After some days at this University Hotel, I was taken by bus to a train station and was accompanied by other foreign and Soviet students to Kishenev in Moldavia.

I arrived on the 10th of September at Kishenev, and I learned that I was to be at a language center for a year. We were taken

with other foreign students for a medical checkup. Language and political classes started. In the political classes we were taught Marxism-Leninism in English by a woman called Lubov.

Senator DENTON. I must say that I cannot help remarking that this sounds somewhat familiar to me, because I went through similar experiences.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Lubov, the political teacher, told me that she was interested in South African student politics. Three Soviet men would be coming in the evenings to my room and telling my Ugandan roommate to leave. They would be telling me that they are writing a book on South African student activities inside South Africa. I would be forcefully given an injection by one of these men, and I would lose consciousness. This went on continuously in the evenings from September to late November.

Senator DENTON. So they are escalating the pressure on you and becoming less indirect in their effort to persuade and indoctrinate you.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Three Soviet men are coming to your room in the evenings telling your roommate to leave. Then they tell you that they are writing a book on South African student activities, I guess to engage you in dialog or to try to deceive you about what they are really about, but this does not deceive you, I presume?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Then this injection, and you lose consciousness. Could you talk about the injections some more? What does the injection do to you?

Miss KAVE. They would put it in and I would not know what——

Senator DENTON. You do not know what happened after that?.

Miss KAVE. I would wake up.

Senator DENTON. You would wake up in the morning, and that would be it. All right, go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Two of these Soviet men would be following me all the time. In late November I was sent by the teachers of the Language Centre to a psychiatric hospital for reeducation as I was refusing to learn Marxism-Leninism. I learned at this psychiatric hospital that the "doctors" who were questioning, torturing, and sexually abusing me were KGB men. They were saying my party, ANC, has informed them that I was a CIA agent.

Senator DENTON. So they are really getting down to business now. They have you in a psychiatric hospital for "reeducation" because you are refusing to learn Marxism-Leninism?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. The doctors who were questioning you, who were torturing you and sexually abusing you, were not doctors; they were KGB men?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And they were accusing you of being a CIA agent?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I was at this psychiatric hospital from late November to the 29th of December. I was released after promising to learn

Marxism-Leninism, and also to marry the Dane, Kay Janson, who would be coming to the Soviet Union to join me.

Senator DENTON. This man was already married, but they wanted you to marry him for their purposes. They are trying to get you to agree to a series of events by which you can release yourself from this situation. Is that generally what was going on?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go on.

Miss KAVE. I attended classes for a week in January and I then refused to go to classes. I demanded to be taken to Moscow as I was very bitter about ANC treachery. After a lot of troubles and ups and downs, I was issued with a ticket to Lusaka via Moscow. The dean of the Language Centre gave me an address in Moscow where I was to go.

Senator DENTON. So your state of mind at this point was that all of this torture, sexual abuse and so on is because of treachery within the ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You really believed that. And you also thought that it would be better for you to go to Moscow?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. From the airport in Moldavia to a small airport in Moscow I was escorted by Soviet soldiers.

At the given address in Moscow, I met a man who introduced himself as Shubin and in charge of the armed struggle in southern Africa. Shubin asked me to work for the Soviets and the KGB and offered to pay any money I needed. I asked him as to what would make me not work for the Americans if they offered me more money than the Soviets. I said I wanted to learn Marxism-Leninism. He exclaimed that I was a revolutionary, not like my leaders, Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders, who had to be paid to be revolutionaries. I learned more shocking revelations from Shubin about ANC and SACP leadership. He informed me that the Soviets are blackmailing the ANC and SACP leaders as they are collaborating with white South Africans and the CIA.

Senator DENTON. That is a very interesting statement, and I want to understand it better.

You met a man named Shubin in Moscow who was in charge of the armed struggle in southern Africa?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. He asked you to work for the Soviets and for the KGB?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And he offered you any amount of money that you needed to do that?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And then you asked him what would prevent you from working for the Americans if they offered you more money than the Soviets. Did you ask him that because you wanted to let him know that money did not mean that much to you?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You said you wanted to learn Marxism-Leninism, you told him that. Did you tell him that as a matter of self-protection and survival or because you really meant it?

Miss KAVE. As a matter of self-protection. And also I wanted to learn Marxism-Leninism to understand it. Because, you know, I knew that everybody knew Marxism-Leninism, and I did not know much about it from what I had learned in South Africa.

Senator DENTON. So you did it for self-protection but you were curious to know what Marxism-Leninism was all about?

Miss KAVE. To know more.

Senator DENTON. Then he explained that you were a revolutionary not like your leaders, Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders who had to be paid to be revolutionaries?

Miss KAVE. ANC and South African Communist Party.

Senator DENTON. Yes.

And by your courage and statements, you had established with him that it was not money that motivated you, that it was a true desire for improving things, and that was all that motivated you?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Then you said that you learned more shocking revelations from Shubin about the ANC and SACP leadership. I will ask you more about that later. He informed you that the Soviets are blackmailing the ANC and the SACP leaders because they, ANC and SACP leaders, are also collaborating with white South Africans and the CIA. That is what he told you?

Miss KAVE. Yes, he said that. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Shubin asked me to talk to other South African students as they were drinking too much and were very irresponsible.

I left his apartment and went to Lumumba University to join other South African students. I learned that the South African students were very frustrated. The Soviets were inciting them against some ANC leaders and many of them did not know how to cope with the confusion and Soviet teachings.

Senator DENTON. You went to Lumumba University, about which I have heard a great deal in connection with other countries. You went to Lumumba University, you joined other South African students and found that they were quite frustrated. The Soviets were trying to incite them against some ANC leaders?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And many of these students did not know how to cope with the confusion and the Soviet techniques of teaching?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I must ask, at this point, were these leaders that they were trying to incite you against, the ones that were not going along with the Communist line, with the Marxist-Leninist line?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What characteristic was there about these leaders which the Soviets did not like? Could you tell at that point?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Because the students and Mr. Shubin himself mentioned why—and I learned from Shubin in a letter some similar things—they did not like these leaders. You know, all these leaders are also members of South African Communist Party, be-

cause members of the National Executive must be SACP members, but there are those who are not regarded as genuine.

Senator DENTON. They accused them of not being genuine members of the South African Communist Party?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. They were phony——

Miss KAVE. They were not genuine revolutionaries.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In January to February 1979, there was a Southern African student conference. Joshua Nkomo from ZAPU, Eddy Funde of the ANC, and Shangule of SWAPO addressed the student conference.

Eddy Funde and an ANC girl called Mogale attended an international conference outside the Soviet Union. I was at Eddy Funde's room when Shubin came and asked for a report of that international conference.

Senator DENTON. You had a Southern African student conference addressed by Joshua Nkomo, Eddy Funde of the ANC, and Shangule of SWAPO.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Eddy Funde and an ANC girl called Mogale attended an international conference outside the Soviet Union. I was at Eddy Funde's room when Shubin came and asked for a report of that international conference.

In February 1979, I managed to leave the Soviet Union with the ANC headquarters in Lusaka sending a telegram that I should not come back to Zambia. I traveled on Aeroflot from Moscow to Budapest, Angola and Lusaka. Shuta was at the airport and he cleared me and took me to the Dane, Kay Janson's place.

Senator DENTON. So you are on your way back?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And you feel that you have established that you will not work for money but that you have studied Marxism-Leninism?

Miss KAVE. Not much.

Senator DENTON. Not much, you say.

Do you think that they were convinced that you were more on their side at this point than when you came? Why were they sending you back to Africa?

Miss KAVE. They did not think I was a Communist. But, you know, I left Moscow although I was with the students and I was supposed to stay for some time, for schooling and all the other things. But I had a boy friend and he took me to the airport, and at the airport I had problems because I did not have an exit visa. But he talked to the Russians, and after that I was allowed to go to the plane.

Senator DENTON. I would imagine, because of your courage, because of your recognition among your own people, that the Soviets would have thought twice about killing you.

In other words, many people knew you were in Moscow?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Many of your fellow students knew that?

Miss KAVE. And the friend I met in Moscow, was addressing meetings and was very active. I was led around, I was not guided

at this time because I was no longer organizing the students politically. Because after the combined southern African—conference for southern African students—I was not in touch or doing the organizing. However, because I knew the youth from South Africa, we had no problems with each other. And so Shubin had seen—he was saying in Eddy Funde's room that they may have made the mistake of isolating me in Moldavia. If they had known, they would have placed me among the South Africa students because I liked South African company.

Senator DENTON. You were not——

Miss KAVE. I was allowed to stay.

Senator DENTON. So you were not doing them much good in Moscow, but I want to be sure that I understand.

You were somewhat protected from death or harsh punishment because the Soviets knew that you were well known among a large number of people, of your people. Is that correct?

Miss KAVE. Because now what they were trying to do was establish us—the youth—as a force. That is why they said that the youth was a force to challenge the adult members of the African National Congress. This was the aim, and I was still—they saw that I might be—useful.

Senator DENTON. So they saw you as having some potential for them and it was better to leave you alive and send you back than to kill you and get rid of you?

Miss KAVE. Yes. I still had my position but it had been altered in Moldavia and in Moscow, there were changes that had to be made. And in Moscow there were changes which had to be made because Kay (Janson) was supposed to come from Zambia—and Kay was going to join me in Moscow because I was told that——

Senator DENTON. They were going to let you return, continue to work on you and hope that you would be useful to them?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. In spite of all the courage and defiance that you have shown to them?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please continue.

Miss KAVE. From 1978, several anti-Communist members of the ANC were killed under the direction of Reggie September of the ANC and SACP. Among these were Sonwabo Mlisane who was killed in Zambia, Majuba Yekiso in Zambia, Gwentshe killed in Tanzania, Panase in Botswana, Mavuso killed in Angola. Alfred Nzo warned me that I cannot try to outwit the SACP. Kay Janson was still trying to persuade me to join the SACP as Black Consciousness had died. I refused, telling him that I was a Christian.

Senator DENTON. Several anti-Communist members of the ANC were killed because they were anti-Communist?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Is this well-established information? Is it common knowledge that these men were killed for that reason?

Miss KAVE. They came to me because I knew them. So I was told by the leadership that these people were killed because they gave me inside information of what was happening within the ANC. People would come, for instance, Sonwabo Mlisane, and would tell me for instance, some business. One that came was a relative of

someone who was expelled from the ANC. They said he gave me reports, but I had not let him in to give me reports. So then, one day, they said he had shot himself. They came and said: "Your boy friend who was using drugs has committed suicide because now he has been exposed and all that you have been doing has been exposed. And, for instance, he was the one who had helped me, warned me not to go to"——

Senator DENTON. So they told you about all these men being killed because they were anti-Communists?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. They also warned you that you should not try to outwit the South African Communist Party, and Kay Janson continued with his effort to persuade you to join the South African Communist Party because Black Consciousness was alleged to be dead?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You refused, saying that you were a Christian?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Kay Janson showed me a copy of the New York Times and there was a long article that the Western countries are trying to abort the revolution in southern Africa. I learned from Kay Janson that the black American I had met in 1978 had written that article, and that he was also working for the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. Kay Janson who was trying to persuade you to join the South African Communist Party showed you a copy of the New York Times?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. With a long article stating that the Western countries were trying to abort the revolution in southern Africa?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You learned from Kay Janson that the black American you had met in 1978 had written that article, and he was also working for the Soviet Union?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Do you mean to say that the black American was writing directly for the New York Times and it was under his name, or that he had just written the article and that it was reprinted but not with his name?

Miss KAVE. I do not know whether it was with his name or without his name because although I had met him, he did not tell me his name. So I cannot say whether it was under his name. It was about southern Africa and had a lot about the students and all these independent students who were not African National Congress members in Botswana.

Senator DENTON. We will be asking you to identify that article in 1978 in the New York Times for us and asking more about that.

Please go ahead, Miss Kave.

Miss KAVE. I was taken twice to the Cuban Embassy in Lusaka by Kay Janson. A man introduced to me as the Cuban Ambassador, called John, was persuading me to join the SACP and to be able to fight the ANC leadership. I informed him that I was sick. On the second occasion I went to the Cuban Embassy with Kay

Janson, I saw a black Cuban drop powder into the glass I was drinking from. I managed to exchange the glasses.

Senator DENTON. You were taken twice to the Cuban Embassy in Lusaka by Kay Janson, were introduced to a man who was supposed to be the Cuban Ambassador, whose name was John; he tried to persuade you further to join the South African Communist Party and to fight the African National Congress leadership, obviously the ones who were not Communists. You told him that you were sick.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. On the second trip to the Cuban Embassy, you saw a black Cuban drop powder into the glass you were drinking from. You probably do not know what was in it, but you managed to exchange the glasses.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. After this incident in February 1979, Kay Janson became violent and assaulting me, saying I was a bloody Nationalist and a CIA agent who has drugged and killed a Cuban revolutionary.

Senator DENTON. After that incident, Kay Janson became violent—that is the man they wanted you to marry—he became violent, assaulted you, said you were a bloody Nationalist and CIA agent, and he accused you of drugging and killing a Cuban revolutionary.

Is that the man who tried to put the powder in your glass?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. The same man?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. So you switched glasses with him?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I left Kay Janson's house in March 1979 and went to a SACTU house along Lumumba Road in Lusaka, Zambia.

From March to June 1979, ANC and the SACP leaders joined hands trying to drive me to a nervous breakdown. I was helped by an old man, Mr. Mkwanazi, for moral and physical support.

In June 1979, I left the SACTU house after having witnessed senseless killings of South Africans and Zambians at the SACTU house. I saw two boys and a girl being given an injection by Dr. Randaree of the ANC and SACP. Joe Modise and Peter Mosemula would come and cut them open from the chest to the navel. They would be laughing, saying I would soon witness Mr. Mkwanazi being killed the same way. I went into hiding with a Namibian, Siselo Chibeya, who was also hiding from SWAPO.

Senator DENTON. Well, they started to get tough with you again, this time very emphatically. They let you witness senseless killings of South Africans and Zambians.

Miss KAVE. And a Zambian, one Zambian.

Senator DENTON. One Zambian and South Africans.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You saw two boys and a girl being given an injection by Dr. Randaree of the ANC and SACP. Does that mean that they were killed or just knocked out?

Miss KAVE. They were killed.

Senator DENTON. They were killed.

You saw two men come and cut them open from the chest to the navel; while they did this, they were laughing, saying that you would soon see this old man, Mr. Mkwanazi, who had been trying to give you support, you would soon see him being killed the same way?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Siselo Chibeya had done a master's degree in electrical engineering in Czechoslovakia, and had done his thesis in "Safeguards of Nuclear Power Stations."

Senator DENTON. Excuse me, Miss Kave.

The Namibian was hiding from SWAPO, but you were hiding from ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Siselo Chibeya had done a master's degree in electrical engineering in Czechoslovakia, and had done his thesis in "Safeguards of Nuclear Power Stations." SWAPO leadership were telling the membership that Siselo was refusing to manufacture a nuclear bomb for SWAPO and was collaborating with white South Africans. I witnessed many instances where SWAPO members threatened to kill him saying he was a reactionary.

In August 1979, I married Siselo Chibeya in Lusaka, Zambia. This helped me escape from the SACP.

Senator DENTON. You married him which helped you escape from the South African Communist Party?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

In September 1979, Siselo Chibeya was employed as a lecturer by the University of Zambia. In November 1979, his 3-year contract was terminated by the University of Zambia without any reasonable explanation. He tried to appeal to the authorities of the University of Zambia, but all was in vain.

I was a student at the University of Zambia from September to February 1980. After the termination of the contract of Siselo Chibeya, we had nowhere to stay. We forcefully remained at the university flats until November 1980.

In May 1980, I resigned from the ANC. I applied through the office of the representative of UNHCR in Lusaka for a Tanzanian alien travel document to be issued. When it came, it was improper and untidy.

Senator DENTON. You resigned from the ANC in Lusaka?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In June 1980, Ambrose Makiwane, an expelled ANC leader, came to Zambia and informed me about the SACP takeover of the ANC.

Senator DENTON. An expelled ANC leader came to Zambia and told you that the SACP had taken over the ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

That was June 1980?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Two ANC and SACP leaders, Lerule and Nkula came to me and said Ambrose Makiwane, Tennyson Makiwane, and other expelled

ANC Nationalist leaders and characters like me were to be wiped out after the OAU conference at Free Town. I learned from them that Makatini, an ANC and SACP leader who attended the Free Town conference, had been given the go-ahead for the SACP to wipe out all reactionaries in the ANC.

Senator DENTON. So you are now told by two ANC and SACP leaders that you and a number of others like you were to be wiped out after the OAU conference at Free Town. And you learned that Makitini, who attended the Free Town conference, was given the go-ahead to wipe out all reactionaries in the ANC?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. After this OAU conference at Free Town, Tennyson Makiwane was killed by the SACP inside South Africa. The firing and assassination squad was also sent after me, and Siselo Chibeya advised me to leave Zambia as he could not protect me with the SACP and SWAPO following us.

Senator DENTON. So they killed Makiwane?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I have a document which is an excerpt from a publication called "The African Communist," No. 65, second quarter, from page 16 to page 40. The article is entitled "The Enemy Hidden Under The Same Colour." This Communist publication condemns violently the very same man and others, that you say were killed for being anti-Communist?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. So this is a Communist publication which confirms your testimony; it will be entered as part of the record.[1]

Thereafter, Chibeya advised you to leave Zambia since he could not protect you under the circumstances.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. On November 12, 1980, I traveled from Zambia to Botswana by Zambian Airways.

Mosa Ntwana, an ANC and SACP member working for the KGB, fetched me from the airport at Gaberone. Mosa Ntwana had studied mining engineering in the Soviet Union. His father, Abel Ntwana, is a SACP member and a loyal follower of Oliver Tambo.

In late November 1980, I married Mosa Ntwana. I wanted to legalize my stay in Botswana as I feared that the SACP could try to have me deported to South Africa. I did well marrying Mosa Ntwana as the SACP and two Botswana security officers attempted in vain to cause some troubles. Abel Ntwana came out in the open being used by SACP. He went to Mr. Magetsi, who issues Botswana travel documents, and told him not to give me a travel document. He wanted me to go back to the ANC or join the SACP. We became bitter enemies.

Senator DENTON. As I understand it, you were really just trying to save your life so you married Mosa Ntwana?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. In order to legalize your stay in Botswana and to avoid being deported to South Africa?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

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[1] This article appears as exhibit A in the appendix to this hearing.

Senator DENTON. And because of that marriage, they had attempted in vain to cause some troubles?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. This man Ntwana came out in the open, however, being used by this South African Communist Party?

Miss KAVE. The father of the man I married.

Senator DENTON. The father of the man you married came out as being used, and he went to the Botswana travel documents and told them not to give you a travel document. He wanted you to go back to the ANC or join the SACP, so you became bitter enemies of that man.

Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In March 1981, I was issued with the Botswana travel document. I was offered a scholarship by the World University Services of Canada to go to Canada as a landed immigrant through the office of the representative of the UNHCR.

Mosa Ntwana was working at Seleb I Pikwe as from February to April or May in 1981. He had also become an enemy and threatening that the Soviets will not allow me to get away as I was a CIA agent. I was telling him that he was also a KGB agent.

Senator DENTON. So the man you married now has become an enemy?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And he threatens that the Soviets will not allow you to get away because you are a CIA agent. And you are telling him that he was also a KGB agent.

Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I left Seleb I Pikwe in May and went to Gaberone to stay with a Mr. Hlalukana, an expelled ANC member.

Mr. Hlalukana was working with a South African, Bryce Cenge. Cliff Cenge, a brother to Bryce, a SACP member and an assistant of Joe Slovo came from Zambia. He would be boasting that they are going to eliminate Joe Matthews and other reactionaries. Mr. Hlalukana realized that Bryce Cenge had been a plant by SACP and we stopped seeing him. Bryce Cenge was being used by the SACP and Soviets to give false reports to an American Consular Officer, Mr. Benedette.

Senator DENTON. I would like to ask you a question at this point.

You bring up the issue of KGB and CIA, and back on page 2, you were told, according to your statement, you were told by Mr. Sidumo, the ANC man in Botswana, that Steve Biko had been a CIA agent.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. In addition, Ndwandwa had told you that the man was a CIA agent.

In your opinion, was the information which Biko asked you to gather being passed on to U. S. intelligence?

Miss KAVE. No. No, we did not want to be influenced by any foreign country in South Africa. We did not want to—with America or with the Soviet Union. As nationalists, we wanted our struggle to be purely nationalist.

Senator DENTON. I will ask you, and you are under oath, and there will be many checking on this.

Have you ever been an agent of the CIA?

Miss KAVE. No. I do not know anything except that the CIA means Central Intelligence Agency. That is all I know.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In June 1981, Bryce Cenge went to the United States to further his studies. He informed the representative of the UHCR, Mr. Mkanda, that I was dead.

Senator DENTON. He told the representative of the UHCR, the U.N. organization, that you were dead?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In July 1981, Peter Masemula or Mogale, chief commander, stopped me in front of the President Hotel in Gaberone, Botswana. He was threatening me with death, saying nobody will believe my stories about the ANC. He was saying I am from a bourgeois family and they nearly killed my uncle inside South Africa. He was saying even if I outwitted him, I will not pass the Soviet Ambassador, Soldovnikov, in Lusaka.

Senator DENTON. So you were stopped in front of the President Hotel, threatened with death, told that no one would believe your stories about the ANC, accused of being from a bourgeois family, told that they nearly killed your uncle in South Africa, and that even if you outwitted him, you would never get by the Soviet Ambassador, Soldovnikov, in Lusaka?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I reported the incident to the representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Mkanda, and to the administrative secretary at the President's office, Mr. Modima Kwane.

That evening, Mr. Mkanda, the representative of the UNHCR, came to Mr. Hlalukana's place to take me to his house saying he was offering me protection.

The behavior of the representative of the UNHCR, Mr. Mkanda, shocked and disgusted me. He is abusing his position, and with what I experienced at his hands, as a representative of the United Nations, I gained a very negative impression of the United Nations in Southern Africa. He locked me in his house, abused me sexually and mentally, and did nothing to help those who were in danger in Zambia, Tanzania, and Angola.

On Monday following that Friday, I made a phone call to South Africa and told the SACP killings to a journalist friend, as I realized that I was getting weaker and may not leave Botswana alive. This phone call shocked Mr. Mkanda, as he had thought I could not help myself. He had refused to take me to an appointment at the hospital, saying he does not want to be seen with a drug addict. The doctor at the hospital had prescribed Phenobarb because of my nervous state. I learned from the representative of UNHRC, Mr. Mkanda, that he had seen the body of Mr. Mkwanazi and two other ANC rebels. This shocked me a lot as Mr. Mkwanazi had saved my life on many occasions.

Senator DENTON. These are very serious allegations. You say the representative of the UN, Mr. Mkanda, shocked and disgusted you. He used his position, and you gained a very negative impresssion of the UN in South Africa as a result of your experience with him.

That he locked you in his house, having told you that he was going to give you protection, abused you sexually and mentally, and he did nothing as far as, you know, to help those who were in danger in Zambia, Tanzania, and Angola. Is that your statement?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I was told during the course of that week, by Mr. Mkanda, that I would be foolish to refuse CIA and KGB payments if I was offered any. He brought a white man whom he said was from Zimbabwe, and was prepared to pay me. I refused to accept any payment.

Senator DENTON. Do you know if he were going to pay you, if he were prepared to pay you, as a CIA or KGB agent? Do you know which one?

Miss KAVE. This man came to the house, but it was Mkanda who did the talking. This man just sat. Mr. Mkanda said he was a white from Zimbabwe, and he is prepared to pay for all the information that you can give him.

Senator DENTON. So you did not have any direct contact with that man. You were just told that he was going to pay you from what agency?

Miss KAVE. After that, when he had left, Mr. Mkanda left me with that man. That man was also staying in the house. So I called him and informed him about everything, and told him that I don't need money from him, whether he is from CIA or KGB. But he was from Zimbabwe, and I understood he could speak the South African language, so I had made my point to show that he was not a KGB man. He was either white South African or Zimbabwean, maybe, because he could speak Afrikaans, which is a South African language.

I told him everything, and he was worried, saying, "I am in a difficult position, you know, Miss Kave." (He seemed to be playing Devil's advocate.) He said: "He did not tell me all these things that I'm getting from you, and I have got a different perspective in the report from him about you." He was also there—this white man—when Mr. Mkanda was telling about the death of the old man and the others, and I am sure that was the first time that he learned that they were dead.

At that time, I was very insecure, from then, because I had learned of the death of these men I knew and it was a tense situation.

Senator DENTON. You were being offered another temptation about money, and you refused it; is that essentially true?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. Mr. Mkanda then brought another black man whom he said was from Uganda. I learned from this man that he was the Angolan Ambassador in Botswana. He told me that the Socialist countries were to attack South Africa, and then President Reagan would be killed by the PLO in Ottawa, and was advising me to join the Socialist countries or also be killed.

Senator DENTON. I just want to take note for the record that the Soviet Ambassador you mentioned, Soldovnikov, had been the head

of the African Institute at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and later became Ambassador to Zambia.

You have just testified that you learned from another black man who was brought to you, that he was the Angolan Ambassador in Botswana; he told you that the Socialist countries were to attack South Africa; that President Reagan would be killed by the PLO in Ottawa, and he advised you to join the Socialist countries or be killed also.

I would be interested in the time frame, if you can recall, in which that charge was made. Can you recall when the mention of President Reagan's assassination was made to you?

Miss KAVE. The date? You want the date? I can get that.

Senator DENTON. Within a month or so.

Miss KAVE. From what?

Senator DENTON. What month and what year were you told that President Reagan would be killed in Ottawa?

Miss KAVE. It was July. It was early July, when I learned this.

Senator DENTON. July 1981?

Miss KAVE. Yes, 1981.

Senator DENTON. I think it is evident to those with any general memory of the situation, that those were the days during which allegations were being made regarding the danger to the life of our President from Libyan hit teams composed of men of different nationalities. I mention that for the record.

Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I confronted Mr. Mkanda as a multiple agent. He was warning me not to trust Americans. I phoned the American and British Embassies in Botswana asking for protection. In the middle of July 1981 I traveled from Botswana, Lusaka, London, and finally Ottawa in Canada. On my arrival in Ottawa, I reported to the Canadian Security the possible PLO assassination attempt on President Reagan.

Senator DENTON. You reported to the Canadian Security the possible PLO assassination attempt on President Reagan that had been told to you.

Go ahead.

Miss KAVE. I was with the World University Services of Canada representatives in Ottawa for some days. They were bringing some ANC members creating the impression that they were independent South Africans.

The World University Services of Canada then sent me to the University of Calgary in Alberta. Here some other ANC and SACP members were being brought by the World University Services of Canada. I was being told that I should be careful as I was helping the CIA which was collaborating with the white South Africans.

Senator DENTON. When you were told that you should be careful, do you mean that you were warned because they were making the charge that you were helping the CIA, and they were keeping their eye on you?

Miss KAVE. They were not warning me directly. Now, there were the security people who were protecting me, and there were these people who were working with me, inside the African National Congress, and so these people were not coming directly and warning me like that. They were always coming as friends, and telling

me, "Do you not think that what you are doing, you are helping the CIA?"

Senator DENTON. Oh, I see. Your friends were describing your actions as the equivalent of helping the CIA.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In Calgary there was a SWAPO student, Joseph Tokodyo, who started organizing African students against me. I was beaten by a Malawian student, Chris, for defending Coetzee during a boxing match. I realized that I seemed to be in another Socialist country in Canada.

Senator DENTON. Summing up your last statement, when you got to the World University of Canada, you ran into a great number of ANC and SACP members who were being brought to that university, and your overall impression, as a result of your experiences there, was that you were in another Socialist country?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. In that environment?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please go ahead.

Miss KAVE. In September 1981, I phoned my uncle, Charles Sebe, who is Chief of Ciskeian Security, and I revealed all the SACP maneuvers in southern Africa assisted by the Socialist countries. He promised to do everything to get me out of Canada to the United States.

Senator DENTON. And you finally arrived in the United States on the 12th of November 1981?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Miss Kave.

I will have some questions.

Again, I want to express my admiration, not only for your incredible courage, but also for your perseverance, the way you were able to endure all of this, use your wits, and, at the same time, not compromise your conscience.

Miss KAVE. I did not do it all by myself. I do not want to take that credit. I could not have done it by myself. I did it with the others. You know, those who died, and the others who are still in detention camps, and others, who may have been killed. I could not do it all by myself. But I am among those few who managed to get out alive and to tell what had happened. Otherwise they say that nobody who has seen what is happening, should ever leave alive.

So I am just lucky that I managed to get out alive.

Senator DENTON. You ascribe credit to many of those who died or who are in detention camps, and acknowledge your good fortune in being among the very few who have survived so far.

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Have you received any threats, or have any promises made been to you, by anyone, with respect to your testimony before this subcommittee?

Miss KAVE. Threats?

Senator DENTON. In other words, you have been in the United States for sometime. Has anyone directly or indirectly threatened you, or tried to persuade you not to testify here today?

Miss KAVE. No; I have not received any threats.

Senator DENTON. Has the South African Government tried to persuade you, in one direction or the other, regarding your testimony here today?

Miss KAVE. No; they have not persuaded me in any way. They were also, I think, shocked by these things, because when I informed the journalist, they learned about these things inside South Africa.

Senator DENTON. What do you expect is likely to happen to you as a result of your testimony today? How will your circumstances change?

Miss KAVE. Anything may happen to me. I am aware of that, and I took all the risk, knowing what I am expecting. And I expect anything.

My enemies, the people in the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party can do anything to me, and even the white South Africans, because, when I left South Africa, I had been involved in illegal student activities inside, which are regarded as difficult in South Africa.

Senator DENTON. So you expect that reprisals are made more likely as a result of your testimony?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Do you want to return some day to South Africa? And if so, what do you want to do when you get there? What conditions do you want to obtain before you return?

Miss KAVE. I would like to return to South Africa, but there are differences which I have about the political situation in South Africa, and other things which I would say I want to happen. I would like to make it clear that I do not want to be considered as a traitor by my people inside South Africa, the blacks inside South Africa, and black interests in South Africa.

But I do not want to be considered a traitor by blacks or whites, because if I were to work with the South African Communist Party, the whites would consider me a traitor, you know, to the South African cause. I want to let the parents of these children, especially the ones who came in after 1976, and the other African National Congress members who came in the 1960's, know that there is nobody who is left among those people. Those who are still alive, who had been sent for reeducation to prisons in Angola, and a number of our people have been killed. I want to let even the world know that I cannot reconcile my conscience with what the ANC is doing, because they are telling everyone, for instance, that the South Africans raided the ANC bases in Matola in 1980, and they gave a list of the people who supposedly died in that Mozambique raid.

I can tell you that two of those people had long been dead. One died in 1978, and one in 1980 in Zambia, in my presence; and other people, from witnesses whom I know, I have learned that others had died even before that. So I do not want to be blamed by the parents of the children I worked with. I am not going back to South Africa as a peasant, just to be secure, or something like that.

I do not want to be considered like that. But I cannot continue fighting alone against forces which are stronger. The outside struggle is no longer a nationalist struggle, but has become a struggle against the Socialist countries, and now the Socialist countries

have come out in the open to defend the South African Communist Party, and our people are dead.

As I am speaking to you here, I am trying to be brave. I feel like crying. Everybody is dead from 1976. You know, here, this is just a rough summary. I have the details inside, on how everything occurred from 1980 when I left Zambia. People were killed. I was taken by the last boys who said, "We are African men, we can stand and fight, you are a woman. We cannot allow them to kill you. We will try to get you out of here." And like my husband, Chibeya, now as I am seated here, in the last letter he wrote me, he said he had been threatened and threatened with kidnap, but I should go ahead and not stop. So they are almost all dead.

That is why they died trying. Also I heard from the boys what they were doing. They were trying to go and protect me in Botswana, but now I am alive and they have died. And others, our own people, went to Zimbabwe, and we also had to fight back, and we did kill some of the South African Communist Party members who were in Zimbabwe. We did that.

I do not want to lie, because we had to fight back, because of the Soviets. We managed to get the guns which they were using and when this started happening, they expelled the American diplomats from Mozambique and Zambia, saying it was the Americans who were helping us, but we never worked with the Americans.

What we are doing is genuine black politics affecting the political outlook in South Africa.

Senator DENTON. So you run the risk back in your own country of being attacked by those with whom you identify, because they will have been perhaps deceived by false reports about what your activities are?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And at the same time, you run the always present danger of being killed by those whom you really hate, whom you are exposing by your testimony, for having subverted the legitimate origins of the African National Congress and for having turned the ANC to the ends of the international Communist movement. Is that correct?

Miss KAVE. Yes, and SWAPO as well. Because I am not only accusing the African National Congress, SWAPO was involved as well. They expelled Chibeya, and after that, he was kidnapped by—I do not know which—SWAPO or the African National Congress——

Senator DENTON. Can you give the subcommittee any other information on the alleged threat to the life of President Reagan by the PLO in Ottawa?

Miss KAVE. Yes, I did tell more.

Senator DENTON. You have told the staff of the subcommittee that you also learned of the PLO plot against President Reagan from Oliver Tambo's bodyguard. What was the name of the body guard of Oliver Tambo, who passed on this information to you, do you recall?

Miss KAVE. People do not use their real names. They usually use the nicknames, that is all, military names that they given. He is called Shuta.

Senator DENTON. Did you have any evidence that those PLO people had a connection to Libya?

Miss KAVE. Yes. You must understand I had learned in Zambia, where I was involved, that the ANC worked with everybody who is from the National Liberation Movements, assisted by the Soviet Union. So even in Zambia, for instance, the other thing that I had to escape from in Zambia, was what they call the firing and assassination squad. The firing and assassination squad is comprised of—it has groups, there is the group of the African National Congress members—that it is called the security department. When members of the South African Communist Party, and members of Communist Parties from other countries, even West European—they have their members involved too, like Kay Janson—and other people from the Communist Party of the United States, and the Communist Party of Britain, for instance, when they are combined with the South African Communist Party—these Communist Party members from West and East European countries—they are called the firing and assassination squad. When it is only people who are trusted, from the South African Communist Party, the other ANC members are not treated by the Soviets—then it is the third group, called an extension wing of the KGB.

That group is usually dominated by the Palestine National Liberation Organization, because these are the best assassins.

Senator DENTON. All sorts of Communist organizations from different countries are involved?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I wonder, after you have read our newspapers for a while, whether you have come to the conclusion that we are understanding the situation in South Africa. Would you care to comment?

Miss KAVE. You are poorly informed.

Senator DENTON. We are poorly informed?

Miss KAVE. Poorly informed. And what information you are given, from what I hear, on what it is like in South Africa, the reports are prepared by the Soviets.

Senator DENTON. We are given prepared reports by the Soviets?

Miss KAVE. Yes. What is happening in southern Africa, the Americans are not aware. Even when some American diplomats were expelled from Mozambique, they did not understand, they did not know that we were fighting in Zambia, and they were said to be the ones organizing this net. The Zambians did not give reasons, they just told them then to leave the country. Many things which are happening in Zambia, which I was accused of being a part of—I was accused of trying to assassinate President Kaunda—it was actually done by the South African Communist Party, and later the story was changed. They changed the whole thing, and said it was the CIA and the Western countries you know, but with me having been persuaded to be part of that. I came to know of this. I changed—we changed—the whole thing, and some Palestinian Liberation Organization and SACP people were killed by our own people in Zambia. When the whole thing erupted, President Kaunda did not know who was trying to kill him, and he started saying it was the Americans, and we did not have access to him, to tell him exactly what was happening. His own security people have

proven that they were working with the Soviets, and they said what sounded better—that it was the white South Africans and white Zimbabweans who were doing the SACP killings—when all the time it was our own people who killed the South African Communist Party members, and other Communist members.

Senator DENTON. Miss Kave, you have been talking rather rapidly. I hope the recorder is able to get most of this.

I talked rapidly when I was returned from a Communist country. Having had the experience hundreds of times of reading a report from Moscow, which I knew to be a lie, and then 2 days later seeing the same paragraphs in the English version of the Hanoi Communist propaganda, and then less than week later seeing similar paragraphs in the American press, I can understand the earnestness and the rapidity with which you are testifying. I do not know why it happens. I went through a similar experience with a similar response of dismay and frustration.

Would you describe further the 6-week confinement in the psychiatric hospital in more detail?

Please talk about what kind of treatment you received in the psychiatric ward.

Miss KAVE. Yes. It is a long story. I will try to be very brief, and try to bring out the main points.

Senator DENTON. And if you speak more slowly, please. Your English is excellent but the speed sometimes make it difficult to understand.

Miss KAVE. OK. I will try to cover briefly what I consider the main points.

At the language center at Kishenev in the Soviet Union, these three men were coming in the evenings, and giving me injections, and this went on from—at least September—it started, on September 12—I think.

From September then, when I had come there, it went on until late November, these injections, and it really affected me. I was afraid then, and I kept noticing the presence of one of these men who gave me the injections, around the language center building, and I had become very afraid of him. One day our mathematics teacher became sick, and this man came to the classroom to teach mathematics, and he kept on coming nearer to me, and he saw that I was very afraid of him, and one time while I was sitting there he just came nearer, I do not know exactly, whether he took out a pen or what, but I just jumped from the chair, and I fell, and I ran to the door, and started crying. After that they called a doctor, but the doctor said there was nothing wrong with me.

I was allowed to go to my room after the medical examination, and after the examination when I was in the room, my political teacher came and said: "Do not think that we are giving this treatment to you because we do not like you, but we have got information from your Party, the African National Congress, that you are a CIA agent." This was the first time I knew that the ANC, had said—that I was a CIA agent to the Soviet authorities.

I told this woman then: "Why do you think you should be teaching Marxism-Leninism to a CIA agent?" She said: "I am working for the KGB, and if they ever know that I told you that you are a

CIA agent, I will be killed." I said: "I do not care. I also will be killed. We can be killed together."

From then on I did not go to any further classes. I asked Lubov: "Why do you not kill me quickly? I have had enough of this slow death. Why do you not kill me soon?" So then I refused to go for the classes of Marxism-Leninism.

I had a boyfriend from Burundi, and this boyfriend was sent by the teachers, and this woman Lubov, to tell me that I needed a medical certificate to be excused from my attendance at the classes, and that I should go and get it. So a few days later, he came in with the dean of the school, and another woman, you know, another lady teacher, and they took me to a hospital in Kishenev. After we had arrived at the hospital, the dean and the woman teacher remained in the car. Inside we waited in the corridor, and were standing there for some time, until a doctor came out of the room.

After some time, while we were there, a number of doctors went into the same room, and they called my friend from Burundi, and they said I should stay outside. After about 15 minutes he came out again and said: "They want to talk to you." I said: "I do not know Russian." And he said: "No, they understand English, they said they understand English."

So I went in. These doctors were sitting in two semicircles and there was a chair in front, and I was made to sit there. They were quiet for some time, and after that asked me three questions—they said three things.

They said first: "Why are you refusing to attend classes?" Before I could answer, another one asked me: "Why do you want to commit suicide?" I just looked at them, and some stood up and one said: "You need reeducation." They started walking toward the door.

Then two soldiers came in the door and held me, and took me out and drove me to the outskirts of Kishenev. They were not talking, these soldiers, on the way, they were just driving—one man was driving, and two soldiers were sitting next to me.

At the place where we went first, I was told to start taking off my clothes. After some time I was given clothes, I can say a night dress—a hospital nightgown.

Senator DENTON. Pajamas, hospital gown?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And then I was given some push-in (slip-on) sandals.

Senator DENTON. Given what?

Miss KAVE. Push-in sandals, and they were big. Then they checked the inside of my mouth, I was made to open my mouth, and this woman checked inside. There were other people in the room screaming, down on the floor.

Senator DENTON. Screaming, on the floor?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Speaking in Russian, and another one shouting lying on the floor. From there, we were taken in a car to another building. It was there that I got, you know, the treatments.

Senator DENTON. Would you please move closer to that microphone?

Miss KAVE. Yes, it was to this second place that I was now taken, and because I had missed lunch, I was offered bread, and I said: "I

do not want any bread." After some time I was taken—by the—people there—they came and took some blood. They knew a little bit of English. And after some time, later in the evening, I was taken to a big room, and there was one bed, and some chairs, and I was left by the nurses—they call them nurses, but they all have the same medical coats. You cannot tell who is the nurses. I was left there by the nurses. Later that evening, many doctors, 20—I realized 20 came, and they were about 15 women, 15 women and about 5 men—and after that they told me to take off my clothes. They could speak English as well. Very well.

Senator DENTON. Fifteen women and five men?

Miss KAVE. Yes, old women. Mainly old women.

Senator DENTON. And they told you to take off your clothes, all of them?

Miss KAVE. Yes, and I was just left, and told to lie on the bed. Then they then asked me, they said they wanted to get my own opinion about the ANC leaders, ANC individual leaders.

Senator DENTON. You are lying on the straw bed, naked, and they are asking you questions about what you think about the ANC leaders?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And I give them exactly what I told you.

First, I told them that I do not know much about ANC leaders. I had not been a member of the ANC in South Africa, I just met them outside the country. So they asked: "What you have experienced and what you think of them?" So I told them. This went on for about 1 week, they were now asking details and they were taking notes as I was talking about this.

Senator DENTON. They are interrogating you under increasingly intimidating circumstances?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And they were coming only in the evenings. During the day, they were not. I was only made to remain in the room and I was made to go to the place where the immates were eating, through the kitchen where food was being given. At this place I was not allowed to take any soup. They had soup and some other things. I was told to take only bread, you know, and tea without milk, without sugar. And they were saying that I had to learn to be a revolutionary. So, all the time I was at that place, I had only bread, you know, and tea.

They went on like that all that week, and during that week, they also brought corpses in plastics.

Senator DENTON. Corpses in plastics?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And put them in my room—one would be near the door.

Senator DENTON. Put them in your room in various places? Put one in bed with you, did you say?

Miss KAVE. Later. But, first, they put one next to the door and put another one just next to the bed, and they would always be kicking them, saying: "This is what we do to reactionaries."

Senator DENTON. This is what we do to what?

Miss KAVE. To reactionaries.

Senator DENTON. Reactionaries?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And after some time, I realized that these were corpses, although I could not see through—it was not a translucent plastic—I could realize. So, one day, I pretended that I do not real-

ize that these are corpses. So one time they told the men to put one of them next to me on the bed, and they said: "Do you want to feel?" I said yes. And I felt. They said: "You see, this is what we do to people." And they said: "Do you fear corpses?" I said: "I do not usually fear corpses, I fear living people because they are dangerous."

I am trying to be brief. They were telling me some things which I had told the Dane (Kay Janson) about the students' activities. They had all the reports about what I had told the Dane about student activities inside South Africa. They were asking me about the whites in South Africa who had taught me political science in South Africa, and they asked me what I was taught about Marx and Lenin? I said one time that I was told that they were utopian in their politics. That annoyed them very much. They were saying: "You should not listen to imperialistic lies from those whites in South Africa who told you what you are saying." And they said I had been brainwashed by the whites in South Africa, and that those whites told me that because they were supporters of Nazi Germany who fled to South Africa. And after that, that ended.

Senator DENTON. Excuse me. I am required to go vote at this point. I wanted to make certain that I have some points clear.

These opaque bags containing the corpses—they put one in your bed to make sure that it was a corpse and they asked you how frightened you were and you said you did not fear corpses. You were given a number of injections, which caused you to go blind temporarily?

Miss KAVE. Yes. One of them did that.

Senator DENTON. Were you ever raped and if so, how often and over what period of time?

Miss KAVE. How it happened was that they told me, for instance, that I should work with people like Joe Slovo. I said: "He is a white South African, and you said we are fighting the whites in South Africa." They tried to tell me that—I seemed not to think that whites are people and that they were going to reeducate me and show me that whites are also people. And I was given, you know, injections. I was given an injection here [indicating]. They said my blood is weak—they had been taking blood specimens from me—so now they were saying that my blood is weak and they are going to give me calcium. So the first day they gave me the calcium—they said it was calcium—I started not seeing properly. I became bleary in my sight. And on the second day they came and give me——

Senator DENTON. The calcium that they gave you caused you to lose your sight?

Miss KAVE. They said it was calcium. And they gave it to me the second time, and after the second time, I could not see anything. After that, they could come and, you know, make me have sex with whites, and say that I should know that whites are people also. And they also said that——

Senator DENTON. Whites are people also?

Miss KAVE. That they are also people. Whites are also people.

Senator DENTON. And they forced you to have sex with them to show you that as a lesson?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And after that, they would laugh and say: "We have photos of you, you know, and what we are going to show these photos."

Senator DENTON. So they took photos of the sexual activity and said you could be exposed through blackmail by those photographs?

Miss KAVE. Yes, saying that now I have really become a revolutionary, I am having sex with whites. And after that, they then——

Senator DENTON. Excuse me, Miss Kave. I will have to go vote. I will turn the questioning over to Mr. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director, and I shall return as soon as I finish voting.

Mr. LISKER. Miss Kave, with respect to your confinement to the mental hospital, you had indicated that you were given a series of two injections which caused you to lose your sight and thereafter you were forced to have sexual relations with different individuals over a period of a week. Were they different people or the same person, and if they were different, how could you tell?

Miss KAVE. They were different. The way I could tell, the way that it was different, you know, the weights.

Mr. LISKER. The weight of the individuals?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And I could feel their hair. I was moving my hands and I could feel their hair—whites.

Mr. LISKER. They were white people?

Miss KAVE. Yes. I could tell from the hair.

Mr. LISKER. By the texture of their hair?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. What sort of nourishment were you given during this period?

Miss KAVE. I was given bread, you know, bread and tea only, throughout my stay at that place.

Mr. LISKER. Throughout the entire period of your confinement, you were given only bread and tea to eat?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Did you become ill as a result of lack of nourishment?

Miss KAVE. Yes. My gums, you know, were swollen, and I was not allowed to clean my teeth. My mouth and gums were really swollen.

Mr. LISKER. Did you develop scurvy?

Miss KAVE. I do not know. My gums, it was the gums would be so bleeding.

Mr. LISKER. Were you given any citrus products, any fruits to eat?

Miss KAVE. No. I ate only bread.

Mr. LISKER. Only bread. Bread and tea?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Would you describe in detail the murders which you witnessed in the SACTU house, which is the South African Congress of Trade Unions, prior to June of 1979?

Miss KAVE. Yes. We were at the SACTU house. There is a plain house and seven squatters huts in back. So the old man is Mkwanazi and myself, we are staying in one of these seven squatters huts. We were taken the first evening—late in the evening—they came in, and we were told to go to the main house. At the main house there was Dr. Randaree, an ANC man, and Joe Modise. And they

brought in a boy—they were working with this boy in the house—and we were sitting here with this old man. And after that, Dr. Randaree, who is an ANC member and in the Communist Party, he started asking me if I think I am going to get away, after knowing about what he is doing here? He had asked me to do some research about loans before I left to go to the Soviet Union. He had asked me to make a report from Zambian local newspapers of loans which were given to Zambia by the Western countries. So I had done that for him. So now he was mentioning those loans, do I think I am going to get away, and tell people about his activities After that, Peter Mosemula, who is an ANC leader and military man, started interrogating the boy and started asking him what message, "what message were you given by the South African Security, to whom were you giving that message here in the organization?" This boy was denying that he had got any message from white South Africans. And, after that, Mosemulas said: "You young South Africans, you think you are intelligent, or you think you are going to do what you like here within this ANC. Now, we are going to show you."

After that, there were many things which they said which I do not want to go into detail about. They lifted the boy, and he was in a round chair, round wooden chair. So they came to him, and he was trying to get up. They held him, and Dr. Randaree gave him the injection, and after that, they took off his clothes.

Mr. LISKER. Did the injection kill him?

Miss KAVE. No.

Mr. LISKER. He was still alive, but he was unconscious?

Miss KAVE. Yes. He slowly went unconscious. He slowly went unconscious.

After that, there was a table, a steel table——

Mr. LISKER. Kitchen table?

Miss KAVE. Steel table. Yes, it is not steel but——

Mr. LISKER. But this was taking place in the kitchen?

Miss KAVE. In the kitchen of the SACTU house, and they brought another table and put two tables together. They joined these two tables. And after that—after taking off the boy's clothes, they put him on the table, and then Modise went into another room and brought knives.

Mr. LISTER. What kind of knives?

Miss KAVE. Big knives. And we were afraid because we did not know, although it was directed at the boy, it could have been us. And he started—he went—you know, to the heart, started from the heart, just cut the boy, and blood started falling from the table.

Mr. LISKER. Were you watching this?

Miss KAVE. Yes, I was watching. I was watching.

And after some time, I was—I went—I was shocked, I just went and held this old man. And after then, when we were to leave the room, I saw that he was open from the navel upward to the stomach here. After, they were telling me that I am going to see the old man—them doing the same thing to the old man. And the second day, they brought a girl. They brought a girl. The first boy, I had understood because in the interviews he was speaking to them in Sotho, a South African local language. So, the second night, we were again taken from the bed, and now they brought a girl, and

the gentleman who was the ANC military man was kissing this girl. They were talking with this girl in her language.

Mr. LISKER. Did she know from the conversation what was about to happen to her?

Miss KAVE. No; she did not know. She seemed not to be aware of what was going to happen to her.

They were speaking in this language, which was the Zambian dialect, and I later asked the old man who knew Zambian, what the girl was speaking—it was a local Zambian language—and after that talking, Randaree also injected this girl, who was trying also to resist. And after that, it was during some killings of girls in Zambia that this thing was happening. And on the third night, they brought another boy, and with this boy they asked him—it was a different boy. I do not remember exactly what he was asked about now. He was also denying, saying I do not know anything, and also speaking in Sotho. He was not speaking in any language but Sotho, which is a local language. The thing went the same way. By now, I was looking, and they were saying: "You seem to be strong. You are not affected."

I became angry. I felt that anything could happen to us. But the old man that evening, and some other people, they decided that we had to move from the house, from the SACTU house. And I and other people were also outside during all this time that these things were happening. So these people knew that they were killing them, and said if they die inside the house, we are going to fight right here in Zambia, and we will all die right here. But this thing was happening with people coming in the evening, and our own people watching from outside, saying we cannot do anything. These people have got the Zambian security and Zambian police who can go and report anybody.

So the old man told me to marry Chibeya, and that is how I made that sacrifice.

Mr. LISKER. So you witnessed three murders at the SACTU house?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. By these two men?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Three nights in a row?

Miss KAVE. Yes. And that affected me. I was taken by a Zambian woman to a hospital. And after then, you know, when I realized that I cannot stay any more, I moved out of the SACTU house.

Mr. LISKER. You mentioned the theory of confusion of forces that Florence Maposho had told you about. Could you briefly explain the theory of confusion of forces within South Africa.

Miss KAVE. I was told by Florence Maposho about it, and I later learned from that man who brought the KGB man to the university, he told me about it the whole evening. This is a Soviet—Socialist—strategy in southern Africa, how to set people within an organization or within a government against each other, to the point where they would not know who is the enemy, whom they are fighting. You had to get the facts about everything and then evaluate, and then try to get the people inside, into the enemy camp and know exactly what they are doing, what the other side is doing, and use that against them. And if you want to eliminate both sides,

people would say, you bring up your own Communists—they would bring up their own Communist leaders or the ones they wanted to use.

Mr. LISKER. So, basically, it is tactics by which infiltration is used to set one faction against the other faction? Exploit the differences?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Do you speak some Russian?

Miss KAVE. A little bit, I do.

Mr. LISKER. Did you learn Russian in Russia?

Miss KAVE. Yes. At the language center.

Mr. LISKER. How did you feel when you realized that the ANC and SACTU had a relationship with the PLO? I mean you apparently were not aware of that.

Miss KAVE. Yes. Not only with the PLO, it was with the PLO and many other opposition parties in Africa. I felt really betrayed, and I felt that I did not want to be part of what I did not believe in. And I also realized when I left South Africa, and when I later joined the African National Congress, I thought that I was joining a national liberation movement, and it was while I was within the ANC that I realized that they are a Communist Party. And I later found out that in working together with the PLO and other southern African opposition parties that we are—you know, we are—undermining the stabilizing elected governments in southern Africa, not only, you know, in southern Africa, but northern Africa, and in the independent countries, and I realized I did not want to be part of international terrorism, and communism. In South Africa, I was always believing that the ANC is a national liberation movement. I believed that they had some working relationship with the Communist Party but that not everybody within the African National Congress is a Communist.

Now, I believe that people are blackmailed to be Communists, and the worst thing that I could not reconcile with was working with other known terrorist organizations, they may be fighting maybe for a just cause in their countries, but I do not have the facts about the history of those countries.

Mr. LISKER. Is Kay Janson, whom you described in your statement, a KGB agent?

Miss KAVE. Yes; he never made it a secret to me. He told it to me, before I even went to the Soviet Union that he had been to the Komosol. He went to South Africa as well. He took some pictures in South Africa, and when he brought them to Zambia, he told me that these are military installations in South Africa, and he was going to sell the pictures to Pravda. I asked him: "Do you not think that it is dangerous for you to sell South African military installations to the Soviets?"

That was when he was saying that I was a bloody nationalist, I did not seem to be a revolutionary.

Mr. LISKER. You are presently a fugitive from South African justice. In your statement you say that you organized the funeral of Steve Biko. But was there not some evidence that he was murdered by the South Africans?

Miss KAVE. Yes. Yes. That is how we feel, but we know better who was fighting who, that there was also a contribution by our very own people, because of the differences in the leadership. Some

of our own leaders gave false reports to the South Africans about what "Black Consciousness" stood for.

Everybody regarded the "Black Consciousness" as people who hated whites, and wanted to kill whites in South Africa, and people who were pro ANC gave these reports to the South African Security.

Mr. LISKER. What is it that you did at Mr. Biko's funeral that caused you to have to flee to Port Elizabeth? You say you were wanted by the Security Police. What did you do?

Miss KAVE. During the week, you know, before the funeral, and on the night of the—before the day of the funeral, there were many of the youths, the "Black Nationalist" youths, and we met and I spoke about the enemy that we were facing. Biko brought to our attention that he was going to die, and when he died, we did not finally know who had killed him, because after an American Senator had come to South Africa, and talked to Steve Biko, the CIA label, you know, was given to him, because some people felt that he should not have met this Senator.

So he had always brought this dissension to our attention, that we were getting in the "Black Consciousness Movement." The organization was getting divided. So at that meeting before his funeral I was doing some of these things, breaking up the political. . . .

[At this point Senator Denton returned to the hearing.]

Mr. LISKER. Miss Kave was explaining what she had done at Steve Biko's funeral——

Miss KAVE. We were against any foreign ideology. What we stand for should be a genuine, wholly African, political outlook, and political culture, and our own African outlook, through politics which is different from what Americans and the Western countries are standing for.

We have this uniqueness of Africa, which we do not want to overlook, when we engage in politics, our background, our culture, we want to retain, this is why we are still moving into politics.

Mr. LISKER [continuing]. Is the Black Consciousness Movement a black version of apartheid? Is it for blacks only, or coloreds, nonwhites only?

Miss KAVE. When you say blacks, blacks in the southern African situation, and in Black Consciousness, it means the Africans, the coloreds, and the Indians—those people who are not classified in South Africa as whites. These are the people who are trying to organize, who should organize themselves politically and culturally.

Mr. LISKER. To become a political force, and a cultural force in the white man's world?

Miss KAVE. We do not become a lost force. The leadership, on certain occasions, can meet and work together, when they have to; groups can work separately because even among the coloreds and Indians, and Africans, at times, we do not always have the same problems. We are acknowledging in South Africa that where we have similar problems we can work together, but in the political arena in South Africa, we felt that we could work loosely as the cultures would differ.

Each group could come in and work with its cultural group alone.

Senator DENTON. I think I know the answers to some of these questions, and you can make them quite brief. But I want to get the questions and answers on the record.

In your opinion, does the ANC represent the people of South Africa?

Miss KAVE. It is difficult to say. It is difficult now to say, to explain to any outsider what the African National Congress is, because what is here, for example, known as the African National Congress is not the African National Congress.

When the African National Congress was formed in 1912, in South Africa, it was meant to unite the African people, and only Africans, not coloreds, and Indians were supposed to be members of the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was supposed to harmonize——

Senator DENTON. Excuse me, Miss Kave, we have reviewed that in previous hearings. We understand that. I should reword the question.

In your opinion, does the ANC, with the leadership it has today, with the composition of the leadership, such as it is, do you regard it as representing the people of South Africa?

Miss KAVE. You should say the South African Communist Party, the African National Congress has been taken over by the Communists.

Senator DENTON. The African National Congress, in terms of its leadership, in terms of its effect, has been taken over by the South African Communist Party?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And you have made it clear that all members of the African National Congress are not dedicated to, or satisfied with the organization as it presently exists?

Miss KAVE. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What is the Namibia Institute to which you referred on page 4 of your statement?

Miss KAVE. This is a United Nations school, it is a school, it is not a college. It is a United Nations school, run for Namibians, to give Namibians technical skills, and it is in Zambia.

Senator DENTON. Back in February 1977, Steve Biko advised you to go to two other cities, to learn more about the ANC and the SACP. Was it not an intelligence assignment to gather information for the Black Consciousness Movement, to gain more information about how the ANC and SACP were related, in order to assess the effects that that relationship might have on the Black Consciousness Movement?

Is that generally why he wanted you to go?

Miss KAVE. Yes, to learn more about the history of the African National Congress, and South African Communist Party, as both, you know, both organizations are banned in South Africa, and you can only learn about their history from individuals.

Senator DENTON. There are a number of people dissatisfied with the ANC. You have established that. You resigned from the organization, but you had a lot of pressure on you. You already had had a great deal of punishment and abuse.

Are there many in the ANC who are dissatisfied with it, who are able to resign or are they faced with a very complex situation?

Are they able to resign, if they wish to? That is the basic question.

Miss KAVE. They are not allowed to resign.

Senator DENTON. They are not allowed to resign?

Miss KAVE. They have a saying, once a member, always a member. So you are not allowed. I got married, you know, this was one of the conditions, the Namibian had to force them, for me, to leave politics. He was then a member of SWAPO, and they were checking on him, but he said that he is going to use me within SWAPO, that I would work within SWAPO politics.

Otherwise, other members are not allowed to resign.

Senator DENTON. You have stated what you think might happen to you, and you have talked about your prospects if you were to return to Africa.

What do you think would happen to other disillusioned or dissident members of the ANC if they were to return to South Africa? Are they under generally the same kind of dangers you are?

Miss KAVE. Yes. They are facing the same danger. The situation, and we are also placed in this situation where we cannot get out.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Miss Kave, for your enlightening testimony. We may address written questions to you after this hearing, and request that we receive replies within 30 days.

Upon conclusion of this hearing today, there will be an opportunity for the press, for 10 minutes, to ask Miss Kave questions. Again, I want to express my admiration for you, Miss Kave.

Senator East has requested that an article from "The African Communist," 3d quarter, 1980, be made a part of the record. It shows the official SACP/Soviet view of terrorism of "armed struggle"; in it, it is also stated that armed struggle may be an effective tactic of revolution because of assistance from the "Socialist community" (that is, U.S.S.R. and allies).

I also want to make a part of the record chapter 4 of a monograph, "The Soviet Strategy of Terror" by Samuel T. Francis, which discusses the role of "national liberation" and the importance of natural resources in Soviet strategy.

Finally, I want to insert into the record two checklists of Communist parties and fronts, and national liberation movements.[1]

Tomorrow morning, we will resume the hearing with the witness who did not have time to testify today, Mr. Ephraim Mfalapitsa, a former member of the African National Congress. His testimony will relate to similar events, but will focus on the East German involvement, and his training in East Germany.

This hearing stands in recess; the subcommittee will continue an examination of the same issues tomorrow, March 25.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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[1] These documents are inserted in the appendix to this hearing as exhibits B, C, and D.

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

[From the African Communist, No. 65, 2d quarter]

"The Enemy Hidden Under The Same Colour"

Statement of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party on the racist and anti-Communist activities of the group of eight recently expelled from the African National Congress.

'the other face is that of the indirect and secondary enemy, who presents himself under the cover of a nationalist and even as a revolutionary thus making it difficult to identify him . . . THE FIGHTER MUST DISTINGUISH FRIEND FROM FOE EVEN IF THE LATTER IS CONCEALED UNDER THE SAME COLOUR, LANGUAGE, FAMILY TIES OR TRIBAL MARKINGS AS THEIR OWN, EVEN IF HE RAISES HIS FLAG WITH US'.

— President Samora Machel.

South Africa's press has given a great deal of space to anti-Communist, anti-ANC and racist propaganda with which it has been fed by the group of eight who were recently expelled from the ANC for persistently betraying its political and organisational principles. For the enemy this group's campaign against the people's struggle could not have come at a better moment. It fits in very well with the Vorster government's desperate attempts to find black collaborators both inside and outside the country, in order to break up the unity of the liberation forces and to cover its criminal aggression against our brothers in Angola. Times are changing and our ruling class is being forced to find new ways to keep white power alive. Both inside and outside

South Africa it desperately needs the Savimbis and the Holden Robertos, to divide the people under banners of so-called nationalism, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, and thus to prevent true liberation. Vorster and BOSS Chief van den Bergh must indeed be satisfied to see how well *their* cause is being served by this group of renegades from the ANC who are capturing so many headlines in the racist press.

The issues on which they have chosen to attack the liberation movement are as old as the struggle itself. The slander that the ANC is run by the Communist Party is not something new: it has always been spread by the racists and those who act as their agents. And it has always been designed to weaken the people's struggle. As early as the 1920s, liberals like Balli iger helped destroy the ICU by raising the banner of anti-Communism, and spreading scare stories about 'Communist take-overs'. In the late 50s, the break-away PAC group also used the white liberal parrot-cry that 'the Communists were running the ANC' in an attempt to destroy it.

The principled stand of the ANC against the so-called 'homelands' policy has been attacked by the Bantustan collaborators as 'Marxist-inspired' and the creation of Communists who 'dominate the ANC'. The latest tragic example of the way racists and reactionaries act together to exploit this kind of slander, is in Angola. There, a few doomed black collaborators are again raising these cries together with Vorster and his Western imperialist allies, in a hopeless attempt to destroy Angola's newly-won independence, and to discredit its undoubted leaders - the MPLA.

GHETTO 'NATIONALISM'

Erecting obstacles in the way of the unity of all revolutionaries has also always been the tactic of South African white supremacists. It is for this reason that they devised a law (the Prohibition of Political Interference Act) to prevent Africans, Indians, Coloureds and whites from working together. Now the group of 8, like the PAC clique before them, are shouting 'poqo' (we alone) for the same reason. Under the guise of an admirable claim to be building the unity of the African people, they spread racialism and a Savimbi kind of nationalism. They cover their real purpose by pretences about what they call 'a unity be-

tween equals'. We shall show later that in fact they clearly want to exclude even proven revolutionaries who are not African from any form of collective participation in the ANC's External Mission, on grounds of race alone. Like Vorster, they believe that the place of a Coloured and an Indian is to work only in his own ghetto amongst his own people. The race character of their so-called nationalism is revealed further in their statement that it is the duty of non-Africans in the struggle to 'humble themselves'. This is clearly the language of racism not of comradeship or revolutionary nationalism.

White supremacists have always shown their contempt for the African people in their insulting belief that Africans are inferior and will invariably play a secondary role if they work with Coloureds, Indians or whites. In exactly this spirit, this group of 8 scream 'manipulation' and 'domination' at the very thought that Coloured, Indian or white revolutionaries should work side by side with Africans. For example, the ANC's Revolutionary Council is overwhelmingly African in composition including in its ranks only one Indian, one Coloured and one white, and with 100% African membership at its Headquaters. According to this group, this is enough to put the Revolutionary Council 'under the hegemony' of the 'clique of non-Africans'.

BIRDS OF A FEATHER

Indeed, on this question of liberation unity, as on so many others, the group of 8 find themselves repeating (sometimes word for word) the mouthings of those whom they have themselves, until very recently, condemned as traitors to the cause of African liberation. Refer, for example, to the recent statement by the group of 8 read on their behalf by Tennyson Makiwane to an invited audience in London in December 1975, which not surprisingly included well-known PAC leaders. It is certainly no accident that there is such striking similarity between the words used in that statement, and those used by Leballo in 1958 justifying the PAC break-away of that year.

LEBALLO (all quotes from *CONTACT*, 1st November 1958):
'The leaders (of the ANC) . . . do not want to see the emergence of an African nationalism. Subscribing as they do to the myth that this is a

class struggle, they see an obstacle in nationalism.'

GROUP of 8:
The 'non-African clique' who have 'highjacked the ANC' have attempted 'to substitute a class approach for the national approach to our struggle.'

LEBALLO:
'The present ANC leadership both national and Transvaal, is dominated by . . . people of leftist inclination.'

GROUP of 8:
'The SACP relies entirely on using the ANC as its . . . front organisation.'

LEBALLO:
'If the Indians, for example, are also an oppressed group they should unite and fight as an Indian group.'

GROUP of 8:
The 'clique of non-Africans, rather than spend time organising their own people, has sought to impose its hegemony . . .'

LEBALLO:
'Since the advent of the present ANC leadership, a fetish has been made of loyalty to the leadership as such.'

GROUP of 8:
'Criticism of official ANC policy and practice has come to be regarded within the leadership circles as nothing less than treason.'

And so on and so forth.

It is not surprising that the group of 8 find themselves in that kind of company, echoing the ancient and discredited PAC politics.

Who are the leaders of this new group of splitters? Amongst them are some who not long ago were found guilty of organising factional groups in the ANC, and were removed from positions of responsibility in the organisation for that reason. Their persistent efforts to return to positions in the leadership (at the same time refusing to accept the organisation's discipline) have been frustrated by the rank-and-file in the African National Congress which has nothing but contempt for their political and personal past. So now (with London as their base)

they spread the malicious lie that their exclusion is all due to a conspiracy by the 'Communists' and a 'non-African clique'. They have spent some years gathering together a motley collection of dissidents whose history is only too well-known. Most of them have made many somersaults in their chequered political careers, always following what seemed to serve their ambitions at the given moment. Some of them have been Communists at some time and anti-Communists at others; some, racialists at times and multi-racialists at others; tribalists and African nationalists; strongly pro-Soviet, and equally strongly anti-Soviet and pro-China. Some of the loudest so-called nationalists amongst them were activists of the white-led Liberal ARM when they were in South Africa; not of the ANC or its military wing Umkhonto. Some of them are not new to factional activities within the ANC, and have in their time attempted to use both Communist Party attitudes and anti-Communist Party attitudes to advance their personal careers. Included in this group of 8 are two gentlemen who in 1969 secured their own safety by giving evidence for the prosecution against Dorothy Nyembe and other comrades of the ANC in Pietermaritzburg, helping to send them to jail for decades.

The reason this group now attacks the ANC more openly than ever before is not because the ANC has changed since they were in the leadership. But because they sense the prospect of new advances of the liberation struggle, new break throughs in the new favourable conditions created by the people's victories in the last year or two. And they want desperately to be at the top once again. They play on ignorance, and make their main appeal to prejudice and political backwardness. They distort the truth of the history of our movement, and exploit the problems which have faced it during the difficult period after 1963.

AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

We will deal more specifically with some of their main distortions; but first it is important to emphasise that, like the PAC before them, this group is the expression of a political trend which seeks to dilute and eliminate the revolutuionary content of South Africa's liberation struggle. Basically it wants the ANC to return to a type of nationalism which serves only a small elite and not the masses of the oppressed.

people. The social base for this tendency is to be found amongst those classes and groups within the oppressed who seek the kind of 'liberation' which will, at best, replace the white exploiter with a black exploiter. It is the unequivocal rejection of this type of 'nationalism' which gives a special revolutionary quality to such movements as FRELIMO and MPLA. The Simangos of Mozambique and the Savimbis of Angola also in their time paraded under slogans of 'true black nationalism', anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism, etc. They accused FRELIMO and MPLA of being dominated by Marxists, by minorities, and by persons of mixed blood. But in the course of the revolutionary struggle they soon showed their true colours by becoming open collaborators with the oppressor. Our Party is made the special target of this sort of attack precisely because it always exposes the kind of 'nationalism' which only fights the enemy in words, but helps it in action. It is an insidious 'nationalism' because it attempts to use the people's justified grievances and their hatred of the oppressor not against the enemy but against the people's interests, against comrades in the struggle, and against revolutionary unity.

The policy of our Party on the national question in South Africa is well known. Its essentials are contained in the Programme adopted at an underground Party conference in Johannesburg in 1962. We pioneered the concept that the main content of the present phase of the South African revolution is the liberation of the African people. For this reason we have always recognised that the leading role in the liberation front is played by the national organisation of the African majority, the ANC. But unlike the Liberals we understand that racism is not just a human failing; it has roots in the system of capitalism and in South Africa especially in the economic exploitation of the black working class. We believe too that the working class is, in the words of our Programme,

> '. . . the disciplined and advanced class which has no property stakes in present-day South Africa and has been the core and inspiration of other classes in every struggle of our time. The working class seeks a close alliance with the rural people; and with the urban middle classes and intellectuals in the national democratic revolution. *Only under its leadership can the full aims of the revolution be achieved.*'

The emphasis on the dominant role of the working people in the

struggle for national liberaion is the main foundation of the ideology of revolutionary nationalism in the contemporary period. The African National Congress in its strategy and tactics (to which the group of 8 object), and movements such as FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC, the Congolese Party of Labour, also stress the fundamental role of the working people at all stages of the liberation struggle. For South Africa this approach involves a theory of revolution which takes into account both class and national factors. What then are the politics of the group of 8?

BACKWARD POLITICS BEHIND BACKWARD NATIONALISM

The group of 8 complains that it is a Communist trick to dismiss those with whom they disagree as 'racist' and 'bourgeois nationalist'. Let us therefore briefly examine some aspects of the group's political standpoint as expounded in the Makiwane address.

The group claims that the South African struggle is

> 'no different from the post-World War II, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggles which have been waged and are being waged by our brothers on the African Continent as well as similar struggles in Asia and Latin America,

It hardly needs theory to remind us that the fruits of victory in many of the struggles on our Continent (as well as in parts of Asia and Latin America) have not been gathered by the mass of the exploited people; they have been gathered by these small groups who stepped into the shoes of the colonial oppressors and exploiters. Where this has happened, it is precisely because the *dominant classes* in the national struggle were the self-seeking petit-bourgeoise together with the emerging national bourgeoisie. The dominant ideology of such movements was therefore bourgeois-nationalist in character; in saying this, reference is made not to the social background of the individual leaders, but to the class interests served by their policies.

In South Africa there is perhaps the oldest and most experienced black working class on the African Continent, with a growing trading and bureaucratic black petty bourgeoisie and, in the Bantustans, even the beginnings of a black commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. It is

therefore particularly important for South Africans to distinguish between a nationalism designed to serve the interests of an elite or an aspirant bourgeoisie and a nationalism which is revolutionary and designed to serve the interests of the mass of the oppressed people. In other words, it is not enough merely to speak of 'nationalism'. Nationalism, like all ideology, has a class content and it is necessary to say whether, in the long term, that nationalism is progressive or reactionary, bourgeois or revolutionary. In our view therefore, it is impossible to separate nationalism from the class struggle; and the depth and closeness of this connection will have a vital bearing on the future of the South African revolution.

On the nature of our national struggle the ANC's Strategy and Tactics says:

'The national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. But it is a national struggle which is taking place in a different era and in a different context from those which characterised the early struggles against colonialism. It is happening in a new kind of world - a world which is no longer monopolised by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system and a significant sector of newly liberated areas has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful - economic emancipation. It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa; a South Africa in which there is a large and well-developed working class whose class consciousness and in which the independent expressions of the working people - their political organs and trade unions - are very much part of the liberation front. Thus, our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the opressor in the exploitation of the mass. But none of this detracts from the basically national context of our liberation drive. In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which - by destroying the existing social and economic relationships - will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new - and deeper internationalist - approach. Until then, the national sense of grievance is the most potent revolutionary force which must be harnessed. To

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> blunt it in the interests of abstract concepts of internationalism is, in the long run, doing neither a service to revolution nor to internationalism.'

But the group of 8 see in this stress on the revolutionary role of the working class only a sinister Communist diversion to narrow the base of the national struggle. They echo the kind of attack which the most backward political forces in Africa have used under instigation from Western imperialism, to try to dragoon such movements as MPLA into some sort of acceptance of and accommodation to reactionary and counter-revolutionary nationalist forces in the spurious name of 'national unity'. The group of 8 complains that the SACP identifies

> 'two strands in this situation - a *so-called* bourgeois nationalism and a *so-called* revolutionary nationalism . . . Such dogmatic infusion of Marxist terminology into a situation with special characteristics of its own only serves the forces of confusion and division.'

Again they say that the SACP talk about the 'progressives' on the one hand and 'reactionaries' on the other is

> '. . . in fact nothing more than a highly disguised sectarian attempt to substitute a class approach for the national approach to our struggle. Its most dangerous implication being to narrow down the broadly based African resistance and seeking to highlight only a workers' and peasants' conflict against capital.*

An example of the type of nationalism which is not revolutionary but reactionary, and which objectively serves those who seek a neo-colonial type of 'liberation', is provided by the ideology of the group of 8. The group regards an emphasis on workers' and peasants' struggle

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*In fact the current fashion amongst ultra-left academic critics of our Party's policy is to accuse it of the very opposite: a failure to highlight the workers' and peasants' conflict against capital. But in their frenzied enthusiasm to attack the 'Communist-controlled' ANC and SACP from every possible angle, the group of 8 in fact contradict themselves earlier in the document when they say that a source of the organisational crisis in the ANC was a 'misguided and opportunistic definition of the nature and content of the S.A. freedom struggle and *projecting it as if it were merely a struggle for the elimination of race discrimination* . . . .'

against capital as an unpatriotic diversion. They believe that the concept of a bourgeois nationalism is a devilish invention of the Communists and that blackness alone is the test of the credentials of a South African nationalist. In effect they would like to see the ANC retreat into the past, and restrict its public policy to a vague, undifferentiated kind of patriotism which pretends to be classless, but which in practice serves the interests of the elite, the bureaucratic, the petty bourgeois minority.

They show the same spurious 'classless' formulation in their approach to the world struggle against imperialism, when they state that in international affairs they will work to change ANC attitudes by 'reinstatement of a foreign policy based on non-alignment.'

It is characteristic of the self-seekers amongst oppressed nations that they present their 'nationalist' ideology everywhere as if it were not ideology at all; the group of 8 follow that presentation. They claim that

> 'The ANC is not a political party committed to any political ideology.' (!!)

But, in fact, the history of its whole struggle has forced the ANC to reject this formlessness, just as it has for so many other revolutionary organisations. For such organisations as FRELIMO, MPLA and the PAIGC, it was the maturing of ideology, and steadfast safeguarding of their political line which enabled them to fight and defeat not only Portuguese fascism but also racist reaction and bourgeois nationalism in the ranks of their peoples. The importance of commitment to a revolutionary political ideology was stressed by the great Amilcar Cabral, speaking from the African experience:

> 'The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements - which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements claimed to transform - constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all . . . Nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory.' *(Revolution in Guine - an African People's Struggle* p. 75).

In Guine the working class, in the sense which Communists use the

term, hardly existed; and yet Cabral goes on:

> 'We know that a struggle of the kind we hoped to lead - and win - had to be led by the working class; we looked for the working class in Guine and did not find it . . . We realised that we need to have people with the mentality which could transcend the context of the national liberation struggle, and so we prepared a number of cadres from the 'small group of urban workers' . . . and even some peasants so that they could acquire what you might call a working class mentality . . . We are not a Communist Party or a Marxist-Leninist Party but the people now leading the peasants in the struggle in Guine are mostly from the urban milieu and connected with the urban wage-earning group.'

Of tribalism in the Guine-Bissau struggle, Cabral emphasised the way in which it is exploited mainly by 'detribalised individuals or groups within the national liberation movement'. These groups corruptly play on tribal divisions to create a power-base for themselves in order to advance their careers. In the middle sixties, this is precisely what some of the leading members of the group of 8 were attempting to do within the ANC.

BEATING THE RACIST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST DRUM

But now they are beating another drum, equally emotive and basically racist. In this respect too, they again follow the patterns set by the PAC in 1958. The group's statements and other pronouncements are filled with such phrases and expressions as 'non-African clique', 'the white-led CP', the 'failure of the non-Africans to humble themselves' and 'submit themselves' and so on. 'The Morogoro Conference', they say, 'was a multi-racial affair'. This, they assume, damns it beyond redemption.

On the surface their main complaint is against the Morogoro decision to integrate non-African revolutionaries into the ANC's External Mission. Yet all those in the group of 8 who were present at the Conference neither voted nor spoke against the decision. We will return to the way in which this decision has been distorted. But for the moment we should ask what lies behind their policy of denying all non-African revolutionaries any place or any effective part to play in the work of the External Mission of the African National Congress. This policy

means, in effect, that there is no place at all for a non-African revolutionary in exile, as they are well aware. For there is a long-standing decision adopted by the African National Congress leadership in the early sixties and endorsed by all the other partners in the Congress Alliance, that the whole South African liberation movement abroad would be represented to the outside world by the ANC only, acting for all and in the name of all.

Can it be that the group of 8 is saying that Indian and Coloured comrades on Robben Island and white comrades in Pretoria prison, some serving terms of life imprisonment for their part in both armed and unarmed struggle, should not have played a part, but should have restricted themselves to organising only among their own communities? Are they saying that non-African revolutionaries like Basil February, killed alongside Partick Malaoa in Umkhonto's fighting ranks against racist troops, had no right to participate in theANC's External Mission, or ever to be a member of the ANC's Revolutionary Council? But, of course, they *are* saying all this. And, we suspect, more than this. Their prime purpose is to create a constituency for themselves and their reactionary ideology by appealing to racist emotionalism, prejudices and political backwardness.

Once again they ape the PAC who used precisely the same arguments when *they* were expelled from the ANC in the late fifties, long before the Morogoro decision was taken. It did not take long for the PAC to demonstrate what was really behind their attack on so-called non-African influence in the ANC. Shortly after their formation, they brought the white Liberal Patrick Duncan into their leadership and made him their official representative in Algeria; Gora Ebrahim became their chief ideologist and spokesman in Dar es Salaam; and others were brought into their top leadership. These acts fully exposed the hypocrisy and dishonesty of their criticism of the ANC. Clearly the truth is that white, Coloureds and Indians are acceptable as long as they are anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, and not left. The real attack on the ANC, then, was an attack on revolutionary nationalism, and the emotionally-charged approach of racism provided the smokescreen under which the attack was launched. Leballo in fact said as much when he let slip that

> 'The African people in general . . . know them (the non-white partners in the Alliance), and when we want to fight for our rights, these

people weaken us. This is so because they use campaigns for their own ends and also *because the government will not listen to our requests and demands because of their outlook.'* [our emphasis]

In the case of the expelled group of 8 it is equally clear why they are using the racist argument: firstly they hope that in the atmosphere of emotion that they build up by talk of 'non-African cliques' and 'high-jacking of the ANC', the real reason why they were excluded from the top leadership of the ANC will be forgotten. Secondly, whilst the racialist bogey cannot be used against African Communists (who constitute the overwhelming majority of our Party's leadership and membership) it becomes a convenient weapon of attack against national leaders like Dadoo and other non-African Communists.

THE LIES AND DISTORTIONS

The offensive which has been launched by the group of 8 against the ANC and the SACP is 'supported' by a stream of lies and distortions mostly about events which occurred some years ago. They hope that people who did not take part in these events will be misled into becoming hostile towards the leadership of the ANC and its allies in the liberation struggle. Let us examine just a few of the lies, distortions and half-truths which the group is attempting to spread.

Why the Morogoro Conference was called

The group of 8 states that the 1969 Morogoro Conference was called under pressure from the SACP and minority groups.

The facts:

The decision to call the Conference was taken unanimously by the NEC of the ANC which at that stage included four members of the group of 8 and the late Robert Resha whose name is being opportunistically exploited by the dissidents. Those who were present at the Conference could have had no doubt that it was convened because of the overwhelming feeling of the rank-and-file of the ANC and Umkhonto that a radical reappraisal was needed in a number of important areas. It was clearly felt necessary —

(a) to create a more effective division between external and internal

work by setting up special machinery under the NEC which would devote itself exclusively to problems of the internal struggle without being diverted by external solidarity work.

(b) to examine the composition of the National Executive Committee which had, by external cooption, grown to an unwieldy size. In addition, the personal misconduct of some of the Executive members had been severely criticised by the rank-and-file who were, as a result, beginning to lose confidence in the leadership.

(c) to find an effective place in the ANC's *External* apparatus for non-African revolutionaries who were expected (by a decision of the ANC at home) not to create their own separate external units.

The preparations for the Conference were perhaps the most remarkable that any exile movement has undertaken. A six-month period of intense, uninhibited and democratic discussion was encouraged. Literally scores of individual and collective written memoranda and other contributions had been submitted. In other words, it was perhaps the most representative and the most democratic ANC assembly since the days of legality. Just as the pressure for the Conference clearly came from the rank-and-file and the cadres in the camps, so it was the same groups who were the prime influence on the decisions which finally emerged.

The Composition of the Morogoro Conference:

The false version of the group of 8 is that the Morogoro Conference was unduly influenced and dominated by non-Africans. In the Makiwane memorandum it is described as 'a multi-racial affair which was attended by Africans, Coloureds, whites and Indians'. The innuendo is clear and is intended once again to invoke the ghost of 'racial parity'.

The facts:

The non-Africans who attended were in fact appointed as delegates by the ANC's executive (which at that stage included men like Makiwane, Resha and Matlou) to ensure the presence of at least a few comrades who had connections with the ANC's allied organisations – the SACP, SAIC, CPC and SACTU.

In any case, non-Africans formed a minute proportion of those who

attended. Out of approximately 70 to 80 delegates there were only three coloureds, five Indians and three whites. The proceedings themselves were overwhelmingly dominated, both in numbers and in contributions, by the rank-and-file delegates, particularly from Umkhonto.

The change in leadership:

The change that took place in the composition of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, has been described by the group of 8 as a sinister manoeuvre resulting from pressure by the Communists and the non-African groups who attended Morogoro.

The facts:

Morogoro did not dismiss the NEC of the ANC. The NEC in fact came to Morogoro with the announcement that it had resigned en bloc and that it had mandated the Acting President General with full powers (assisted by the late J.B. Marks and Moses Mabhida) to reconstitute the Executive. The Acting President General announced that in carrying out his mandate he had been guided only by the *African delegates* at the Conference whose views he had canvassed. During the proceedings the delegates from the camps did not hide their outrage about the personal misconduct of some of the officials and members of the NEC. Most of those belonging to the dissident clique who were members of the NEC were also targets for such criticisms.

The non-African delegates to the Conference were neither singly nor collectively consulted on the composition of the new Executive. The Conference was informed that Executive members Temba Mqota (Alfred Kgokong) and Ambrose Makiwane had already been suspended from the Executive because of their pre-Morogoro attempts to organise an anti-leadership faction. When the names of the new Executive were announced all members of the previous Executive, such as Makiwane, Resha, Joe Matlou and others who were present at Morogoro, pledged their support to the new leadership and offered their services in any capacity. It should also be recorded that some of those who were not reappointed to the new Executive were S.A. Communist Party members who had also forfeited their right to serve on the leadership because of personal misconduct.

Non-African revolutionaries:

The version spread by the group of 8 about the decision to integrate non-African revolutionaries into the ANC's External Mission is a deliberately misleading and grotesque distortion of the facts.

The facts:

It is now conveniently 'forgotten' by those in the group of 8 who were present at Morogoro, that they did not speak or vote against the decision to integrate the non-African revolutionaries into the External Mission of the ANC. They in fact joined in the unanimous and tumultuous cheering which accompanied the adoption of this decision.

What in fact was actually decided? The decision was to integrate Coloured, Indian and white revolutionaries into the *External Mission* of the ANC. For this purpose branches were to be formed in those areas with a big concentration of South African exiled revolutionaries. The group of 8 has selected this decision (to which some of them were a party) as their main target for attack. It is in this area that their dishonesties, distortions and half-truths reach truly monumental proportions.

In every one of their pronouncements, including the above-quoted Makiwane statement, they baldly state that 'ANC membership has been opened to whites, Indian and Coloureds' but they dishonestly omit to mention that the decision explicitly referred ONLY TO THE EXTERNAL MISSION OF THE ANC. They also conveniently omit to mention that the decision EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED NON-AFRICANS FROM SERVING ON THE NEC OF THE ANC.

What then was behind the decision to allow non-Africans to participate at CERTAIN LEVELS of the External Mission? A brief look at some relevant post-1960 developments will throw light on this question.

We have already referred to the decision which was taken by the internal leadership of the ANC that, externally, its representatives should be the sole spokesmen on behalf of the liberation alliance and that the SAIC, CPC and COD should not establish separate external missions. This decision was taken after the break-up of the United Front which had operated outside for a short while and had included the PAC. It

was endorsed by the leadership of the SACP and the other Congresses inside the country. Thereafter, as a result of the post-Rivonia terror, most internal organised levels of the liberation front (including the ANC) were, for a time, completely destroyed or incapacitated. It became necessary for the external forces to assume greater responsibility in many areas including the most important area of internal reconstuction.

Hence, inside the country the Congress Alliance in the form that it was moulded in the 50s, ceased to exist. And outside the country non-African revolutionaries loyal to the original decision about the ANC's external mission could neither create their separate communal organs nor participate as members of those ANC organs also mandated to speak on their behalf. In addition there was widespread recognition that with the disappearance of the Congress Alliance there was no longer any *public* expression (either inside or outside the country) of the true character of the revolutionary front in South Africa and, in particular, of the non-racial content of our struggle. Indeed, reports indicated that the sudden disappearance at all public levels of the liberation front of leaders like Dadoo (whom the South African masses had always regarded as more than merely communal leaders) was being interpreted by many as reflecting a new policy of African exclusiveness.

It was partly in order to deal with these important problems that in the mid-sixties the NEC created a new apparatus in London under the late Robert Resha. In terms of his mandate Resha created an *ANC collective* which included non-Africans. At about the same time, leaders like Dadoo and September were being appointed to represent the African National Congress at international conferences as part of its own delegation and not as representatives of the CPC or SAIC. The practice also began of inviting leading personnel like Dadoo, September and Slovo to some of the extended meetings of the NEC. Executive members like Resha, Matlou and Makiwane welcomed this procedure and indeed were partly responsible for establishing it in the late 60's. They were also part of the collective which ensured that the Morogoro Conference was what they now disparagingly call a 'multi-racial affair'. What was different about Morogoro was not the fact that it had the usual sprinkling of leading non-African revolutionaries, but that it decided to find a place within the ANC External Mission (at levels below

the top leadership) for non-African rank-and-filers who had proved themselves in the struggle.

The Strategy and Tactics document adopted by the Morogoro Conference showed no ambiguity on the ANC's approach to collaboration with other revolutionary groups. Now, six years after the event, the group also, *for the first time*, dissociate themselves from the ANC Strategy and Tactics Document which they say 'was never discussed in the Conference'. Yet at the Conference itself they voted in favour of the document which like all others had been circulated for discussion long before the actual Conference took place. It stated:

> 'Whatever instruments are created to give expression to the unity of the liberation drive, they must accommodate two fundamental propositions: firstly they must not be ambiguous on the primary role of the most oppressed African mass and, secondly, those belonging to the other oppressed groups and those few white revolutionaries who show themselves ready to make common cause with our aspirations, must be fully integrated on the basis of individual equality. Approached in the right spirit these two propositions do not stand in conflict but reinforce one another. Equality of participation in our national front does not mean a mechanical parity between the various national groups. Not only would this in practice amount to inequality (again at the expense of the majority), it would lend flavour to the slander which our enemies are ever ready to spread of a multi-racial alliance dominated by minority groups. This has never been so and will never be so.
>
> 'Therefore, not only the substance but the form of our structural creations must, in a way which the people can see, give expression to the main emphasis of the present stage of our struggle. This approach is not a pandering to chauvinism, to racialism or to other such backward attitudes. We are revolutionaries, not narrow nationalists. Committed revolutionaries are our brothers, to whatever group they belong. There can be no second-class participation in our movement. It is for the enemy we reserve our assertiveness and our justified sense of grievance.'

And indeed the apparatus created after Morogoro in no way departed from this approach. The Executive retained its 100% African character. The Revolutionary Council (which includes one white, one Indian and one Coloured) is overwhelmingly African in both numbers

and executive function. Every external mission is (with the exception of New Delhi and London) headed by an African. It therefore seems clear beyond any doubt that the continuous attack on the London office of the ANC because it is represented by a national leader like Reg September (who happens to be Coloured) is either crude Vorster-type racism or is cynically used as a cover for advancing corrupt political ambitions.

The Congress Alliance:

On this question, as on so many others, the group of 8 invents 'facts' which it then supports with racist slander. Their document states that the Congress Alliance was dissolved in 1960 for 'two important reasons': one, the ANC and the COD were outlawed and the COD disbanded itself; two, the ANC decided to embark on armed struggle, 'but some of the constituents of the Alliance, the South African Indian Congress and the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, did not adopt the policy of armed struggle.' The group alleges that the non-African section outside wanted to revive this Alliance in its original form but 'the main basis of the ANC's rejection (of this attempt) was on the ground that the non-African contingent and their organisations had to consider the repercussions for all involved in a situation wherein some organisations had adopted a policy of armed struggle whilst others had not'.

The facts:

In the first place it is not true that the Congress Alliance was dissolved in 1960 or at any stage in the sense described by the group of 8. After the outlawing of the ANC, the Alliance continued to operate in clandestine conditions. Leaders of the Congress Alliance met regularly and there is public evidence of raids by the Security Police on some of these meetings under the chairmanship of the late Chief Albert Lutuli. This arrangement continued until the Rivonia setback which, as we have seen, for a time destroyed most internal levels of organisation of the whole liberation fron. In this sense it could be said that it was enemy action which effectively destroyed the Congress Alliance inside the country.

The policy of armed struggle was initiated in 1961 (and not 1960)

by the ANC *and the* SACP (a fact which is deliberately omitted by the group of 8). For tactical reasons both organisations decided that the armed wing of the liberation movement - Umkhonto - should operate as an 'independent' body. It was some time after the commecement of the sabotage campaign in December 1961 that MK's connection with the liberation movement was divulged externally by Robert Resha.

For the same tactical reasons (which seem very obvious) *it was decided that the SAIC, CPC andSACTU should not do anything to jeopardise their legality by an open commitment to armed struggle.*

But right from its inception Umkhonto (by decision of its founders - the ANC and SACP) incorporated militant revolutionaries from every section of the Congress Alliance. Robben Island and Pretoria are still filled with 'a fair share' of Indian, Coloured and white revolutionaries who 'waged war'. And the group of 8 have the temerity to say 'how very immoral indeed are some people to speak of a Council of War before they have even taken a decision to wage war'. How very immoral indeed are some people, like Makiwane and Mqota, who have never lifted a finger to engage in war whilst in South Africa, to talk this racist reaction about the Kathradas, the Naidoos, the Februarys, the Aprils, the Goldbergs and the Fischers!!

But in any case it is completely untrue to suggest that there was an attempt outside by any group to revive the defunct Congress Alliance in exile in the form in which it had been historically formed in the 50s. Certainly as far as our Party is concerned the position we consistently adopted is contained in the 1970 report to a Plenary Session of our Central Committee which says:

> 'Our movement has moved away from the concept that the Alliance necessarily implies a single formal defined structure. We see it operating at a number of levels and simultaneously in a number of different ways. We must discover and integrate individual revolutionaries. We must achieve a broad collaboration between the ANC and the other community bodies We must cement a formal working relationship between the Party and the ANC and so on. As our work inside the country develops, consideration will have to be given to the need for collaboration between our revolutionary movement and other bodies such as student, trade union, peasant movements etc.

> This will not necessarily imply the incorporation of these bodies into a formal front with a defined structure. It is clear that in this sphere there can be no rigidity. The different structures which are created from time to time must serve the political needs and the political realities. The primary problems at each stage is the mobilisation of the maximum number of forces for revolutionary aims. The precise manner of achieving this is complex and many-sided and must not necessarily be sought for in a single formula and a single structure.'

The Party

It is for our Party that the group of 8 reserves its most poisonous distortions. In their hymn of hate against us, they falsify our history and deliberately distort the composition of the Party and the true nature of its relationship with the liberation movement. We say 'deliberately' because in the case of at least two of the clique (Kgokong and Makiwane) they were both members of the SACP during the 50s. Both were subsequently expelled when, outside the country, they attempted to use the Party as a base for their tribalist and factionalist activity against the ANC.

Examining only the opening paragraph of the section in the Makiwane document headed 'The South African Communist Party', we find that every single line bristles with deliberate distortions and lies. The paragraph reads:

> 'The SACP was formed in 1921 as a white organisation. It remained as such for a full decade and when, during the thirties, it decided to recruit Africans into its ranks, it was to pursue a consistently incorrect policy on the national question. For instance it resisted the slogan of the Communist International calling for the setting up of a Black Republic in South Africa, and it opposed all moves aimed at consolidating African trade unionism, insisting on a multi-racial set-up despite the fact that the white working class had shown its determination to carve for itself a position of privilege and was to support Industrial Colour Bar and Job Reservation.'

It is a fact of history that the SACP emerged largely from the organised white labour movement at a time when the black proletariat was still in its infancy and the white working class as a whole had not yet been fully coopted politically into the ruling class. Nevertheless, right

from its inception its constitution was non-racial and its membership included blacks. It is untrue that the Party was a white organisation for a decade and that it only began recruiting Africans into the Party in the thirties. Already by 1928, of the 1,750 Party members, 1,600 were Africans. It was also during the middle and late twenties that names famous in South Africa's working class and national movements, like J.B. Marks, Moses Kotane, Albert Nzula, Gana Makabeni, E.T. Mofutsanyane, Johannes Nkosi, Josie Mpama, were already leaders and activists of the Party. By 1929 Albert Nzula was the Assistant General Secretary of the Party and was acting as Editor of its official organ, *The S.A. Worker*. Gumede, the President-General of the ANC, told the February *1927 Congress* of the League Against Imperialism in Brussels:

> 'I am happy to say that there are Communists in South Africa. I myself am not one, but it is my experience that the Communist Party is the only party that stands behind us and from which we can expect something.'

And at the ANC's annual conference in *June 1927*, in his Presidential Report President Gumede said:

> 'Of all political parties, the Communist Party is the only one that honestly and sincerely fights for the oppressed people.'

It is also a fact of history that the call for a Black Republic was adopted at the Party's 7th Congress in 1929. True enough (and understandably) a spirited debate within the Party preceded the adoption of this history-making policy. But our Party has the distinction of being the first organisation in the history of our Continent to call unambiguously for black majority rule on the basis of universal suffrage. This was at a time when even the ANC stopped short of this demand. Why then do the authors of the Makiwane document falsify so blatantly when they say that the Party 'resisted the slogan'?

It is also a fact of history that from the twenties onwards Communists were right in the forefront of attempts to build and consolidate African trade unions. By 1926 Black Communists were active enough in the ICU to provide Kadalie and his liberal advisers with the excuse to push through a resolution excluding Communist Party members from holding office in the ICU. This move was, like all such moves, designed

to steer the ICU towards a more 'moderate' and 'sensible' policy. Already at its 3rd Congress in 1924 the Party decided that failure by the existing trade unions to admit African workers required the Party to go all out to organise separate African unions. It was the Communist Party and its activists which both inspired and helped to build the Federation of non-European Trade Unions in the twenties and thirties and the Transvaal Council of non-European Trade Unions in the forties. It was our Central Committee which went on trial for the Party's role in helping to build the African Mineworkers' Union and supporting the historic African mineworkers' strike of 1946. Communists were again in the forefront of those who, in the fifties, helped found and organise the South African Congress of Trade Unions, the membership of which was overwhelmingly black. And against all this incontrovertible evidence, we are now told by this middle-class clique that the SACP 'opposed all measures aimed at consolidating African trade unions'.

We have dealt with the opening paragraph of the group's diatribe against our Party as an example of their reckless and deliberate disregard for truth. The balance of their document is equally studded with petty lies. They know (certainly those of them who were members of the Party during the fifties) that in the stirring campaigns of the fifties our illegal Party played a most important role. Yet they say that after dissolving in 1950 the Party 'remained dormant for a whole decade'. Some of them know too that the overwhelming majority of the membership and the leadership of the Party is black, yet they nevertheless spread the smear that it is 'white-led'. They are aware that by the fifties the Party's illegal network had spread to every major South African centre, and that by 1960 five underground national conferences had already taken place. And yet they resort to another childish invention that the Party had to 'rely on a number of members of the ANC to help out' with the first illegal leaflet distribution. On this question, too, the jails of South Africa have the answer: Robben Island and South Africa's other jails hold many of the Party's leaders and activists.

It is clear from the few distortions we have dealt with that there is no limit to the depths to which this group is prepared to sink in its unprincipled assault against our Party and all sections of the liberation movement.

Above all the group has attempted to distort the true character of the collaboration between our Party and the national movement.

Our movement has never hidden the fact that there is a relationship between the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party on those questions of policy which both organisations share in common. In particular both organisations believe that in the present stage of the revolutionary process in South Africa, the primary aim is the national liberation of the most exploited and most oppressed section of the South African people - the Africans. It is well known that throughout the forties, fifties, and sixties, the two organisations collaborated on many issues. Dr. A.B. Xuma was meeting with representatives of the Communist Party. Chief Lutuli had the closest working relationship with Comrade Moses Kotane who was both General Secretary of the S.A. Communist Party and also a member of the NEC of the African National Congress.

> 'This collaboration', says the Central Committee report to the 1970 Plenary Session, 'is not, as our enemies always allege, a ploy to create front organisations or to 'capture' fraternal organisations and transform them into wings of the Party. Indeed, where objective circumstances require it, the true independence and political expression of other social forces (whether economic or national) must be safeguarded both in the letter and in the spirit. A Party exercises its vanguard role in relation to trade unions not by capturing them or transforming them into wings of the Party, but by giving correct guidance in the best interests of their members; and by individual Communists proving that they are the most loyal, the most devoted and the most ideologically clear members. The same principle applies when we examine a situation such as ours in which the main content of the immediate struggle in our country is the liberation of the African people whose national movement is devoted to this end.'

In the middle sixties, the late Robert Resha was the first to announce externally at a meeting in London (when questioned about the need for liberation unity) that there was in fact liberation unity in South Africa and that it correctly expressed itself in an alliance between the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the other Congresses. In deeds, as well as in words the basis of collaboration between the two organisations has always been

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founded on a respect for the absolute organisational integrity and independence of each.

* * * * *

In his closing address to the Morogoro Conference, Oliver Tambo received a prolonged standing ovation when he exhorted the delegates present to:

> 'wage a relentless war against disrupters and defend the ANC against provocateurs and enemy agents. Defend the revolution against enemy propaganda, whatever form it takes. Be vigilant, comrades. The enemy is vigilant. Beware of the wedge-driver, the man who creeps from ear to ear, carrying a bag full of wedges, driving them in between you and the next man, between a group and another, a man who goes round creating splits and divisions. Beware of the wedge-driver, comrades. Watch his poisonous tongue.'

And now the wedge-drivers who had been working behind closed doors against the whole liberation movement and its policies have come out into the open. They are part of the impure load which every revolution carries and when that load is thrown aside the journey to victory is always a swifter one.

EXHIBIT B

[From "The African Communist," 3d quarter, 1980]

The Immediate Task of our Movement

ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by "Comrade Mzala"

In this period of struggle the urgent task of our movement is to inject into the masses of our people a feeling of confidence in their own potential to overthrow the racists, by means of vigorous revolutionary action, the main content of which must be effective and sustained guerrilla operations including a nation-wide sabotage campaign reminiscent of the early sixties, and thus continue from where Rivonia left off.

This does not mean that we must go and grab guns and start fighting tomorrow, anywhere. The Marxist theory of revolution differs from all other theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius and revolutionary initiative of the masses'[1]

Certainly, we must severely criticise the adventuristic theories of the Narodnik type which completely separate the subjective factor from the real objective conditions that prevail. My stress, however, on the role of armed struggle at this critical stage of our revolution is a deliberate

approach that reflects the new requirements of the movement at a time when conditions have become ripe for vigorous armed revolution. It would therefore be wrong for the reader to draw a conclusion from the article that armed activity alone can accomplish a revolution in South Africa irrespective of the objective political situation and in disregard of other forms of political struggle. These propositions are advanced not on mere theoretical consideration but on practical considerations and as always, practice is the test of theory.

Lenin taught that while soberly taking into account objective conditions, one should not forget that 'in revolutionary times the limits of what is possible expand a thousand fold'[2] under the powerful impact of the mass historical action. It should be said in all fairness and truth that each year, indeed each month, that the liberation of South Africa is speeded up will mean the lives of millions of undernourished children saved from starvation; hundreds saved from detention, torture and the hangman's noose; an infinite quantity of pain spared the people. In the words of the founders of Umkhonto We Sizwe: "The time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice."[3]

Formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe

Slovo, summing up the conditions that dictated the historic decision to form Umkhonto We Sizwe in December 1961, states:

> "By then the strategy of mass struggle along non-violent lines had exhausted its potential for mobilising the people. The regime had turned to the use of undisguised terror against all militant opposition to race rule; the liberation organisations had been outlawed. The facts had put paid to any lingering illusions that radical change could be won by action which did not include armed activity".[1]

The Manifesto of MK declared:

> "We are striking out along a new road for the liberation of the people of this country. The Government policy of force, repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only! The choice is not ours; it has been made by the Nationalist Government which has rejected every peaceable demand by the people for rights and freedom and answered every such demand with force and yet more force."

That therefore the time had come in 1961 to answer racist violence with revolutionary people's violence can no longer be a debated question. The above-quoted passage of the MK Manifesto clearly reflects that the decision to embark on armed struggle was arrived at after great consideration and deliberations. Further than that, it is a proof in itself

that Umkhonto We Sizwe at such an infant stage, having hardly any serious material resources to talk about, operating in a highly industrialised capitalist-totalitarian state that was surrounded by hostile states, could manage to conduct more than 150 acts of sabotage during a period of only 18 months. These dramatic acts of revolutionary assault, which grew in intensity and scope with each passing month, are proof enough that the majority of the people 1) were already disillusioned with the prospect of achieving liberation by non-violent means, and 2) were ready to respond to the call for armed struggle.

In the light of these conditions the prosecution of military struggle depends for its success on two factors viz., the existence of clear leadership with material resources at its disposal to spark off and sustain military operations, and the strength of the enemy.

Those who criticise the so-called failure of the sabotage campaign of the early sixties by citing as a proof the final arrest of the leadership at Rivonia and thus try to prove that the time had not yet come, should be aware that they would have, in the similar fashion and probably for the same reasons, criticised Fidel Castro in Cuba if his guerilla band had failed to sustain themselves in the Sierra Maestra. After all, the technical security mistake which resulted in the arrest of the leadership in Rivonia was about to be solved with the initial implementation of the draft document "Operation Mayibuye", one passage of which reads thus:

> "Before the operations take place, political authority will have been set up in secrecy in a friendly territory with a view to supervise the struggle both in its internal and external aspects."

It should be noted that the Rivonia arrest took place before the implementation of "Operation Mayibuye."

Although we know that victory in South Africa is certain, our founding fathers could not afford in 1961 to sit in the doorways of their houses waiting for the corpse of apartheid to pass by. They understand, in the same way as Marx put it in a letter to Dr Kugelman, that "world history would indeed by very easy to make if the struggle were taken up on condition of infallible favourable chances."

Then there are those who argue that a revolutionary situation is always a prerequisite of the armed struggle, and that the contrary is left-wing childishness and adventurism. In so doing they make use of quotations from Lenin who once wrote: "To Marxists it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation: furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution."[5] On another

occasion Lenin said: "Oppression alone, no matter how great, does not always give rise to a revolutionary situation in a country."[6]

These texts have been misunderstood greatly, and at times applied dogmatically out of context. Many a vanguard movement has historically doomed itself to political death continued to exist but ceased to live by waiting passively for the moment when the revolutionary situation appears and a nation-wide crisis breaks out. What is a revolutionary situation? Should guerrilla struggle wait for the revolutionary situation?

The Problem of Revolutionary Situation

Lenin developed the concept 'revolutionary situation' mostly during the First World War, when there appeared signs that a revolutionary situation was maturing in a number of European countries. He was describing the state of society preceding the politically mature revolution. His conclusions were the result of a thorough study of the specific experience of the Russian revolution of 1905-07. Initially he did not use the term 'revolutionary situation' but used the term 'political crisis on a nationwide scale' and others. At no stage did he say that armed struggle cannot begin until there is a revolutionary situation. For instance he wrote:

> "What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms. (1) When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis in one form or another, among the upper classes a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for the 'lower classes not to want' to live in the old way; it is also necessary that 'the upper classes should be unable' to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in 'peacetime' but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the 'upper classes' themselves into independent historical action . . . the totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation."[7]

The vulgarisation of Lenin's theses on the revolutionary situation has practically meant that all the vanguard movement should do is to accumulate weapons and manpower in the country while waiting for the D day when we will be strong enough to meet the revolutionary situation. Experience of other countries like Algeria, Cuba, Angola, on the contrary,

shows that guerrilla struggle can bring about a revolutionary situation. Nowadays, this is more so because the liberation forces have at their disposal an advantage (which the Russian revolutionaries never had), that is, the existence of a socialist community which is committed to the principles of proletarian internationalism. In fascist countries like South Africa, therefore, an open struggle of the guerrillas supported by the people will certainly speed up the development of a revolutionary situation to its highest phase – the nation-wide crisis.

After the above analysis, the question that assumes tremendous importance is one of political mobilisation of the masses.

Political Mobilisation

Armed struggle is the highest form of political struggle, demanding as it does greater sacrifice from the people. It is important to emphasise this because any manifestation of militarism which separates armed people's struggle from its political context can result in untold tragedy and disaster and can, in our specific situation, set our movement decades back, if not cause its total collapse.

The policy of the African National Congress is very clear on this question:

> ". . . the people's armed challenge against a foe with formidable material strength does not achieve dramatic and swift success. The path is filled with obstacles and we harbour no illusions on this score in the case of South Africa. In the long run it can only succeed if it attracts the active support of the mass of the people. Without this lifeblood it is doomed."[8]

No matter how skilful or courageous our guerrilla units can be, the lack of mass support could mean their doom. An example of this is the struggle of the people of the Philippines. William Pomeroy, a contemporary Marxist and expert on revolutionary armed struggle, who has himself participated in the guerrilla struggle of the people of the Philippines, sounds this warning note:

> "Broad and universal generalisations about the efficacy of armed struggle or guerrilla tactics cannot safely be made."[9]

But how do you practically mobilise the people now in South Africa? Do you go from man to man inviting him to join the ANC? Or do you remind him that he is oppressed by law A, B and C? Surely, as the struggle sharpens and intensifies, political mobilisation will take the form of all-round educational and agitational work – for it can only be when the enemy is

...assed and his forces dispersed and therefore weakened that effective ...paganda by our underground units as well as armed combatants can ...duce the masses to a higher stage of organisation. Let us not forget that ... propaganda particularly at this initial stage, is in itself a politically ...ilising factor.

Slovo is correct when he observes that:

> Experience of South Africa and other highly organised police states has shown that until the new type of action is started it is doubtful whether political mobilisation and organisation can be developed beyond a certain point. Given the disillusionment of the people with the old forms of struggle, a demonstration of the liberation movement's capacity to meet and sustain the struggle in a new way is in itself a vital way of attracting organised allegiance and support. Therefore, postponing all armed activity until political mobilisation and organisational reconstruction have reached a high enough level to sustain its more advanced forms would undermine the prospects of full political mobilisation itself."[10]

The above quoted passage is in the same tone as the preamble of "Operation Mayibuye" which emphasised in revolutionary optimism that in the initial stage "the plan envisages a massive onslaught on pre selected targets which will create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp" and which will inject into the masses of the people a feeling of confidence that "here at least is an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory." This then will create the proper atmosphere for a gradual mass participation in their own armed revolution.

The question of political mobilisation cannot be treated in the abstract. As in Algeria, Cuba and other places, the general uprising will be sparked off by organised and well equipped guerrilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be drawn in and armed. The fascist ghost is still haunting our people. The ghost is clothed in the myth of invincibility. A serious challenge to this myth by a demonstration of people's armed victories, however small, will shatter the myth — and such slogans as "The Law Has A Long Hand", "Walls Have Ears" will become meaningless and proved to be a mere threat. In terms of political mobilisation of the masses, such MK operations as the Soweto Police Station Assaults are ideal operations, not necessarily because of their offensive nature but because of their victorious nature. The presence of casualties on our side will only be a natural development, but certainly not a deliberate one; the operating law at this stage is: "shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee from the strong."[11]

The Strength of the Enemy

We would be indulging in daydreaming if we disputed the considerable military advantages the Pretoria Boers have at this stage of our revolution, that is, their rich economy (which already finances a huge aggression budget), a large army and police, high level of industrialisation and the modern roads and railways which facilitate transport to any part of the country.

The "Strategy and Tactics of the ANC" correctly states, however, that

> "If there is one lesson that the history of guerrilla struggle has taught it is that the material strength and resources of the enemy is by no means a decisive factor."

Guerrilla warfare by its very definition is meant to be advantageous (in the long run) to the materially weak against the materially strong, and its success is guaranteed by its popular origin and its popular support. So that therefore, no matter how strong is the enemy force, skilful exercise of guerrilla tactics like surprise, mobility and tactical retreat should make it difficult for the enemy to bring into play its superior fire-power in any decisive battles. The need for the racist soldiers to stretch themselves to protect every inch of the lines of communication and the need to protect the widely scattered installations on which the economy is dependent, will make it impossible for them to be in the borders of the country, to be in Namibia and Zimbabwe as well as in the streets shooting the workers when they are on strike. Remove the element of armed struggle in the South African revolution, and the racists will be found in all the above-mentioned places.

Against an enemy of the strength of South Africa, it is only logical for the liberation forces to plan for a protracted war; the contrary would be to entertain disaster. It should be noted however that the very complexity and sophistication of the South African industrial complex makes it vulnerable to effective guerrilla attacks against economic targets, and within a short period (probably far sooner than we can at the moment envisage) great havoc and confusion can plague the country, and thus bring near the revolutionary insurrection for seizure of power – provided, of course, that our movement is ready for such an eventuality.

The Existence of Leadership and Material Resources

To accomplish a revolution there must be real forces and ripe subjective conditions. The subjective conditions for the revolution exist when the progressive forces have the ability to take conscious revolutionary action

with a view to overthrowing the old system and establishing a new one. If there are no such forces the moment may be lost — if the subjective forces are insufficiently ripe, the revolution will suffer defeat. In concrete terms the existence of a clear leadership (by clear leadership I mean those leaders who are the genuine representatives of the working people not only in theory but in actuality) with material resources at its disposal to spark off and sustain operations is an imperative. That the operations have to be sustained is absolutely imperative because spontaneous, isolated action (no matter how well-meaning) is not enough to achieve victory in the revolution. It is vital that the movement demonstrate that it has come to stay. Only then can it give the people confidence and the ability to see possibilities.

Isolated and uncoordinated activities finally play into the hands of the enemy who tries to deceive the people that the guerrillas are a scared, desperate and gangster-like lot who are afraid of the state security forces. An isolated action in a country like South Africa, for instance, is easily drowned in the daily sensational issues in the country many of which are created by criminal gangs.

An assessment of the maturity of the subjective factors at this stage of the revolution must ascertain not only the readiness of the vanguard movement and its political leadership, but also the material possibilities to sustain the struggle till the masses are able to shift from being mere supporters to being active participants in the revolution. The latter factor, because of its mechanical nature, is very easy to ascertain and also to provide (given the presence of the socialist community as well as the enemy resources within the country), but the former can only be tested in practice and not only in theory — for only practice is the criterion of truth. Political forces of revolution are formed and tested in the flames of political struggle on the basis of practical experience accumulated by the masses. The masses themselves are genuinely organised by the struggle itself. Lenin said:

> The real education of the masses can never be separated from their political and especially revolutionary struggle. Only struggle educates the exploited class. Only the struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power; widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will."[12]

He went further to point out that boundless revolutionary enthusiasm of the people opens up new historical horizons, and sets the movement new great tasks (tasks which drawing-room revolutionaries dare not even dream of). Times of revolution then become distinguished by fast rates of

development: history is then measured not in years and decades but in weeks and even days. It is only under such circumstances that the slogan: Freedom In Our Lifetime becomes valid to the masses.

Soweto and our Era

The political events which have occurred in South Africa in the period since June 16 1976, have once again convinced the overwhelming majority of the people that armed resistance and military offensive operations by the people's army are necessary to bring about the collapse of the racist regime.

This can be seen from the offensive mood of the Soweto youth and their colleagues elsewhere in the country carrying stones and dustbin lids. In Soweto, unlike in Sharpeville those who died did not have their wounds at the back fleeing from police terror, but died while advancing against the racist monster. The very preparedness of the people to undertake suicidal offensive campaigns of the Soweto type is a clear indication of the revolutionary militancy that is at present gripping their hearts.

Our people have no other path to liberation than that of armed struggle. To think otherwise would be to engage in a lifeless theoretical discussion lacking all practical signficance. It was with these considerations in mind that the Central Committee of the SACP in analysing Soweto immediately after the events, noted: 'SOWETO has closed the debate about the legitimacy of resorting to the armed struggle.'[13] Similarly the National Executive Committee of the ANC declared 1979 the Year of the Spear - not without reason.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 13 p 36
2. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25 p 525
3. 'Operation Mayibuye' (A draft document)
4. Davidson, Slovo and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*, p 180
5. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 21 p 213
6. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 19 p 221
7. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 21 p 213-14
8. Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress.
9. William Pomeroy, *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism*, p.31
10. Davidson, Slovo and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*, p.194
11. 'Operation Mayibuye' (A draft document)
12. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 25 p 241
13. Political Report Adopted by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, April 1977

EXHIBIT C

The Soviet Strategy of Terror

by
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4

The Soviet Strategy of Terror

The Strategic Target: Advanced Capitalism

Terrorism, under the name "armed struggle," is a necessary part of the classical Leninist model of revolutionary tactics. It is not—or has not been—the whole of this model, and in this respect there is considerable divergence between the practitioners and theoreticians of terrorism—Guevara, Marighella, Meinhof, *et al.*—and the orthodox Soviet ideologists. However, there is also an overlap or congruence between Leninism and contemporary terrorist ideology, and this overlap points to the central purpose of Soviet support of terrorism. The overlap consists in the general agreement of the Soviets and the terrorists on the nature of what they identify as their main enemy—the imperialism of the advanced capitalist states, particularly U.S. capitalism. The purpose of Soviet support of terrorism, the key to the Soviet strategy of terror, is the destruction of the economic base of American capitalism and hence of the United States as a world power.

To Lenin and to his heirs in both the Soviet Union and in all the branches of Marxism, imperialism is not largely a matter of formal annexation of territory or military conquest. Lenin argued that advanced or monopoly capitalism was forced by its own structure to expand into the poorer and undeveloped regions of the world and to dominate and exploit them by the exportation of capital and the appropriation of raw materials for its own production needs. This process of domination was not accomplished by formal political controls but by informal or invisible control of the economies of the Third World.

> To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for "spheres of influence," *i.e.*, for spheres of good business, concessions, monopolist profits, and so on; in fine, for economic territory in general.[1]

According to this theory, the states of the advanced capitalist system fight among themselves for control of these vital backward areas, which are necessary for the capitalist economy. This struggle is symp-

tomatic of the decay of the capitalist system; "imperialism," for Lenin, is the "highest stage of capitalism" and leads to the "intensification of contradictions" within capitalist society. On an international level, the imperialist states themselves form a common system that exploits and is in conflict with the colonized areas, which resist imperialist exploitation as "national liberation movements." This conflict between imperialism and liberation is analogous to that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat within the capitalist states.[2]

Lenin's theory of imperialism was not entirely original with him, and it has been contradicted and disproved by history. The imperialism of the late nineteenth century was not primarily motivated by economic causes, and World War I, contrary to Lenin's theory, was not a struggle for colonies between the European states. As Gerhart Niemeyer has written, "It [Lenin's theory of imperialism] is a superficial theory which owes its success not to the strength of the proofs it supplies but to the emotions on which it plays."[3]

Yet, despite its errors, Lenin's theory contains an important element of truth: the Western economies are dependent for the foreseeable future on the raw materials that can be obtained at present only in the Third World. In 1978, the United States imported over 75 percent of what it consumed in the following metals and minerals: columbium, sheet mica, strontium, manganese, tantalum, cobalt, bauxite and alumina, chromium, platinum group metals, asbestos, fluorine, tin, and nickel. It imported over 50 percent of its consumption of the following materials: cadmium, zinc, potassium, selenium, mercury, gold, and tungsten. With the exception of Canada, a few European countries, and the USSR itself, the source of all these materials is the Third World, particularly Africa and Latin America. The dependence of the American, West European, and Japanese economies on imported oil is well known.[4]

The Soviet Union is well aware of the dependence of the West on the raw materials of the Third World, and one of the principal goals of Soviet policy is to deny or limit the access of the West to these materials through Soviet political influence in the Third World. Thus, from at least 1972, the Soviets openly urged the Arab oil-producing states to use their natural resources as a political weapon against the United States in their conflict with Israel. As early as 1970 Soviet writers noted the dependence of U.S. industry on Latin America for "40 to 100 per cent of its imports of various strategic materials," and in 1972 they predicted that the United States would soon face shortages of raw materials available from Latin America and essential to advanced strategic industries.[5] According to a recent Congressional Research Service study,

> For the Soviets, the Third World is an integral part of their ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically ex-

pect it to be with the unfolding of history; it is a vital component in the correlation of world forces that in the Soviet view implies a shift in the balance of world power in their favor. . . . [It] has become the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power, and for reducing or denying that of the United States, the West, and Communist China.[6]

Or, to cite the Soviet textbook *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism:*

The masses of people in Asia and Africa who have joined the national-liberation movement are a powerful factor in the destruction of imperialism, in intensifying all its contradictions. The colonies and dependent countries are still very important for the imperialists. There the monopolies obtain at very low costs the raw materials they require and sell their industrial commodities at exorbitant prices. In the colonies and semi-colonies the imperialists establish their war bases, strongholds and communications. The national-liberation movement undermines and sometimes altogether abolishes these positions of imperialism. Moreover, it transforms the colonial and dependent countries from a reserve of imperialism into allies of the progressive anti-imperialist forces. *Following the formation of the world system of socialism, the break-up of the colonial empires is another crushing blow against imperialism.*[7]

Although the ideologies and strategies of contemporary terrorist movements are often at odds with orthodox Marxism-Leninism and frequently are not Marxist, there remains an important degree of agreement between the orthodox Communist view of imperialism and the views of many terrorist ideologies. Quotations from terrorist leaders and declarations in previous chapters have already indicated this congruence of views, but some of their principal manifestoes and statements confirm that, in the eyes of many exponents of contemporary international terrorism, it is the "imperialist" states of the West and their economic bases in the Third World that are the key targets of terrorist assaults.

We must bear in mind that imperialism is a world system, the last stage of capitalism—and it must be defeated in a world confrontation. The strategic end of this struggle should be the destruction of imperialism. Our share, the responsibility of the exploited and underdeveloped of the world is to eliminate the foundations of imperialism: our oppressed nations, from where they extract capitals, raw materials, technicians and cheap labor, and to which they export new capitals—instruments of domination—arms and all kinds of articles; thus submerging us in an absolute dependence.

The fundamental element of this strategic end shall be the real liberation of all people, a liberation that will be brought about through armed struggle in most cases and which shall be, in Our America, almost indefectibly, a Socialist Revolution.

While envisaging the destruction of imperialism, it is necessary to identify its head, which is no other than the United States of America.

—Che Guevara, "Message to the Tricontinental, 1967."[8]

The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans. . . . The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers, and the Brazilian upper class.

—Carlos Marighella[9]

The continental character of the struggle is fundamentally determined by the presence of a common enemy. North American imperialism carries out an international strategy to hold back the socialist revolution in Latin America.

—Joint Program, *Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria,* 1974.[10]

The struggle of the Palestinian people, like that of the Vietnamese people and all other peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, forms part of the historical process of liberating the oppressed people from colonialism and imperialism.

—Point Seven of Seven Point Platform of Fatah, 1969.[11]

We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult,for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

—Nelson Mandela, Statement during Trial, 1964.[12]

On one level, that of 'White South Africa,' there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism. There are highly developed industrial monopolies, and the merging of industrial and finance capital. . . . The South African monopoly capitalists, who are closely linked with British, United States, and other foreign imperialist interests, export capital abroad, especially in Africa . . . . But on another level, that of 'Non-White South Africa,' there are all the features of a colony.

—South African Communist Party, National Democratic Revolution, 1962.[13]

If we are correct in saying that American imperialism is a paper tiger, i.e., that it can ultimately be defeated. . . then there is no reason to exclude or disqualify any particular country or any particular region from taking part in the anti-imperialist struggle because the forces of revolu-

tion are especially weak there and the forces of reaction especially strong.

—Red Army Faction. *The Concept of the Urban Guerrilla,* 1971.[14]

Militancy and armed struggle are consistent threads in revolutionary movements—they cannot be wished or forced away. They will continue to be practiced as long as imperialism exists. Together they constitute the fullness of revolutionary war. . . . The Vietnamese built the international solidarity around their struggle. They organized a broad united front against imperialism throughout the world. This international front—of which the movement in the United States is an important part—consisted of many Third World nations, the socialist countries and opposition movements within the imperialist countries. . . . In an era of intense contradictions among the socialist countries, Vietnam fought for a strategic focus of US imperialism as the major enemy of the world's people—and united all socialist countries in support of its struggle.

—Bernardine Dohrn *et al.*, "Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism," a political statement of the Weather Underground Organization, July 1974.

Many terrorist groups have been influenced by Maoist or other Marxist and leftist ideologies and strategies, but the identification of imperialism and its American base as a principal enemy and the concept of imperialism as economic hegemony of the Third World is common to many terrorist groups and to the Soviet version of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The principal ideological difference between the Soviets and the exponents of terrorism has been the reliance of the latter on "armed struggle" to destroy the imperialist base and liberate the colonized area. As we saw in the previous chapters, however, armed struggle is a legitimate method for classical Leninism. The Program of the Communist International of 1928 emphasized the differences between the revolutionary process in the "colonized" regions and allowed for the adoption of the tactics and form of struggle that best fit the conditions of a particular area and situation.[15] Recent Soviet writings suggest that Moscow may soon place more emphasis on armed struggle in the revolutionary process. Moreover, the 1970s saw a disciplining of the insurgency groups of the Third World and their supporters by the Soviets that has led to greater accommodation to Soviet goals and tactics and, in some areas, to greater cooperation with local pro-Soviet Communist Parties.

It is significant, in the context of the Soviet strategic goal of denying Western access to raw materials, to note that virtually all of the terrorist groups that receive Soviet support are active in areas particularly rich in vitally important natural resources. In the Middle East the importance of the oil fields is obvious, especially in view of the Soviets' own oil shortages and of the evidence of recent subversive efforts in

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states. Should a Palestinian state under the control of the Soviet-supported PLO or its component groups become reality in the Middle East, the result for the United States and for the West would be disastrous.

In Latin America, the central focus of current Soviet-Cuban subversion and support for terrorism is in Central America and the Caribbean. Panama and Nicaragua as well as Cuba have acted as surrogates for the subversion of Guatemala and El Salvador, and it should be noted that approximately 75 percent of the oil resources of Mexico lie in the southern part of that country, adjacent to Guatemala, where Guatemalan guerrillas have already established bases. Jamaica provides 42 percent of the bauxite ore necessary for the production of aluminum in the United States, and the administration of Michael Manley was strongly oriented to Cuba. The economic and strategic value of the Panama Canal and of the U.S. ports on the Gulf of Mexico also contributes to the vital importance of the Caribbean-Central American region to the interests and security of the United States.

In Africa, much has been written of the strategic and economic value of southern Africa, Zimbabwe as a pool of technical expertise and food, and South Africa as a source of raw materials and as a strategic chokepoint for control of the sea-routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It is therefore not an accident that the Soviets have concentrated their attention and support on the terrorist movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa and on the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. In northern Africa, however, the Western Sahara—for which the Soviet, Cuban, Algerian, and Libyan-supported Polisario is now contending against the pro-Western government of Morocco—contains 4 percent of Moroccan reserves of phosphates (the largest reserve in the world), a mineral necessary for the production of fertilizer and for continued agricultural growth in both the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world. Moreover, the proximity of the Western Sahara and Morocco itself to the Straits of Gibraltar increases the strategic and economic importance of this region. Shaba province of Zaire supplies nearly 60 percent of the world production of cobalt, a metal essential for the aerospace and electronics industries that has not been mined in the United States since the early 1970s.[16] It was in Shaba province that a Cuban and East German-supported invasion occurred in 1978. Prior to the invasion, the Soviets had been purchasing massive amounts of cobalt at unusually high prices for about six months.[17]

The consensus between terrorist leaders and the Soviets on the importance of Third World resources to the Western, and especially the American, economies points to the principal purpose of the Soviet strategy of terror: the destruction of the economic base of the United States and its Western allies as world powers. While this purpose is ap-

plicable to Third World terrorism and insurgencies, it may appear less so to terrorism in Western Europe and the advanced capitalist states themselves. Yet several European (and American) terrorist groups have often expressed solidarity with Third World "anti-imperialist" forces and have had links with them as well as with the Soviets, Cubans, or Eastern bloc states. Moreover, while terrorist action in the developed countries may not be able to attack the business facilities, personnel, and governments of the Third World, they are nevertheless able to carry out assaults on persons, groups, and institutions associated with the economic development of the Third World. Many such attacks have occurred, often in conjunction with the expression of solidarity with "liberation forces" in terrorist communiques.

The Soviet strategy of terror, then, operates mainly through direction against three targets:

1. Against the local regime: The armed struggle movement terrorizes the local population; attacks military, police, or governmental personnel and institutions; and terrorizes the civilian and non-governmental support institutions of the regime (e.g., missionaries, teachers, communications facilities, administrators).

2. Against the "economic regime": The armed struggle robs banks; assassinates or kidnaps for ransom the employees, managers, or owners of both local and foreign-owned enterprises, and their families; engages in the sabotage of their facilities; or expropriates or occupies property holdings. These attacks may be related to the financial needs of the terrorist group, but they are also often intended to (a) undermine the economic value of business enterprise and operations, and (b) intimidate and force out the personnel and the investments of the foreign enterprises and to raise the cost of their operations.

3. Against the "imperial regime": The armed struggle executes terrorist actions against the diplomats and government personnel and facilities of the imperial or "colonizing" state and against those of allied states. Similar terrorist actions within the foreign state itself by allied groups may complement these attacks.

It is not necessary to see in the actual operations of this strategy a coordinated conspiracy or a centrally directed plan. That linkages and transnational support of and liaison with terrorist groups exist has been known for some years, and the nature of the Soviet role has been discussed throughout the preceeding pages. But the ideology and strategy of "national liberation" and the "anti-imperialist struggle" are well-known to terrorists and to the non-terrorist Left all over the world. While there is strong evidence of Soviet supervision of the stra-

tegy of terror, particular operations are no doubt usually planned and executed without prior Soviet coordination.

These terrorist operations are by no means the sole form of struggle; they are invariably accompanied by waves of propaganda, agitation, demonstrations, and disinformation in the targeted country as well as in the developed countries. Although these support operations may be instigated by Communist or extremist groups, they seek to enlist (and usually succeed in enlisting) the support of moderate Left or liberal elements in the campaign against exploitation and repression or in support of human rights. In this way, the Leninist tactic of supplementing the armed struggle with political action is fulfilled.

Tactical Uses of Terrorism

In addition to, and largely apart from, the strategy or terror, the Soviets and their satellites appear to support terrorism for tactical reasons as well as strategic ones. These tactical uses of terrorism may assist the strategic goals of the Soviets, or they may be intended to realize specific goals not directly related to them. The tactical goals include most prominently:

1. Liquidation of Anti-Soviet Elements: This includes the use of terrorism (assassination, kidnapping, vandalism, intimidation, or harassment) by the Soviets or their surrogates against Soviet defectors, critics of the Soviet Union, or particularly troublesome anti-Communists. The best-known instances of this are the Soviet-engineered assassination of Leon Trotsky in August 1940 by an agent of the NKVD as well as an earlier attempt on Trotsky's life in May 1940 by a team of NKVD terrorists. However, a more recent example is the murder of a Bulgarian defector, Georgi Markov, in London on September 11, 1978, and the apparent attempted murder of another Bulgarian, Vladimir Kostov, in Paris on August 26, 1978; both men, critics of the Bulgarian regime, were attacked by weapons capable of injecting a poisoned pellet that led to a virus infection. In the case of Markov, the attack proved fatal, but Kostov recovered. On October 3, 1978, another Bulgarian refugee, Vladimir Simeonov, was found dead in his London apartment; the cause of death was suffocation, and murder was thought possible, according to British police.[18] Soviet assaults on defectors are often the work of the KGB or of satellite services under their control rather than "independent" terrorist groups. The KGB Department V specializes in this kind of reprisal against defectors as well as in the more general use of assassination and sabotage, and every KGB station possesses a "death list" of defectors who are subject to assassination when located and identified.[19]

2. Pressure on the non-Communist Left: By supporting terrorism on a clandestine level, the Soviets may be able to infiltrate and influence terrorist groups that are not friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviets may then be able to "turn" the group into a more compliant role or, if this is not feasible, to destroy it. This was apparently the Soviet purpose in the case of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. Guevara's mistress, Tamara ("Tania") Bunke, was an agent of the KGB and left photographs in a cave that, when found by Bolivian authorities, led to the apprehension and execution of Guevara and the suppression of his guerrilla group.[20] Similarly, in Uruguay, there is evidence that the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) infiltrated the Tupamaros, who were originally supported by Cuba prior to its satellization. The Communists were instrumental in initiating Tupamaro attacks on the Uruguayan police and military, which in turn led to the state of siege in which the terrorist movement was crushed. A member of the Central Committee of the PCU declared afterward that the suppression of the Tupamaros gave the Party the opportunity to gain stature and influence among the youth of Uruguay in the absence of rivalry from the terrorists.[21] The PCU's hopes of gaining political influence through this tactic were frustrated by the state of siege, which ended all leftist opposition. In Italy, however, a similar tactic may be in use. Although the Red Brigades often criticize "Berlinguer's party," they do not usually name the Italian Communist Party (PCI) or attack PCI members. Several known members of the Red Brigades were members of the PCI prior to their becoming terrorists, and a certain degree of collaboration between the Red Brigades and at least certain factions of the PCI cannot be excluded.

The PCI, for its part, though it frequently denounces terrorism, concentrates its denunciations on right-wing terrorism and has often opposed legislation designed to deal with terrorism more stringently. As a member of the Red Brigades stated after his capture, "In the event of a violent governmental repression against terrorism, the PCI will guarantee our physical survival. The legalitarian attitude adopted by the PCI will never allow the State to adopt measures against us that are too strong." And the Italian philosopher Sergio Cotta has pointed out that "every wave of terrorism has accelerated the leftward drift of actual power and the decomposition of constitutional democracy in favour of the disorderly mass organs manoeuvered by the PCI and the labour unions."[22] Clandestine Soviet or Communist involvement with terrorism, then, may have as one of its purposes the application of pressure to non-Communist leftists or the pro-

motion of pro-Soviet parties as alternatives to ineffective or corrupt bourgeois parties.

3. Destabilization: There is no doubt that terrorism, whether of the Right or of the Left, whether Soviet-supported or not, increases tensions in a society, challenges the public consensus, and often induces the government to adopt a repressive reaction that cannot be sustained indefinitely without serious damage to constitutional processes and institutions. Such reactions have occurred in several countries in Latin America, and West Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s have all been accused of over-reacting to terrorism and political extremism through the enactment of special legislation or the alleged violation of civil liberties. Furthermore, lack of such a reaction or the persistence of leniency in one country may lead to international tension with other states when terrorists from the more lenient state strike at targets outside it. All of these consequences may lead to uncertainty, discontent, backlashes, extremism, and the weakening of the Western alliance structure—which would be in the interest of the Soviet Union and may be tactical goals of its support of terrorism in some instances.

   Ladislav Bittman, an officer of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service who specialized in disinformation prior to his defection in 1968, has written that in the mid-1960s the Czechoslovak disinformation plan had as primary goals the isolation of the United States from its allies, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Western Europe, and the disruption of NATO. More recently, Bittman has stated, the Soviets, who supervised and controlled the Czechoslovak plan, have changed their tactics. Until about 1970, spreading false information was the standard tactic, but this "wasn't always very productive. If American businessmen can be systematically terrorized, it could be a more effective kind of harassment."[23]

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Strategy of Terror

The principal purpose of the Soviet support of terrorism, however, remains the goal of destroying the Third World economic base of the United States, Western Europe, and their allies as world powers or of denying them access to raw materials and the economic resources of the underdeveloped regions of the earth. There can be no doubt that, if the Soviets and the "liberation movements" they support were able to do this, the position of the United States as a world power and as an alternative or threat to the Soviet Union would be seriously weakened or that serious strains would be placed on American alliances in Eu-

rope and the rest of the world. However, there are several reasons to believe that the Soviet strategy will not be successful, as well as reasons to believe that it could be.

In the first place, it is not certain that either armed struggle or united front tactics generally can succeed in seizing power or in damaging irreparably Western economic enterprises. Terrorism, guerrilla war, and armed struggle by themselves generally have not been successful roads to power—as Guevara discovered in Bolivia. Secondly, even if a regime is overthrown or replaced by Soviet-supported insurgencies, it is not certain that the new regime will become or remain pro-Soviet. A "liberation movement" by its very nature usually contains elements that are anti-Communist, and even Marxist elements may fear or oppose the Soviets. Thirdly, many regimes of the Third World, regardless of their ideology and international support, may need Western economic contacts and assistance even more than the West needs them, and they may find it impossible to embargo their trade with the West. However, these considerations, while leaving room for optimism in the West, should not blind us to the reality of the threat. None of them will come true automatically, and they may not be operative at all.

Insurgency movements have been successful in a number of Third World regimes—China, Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. In no instance, however, did an insurgency obtain power purely through armed struggle or military means. In all these cases the insurgents had the material and moral support of the Soviets or their surrogates, and often considerable diplomatic and political assistance from the Soviets and their supporters. Two other factors were also often important in their seizure of power: the combination of armed struggle with political action within the targeted states and lack of firm support of the regime from the United States or the Western powers. In each case, the vacillation of the Western powers was partly or largely induced by the supporters of the insurgency movement within the West. It is therefore possible, if not likely or easy, for insurgency movements to obtain power, especially with Soviet support and with Western vacillation.

Secondly, although a victorious insurgency may not be decisively pro-Soviet and may actually break with the USSR, it is also possible for the Soviets to reduce it to obedience, even after it takes power. There are many ways in which the Soviets can do this, and we have seen that they were able to satellitize Cuba several years after Castro came to power. Similarly, the Marxist regime of Agostinho Neto and now Dos Santos in Angola was virtually a satellite simply because Cuban troops literally restored Neto to power in May 1977, after he was temporarily overthrown by a revolt led by his former Minister of the Interior. Many Third World states are economically unviable and are

unable to control their own territory and populations. For this reason their leaders may find Soviet, Cuban, or East German advisers, troops, and technicians indispensable for establishing and maintaining their power, especially in the face of continued revolts and conspiracies against them by different ethnic, religious, or regional components of the population. Finally, one other way that the Soviets can control a Third World state is through infiltration. Soviet training services expose many leaders or future leaders of Third World states to indoctrination, blackmail, bribery, or intimidation by the KGB, and other agents of influence can be recruited within the country or government itself. Once these agents are in place within decision-making organs of the targeted states, they can steer their policies toward more compliance with Soviet goals. As mentioned in chapter one, Soviet training for Cuban DGI and internal security officers has been a significant factor in disciplining anti-Soviet tendencies in the DGI and the Cuban government. Obviously, once a country is effectively satellitized, it is able to sponsor further infiltration efforts in other targeted states.

The ability of pro-Soviet elements to entrench themselves in power is illustrated in contemporary Nicaragua. The Sandinista "Directorate"—which consists at present of seven leaders of the FSLN—is dominated by the pro-Cuban Marxist core. The Directorate not only controls economic planning, but also acts as both the legislative and executive organ of the government. The Council of State, another legislative organ, includes thirty-three members. Although not all are Sandinistas, the Directorate recently demanded that their faction be increased to insure control. Two members of the Council—Violetto Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo—resigned in April in protest of the increasing dependence of Nicaragua on Soviet and Cuban assistance and the radical direction of the economic and press policies.

By late 1979 over 1200 Cuban teachers were present in Nicaragua, and 200 Nicaraguan students have been sent to Cuba. There are now at least 2,000 Cuban agents in Nicaragua, and the Cuban ambassador is an identified agent of the DGI who was previously stationed in Costa Rica. East Germany has made a grant of $560,000 to Nicaragua, and in late March 1980 a Sandinista delegation to Moscow met with Soviet leaders A. P. Kirilenko and Boris N. Ponomarev. This meeting led to the signing of a Soviet-Nicaraguan non-aggression pact that required the stationing of 300 Soviet agents in the Soviet Embassy in Managua, a statement of support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and permission to station a Soviet fishing trawler off the Nicaraguan coast. The CPSU also established "party-to-party" relations with the FSLN for 1980-81, a relationship that may point to a military arrangement among Nicaragua, Cuba, and the USSR in the near future. Castro's agents now control a training camp and an air fa-

cility in Nicaragua. The process by which the pro-Communist elements of the FSLN have taken power in Nicaragua and the cooperation they have had from their Cuban and Soviet sponsors make it highly doubtful that Nicaragua will become independent in the future.[24]

Finally, it is by no means unlikely that Third World states under Soviet influence will deny access to their raw materials to the United States or its allies. Indeed, if the economies of these states follow the Cuban, Angolan or Mozambican examples, they may soon lack the capacity to produce raw materials. The only instance to date of Third World use of natural resources as political weapons is the oil embargoes of the Arab states, though these states are in general by no means pro-Soviet. It is true that Angola continues to permit and even to protect Gulf Oil production facilities in Cabinda province and that some Soviet satellites—Vietnam and Cuba—have solicited economic assistance from the United States. The latter is only to be expected, however, and does not mean that these satellites wish to help the American economy or would miss an opportunity to hurt it. It is not to be expected that pro-Soviet or anti-Western states will deny access to vital resources on a merely occasional or spiteful basis. The strategic nature of such resources calls for a coordinated plan of denial in the future, when the United States faces a crisis or confrontation with the USSR or a Third World state, when the U.S. ability to counteract a denial of resources has further diminished, and when a sudden termination of access would cripple the U.S. economy, paralyze American defense capabilities, and precipitate internal political crises within the United States and the Western alliance. If generally anti-Soviet and pro-Western states such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria are willing to use their resources as political instruments, then we should not be surprised if pro-Soviet or anti-Western states follow the same policy in the future.

The Soviet strategy of terror, by which Western access to vitally necessary natural resources will be denied by the victory or operations of terrorist movements, insurgencies, and their political supporters, is a realistic one and should be taken seriously by the West. It is not a strategy that will be victorious inevitably, and if the West were to recognize and take counter-measures against it, it would cease to be a serious threat. Among the necessary counter-measures would be the resumption of economic assistance and military aid to states targeted by terrorist movements—especially the provision of counter-insurgency assistance and the training of effective counter-insurgency personnel in the local governments by the United States. The development of the C.I.A. and other components of the intelligence community, foreign and domestic, should also be a primary goal in our response to the Soviet strategy. The infiltration of terrorist move-

ments and their support apparatuses within the United States and in other countries; the identification or apprehension of known terrorists and the disruption of their organizations by covert action operations; the development of centralized computerized files on terrorist groups and members and on Soviet bloc intelligence and covert operations; and liaison with sister intelligence services in allied states should be priorities for this response.

Finally, the unequivocal support of the United States for targeted regimes, especially those that have traditionally supported the United States, on a diplomatic and political level, as well as economically and militarily, should provide the foundation for our response to the Soviet strategy of terror. The principal enemy of all terrorism is certainty—the certainty that a government or population will not be abandoned to atrocities and intimidation; the certainty that an economy will not be reduced to chaos by the driving out of investments, the expropriation of property, and the sabotage of business facilities; the certainty that an anti-Soviet government can count on the unquestioned support of the United States. There are indications that the U.S. government is gradually awakening to the nature of the Soviet threat and to the dangers of the Soviet strategy of terror, but the policies, orientation, and mentality of the United States government in the recent past have not been encouraging to those who have been aware of the threat. It will not be a simple or easy matter to reverse these policies and orientations, but it will be necessary to do so. The struggle, as the terrorists say, continues.

Footnotes

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
4. Steven D. Symms and Marianne Winston, "Resource Dependency and American Security," *International Security Review*, IV (Winter 1979–80), p. 391.
5. Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration of Latin America* (Washington: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975), p. 6; see also Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October, 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente* (Washington: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), pp. 80–85.

6. Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy? Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 3.
7. Clemens Dutt, ed., *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism: Manual* (2nd ed.; Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), p. 402.
8. John Gerassi, ed., *Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 420–21.
9. Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," *Tricontinental*, no. 56 (November 1970), pp. 3–4.
10. Quoted in *Terrorism: A Staff Study*, U.S. Congress, Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, August 1, 1974, p. 11.
11. John Gerassi, ed., *The Coming of the New International* (New York and Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1971), p. 234.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
14. Walter Laqueur, ed., *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (New York: New American Library, 1978), pp. 176–77.
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16. Guy Halverson, "Vital U.S. Cobalt Supply Threatened," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 21, 1978, p. 11.
17. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Washington Post*, June 2, 1978, p. A17; Symms and Winston, "Resource Dependency," p. 393.
18. Larry McDonald, "The Long Shadow of Bulgaria's Secret Police," *Conservative Digest*, February 1979, pp. 34–35.
19. John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Readers' Digest Press, 1974), chapter xiii *passim*.
20. Peter Kemp, "Left Against Left in Latin America," *Spectator*, 9 April 1977, p. 7.
21. Peter Kemp, "Russia Against the Tupamaros," *Spectator*, 16 April 1977, p. 9.
22. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy," *Conflict Studies*, no. 120 (July 1980), pp. 14–15.
23. Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972), pp. 90–91; Bittman's more recent comments are quoted in Everett G. Martin, "Latin America's Terrorist Network," *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1980, p. 24.
24. On Cuban and Soviet developments in Nicaragua, see "The Turmoil of Nicaragua: From Somoza to Sandinistas," *Issues in Brief* (ACU Educa-

tion and Research Institute, September 4, 1980), pp. 8-9; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "A Sandinista Mission to Moscow," *Washington Post*, May 16, 1980, p. A15; Robert Moss, "A Soviet Base in Nicaragua?" *Daily Telegraph*, 28 July 1980.

EXHIBIT D

Notes & Views

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981

EDITORS' NOTE: As a service to scholarship, we present, by arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, a "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts." This Checklist continues the series presented in the Hoover *Yearbook on International Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*) since 1976, and jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1982 edition of the *YICA*. We also present, for the first time, a companion "Checklist of Elements in the National Liberation Movement," prepared by Wallace Spaulding, a long-time Washington-area specialist on international Communist affairs. These two lists together comprise the political parties and movements that Moscow views as the critical elements in the world revolutionary process. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

By Richard F. Staar

Soviet party and state leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, announced in his speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) early last year, that there were Communist parties operating in 94 countries of the world.[1] Since Moscow apparently recognizes two parties in Sweden, this would mean a total of 95 parties. The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, resurrected at a congress in May 1981, presumably became a 96th Communist party to be recognized by Moscow. The Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981, that follows below enumerates these 96 parties, listing them by "country,"[2] and indicating the initials of those parties which do not go by the name "Communist Party of [. . .]" To the maximum extent possible, the body of the Checklist is devoted solely to these 96 parties. In a number of countries, the Moscow-recognized "Communist party" is not necessarily the most significant Marxist-Leninist group on the scene. A number of these exceptions are mentioned in the footnotes to the Checklist.

The Checklist provides information on the population of the countries, membership of the Communist parties, the parties' fortunes in the most recent elections, their

Mr. Staar is on leave of absence for public service as US Ambassador and head of delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna, Austria, from his position as a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA). A fourth, revised edition of his book Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe *has just appeared.*

[1] Brezhnev's Feb. 23, 1981, speech was published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[2] In five cases, Puerto Rico, West Berlin, and three overseas departments of France (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion), the local Communist party does not represent a sovereign country, but is still treated as an independent party by Moscow.

legal status, and their general orientation within the world Communist movement. The population estimates are as of mid-1981.[a] Communist party membership figures listed here are either numbers reported or claimed by the given party or—where no reported

[a] The estimates were provided to the author by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce.

CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND FRONTS

Africa and the Middle East	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Algeria (PAGS)	19,422,000	450 est.	(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Egypt	43,300,000	500 est.	(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Iran (Tudeh)	39,958,000	1,500 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Iraq	13,575,000	2,000 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Israel (RAKAH)	3,948,000	1,500 est.	3.4 (1981); 4 of 120	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Jordan	3,443,000	500 est.	(No elections since 1967)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Lebanon	3,097,000[b]	2,500 est.	— (1972); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Lesotho	1,365,000	Negligible	(1970 elections nullified)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Morocco (PPS)	21,590,000	2,750 est.	— (1977); 1 of 264	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Nigeria (SWPP)	79,682,000	Unknown	(1979)	Proscribed[c]	Pro-Moscow
Réunion	518,000	2,000 est.	—(1981); none in Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Saudi Arabia	9,686,000	Negligible	(No elections scheduled)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Senegal (PIT)[e]	5,834,000	1,000 est.	1978	Legal	Pro-Moscow
South Africa	29,313,000	Unknown	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Sudan	19,312,000	1,500 est.	(1980)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Syria	9,107,000	5,000 est.	3.0 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Tunisia	6,663,000	100 est.	2.1 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	309,813,000	21,300			

The Americas	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Argentina	28,130,000	80,000 claim	(No elections scheduled)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Bolivia	5,490,000	500 est.[f]	(1980 elections voided)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Brazil	124,800,000	6,000 est.	(1978)[g]	Proscribed[c]	Pro-Moscow
Canada	24,200,000	2,500 est.[h]	0.05 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Chile	11,162,000	20,000 est.	(Elections promised)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Colombia	25,217,000	12,000 est.	1.9 (1978); 3 of 311	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Costa Rica (PVP)	2,332,000	3,200 est.	2.7 (1978); 3 of 57	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Cuba	9,800,000	434,000 claim	— (1981); all of 499	In power	Pro-Moscow
Dominican Republic	5,855,000	4,500 est.[i]	— (1978); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Ecuador	8,275,000	1,000 est.	3.2 (1979); none[j]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
El Salvador	4,610,000	800 est.[k]	(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Guadeloupe	304,000	3,000 est.	38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 in Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Guatemala (PGT)	7,310,000	750 est.	(1974)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Guyana (PPP)	857,000	Unknown	20.4 (1980); 10 of 65	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Haiti (PUCH)	5,923,000	350 est.	(1973)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Honduras	3,940,000	1,500 est.	(1980)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Jamaica (WPJ)	2,268,000	Unknown	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Martinique	302,000	1,000 est.	6.4 (1981); none in Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Mexico (PUSM)	69,100,000	112,000 claim	5.4 (1979); 18 of 400[l]	Legal	Independent
Nicaragua (PSN)[m]	2,559,000	250 est.	(Election promised, 1985)	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Panama (PPP)	1,928,000	550 est.	— (1978); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Paraguay	3,268,000	3,500 est.	(1973)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Peru	18,119,000	3,000 est.[n]	2.8 (1980); 4 seats[o]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Puerto Rico[p]	3,258,000	125 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
United States	229,700,000	11,000 est.	0.01 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Uruguay	2,944,000	7,000 est.	(No elections since 1971)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Venezuela	17,913,000	4,500 est.	1.4 (1978); 1 of 195[q]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	619,554,000	713,025			

Asia and the Pacific	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of votes; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Australia (SPA)[r]	14,800,000	1,500 est.	–(1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Bangladesh	90,680,000	2,500 est.	– (1979); 1 of 300	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Burma (BCP—White Flag)	35,289,000	3,000 claim	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
China	1,041,500,000	39,000,000 claim	– (1981); all of 3,202	In power	Pro-Beijing
India[s]	692,400,000	150,000 est.	2.6 (1980); 11 of 525	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Indonesia[t]	154,300,000	50 est.	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Japan	117,700,000	440,000 claim	10.4 (1980); 29 of 511	Legal	Independent
Kampuchea (KPRP)[u]	5,774,000	5,000 est.	99.0 (1981); all of 117	In power	Pro-Moscow
Laos (LPRP)	3,518,000	15,000 claim	(No legislature)	In power	Pro-Moscow
Malaysia	14,330,000	3,000 est.[v]	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
Mongolia	1,700,000	76,000 claim	99.0 (1977); all 354	In power	Pro-Moscow
Nepal	15,338,000	1,500 est.[w]	– (1981); none[x]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
New Zealand (SUP)[y]	3,117,000	200 est.	0.5 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
North Korea (KWP)	19,000,000	2,000,000 claim	100.0 (1977); all of 579	In power	Independent
Pakistan	90,439,000	300 est.	(1979 elections postponed)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Philippines[z]	50,100,000	200 est.	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Sri Lanka	15,172,000	6,000 est.	1.9 (1977); none[aa]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Thailand	48,787,000	1,000 est.[bb]	(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing[cc]
Vietnam	55,100,000	1,480,000 est.	97.9 (1981); all 538	In power	Pro-Moscow[dd]
TOTAL	2,469,226,000	43,185,250			

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Albania (APL)	2,700,000	122,600 claim	99.9 (1978); all 250 to Democratic Front	In power	Independent
Bulgaria	8,900,000	825,876 claim	99.9 (1976); all 400 to Fatherland Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Czechoslovakia	15,300,000	1,538,179 claim	99.9 (1981); all 350 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
East Germany (SED)	16,800,000	2,172,110 claim	99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Hungary (HSWP)	10,700,000	812,000 claim	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Poland (PUWP)	35,900,000	2,734,000 claim	99.5 (1980); all 460 to National Unity Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Romania	22,400,000	3,004,336 claim	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Socialist Unity Front	In power	Independent[ee]
USSR	267,900,000	17,480,000 claim	99.9 (1979); all 1,500	In power	Pro-Moscow
Yugoslavia (LCY)	22,500,000	2,199,444 claim	– (1978); all 308 to Socialist Alliance	In power	Independent
TOTAL	403,100,000	30,888,545			

Western Europe	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Austria	7,509,000	25,000 est.	0.96 (1979); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Belgium	9,900,000	10,000 est.	2.3 (1981); 2 of 212	Legal	Independent
Cyprus (AKEL)	636,000	12,000 est.	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Denmark	5,100,000	9,000 est.	1.2 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Finland	4,798,000	47,000 est.	17.9 (1979); 35 of 200	Legal	Pro-Moscow
France	54,000,000	500,000 est.	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Great Britain	56,000,000	18,500 claim	0.05 (1979); none	Legal	Independent
Greece[ff]	9,671,000	33,500 est.	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Iceland (AB)[gg]	231,000	2,200 est.	19.7 (1979); 11 of 60	Legal	Isolationist

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts

Western Europe (cont.)	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Ireland	3,400,000	500 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Italy	57,200,000	1,715,890 claim	30.4 (1979); 201 of 630	Legal	Independent
Luxembourg	400,000	600 est.	5.0 (1979); 2 of 59[bb]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Malta	370,000	150 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Netherlands	14,200,000	13,000 est.	2.1 (1981); 3 of 150	Legal	Independent
Norway[c]	4,100,000	500 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Portugal	9,996,000	187,000 claim	16.7 (1980); 41 of 250	Legal	Pro-Moscow
San Marino	22,000	300 est.	25.0 (1978); 16 of 60[bb]	Legal	Independent
Spain	37,700,000	140,000 est.	10.6 (1979); 23 of 350[bb]	Legal	Independent
Sweden (VPK)	8,324,000	18,000 claim	5.6 (1979); 23 of 349[a]	Legal	Independent
(APK)		Unknown	— (1979); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Switzerland (PdA)	6,390,000	5,000 est.	1.5 (1979); 3 of 200	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Turkey	46,700,000	Negligible	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
West Germany	61,666,000	48,856 claim	0.2 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
West Berlin (SEW)[dd]	1,894,000	7,000 est.	0.7 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	400,207,000	2,793,996			
Grand Total	**4,201,900,000**	**77,602,116**			

Soviet international front organizations	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Number of affiliates	Countries[a]
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	1957	Cairo	No data	87	
Christian Peace Conference	1958	Prague	No data		At least 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	1946	Brussels	Ca. 25,000		Nearly 80
International Organization of Journalists	1946	Prague	Over 180,000		Over 120
International Union of Students	1946	Prague	Over 10,000,000	Ca. 118	
Women's International Democratic Federation	1945	East Berlin	Over 200,000,000	129	114
World Federation of Democratic Youth	1945	Budapest	Over 150,000,000	Over 250	Over 100
World Federation of Scientific Workers	1946	Paris	Ca. 450,000	Ca. 33	
World Federation of Trade Unions	1945	Prague	Ca. 200,000,000	Ca. 71	
World Peace Council	1949	Helsinki	No data	Over 135	

[a] A dash "—" indicates that the vote percentage was not available. The date of the latest election (through December 1981) is indicated in parentheses.

[b] No allowance is made for the possible impact of civil war on the population.

[c] "Proscribed" is not an entirely satisfactory term; the local Communist party may more accurately be said to fail to meet constitutional requirements for participation in national elections.

[d] An overseas department of France, entitled to elect three deputies to the French National Assembly.

[e] The PIT is the renamed and legalized former clandestine branch of the PAI; it continues to enjoy Moscow's recognition.

[f] The PCB is only one of a number of leftist organizations; others include the PCB—Marxist-Leninist, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Revolutionary Party of Bolivian Workers, and various Trotskyist groupings.

[g] At least five Communists were elected under other party labels.

[h] Membership estimate is for all leftist groups, the pro-Beijing CPC (Marxist-Leninist) being stronger than the CPC electorally, getting 0.11 percent of the vote in 1980.

[i] The membership estimate is for all of a dozen or so Marxist groups.

[j] The Maoist radical MRO won 4.8 percent of the vote and one seat.

[k] Membership estimate is for combined political and guerrilla strength of the FCES. This party is one of five leftist groupings comprising the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front conducting civil war against the El Salvadoran government.

[l] The 9.4 percent figure reflects more recent data than available last year. The Mexican CP won 18 of 400 (not 300) seats in 1979.

[m] This party restricts its activities to the domestic scene. The Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) represents Nicaragua at Communist meetings abroad. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of Nicaragua claims 1,200 members.

[n] Pro-Beijing groups total another 1,500 members. Also, there are other Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist parties.

[o] The data are for the United Left—an electoral coalition of the Peruvian Communist Party-Unidad and the Socialist Revolutionary Party—which won two seats in the Senate and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

[p] The Puerto Rican Socialist Party is also pro-Moscow and about the same size as the PCP.

[q] Overall, the Venezuelan Left garnered 9.0 percent of the vote in 1978. The Movement to Socialism (MAS) won 11 seats, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 4; the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), 3; the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1; and the Communist Vanguard, 1. The slight change in the 1978 vote percentage for the Venezuelan CP from that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor of conflicting published data.

[r] The independent Communist Party of Australia has an estimated 2,000 members.

[s] The independent Communist Party (Marxist) has an estimated 100,000 members. In the 1980 elections, it won 6.2 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the Lok Sabha.

[t] A pro-Beijing faction numbers an estimated 250 members, mostly in exile.

Checklist footnotes (continued)

[u] The KPRP, which at a "Fourth" Congress in May 1981 resurrected an organization forced underground in the early 1960's, is not to be confused with the pro-Beijing Kampuchean Communist Party and guerrilla forces associated with Pol Pot, which continue to fight a guerrilla war against the Hanoi-backed KPRP regime.

[v] The membership estimate is a combined total for party members and guerrilla forces in Malaya. There is also evidence of a 200-member pro-Beijing Communist Party of North Kalimantan in Northern Borneo.

[w] The membership estimate is a combined total for all Communist parties, including pro-Chinese.

[x] Under terms of December 1980 constitutional adjustments, the 1981 elections to the National Assembly were on a nonpartisan basis.

[y] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of New Zealand has an estimated 300 members and is legal.

[z] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of the Philippines—Marxist-Leninist has an estimated 3,000 members and is proscribed.

[aa] In a January 1981 by-election, the SLCP won one seat in the 168-member parliament.

[bb] There are always an estimated 10,000 insurgents in the pro-Beijing Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces.

[cc] There are indications student intellectuals and lower-level party officials are advocating a more pro-Vietnam, pro-Moscow orientation.

[dd] The VCP possibly showed a degree of independence from Moscow by attending the 8th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in November 1981.

[ee] Romania's "independence" vis-à-vis Moscow within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is clearly relative and may be moderating under the impact of increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

[ff] The independent KKE-Interior claims some 4,800 members.

[gg] The People's Alliance (AB) is a coalition of leftist elements in which organized Communists are dominant.

[hh] Disparity between the vote percentage reported here and that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor regarding conflicting published data.

[ii] The Norwegian Communist Party is the weakest of Norway's three leftist parties. The Socialist Left Party, with an estimated 2,000 members, is the largest. In 1981, it polled 4.9 percent of the votes and won 4 of 155 seats. The third party is the pro-Beijing Workers' Communist Party.

[jj] Three of these seats were garnered in by-elections since the 1979 polling.

[kk] Western observers consider the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) to be a subsidiary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany.

[ll] In some cases, countries are represented by individuals rather than by affiliated associations.

SOURCES: Population estimates are from the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce. Figures on membership claimed are from party newspapers, journals, or radio broadcasts. Membership estimates, vote percentages and seats in legislature, and information on party legal status and orientation are from the individual party profiles provided by contributors to Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, and/or US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook, 1982*, Washington, DC, 1982 (in draft). Figures for the Soviet front organizations are from last year's Checklist as updated by information in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 27, 1981; *New Times* (Moscow), No. 51, 1980; World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980-1983*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., p. 2; and *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, pp. 121-22.

figures are available or where claims seem exaggerated—estimates by contributors to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. In a few cases, the information on party membership is so sketchy that the best that can be provided is a rough estimate for *all* "Communist" groups, whether recognized by Moscow or not.

The total worldwide membership for all the Communist parties recognized by Moscow reportedly is "more than 77 million."[4] This figure obviously includes—despite the estrangement between Moscow and Beijing—the 39 million members claimed by the Chinese Communist Party.[5] It is interesting to compare this global figure with the total in the current Checklist, 77.6 million—itself an increase from the 76.7 million estimated in the 1980 checklist published last spring.

At the end of 1981, Communists ruled the same number of countries as at the end of 1980 (16, a figure which excludes Afghanistan). The Communist parties are proscribed or not certified for participation in elections in 25 countries (10 in Latin America, 8 in Africa and the Middle East, 6 in Asia and the Pacific, and 1 in Western Europe). The overwhelming majority of the parties remain pro-Moscow in orientation. Some 25 of these parties—plus a new Suriname party—held congresses during 1981 (see Table 1 on page 76).

Looking at trends by region, we find that the situation in Africa and the Middle East remains essentially unchanged. In the case of Senegal, membership estimates were decreased to reflect the fact that Moscow had recognized the smaller clandestine (rather than the less radical, legal) branch of the African Independence Party (PAI). The Moscow-recognized group has recently renamed itself the Party of Independent Labor (PIT) and now also enjoys legal status. In general, information on Communist parties in these regions is difficult to obtain.

In the Americas, the estimated total increased some 7,000 from the 1980 Checklist. Increases in estimates occurred for Argentina, Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Decreases are noted in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (In a number of cases, the decline reflects not so much a change in Communist fortunes as a tightening of definitions to include, wherever possible, estimated memberships of Soviet-recognized movements only.)

Turning to Asia and the Pacific, it should be noted that Afghanistan has not been included in the 1981 Checklist. Although Moscow sees the country as being socialist in orientation, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet been accorded the honor of acceptance among the parties recognized by Moscow as "Commu-

[4] See Boris Vesnin, "The Communists and Peace, Détente, Disarmament," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 49, December 1981.

[5] Reported by Hu Yaobang, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman, in a speech on July 1, 1981, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Broadcast in English by Beijing Xinhua on July 1, 1981, and transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), July 1, 1981, p. K/S1.

nist."[6] Similarly, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), not recognized by Moscow, has been excluded from the totals here. The Moscow-recognized Communist Party of India makes a highly inflated claim of 466,483 members,[7] but non-Communist estimates are about 150,000. The Chinese movement reportedly gained 1 million members over the past year. Estimates for the movements in Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have been lowered. New figures released by North Korea show an increase. On balance, but for the increase in China, the total for the region as a whole would have remained relatively stable.

Table 1. Communist Party Congresses in 1981[a]

Country[b]	Number of congress	Date
Albania (APL)	8th	Nov. 1–7
Argentina	9th National Conference[c]	June
Australia (SPA)	4th	Oct. 2
Bulgaria	12th	Mar. 31–Apr. 4
Czechoslovakia	16th	Apr. 6–10
East Germany (SED)	10th	Apr. 11–16
Ecuador	10th	Nov. 26–29
Finland	19th	May 22–24
Great Britain	37th	Nov. 14–17
Iceland (AB)	Conference	Nov. 20–22
Israel (RAKAH)	19th	Feb. 11–14
Jamaica (WPJ)	2nd	Dec. 18–21
Kampuchea (KPRP)	4th[d]	May 26–29
Mexico (CPM)	19th	Mar. 9–14
	20th	Oct. 15
(PUSM)	National Unification Assembly	Nov. 5–7
Mongolia (MPRP)	18th	May 26–31
Nicaragua (PSN)	12th	July 3
Norway	17th	Dec. 4–6
Poland (PUWP)	9th, Extraordinary	July 14–20
Réunion	Special	Mar. 29
Senegal (PIT)	Constituent	ca. Aug. 8
Spain	10th	July 28–31
Suriname[e]	Founding	July 24
Sweden (VPK)	26th	Nov. 20–24
USSR	26th	Feb. 23–Mar. 3
West Germany	6th	May 29–31
West Berlin (SEW)	6th	May 15

[a] Five Communist party congresses held during 1980 were omitted from the listing of congresses in that year published in the March-April 1981 issue of *Problems of Communism*, because the information became available after that issue went to press. These were the CP of San Marino (10th Congress, Dec. 6–7, 1980), the CP of Sri Lanka (11th Congress, Mar. 26–30), the CP of Syria (5th Congress, May 29–31), the CP of Venezuela (6th Congress, Aug. 8–11), and the APK in Sweden (26th Congress, Apr. 4–7).

[b] Where the local party is not named "Communist Party of . . ." initials of the party name are provided in parentheses.

[c] This conference was "tantamount to a congress" according to *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 27.

[d] The newly constituted KPRP, by calling this congress its "Fourth," laid claim to the heritage of a like-named organization that was driven underground in the early 1960's.

[e] This party was formed by a merger of a rudimentary Surname Communist organization and the Revolutionary Liberation Movement of Surname. See *De Ware Tijd* (Paramaribo), July 10, 1981, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Latin America Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 2363 (JPRS 78906), Sept. 3, 1981, p. 90. It is too early to determine the legal status or orientation of this party, and there has been no indication of whether or not it is recognized by the Soviet Communist Party.

All of the East European ruling parties except those in Czechoslovakia and Poland claimed slight membership gains. In December, the Polish United Workers' Party reported a decline of 415,000 members between June 30, 1980, and December 1, 1981—a drop of some 13 percent.[8] Imposition of martial law apparently has brought more resignations (and expulsions), although no comprehensive information has been published.

In Western Europe, the largest gains were claimed by the Portuguese Communist Party (plus 23,000 members). By contrast, the Italian party's claimed membership is down nearly 100,000, and the French party is estimated to have lost a similar number of members, despite the PCF's very recent claim to have increased its membership to 710,000.[9] The figures for the Spanish Communist party are probably inflated. For one, they do not allow for potential defections by the Catalan and Basque organizations; moreover, growing estrangement between Moscow and Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo may lead to formation of a significant pro-Moscow rump within the PCE. For all of Western Europe, there was an estimated net loss of about 160,000.

A final item in the Checklist is a listing of major international Communist front organizations. Only the 10 most important ones have been mentioned. Several fronts included in the 1980 list (the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, the International Institute for Peace, and the International Radio and TV Organization) have been excluded inasmuch as they are basically regional organizations.

[6] Although the 1982 *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* includes profiles on Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mozambique, and South Yemen, none of the ruling parties in these countries are recognized as "Communist" by Moscow, and hence they have been left off the Checklist.

These and a variety of other parties, fronts, and movements are listed in the Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement" that follows the Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts—Eds.

[7] See *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 46.

[8] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 10, 1981.

[9] Secretary General Georges Marchais's report to the 24th Congress of the French Communist Party on Feb. 4, 1982, as reported in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 4, 1982.

Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"

By Wallace Spaulding

The "national liberation movement" comprises, in the eyes of Soviet theoreticians, the third most important component in the "world revolutionary process,"[1] exceeded in importance only by the "world socialist system"[2] (the 16 *countries* ruled by Communist parties) and the "revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries"[3] (some 80 Communist *parties* recognized by the Soviets in non-Communist countries). These last two are treated in the preceding Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts.

The "national liberation movement" is clearly a more complex phenomenon from the Soviet standpoint. Indeed, Soviet terminology to deal with it has altered over time, and Soviet analysts do not always make explicit exactly which entities fall into specific categories at any given time. To discern the elements of the movement, one must plow through a mass of Soviet theoretical writings and also turn to such indicators as participation of various parties or movements in congresses of certain ruling Communist parties and in the activities of both *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the official Soviet-line theoretical monthly of 63 Communist parties) and Communist front organizations. The results of such an effort, which perforce cannot claim to be comprehensive, are offered in the Checklist below.

The national liberation movement includes, first of all, "revolutionary democratic parties" and the "countries of socialist orientation" which they rule. The latter are said to be the "vanguard" of the national liberation movement.[4] Such countries differ from Communist ones in that they have not definitively left the "world capitalist system," even though the *national* economy in the majority of them is dominated by the state sector.[5]

As is evident from the accompanying listing, the vast majority of the revolutionary democratic parties operate in Africa and the Middle East. Boris Ponomarëv, writing in 1971, by and large excluded Latin America when discussing the national liberation movement, on the grounds that (in contrast to Africa and non-Communist Asia) the region had "a relatively developed capitalism," a strong and experienced working class, a long history of revolutionary struggle, and Communist parties in all countries.[6] There are, however, as we shall note below, parties and movements in Latin America which do seem to be included under the broad umbrella of the world "national liberation movement."

Although Communist parties often exist in countries having revolutionary democratic parties, it is the latter that are treated by Soviet writers as the distinctive pro-

[1] K. Maydanik and G. Mirskiy, "The National Liberation Struggle: The Current Stage," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEMO*), No. 6, June 1981, as translated in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter, *JPRS/UPSA*), No. 1171 (JPRS 78972), Sept. 14, 1981, p. 18; N. N. Inozemtsev, "A Revolutionary Step for Millions," *Znutrhnyye obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 8, Feb. 20, 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1126 (JPRS 77897), Apr. 22, 1981, p. 11; V. Zagladin, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnoye kommunisticheskoye dvizheniye: ocherk strategii i taktiki* (The International Communist Movement: Sketch of Strategy and Tactics), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, as trans. by US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 57044, Sept. 18, 1972; and M. Milin, "A Doctrine Which is Transforming the World," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 20, 1974, p. 4.

[2] Milin, loc. cit., pp. 1, 4; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 47; and Moscow TASS, Jan. 23, 1982.

[3] Zagladin, op. cit., p. 59; Milin, loc. cit., p. 4; Ye. Kuskov, "The Most Active and Influential Force," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Kommunist* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/Kommunist*), JPRS 57988, Jan. 16, 1973, p. 107; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

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[4] R. A. Ulyanovskiy, "Great October and Revolutionary Process in Asian and African Countries," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Arlington, VA), JPRS 69699, Aug. 30, 1977, p. 15.

[5] A. Kiva, "Socialist Orientation: Some Problems of Theory and Practice," *MEMO*, No. 10, October 1976.

[6] B. Ponomarëv, "Topical Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process," *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1971, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 54571, Nov. 29, 1971, pp. 70, 75.

Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement": Indicators of Participation

	Attendance							
	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80	26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main session), Feb.-Mar. 81	12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81	10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81	Work conference, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Nov. 81	Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*	Has members on the World Peace Council[a]
"REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES								
Of which:								
"Vanguard" revolutionary democratic parties:								
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan	—	x	15	x	x	x	Sept. 81	PC
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party	—	x	19	x	x	x	June 76	VP
Benin People's Revolutionary Party	—	—	x	x	x	x	—	(PC)
Congolese Labor Party	x	x	36	x	x	x	Apr. 81	PC
Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia	x	x	18	x	x	x	Apr. 78[b]	VP
Mozambique Liberation Front	x	x	26	x	x	x	June 76	PC
Yemen Socialist Party	x	x	22	x	x	—	Sept. 81	PC
Other revolutionary democratic parties:								
Algerian National Liberation Front	—	—	27	x	x	—	—	(PC)
Burmese Socialist Program Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Democratic Party of Guinea	—	—	x	x	x	x	Aug. 76	VP
African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands[c]	—	x	x	x	x	—	May 76	PC
Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution (AKFM-KDRSM)	—	x	x	x	x	x	Jan. 81	VP
Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe	—	—	x	x	x	—	—	(M)
Seychelles People's Progressive Front	—	x	x	—	—	—	—	(M)
Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Syria	—	x	24	x	x	—	—	VP
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania	—	—	x	x	x	—	May 78	(M)
Possible revolutionary democratic parties:								
New Jewel Movement of Grenada[d]	—	x	x	x	x	—	Sept. 80	—
Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua	—	—	32	x	x	—	July 81	PC
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS PROPER								
Of which:								
Unitary:								
National Liberation Front of Bahrain	x	x	x	x	—	x	Oct. 78	M
Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia)	—	x	x	x	x	—	July 81	PC
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	M
African National Congress (South Africa)	—	x	x	x	x	—	Mar. 80	VP
POLISARIO Front (Western Sahara)	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	M

	Attendance							
	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80	26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main sessions), Feb.-Mar. 81	12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81	10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81	Work conference, "Problems of Peace and Socialism", Nov. 81	Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*	Has members on the World Peace Council[a]
United front:								
Coordinating Body of Revolutionary Mass Organizations/Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador)	–	x	–	–	x	–	July 81	(M)
Association of Revolutionary Organizations of Guatemala	–	x	–	–	–	–	Mar. 81	(M)
Palestine Liberation Organization	–	x	x	x	x	–	July 76	VP
OTHER "SOCIALIST-ORIENTED" PARTIES								
Of which:								
Ruling:								
Unity and National Progress Party (Burundi)	–	x	x	–	x	–	–	–
People's National Congress (Guyana)	–	x	x	–	x	–	–	PC
Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Iraq	–	–	–	x	x	–	–	–
General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamhiriyah	–	x	x	x	x	–	–	PC
Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution[e]	–	x	–	–	–	–	–	(M?)[e]
Democratic Union of the Mali People	–	x	x	x	x	–	–	PC
All-People's Congress of Sierra Leone	–	x	x	–	x	–	–	PC
Uganda People's Congress	–	–	–	–	x	–	–	–
United National Independence Party (Zambia)	–	x	x	x	x	–	–	PC
Zimbabwe African National Union[f]	–	x	–	x	–	–	–	VP[f]
Nonruling:								
National People's Party of Bangladesh	–	–	x	x	x	–	–	(PC)
MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile	–	x	x	x	x	–	Jan. 76	–
Chilean Socialist Party	–	x	x	x	x	–	–	PC
National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt	–	–	x	x	–	–	May 75	VP
People's National Party of Jamaica[d]	–	–	x	–	–	–	–	(PC)
Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)[d]	–	–	x	x	x	–	–	PC
Socialist Revolutionary Party (Peru)	–	x	–	–	–	–	–	–
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico	–	x	–	–	–	–	–	–
Socialist Party of Uruguay	–	x	–	–	–	–	–	PC

[a] Key to symbols: VP—Vice President and member of the WPC's Presidential Committee; PC—member of Presidential Committee; M—member of World Peace Council. Where symbol is in parentheses, the country is allocated the indicated position, but no incumbent is currently identified; it is only assumed that a member of the party in question will be named to the slot.

[b] At the time, COPWE had not been created; the organization represented was the Provisional Military Administrative Council, then and still the actual ruling body in Ethiopia.

[c] Since the overthrow of Guinea-Bissau's Luis Cabral in November 1980, it appears that two separate parties are emerging from PAIGC, one in the Cape Verde Islands, the other in Guinea-Bissau. It is not clear how Moscow views these developments.

[d] Is a member of the democratic Socialist International.

[e] The dominant group in Madagascar's ruling coalition. No slot is indicated for this party in the WPC, although the listing is said to be incomplete, leaving open the possibility that a representative from this party could be added to those from its junior coalition partner, the AKFM-KDRSM.

[f] Moscow long supported the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) over ZANU, and indeed ZAPU remains the country's representative on the WPC. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo was published in the February issue of *World Marxist Review*, and is a vice president of the WPC. It remains to be seen how Nkomo's removal from Zimbabwe's government in early 1982 will affect Moscow's attitudes toward ZANU.

SOURCES: For the 1978 meeting in Sofia, *World Marxist Review* (London), February 1979, p. 3. For the 1980 meeting in East Berlin, ibid., December 1980, pp. 23–24. For the 26th CPSU Congress, Moscow TASS, Feb. 20–21, 1980; Radio Moscow, Feb. 19 and 22, and Mar. 6, 1981; *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 20 and 23, and Mar. 5 and 7, 1981. For the Bulgarian party congress, *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Apr. 1, 1981. For the East German party congress, East Berlin, ADN, Apr. 11, 1981. For the November 1981 conference, *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981. For the WPC, World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980–1983*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., and *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 3, 1981, p. 2.

gressive elements of Africa and non-Communist Asia.[7] The revolutionary democratic parties are said to differ from Communist ones in that they reflect multiclass interests and fail to have a uniformly cohesive doctrine and discipline.[8] But, while these parties are generally regarded by Soviet writers to be dominated by "petit-bourgeois" and other non-working class elements,[9] virtually all have acquired at least some Marxists, according to Soviet Afro-Asian specialist A. Kiva.[10]

In discussions of revolutionary democratic parties, Soviet writers single out for special attention seven that come closer than the others to being "genuine" Communist parties.[11] These "vanguard" or "elite" revolutionary democratic parties—in Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen—have stricter class and ideological requirements for membership than do others and have openly declared their commitment to "scientific socialism" (as the Soviets term Moscow's brand of socialism).[12] According to one writer, this elite group, exercising "people's democratic" power, generally took the "noncapitalist" path of transition to socialism in the 1970's.[13]

The activities of these "vanguard" parties and the way they are treated by the CPSU highlight their special place in the national liberation movement. These seven (plus the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution—AKFM-KDRSM) were the only revolutionary democratic parties to attend a conference in November 1981 on the work of the magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[14] Leaders from each of the seven, except the Benin People's Revolutionary Party, were accorded the privilege of addressing a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress in February-March 1981, an honor extended to leaders of only 26 of the 83 regular foreign Communist parties in attendance. Moreover, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen were the only non-Communist countries except Grenada to vote with the Soviet Union in the United Nations (UN) in January 1980 on the Afghanistan question. The same five attended the June 1980 and July 1981 sessions of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as observers, and they signed friendship treaties with the USSR between 1976 and 1979 (the Congo signed a similar treaty in May 1981).

Nine other parties are currently (as of mid-1981) stated by Soviet experts to be "revolutionary democratic" (see the Checklist).[15] These differ from the "vanguard" parties in this category in that the degree of organization of the ruling party is deemed less advanced. The nine parties vary in their closeness to Moscow. Syria's Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party appears the most pro-Soviet: the state it rules signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in October 1980; and the party, together with Algeria's FLN, was granted the distinction of having its representative address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress. Similarly, the AKFM-KDRSM of Madagascar, while only a junior member of its country's ruling coalition, seems to lean strongly toward Moscow (as evidenced by the party's aforementioned involvement in the conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and by Madagascar's signing of a friendship treaty with Moscow in June 1979). At the other extreme is the largely isolationist Burmese Socialist Program Party.

There may be some basis for including two other ruling parties—the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua—among the revolutionary democratic movements, although the Soviets have not publicly done so. As noted above, Grenada was the only other non-Communist country to join the "vanguard" revolutionary democracies in supporting the Soviet position in the January 1980 UN debate on Afghanistan. Also, in September 1980, a New Jewel spokesman was published in *World Marxist Review* (the London edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), a distinction enjoyed by each of the "vanguard" revolutionary democratic

[7] Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 199–205, 225–29; V. G. Solodovnikov et al., Eds., *Politicheskiye partii Afriki* (Political Parties of Africa), Moscow, n.p., 1970, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 52950, Apr. 23, 1971, pp. 169–70.

[8] A. Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation: Some Aspects of Their Political Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1973, p. 32; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 255; Solodovnikov et al., op. cit., p. 75; G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1974, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 61776, Apr. 17, 1974, p. 100.

[9] A. Bolsky, "The National Liberation Movement: Laws and Prospects," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1975, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/UMA*), No. 1137 (JPRS 64667), Apr. 30, 1975, p. 45; Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 79, 206; and Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," pp. 31, 35–36.

[10] Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," p. 37.

[11] Ye. Primakov, "The Law of Uneven Development and the Historical Fate of Liberated Countries," *MEMO*, No. 12, December 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1129 (JPRS 77924), Apr. 24, 1981, p. 21; V. N. Gavrilov, "Problems of the Formation of Vanguard Parties in Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1111 (JPRS 77660), Mar. 24, 1981, p. 2; and V. Li, "Social Revolution in Afro-Asian Countries and Scientific Socialism," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 3, March 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1150 (JPRS 78507), July 14, 1981, p. 12.

[12] Vanyamin Chirkin, in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1180 (JPRS 79176), Oct. 8, 1981, pp. 4–5; V. Li, loc. cit.

[13] Ye. Primakov, "Countries of a Socialist Orientation: Difficult but Feasible Transition to Socialism," *MEMO*, No. 7, July 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1185 (JPRS 79272) Oct. 22, 1981, p. 12. Primakov draws a distinction between the contemporary "revolutionary democratic" parties and parties of a more conservative, less mass-based nature which in the 1960's were seen as having taken the road to scientific socialism. He refers to the latter as "national revolutionary" regimes.

[14] *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981.

[15] See, for example, Chirkin, loc. cit., pp. 4–8; and N. D. Kosukhin, "Development Trends of the Countries of a Socialist Orientation," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1197 (JPRS 79561), Dec. 1, 1981, p. 65.

parties except that of Benin, but by less than half of the "other" revolutionary democratic parties (see Checklist). As for the Sandinistas, "revolutionary democratic" status might be inferred from two things: (1) their representative was permitted to address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress, a privilege otherwise reserved only for important Communist and revolutionary democratic parties, and (2) like Algeria's FLN, the Sandinistas have replaced the local national Communist party as Nicaragua's sole representative at foreign Communist party congresses (see Checklist). In August 1980, an authoritative Soviet-line source identified Nicaragua and Grenada as the sole countries, other than Cuba, to have "taken the road of building a new society in Latin America."[16]

The relatively high degree of organization of the revolutionary democratic parties is often evidenced through the institution of party congresses—although holding of "congresses" does not of itself indicate a well-developed party structure, as suggested by the very title of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). A listing of recent congresses is provided in Table 1.

There are no convenient Soviet listings of other ruling and nonruling groupings that Moscow considers to comprise part of the world "national liberation movement." Nevertheless, one can discern certain categories of parties or movements other than the revolutionary democratic parties which seem to figure in the movement as Moscow conceives it.

One such grouping consists of "liberation movements" proper. That the Soviets use this as a separate category was evidenced in the listing of groups attending an October 1980 conference cosponsored by *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[17] As can be seen from the Checklist, these can be subdivided into those that are single (or unitary) and those that operate as "united fronts." The five unitary liberation movements listed in the Checklist participate in Communist-sponsored meetings, and four of them (all except the Bahrain National Liberation Front) serve as the organizational affiliate from their respective countries on the World Peace Council,[18] which is regarded by the Soviets as the most important of the international Communist front organizations.[19] Leaders of the Bahrain, Namibian, and South African movements have been published in *World Marxist Review*. In closeness to the Soviets, these movements range from the Bahrain group, which habitually participates in meetings of Arab Communist parties (the sole officially non-Communist organization to do so),[20] to the POLISARIO Front, which appears to be out to gather support from any quarter whatsoever.

Table 1. Congresses of Revolutionary Democratic Parties in 1980–81

	Number of congress	Dates
In 1980:		
Ethiopia (COPWE)	Organizational	June 17–20
Madagascar (AKFM–KDRSM)	9th	Aug. 13–17
South Yemen (YSP)	Extraordinary	Oct. 10–15
Angola (MPLA)	Extraordinary	Dec. 18–23
In 1981:		
Ethiopia (COPWE)	2nd	Feb. 9–13
Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC)	1st	Nov. 8–14

Like the unitary liberation movements, those of the united-front type also participate in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Each of the fronts has had a spokesman published in *World Marxist Review*. Moreover, each of these fronts includes a Communist component.[21] Again, closeness to Moscow varies. Of the group, the Palestine Liberation Organization appears to have the least affinity for the USSR, its ties with the latter appearing to be based primarily on opportunism.

There is yet a third, more amorphous grouping of ruling[22] and nonruling political parties that, while not qualifying as revolutionary democratic parties or liberation movements per se, nevertheless seem to be (or may be inferred to be) viewed by Moscow as part of the worldwide "national liberation movement." It is difficult to arrive at a definitive listing of such "socialist-oriented" parties, because the Soviets themselves make no such listings and appear to shift their opinions regarding one or another party as developments unfold within the individual polities or in their external relations. While not claiming to be exhaustive, the present Checklist iden-

[16] "The Latin American Proletariat and Its Allies in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *World Marxist Review* (London), August 1980, p. 48.

[17] Pavel Auersperg (the Czech managing editor of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), "International Meeting of the Forces of World Progress," *Tribuna* (Prague), No. 48, Nov. 26, 1980, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Social and Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA), No. 1843 (JPRS 77193), Jan. 16, 1981, p. 12.

[18] See World Peace Council, *List of Members, 1980–83*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., pp. 97, 105, 128, and 155.

[19] Sheikhnazarov, loc. cit., p. 101; Kuskov, loc. cit., p. 103. See also Brian Crozier, "Moscow's Efforts for 'Peace,'" *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey, England), Jan. 13, 1982, p. 3.

[20] *Information Bulletin* (Prague, published by Peace and Socialism International Publishers), No. 4, 1979, p. 12; and *Al Hida* (Beirut), May 10, 1981.

[21] On Palestine, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1975, p. 592; on Guatemala, see *World Marxist Review*, March 1981, p. 112; on El Salvador, see ibid., October 1980, p. 19.

[22] In the case of Madagascar, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution is the dominant partner in the ruling coalition.

tifies such of these parties that appear to fall into the category by virtue of the "objective" criteria of participation in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Almost invariably, they also participate in one or another international Communist front organization, most often the World Peace Council.

Among the ruling parties in this category, the majority chose not to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the UN debate (they either abstained or absented themselves). Four (Guyana, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania), however, voted with the UN majority in calling on the Soviet Union to cease its intervention in Afghanistan.[23] Among the nonruling parties on the fringe of the national liberation movement, some appear more pro-Soviet than the ruling parties just mentioned (e.g., the Chilean MAPU and the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Party are the only two in this whole third category to have been published in *World Marxist Review*).

Finally, one should mention yet one additional category which Moscow now seems to employ when it views the worldwide "national liberation movement." This comprises states (not so much the ruling parties of these states) of "national capitalist" orientation. As described in the literature, national capitalist countries are those that have a basically capitalistic domestic structure but which are attempting to disengage from the international capitalist system and to free themselves from the influence of multinational corporations operating in that system, and whose domestic political scene shows some elements which suggest the potential for noncapitalist political development. Countries which at times seem to be considered in this category include India, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.[24] This category is new, and determination of which states fall into it is open to debate and shift in accordance with events. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to offer any sort of listing of states (or parties) that might be included.

[23] Interestingly, Iraq's Ba'ath Party was considered "revolutionary democratic" by Moscow in the 1970's until a downturn in bilateral relations between the two countries. Mali (in the 1960's) and Uganda (in the 1970's) also seemed to fall into the category of "revolutionary democracies," but subsequent political changes have brought to power in ruling parties in those countries that are somewhat cooler toward Moscow and as a result appear to be accorded a less exalted status within the national liberation movement.

One can point to three other countries that "fell from grace," although as recent developments demonstrate, such changes need not be permanent in Moscow's eyes. These are Egypt, Ghana, and Somalia. In the first case, developments under Anwar Sadat (including expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972) left Moscow with little to work with except the National Progressive Unionist Party. However, since Sadat's assassination, the CPSU seems to be a bit more optimistic about relations with Egypt. The recent coup in Ghana, bringing to the fore the leftist forces around Jerry Rawlings, may change Moscow's perceptions of the political orientation of Ghana. And in Somalia, Moscow has not seen fit (specifically) to relegate the ruling party to the capitalist world and may be hoping to reorient it once again toward national liberation.

In the cases of Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, and Uganda, the downgrading from "revolutionary democratic" status was explicitly noted in the Soviet literature. See R. Ulyanovsky, *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1979, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 74317, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 132; and Ilina, "Countries of Socialist Orientation. . . ." Iraq's "departure" can only be inferred from omission of its Ba'ath party from lists of revolutionary democracies published in 1981. See the sources cited in fn. 15.

[24] Some sense of the Soviet approach to this matter may be gained from reading Chapter 2, entitled "Socioeconomic Shifts in the Liberated Countries," in K. N. Brutents, *Osvobodivshiyesya strany v 70-ye gody* (The Liberated Countries in the 70's), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, pp. 22–50. See also G. Ilin, "The National Liberation Movement Today," *International Affairs*, April 1981, p. 20. Ilin contrasts such countries, with their "mass 'democratic' capitalism 'from below'," to countries of "dependent capitalism," which rely heavily on international capital for their development. "Evaluating the role of [the former] in the national liberation movement," Ilin writes, "it is necessary to proceed from the fact that on the whole they retain their considerable anti-imperialist sentiments."

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

Today, we will continue receiving testimony in our investigation of the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in fomenting terrorism in southern Africa.

Yesterday, we heard the startling testimony of Nokonono Delphine Kave, a 27-year-old woman and a member of the Black Consciousness Movement, who was recruited into the African National Congress.

While studying at a language center in Moldavia in the Soviet Union, Miss Kave was sent for 6 weeks to a psychiatric hospital, run by the KGB, and interrogated by them under the most brutal conditions as a program of reeducation; they were reeducating her as a revolutionary. She subsequently fled the African National Congress (ANC), because of its infiltration by Communists and its dependence on the Soviets.

Today, we will hear the testimony of three former members of the ANC, one of whom was also a high-level official of the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The first witness is Ephraim Mfalapitsa, a 28-year-old former ANC cadre, who was trained in Angola and Rostov, East Germany.

The second witness will be Jeffrey Bosigo, a 22-year-old former ANC cadre who was trained in Angola and Pirivalnye, in the Ukraine, Soviet Union. And the third witness will be Bartholomew Hlapane, a 63-year-old former member of the ANC and a former official of the South African Communist Party.

At the conclusion of today's hearing, there will be a 15-minute period during which the press may question the three witnesses; they have agreed to hold a press conference.

Mr. Mfalapitsa, would you please stand so I can swear you in? Please raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. I swear to God that it will be the truth and nothing but the truth.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. You may be seated.

If you have an opening statement, Mr. Mfalapitsa, you may present it at this time.

TESTIMONY OF EPHRAIM MFALAPITSA

Mr. MFALAPITSA. I was born on the 19th of August 1953 in the Swartruggens area of the Western Transvaal in South Africa. I attended school at Krugersdorp, completing Standard 8. After leaving school, I had different jobs in the Rustenberg area and Krugersdorp area until 1977, when the June riots erupted in Soweto.

I took no part in any rioting, but discussed the situation with my cousin and friends. We talked about our dissatisfaction and our hope for a free South Africa ruled by blacks in 2 years' time, and the possibility of our leaving the country for military training.

My friend Lungisa, Noki my cousin, and I then decided to leave the country for military training. Lungisa told me that I must first leave alone for Botswana and that he and Noki would follow later. He said that I must cross the border fence at night into Botswana, and, when in Botswana, must go to the refugee camp in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana.

He said when at the refugee camp, I must ask to see any official of the African National Congress who would organize everything. He also told me to keep our plan secret because the police had many agents and if we were discovered, we would all be arrested.

This was the first time I heard that we were joining the African National Congress. I crossed into Botswana at 10 a.m. I got a lift to Lobatse and reported to the Lobatse police because nobody seemed to know about any refugee camp in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana.

The Botswana police detained me for about 9 days at the Lobatse State Prison, where I met Lintinti Musi, Mboyi, and David. While I was in detention, the Botswana special branch had our photographs and fingerprints taken and questioned us why we left South Africa. I then told them that I was a member of the African National Congress.

On the 9th of September 1976, Isaac Makopo, the African National Congress representative in Botswana, and another ANC member, Keith Mokoape, arrived at the prison and interviewed us. Mboyi and David were not interested in joining the ANC and told Makopo that they wanted to join the South African Students Organization. Makopo said they could always change their minds later and could let him know, when interested.

Lentinti Musi and I left the same day with Isaac Makopo and Keith Mokoape to Gaborone and went to the African National Congress residence, where we stayed for about 1 week.

We were then questioned by Snuki Zikalala, who took down our particulars in writing. We were also asked why we left South Africa, our involvement in politics, whether we were wanted by the police, and why we wanted to join the African National Congress. Before we left the residence, Snuki issued us United Nations passports. The name Francis Tladi appeared in my passport, and Moses, surname unknown, in Lentinti's passport.

On the 15th of September 1976, Snuki Zikalala issued Lentinti and I with air tickets and drove us to Gaborone Airport, from where we flew by Air Tanzania to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the capital town of Tanzania.

We stopped over at Lusaka in Zambia in transit to Dar-es-Salaam and we were locked up that night by the Zambia Immigration Department. While locked up, we were visited by three African National Congress officials based in Lusaka, who bought us food and apologized for the treatment we received from the Zambian Immigration Department.

On the evening of the 16th of September, we arrived at the Dar-es-Salaam International Airport and were met by Reddy, who transported us to an ANC transit house called Mokhombane No. 1 in Dar-es-Salaam.

Our daily timetable was: physical training given by Mashigo; political discussion given by Themba Ngcobo; history of the ANC given by Khumalo; the black workers in South Africa and the South African Congress of Trade Union's role given by Mark Shope; military tactics and lectures by Banda; the singing of freedom songs; reading ANC literature, like Sechaba, the African Communist, 50 Fighting Years, Mao's History, Mao Tse-Tung on modern guerrilla warfare; and doing guard duty.

We were taken on one occasion to the North Korean Embassy to see a film on the Korean revolution.

On November 25, 1976, Oliver Tambo, Mashigo, Julius, and Reddy visited us and told us that we were all to leave for Angola the following day. On the 26th of November 1976, our group left for Angola by East African Airways.

We stayed at Luanda for 3 months and we were then transported by army trucks to the Engineering Camp situated to the east of Luanda. At Engineering Camp, I saw the following persons: about 50 Cubans, who were mostly instructors and engineers; about 300 FAPLA troops waiting to go to their combat areas; about 30 trained African National Congress cadres waiting for missions; and about 100 African National Congress recruits waiting for military training, which included a group from Tanzania.

The camp commander was Sizwe. Castro was the company commander of all the recruit cadres. We were all issued with FAPLA, Cuban or OAU uniforms, as the ANC had none and uniforms were hard to get. I was issued with a Cuban uniform.

Our daily routine in Engineering Camp was: lectures in bush techniques; military combat work; topography; politics, including Leninism and Marxism, and South African politics, with special emphasis on the role of the African National Congress, and also international politics; and listening to news.

We also helped keep the camp clean, offloading equipment from the docks destined for the African National Congress in Angola,

which was usually shipped from Hungary, Bulgaria, Cuba, and the USSR.

While here, we were visited by the following prominent African National Congress officials: Cassius, Secretary of the RC; Joe Modise; Yussuf Dadoo, member of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress; Moses Mabida, Secretary of Defense; Mzwai Piliso, member of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress; and Dilinga Masondo, National Political Commissar of the African National Congress.

During February 1977, Joe Modise arrived with news that a platoon of 30 of the most disciplined recruits were going to be selected for military training in East Germany. I was very happy to be one of the few chosen ones.

The GDR group, including myself, flew from Luanda Military Airport by East German civilian airline on the 23d of February 1977. We flew via Nigeria and landed at East Berlin International Airport on February 25, 1977. On arrival, we were taken by a civilian bus to the outskirts of a town named Rostov, to a complex of flats and offices. On arriving, we were introduced to the following East Germans who were to be our instructors: Wolfgang, Jorgan, Morgan, and Tito.

We were shown to a very modern block of flats; there were about 10 units in all. Adjoining those flats was a large dining room——

Senator DENTON. Excuse me. Did you say there were about 100 units, or did you mean 10 units?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Ten units.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. TV room, library, canteen, lecture room and a gymnasium. The appearance was civilian and, from outside, it looked quite innocent, except for the high-security fence.

About 2 days later, we were each issued with a complete set of East German army uniforms, including webbing, track suits, takkies and a set of civilian clothing. We were also issued AK–47 assault rifles, of which the firing pins were removed.

Wolfgang, who was the course leader, explained the basic course rules we were to adhere to. Our planned training program during our stay was as follows: firing training; field tactics; military combat work and topography; explosives; conspiracy; the history of the African National Congress; photography; the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and the operational methods they employ; and physical training.

Our training program was broken down as follows:

(1) *Fire training,* instructed by Wolfgang; theory of the AK–47, Makarov, RPG–7, F–1 and RGD–5 grenades, and practical use of some.

(2) *Field tactics,* instructed by Jorgan: We were given lectures on raiding small military bases; ambushing patrols and army convoys; patrol formations; skirmishing; and antitracking. We later did everything in practice.

(3) *Military combat work,* instructed by Tito: We were given lectures in urban guerrilla warfare, and communication by secret writing using invisible ink prepared from certain chemicals; preparing suitable dead letter boxes; the formation of underground cells, et cetera.

(4) *Explosives,* instructed by Morgan: This was a very basic course only including Nitropenta and TNT. We were also shown how to use electric detonators and mechanical detonators. We, in fact, detonated a few charges on the rifle range.

(5) *Conspiracy,* instructed by Tito: Lectures on underground secrecy and "the need to know."

(6) *The history of the African National Congress,* instructed by Phalo Pheto, an ANC official who flew in from London. He was at that time attached to the African National Congress Publishing Department: It included lectures on the history of the African National Congress since its formation in 1912 to the present day.

(7) *Photography,* instructed by an unknown German: Including the correct way of taking discreet photographs of people and documents, and developing our own photographs.

(8) *The structure of the Central Intelligence Agency,* by an unknown German.

(9) *Physical training,* every day by Tito.

At the beginning of October 1977, we completed our training and flew back to Angola by an East German aircraft. A few East German technicians accompanied us, who were all being transferred to Angola. Two days later, we landed at Luanda, and we were met by Agmet, who transported us back to the Engineering Camp.

A week after my arrival, I was transported from the Engineering Camp to Funda. At Funda, I met David, the camp commander, and Sipho, the instructor and political commissar, who was also previously in the engineering camp. We were then all given a crash course on foreign weapons which lasted 1 week, including the following weapons: FN, G3, UZI and the .303 rifle.

Having returned to Angola, the military African National Congress leadership gave me instructions in the form of various assignments or missions. Those assignments included operations in Botswana and South Africa, which required me to infiltrate into South Africa, and a spell with the Operations Department, during which I acted as a driver for members of the National Executive Committee, assisted the Revolutionary Council in field duties, assisted the members of the security department of the African National Congress with interrogations, and had part responsibility for the Zimbabwe and Botswana machinery at different times. Those operations are more fully described in my written statement.

The area east of Beit Bridge to Mafikeng had been declared an operational area by the ANC to be used as a springboard against South Africa. While engaged in operations just outside South Africa, I finally reached a decision to surrender to the South African police, and I did so on September 22, 1981.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Mfalapitsa. We will include a full copy of your prepared statement in the record.

I would like for you to confirm the following review of what you have told us. I want to insure that I understand what you have just said.

The June riots took place in Soweto after you had left school and took some different jobs. You did not take part in the rioting, but you were dissatisfied and you hoped for a free South Africa ruled by blacks in about 2 years' time, and you were thinking about the possibility of leaving the country for military training.

You crossed into Botswana; you were given a false United Nations passport with a false name; Francis Tladi appeared on your passport. You went on into Zambia, where they detained you, and the ANC representatives contacted you and transported you to a transit house and you had training there under the ANC leaders.

As you departed, you went by the North Korean Embassy to view a film on the Korean revolution, and just before you departed for Angola on the 25th of November, you met with Oliver Tambo, a

most important figure, and three other gentlemen whose names you mentioned.

Incidentally, for the record, Oliver Tambo has been invited to present testimony. We asked for witnesses from the other side to come and present their cases; they chose not to respond or appear. Sam Nujomo, the president of SWAPO, has also been invited to testify.

The very next day, your group left for Angola by East African Airways. You stayed at Luanda for 3 months and met 50 Cubans, 300 FAPLA troops waiting to go to their combat areas, 30 trained African National Congress cadres waiting for missions, and 100 ANC recruits waiting for military training.

You gave us the name of the camp commander and the company commander of the recruit cadres. You gave your routine at that camp, and you stated you were visited by a number of prominent ANC officials, including Yussuf Dadoo, and others, whose names you have given us.

You then were among a platoon of 30 who were selected for military training in East Germany, and you were very happy to be among those. You flew from Luanda and landed at East Berlin.

You went to a complex of flats and offices and met the men whose names you gave us. Then you were issued a complete set of East German army uniforms, including webbing, track suits, takkies, a set of civilian clothing, and an AK-47 assault rifle with the firing pin removed.

You described the facilities, including the canteen, the lecture room, gymnasium, and so forth. You gave us your training program, including military combat work, which we will be asking you about later. Then you summarized what took place; you summarized your assignments which were to take place after this training in terms of terrorist attacks on civilians, and so forth.

Is that an accurate summary of your testimony so far?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Have you been threatened in any way?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, I have been threatened.

Senator DENTON. How did they threaten you, and who threatened you?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, the threats came from the African National Congress. During the security roundup in South Africa, the South African Securities Forces found a pamphlet with my photo, which was asking the people to regard me as a traitor and a person who betrayed the ANC. It actually instructed as quick as possible to do away with my life.

Senator DENTON. You know that they have been instructed to kill you as soon as possible. They have your photograph and you have been charged with betrayal?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Are you aware of any ANC members who have been killed because of alleged association with South African or other groups?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, I know of several cases. At Fishwan (phonetic), I was involved. At Fishwan, I took part in the meeting that was decided, you know, the planning of such a killing. I know of

two cases, of which I had confirmation before that that people were to be killed.

Senator DENTON. You know about the planning, and you have confirmation reports of their being killed. Could you tell us who they were?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes. The first case was a certain man by the name of Pismo, who was involved in operations in African National Congress cadres in Zimbabwe.

I understood this man had a fight over a woman or girlfriend somehow, but it happened that this Pismo and this Zabochev fought, and in the process this Zabochev was killed. And this Pismo ran to Botswana and he was subsequently taken to Lusaka. There, he was under the control of the machinery of which I was a member, and then the head of that department, which is Keith Mokoape, decided that this man must be executed. And he gave me orders that I must instruct the administration staff in Zimbabwe to dig a grave, and I must transport this Pismo to an agreed spot where the administrative staff would be waiting, and the man must be stabbed, in the kidneys and immediately be thrown in the hole and buried, and that was done.

Senator DENTON. He was stabbed, did you say?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. He was stabbed.

Senator DENTON. Stabbed in the kidneys; I see.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. That is the military way of instant killing.

Senator DENTON. But as far as you know, that man was punished and killed because of his fight with the other gentleman?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Was anyone ever killed for the charge of spying?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. The second man who I know was killed was a man by the name of Pedro, who belonged to the machinery of the African National Congress in Botswana. And he was dissatisfied and disillusioned about the ANC, and he told ANC members that he would no longer take part in any activity of the ANC.

But then the report was sent to the headquarters and the head of the military department, of which I was a member, decided that the man must be executed secretly and buried in Botswana. And this was done, and I reported the confirmation report that the man had been killed.

Senator DENTON. He was executed secretly and buried in Botswana?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I am going to ask you about your course, which you describe as military combat work. It is among the courses in your training program, which you break down into fire training, talking about the theory of the AK–47, Makarov, RPG–7 and other weapons; field tactics, lectures on raiding small military bases, ambushing patrols and army convoys, skirmishing, and antitracking. You did everything in practice, you said.

Then you referred to military combat work in which you were instructed by Tito. You say you were given lectures in urban guerrilla warfare; communication by secret writing using invisible ink prepared from certain chemicals; and preparing suitable dead letter boxes; the formation of underground cells, and so forth.

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Could you give us any further information about the intent or composition of military combat work?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Military combat work is concerned with urban guerrilla warfare, and the subsequent expansion of urban guerrilla warfare into rural guerrilla warfare, which is called classical guerrilla warfare.

Senator DENTON. What kind of warfare? From urban guerrilla, it expanded into what?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Into what they call rural or classical guerrilla warfare.

Senator DENTON. Rural or classical guerrilla warfare.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. So, it involved secret fighting; that is, underground warfare. It involved administration of urban guerrilla combat, and it involved things like secret communication, assassination——

Senator DENTON. Assassination?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, assassination; sabotage, and many other military aspects.

Senator DENTON. Joe Modise, according to your prepared statement, told you it had been decided by the Revolutionary Council to allocate Botswana to your group because the existing machinery in Botswana had been destroyed. You also mentioned that you discussed possible targets, including President Mangope's palace at Montshiwa and President Mangope himself.

Could you explain the reasoning behind that targeting?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. One of the most important aspects surrounding selection of an attack of that nature—as Joe Modise said, if it was to happen that we destroyed President Mangope, who was the President of Bophutatswana, it will have very serious repercussions in the system of South Africa, and subsequently the political system in southern Africa as a whole.

Senator DENTON. Would that kind of killing of a leader be in the phase they called urban guerrilla warfare, or the next phase of rural or classical, or would it be occurring at any time?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, as I far as I know, this kind of operation was to fall under rural or classical guerrilla warfare.

Senator DENTON. So, the urban guerrilla warfare, as you stated, was to be more or less secret, relatively low-scale activity, compared to the second pha[illegible]ich is the rural or classical warfare, which is the next step in escala[illegible]on. Is that generally true?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Your testi[illegible]ny is entirely consistent with that which we have heard from other witnesses dating back to a year ago—unfortunately, not much of it has been passed on to our public—regarding the use of the Handbook on Urban Guerrilla Warfare which is found all over the world and is used as the reference for these courses.

In Sechaba, September 1981, the official organ of the African National Congress—I guess you are familiar with that—the ANC claims, on pages 20–21, credit for a number of incidents by Umkonto We Sizwe, the military arm of ANC.

Some of the actions reported during 1981 were—and I will submit this for the record—January 26, time bomb explodes in warehouse belonging to government official near Durban; February

7, bomb explodes outside Daily News building in the same city; April 21, electricity substation near that city attacked with explosives; May 6, bomb explosion on railway line near Cottondale; May 19, railway line near Port Elizabeth cut by explosion; May 25, powerlines cut near Vrede, Orange Free State, et cetera.

This particular version we have is in English. I note it is printed in East Germany. It deals specifically with the South Africa situation. It is not just a one-shot publication; it is a periodical which is circulated to a large group.

I request and so order that this document, and several others which document these terrorist acts, be inserted in the record.[1]

You state that Joe Modise said that if you were successful in these missions, you could concentrate on such jobs as laying mines on farm roads, attacking farmhouses, ambushing lonely vehicles, and attacking small police stations.

What was the purpose of such apparently random attacks?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. From a military point of view, this type of strategy was designed to push away the local people from what was to be described as the operational area, so that it allows a free movement of combat in that area, and also makes the work of the security forces difficult because they will have no sympathetic forces within the area of operation.

Senator DENTON. Terrorize the people from the operational area so that there would be more free movement and presence and activity by the military-oriented forces?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. This is exactly the technique which was shown to me in North Vietnam and used in South Vietnam—almost the exact wording that you are using.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. In your training in East Germany, what weapons were you given training on?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. The weapons that I was trained with in East Germany were AK–47; RPG–7, which is this bazooka; a Makarov pistol and explosives.

Senator DENTON. Would you demonstrate the AK–47 for us? It is my understanding that this weapon is made in Czechoslovakia, but you got it in East Germany. Is that right?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, sir, we had these types of weapons.

[The witness disassembled and reassembled the weapon.]

[Photo of Mr. Mfalapitsa follows:]

[1] Documents referred to are found in the appendix to this hearing as exhibits A through D.

Mr. Mfalapitsa, demonstrating use of the AK-47.--Photocredit: Julia Ferguson.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Mfalapitsa has field-stripped the weapon and is now reassembling it. We gave some automatic weapons like that to some of our troops in Vietnam.

Thank you, sir. Would you tell us where you first became familiar with that weapon?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. I was first shown this weapon in East Germany.

Senator DENTON. In East Germany. Did they show you a style of marching?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, they did. The style they used in the marching was Soviet style.

Senator DENTON. The Soviet style. Would you demonstrate the marching you were taught in East Germany in front of that table out here, with the AK-47?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, sir.

[The witness complied with Senator Denton's request.]

Senator DENTON. Where did you use that style of marching?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. In the GDR; in East Germany.

Senator DENTON. In East Germany?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. It looks like the Soviet style used in May Day parades, and so forth.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. What would happen to the African National Congress dissidents if they should desert from the African National Congress and return to South Africa?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, from my own experience and some of the people whom I met, the government in South Africa is prepared to accept young students, even those who were involved in the African National Congress, if they had to return to South Africa.

For instance, immediately after June 16 erupted, there were some arrangements that were done between the parents of students or children involved and the South African Government that if they have any other way of making contact with their own children to come back to South Africa, this will be accepted and welcome to the South African Government, and this is still what is happening today.

Senator DENTON. Have you studied the ANC constitution?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, I did a little bit, and African politics, and, of course, the Freedom Charter.

Senator DENTON. You studied the Freedom Charter?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. We will get more testimony on those documents later.

What caused you to arrive at the conclusion that you should leave the ANC? What made you decide to leave the ANC?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. One of the most important things is, with my political involvement in the ANC, my aim was—the immediate aim of the ANC is to concentrate on the question of the liberation of African people in South Africa.

With the time of my involvement and my experience and my own political standing, and subsequently my own military involvement, one of the most serious problems that we used to face in sustaining our operation within the country was the lack of political sympathy from the people.

The other problem which led to my decision was the ANC involvement with Communists. We subsequently were to sort of bring a situation where the ANC would be irrelevant to South African politics and would even complicate much more the immediate problem that the African people are facing in that country.

So, I came to the conclusion that the only solution left for all the people involved was to sort of secure a free, systematic evolutionary change so that all the parties involved should come together and solve their problems peacefully.

Senator DENTON. Let me make sure if I understood your answer, sir. You were, and still are, intellectually devoted to the original aims of the African movement.

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. But as a result of your experience in the African National Congress and your actual military involvement with it, you found that not only were your activities in the ANC irrelevant to the purpose which you had in your heart and expected to be borne out in your actions in ANC, but that you could not support the effects of those actions. Also, the people you were serving, namely, the African people, were not able to show political sympathy for what you were doing in the ANC.

You reached the conclusion that the immediate problem in your country was being aggravated and complicated by the tactics and the means which the ANC was pursuing. You came to the conclusion that it was doing more harm than good, that the best way to make progress was through a peaceful evolutionary process.

Is that a generally accurate statement?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

Did you become disillusioned with communism as a philosophy and as a dynamic in terms of the way it is spread?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes, sir. One of the most important points that pushed me into this decision was that the aims and the objectives of the ANC, in reality, were one and the same thing with the objectives of the Communist Party of South Africa.

In their politics, in their language, they have got what they call—they are saying that their strategy is a national liberation strategy; that is, to liberate the black people. Well, that is okay. But they say again that after the national revolution, there will be what they call a socialist revolution. This socialist revolution will commence the dictatorship of the prolitariat, and the dictatorship of the proliteriat is, in any part of the country, led by the Communist Party. That is what they call the party of the workers.

And this, in my opinion, is going to complicate a lot of historical development and political economy, because history has proved that it has cost the lives of millions of people. Many people were killed in this process of what they may call the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a lot of suffering and killing of democratic forces who are opposed to this type of system.

So, to me, it was suicidal to support that type of solution as far as our problem is concerned.

Senator DENTON. The ANC's aims, as manifest with their means, coincided with the aims of communism rather than with the aims of you and those who wished to see certain changes takes place. Al-

though the ANC says they want to liberate, they also say that there will be a socialist revolution which follows the liberation, which will entail a dictatorship of the proletariat. This amounts to a takeover by communism in terms that are political and economic, and you do not see this as the proper way to accomplish what you felt was best for your people.

Can one simply get up and leave the ANC?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. No. With my own experience, it is an offense punishable by long-time prison or by death, because I know several people who attempted genuinely to register their dissatisfaction and disillusionment about this. But, unfortunately, a majority of them are in prison or are killed secretly. Nobody can ever know.

Senator DENTON. Tell me if you agree with this, because this is something that I experienced to some degree myself. I have watched the citizens of North Vietnam, for example, and now Vietnam, show their hatred and contempt for the system in which they had to live and perform.

Would you think it is fair to say that in the case of the ANC and your association with communism as it is being applied in Africa, that not only do they apply terrorism against their perceived enemies—those whom they want to defeat—but they apply terrorism within their own ranks to rule those who are considered their own people, their own servants? Would you say that is true?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, relatively so.

Senator DENTON. Relatively so.

Have any threats or promises been made to you by anyone with respect to your testimony before this subcommittee?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Well, the only threat that I know of is that I spoke of earlier.

Senator DENTON. The ones you have already mentioned about your betrayal, and so forth, and having been targeted for death?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Has the South African Government promised you anything as a result of anything you might say here today?

Mr. MFALAPITSA. No.

Senator DENTON. I cannot imagine why they would, because you are not showing any particular identity with that point of view.

I would like to thank you very much and compliment you on the clarity of your testimony. I also congratulate you on your courage. Thank you again.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mfalapitsa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EPHRAIM MFALAPITSA

I was born on the 19th August 1953 in the Swartruggens area of the Western Transvaal in South Africa.

I attended school at Krugersdorp, completing Std. 8 in 1969. After leaving school I had different jobs in the Rustenburg and Krugersdorp areas until 1976 when the June riots erupted in Soweto.

I took no part in any rioting but discussed the situation with my cousin and friends. We talked about our dissatisfaction and our hope for a free South Africa ruled by blacks in two years time, and the possibility of our leaving the country for military training.

My friend Lungisa, Noki my cousin and I then decided to leave the country for military training. Lungisa told me that I must first leave alone for Botswana and that he and Noki would follow later. He said that I must cross the border fence at night into Botswana and when in Botswana I must go to the refugee camp in Gaborone. He said when at the refugee camp I must ask to see any official of the African National Congress (ANC) who would organise everything. He also told me to keep our plan secret because the police had many agents and if we were discovered we would all be arrested.

This was the first time I heard that we were joining the ANC.

I crossed into Botswana at 10 am.

I got a lift to Lobatse and reported to the Lobatse police because nobody seemed to know about any refugee camp in Gaborone.

The Botswana police detained me for about 9 days at the Lobatse State Prison where I met Lintinti MUSI, MBOYI and DAVID.

While I was in detention, the Botswana Special Branch had our photographs and fingerprints taken and questioned us why we left the RSA. I then told them that I was a member of the ANC.

On 9th September 1976, Isaac MAKOPO the ANC representative in Botswana and another ANC member Keith MOKOAPE arrived at the

prison and interviewed us. MBOYI and DAVID were not interested in joining the ANC and told MAKOPO that they wanted to join South African Students Organisation. MAKOPO said they could always change their minds later and could let him know when interested.

Lentinti MUSI, and I left the same day with Isaac MAKOPO and Keith MOKOAPE to Gaborone and went to the ANC residence where we stayed for about one week.

We were then questioned by Snuki ZIKALALA who took down our particulars in writing. We were also asked why we left the RSA, our involvement in politics, whether we were wanted by the S.A. Police and why we wanted to join the ANC. Just before we left the residence Snuki issued us with United Nations passports. The name Francis TLADI appeared in my passport and Moses (surname unknown) in Lentinti's passport.

On the 15th September 1976 Snuki Zikalala issued Letinti and I with air tickets and drove us to Gaborone Airport from where we flew by Air Tanzania to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

We stopped over at Lusaka in Zambia in transit to Dar-es-Salaam and we were locked up that night by the Zambia Immigration Department. While locked up we were visited by three ANC officials based in Lusaka, who bought us food and apologised for the treatment we received from the Zambian Immigration Department.

On the evening of 16th September we arrived at Dar-es-Salaam International Airport and were met by REDDY who transported us to a ANC transit house called Mokhombane No. 1 in Dar-es-Salaam.

Our daily timetable was:

- Physical training given by MASHIGO
- Political discussions given by Themba NGCOBO
- History of the ANC given by KHUMALO
- The Black Workers in S.A. and the SACTU role given by Mark SHOPE
- Military tactics, lectures by BANDA
- The singing of freedom songs
- Reading ANC literature like the Sechaba, The African Communist,

50 Fighting Years, Mao's History, Mao TseTung on modern guerrilla warfare.

- Doing guard duty.

We were taken on one occasion to the North Korean Embassy to see a film on the Korean Revolution.

On the 25th November 1976, Oliver TAMBO, MASHIGO, JULIUS and REDDY visited us and told us that we were all to leave for Angola the following day.

On the 26th November 1976 our group left for Angola by East African Airways.

We stayed at Luanda for three months, and were then transported by army trucks to the Engineering Camp situated to the east of Luanda. At Engineering, I saw the following persons:

+- 50 Cuban's, who were mostly instructors and engineers,
+- 300 FAPLA troops, waiting to go to their combat areas,
+- 30 trained ANC cadres waiting for missions, and
+- 100 ANC recruits waiting for military training which included a group from Tanzania.

The Camp Commander was SIZWE.
CASTRO was the company commander of all the recruit cadres.

We were all issued with FAPLA, Cuban or OAU uniforms as the ANC had none and uniforms were hard to get. I was issued with a Cuban uniform.

Our daily routine in Engineering was:

- PT
- Lectures in bush tactics.
- Military combat work.
- Topography.
- Politics including Leninism and Marxism, S.A. Politics with special emphasis on the role of the ANC and also International politics.
- Listening to the news.

We also helped keep the camp clean, offloading equipment from the docks destined for the ANC in Angola which was usually shipped from Hungary, Bulgaria, Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

While here, we were visited by the following prominent ANC officials:

- Cassius, Secretary of the RC
- Joe MODISE
- Yussuf DADOO, member of the S.A.C.P. and the ANC
- Moses MABIDA, secretary of Defence
- MZWAI PILISO, member of the N.E.C.
- Dilinga MASONDO, National Political Commissar of the ANC.

During February 1977 Joe MODISE arrived with news that a platoon of 30 of the most disciplined recruits were going to be selected for military training in East Germany (G.D.R.). I was very happy to be one of the few chosen ones.

The G.D.R. group including myself flew from Luanda Military Airport by East German civilian airline on the 23rd February 1977.

We flew via Nigeria and landed at East Berlin International Airport on the 25th February 1977. On arrival we were taken by a civilian bus to the outskirts of a town named Rostov to a complex of flats and offices. On arriving we were introduced to the following East Germans who were to be our instructers:

- WOLFGANG
- JORGAN
- MORGAN
- TITO

We were shown to a very modern block of flats, there were about 10 units in all. Adjoining these flats were a large dining room, TV room, library, canteen, lecture room and a gymnasium, the appearance was civilian and from outside it looked quite innocent except for the high security fence.

About two days later we were each issued with a complete set of

East German army uniforms including webbing, tracksuits and takkies, and a set of civilian clothing. We were also issued AK 47 assault rifles of which the firing pins were removed.

WOLFGANG who was the course leader explained the basic course rules we were to adhere to, and our planned training program during our stay, which was as follows:

- firing training
- field tactics
- military combat work and topography
- explosives
- conspiracy
- the history of the ANC
- photography
- the structure of the CIA and the operational methods they employ
- physical training.

Our training program was broken down as follows:

- Fire training (instructed by WOLFGANG). Theory of the AK 47, Makarov, RPG 7, F1 and RGD 5 handgrenades, and practical use of some.
- Field tactics (instructed by Jorgan). We were given lectures on raiding small military bases, ambushing patrols and army convoys, patrol formations, skirmishing and anti-tracking. We later did everything in practice.
- Military combat work (instructed by TITO). We were given lectures in urban guerilla warfare, communication by secret writing using invisible ink prepared from certain chemicals. Preparing suitable Dead Letter Boxes, the formation of underground cells etc.
- Explosives (instructed by MORGAN). This was a very basic course only including Nitropenta and T.N.T. We were also shown how to use electric detonators and mechanical detonators. We in fact detonated a few charges on the rifle range.
- Conspiracy (instructed by TITO). Lectures on underground secrecy, and "the need to know".
- The History of the ANC (instructed by Phalo PHETO, an ANC official

who flew in from London, he was at that time attached to the ANC Publishing Department) which included lectures on the history of the ANC since its formation in 1921 to the present day.

- Photography (instructed by a unknown German) including the correct way of taking discreet photographs of people and documents and developing our own photographs.
- The structure of the C.I.A. (by an unknown German).
- Physical training - every day (by TITO).

At the beginning of October 1977, we completed our training and flew back to Angola by an East German aircraft. A few East German technicians accompanied us who were all being transferred to Angola.

Two days later we landed at Luanda and were met by AGMET who transported us back to the Engineering camp.

A week after my arrival I was transported from the Engineering Camp to Funda. At Funda I met -

- DAVID, the camp commander, and
- SIPHO, the instructor and political commissar, who was also previously in the Engineering camp. We were then all given a crash course on "foreign" weapons which lasted one week and included the following weapons:
  FN, G3, UZI and .303 rifle.

Just before we completed this course we were visited by OBADI who told me that Keith MOKOAPE had sent a message instructing me to proceed to Botswana for a mission into the RSA.

After completing my training at Funda, OBADI transported me to the ANC residence in Luanda, where I was issued with a new Lesotho passport in the name of Andrew MOREM, and given R100. The following day I returned to Botswana by air, via Zambia.

I landed at Gaborone Airport on about the 15th October 1977 where I was met by Keith MOKOAPE who took me to Dan THLOOME's house.

The following day Keith, SNUKI and Zakes TOLO who was visiting from the RSA arrived and told me that they were going to take me to a

free zone in Botswana to meet the people I would operate with. We drove to a place about 150 km north of Lobatse to a cattlepost where we met HABO, GODFREY and OUPA. KEITH and SNUKI returned the same day to Gaborone, and the five of us stayed at this cattlepost for two weeks during which THABO and GODFREY trained ZAKES in the use of the Makarov pistol, F1 and RGD 5 handgrenade.

While we were still at this cattlepost KEITH and SNUKI arrived and said that the mission that had been planned for Pretoria had been called off but that he had a reconnaissance mission for OUPA and I in the Rustenburg area. We were to reconnoitre the area and locate suitable weapon caches for future use.

Towards the end of October 1977 OUPA and I infiltrated at night into the RSA. We were both armed with Makarovs and given R200 each by SNUKI. We walked that whole night and hired a black teacher to transport us to Rustenburg the next day.

We stayed in the Rustenburg area for about eight days. First we reconnoitred the bush area west of G.G.

But then OUPA who had gone off on his own did not return and I thought he had been arrested and so spent several nights in the bush.

I also saw some of my relatives who advised me to surrender to the authorities as the Police were looking for me. As a result of this information, I decided to spend the nights in the bush as a precaution against my arrest, returning to G.G. location in the mornings.

On my return to the location, one morning I met OUPA again. He said he was organising a reference book and passport which would enable him to operate legally in the country, and also told me that he was now no longer interested in our mission. I told OUPA that I intended to return to Botswana and he said that he would arrange transport for me.

The following morning OUPA took me to Derdepoort.

He dropped me close to Derdepoort borderpost where I crossed back to Botswana and travelled to Gaborone by bus and phoned KEITH from the President Hotel. I informed him of the failure of our mission, and he then took me to Godfrey MOTSHIWANE's residence in the Village in Gaborone where I stayed for two weeks.

While at GODFREY's residence THABO and GODFREY visited me and told me that I had been incorporated into another unit based at Mochudi.

Towards the end of November 1977 THABO and GODFREY took me to MABANDLA's house in Mochudi where I met:

- JEREMIAH who was now called KROESTJOFF and
- SIPHO

While living here I was called RADIMPO or SHORTY.

Whilst at MABANDLA's residence we were visited by:

- THABO and
- DANOOD who briefed us on our next mission.

We were to go to a base which had been established by SIPHO and KROESTJOFF a few weeks previously near Koedoesrand in the Swartruggens area, where we would find food as well as firearms and ammunition.

On the 26th December, SNUKI and THABO transported KROESTJOFF, SIPHO and me to the Ootsi area where we crossed into the RSA through the border fence. We were taken to Koedoesrand. We were each armed with Makarovs and one F1 handgrenade each. That night we slept in the bush close to the base established by KROESTJOFF and SIPHO.

The following morning we arrived at the base only to find that all the equipment had been removed.

We walked back to Phelastad, which took the whole day. We then spent that night in the bush.

The following morning we started walking back to Botswana and four days later we arrived at Derdepoort area where we crossed the border into Botswana. We then travelled by bus back to Mochudi from

where I then went on my own to Gaborone and arrived at the ANC residence where I made a report to SNUKI as to what had happened. I then remained at this residence for a few days, was again joined by KROESTJOFF and SIPHO and we were then taken to an ANC residence at Mogoditsane where we stayed for four months. While we were living here Keith MOKOAPE and SNUKI were transferred to Lusaka by the ANC.

Our next mission was given to us during February 1978 by THABO DAWOOD and ERIC. We were told to go to the Mafikeng area and recruit contacts who were to help reconnoitre the area. SIPHO and I left shortly hereafter to Ramathlabama where we crossed the border fence on the west of the border post. We cycled to Letlhakane via Mafikeng armed with Makarov pistols.

After arriving at Letlhakane we visited TLHOUI, the daughter of Mr SHADI who was a member of the Bophuthatswana parliament. She and SIPHO had attended Barolong High School at Montshiwa together. She also knew we were ANC cadres. We told her we were looking for accommodation, she then introduced us to two teachers who were teaching at Letlhakane High School. Their names are:

- Richard MSIBI and
- RUBEN.

We spent three weeks in this area and recruited RUBEN into the ANC. We returned back to Botswana at the beginning of April 1978 and reported back to DAWOOD, ERIC and THABO who were very impressed with what we achieved.

During the middle of April 1978 SIPHO and I returned to Letlhakane to RUBEN's house where we lived for about one month until the end of May 1978. During our stay at RUBEN we instructed him in using the Makarov pistol and handgrenades. SIPHO and I then again returned to Botswana.

During June 1978 SNUKI and MBANGASO arrived from Lusaka with instructions from Joe MODISE that KROESTJOFF, SIPHO and I had to withdraw from operations in the RSA and had to be incorporated in the existing machinery in Botswana.

- I was to be in charge of all ANC weapons in Botswana and help with infiltration.
- KROESTJOFF and SIPHO were responsible for infiltration into the RSA.
- MBANGASO was transferred from Lusaka to Botswana and had to assist us.
- GODFREY was transferred back to Lusaka.
- THABO was to be overall commander of operations.

THABO took me to a house in Broadhurst where we used the servants quarters as a storeroom for our equipment. In this room I saw the following weapons, about 15 AK. 47's, 10 PPSH, 3 RPK's and ammo. THABO told me to find suitable caches for these weapons.

THABO also showed me explosives that were hidden at a cattlepost near Ootsi. I was also told to move these to suitable caches. THABO later introduced me to MARO and his assistant BANAZE, both were also part of the Botswana machinery, responsible for transporting weapons from Lusaka to Botswana. They would in future when bringing in new consignments of weapons hand them directly to me. THABO also introduced me to Nat SERAKE whom would also assist me in locating caches for weapons and explosives.

MPHO assisted me in transporting the weapons and explosives to three new caches situated at:

- Barolong Farm, 2 tin trunks of weapons;
- Molepolole, 2 tin trunks of weapons; and
- between Gaborone and Ootsi, 2 tin trunks of weapons.

Whilst in this position, I was also responsible for infiltrations/ missions into the RSA, actually carrying out missions myself on occasions. The infiltrations I were involved with were as follows:

(1) 15th June 1978 at Witkleigat.
(2) 1st August 1978 at Witkleigat.
(3) 19th September 1978 in the Mafikeng area.
(4) 9th October 1978 in Thabazimbi area.
(5) 12th November 1978, Zeerust.
(6) 13th January 1979 at Derdepoort.

(7) February 1979, Mara area.

Just before MPHO's disappearance THABO arrived at my residence with a man who he introduced as SELLO. He told me that SELLO was on two weeks leave and that he had legally left the RSA.

THABO instructed me to house SELLO for two weeks during which I was to train him in the use of the Makarov pistol and handgrenades, and on basic undergroundwork.

After completing his training THABO and I drove him to Pioneergate where he departed legally through the border-post back to the RSA.

Shortly hereafter THABO arrived with two men who he said were members of the Swaziland machinery. He instructed SIPHO and I to transport them to the RSA/Botswana border in the Ootsi area near Witkleigat and help them infiltrate into the RSA. After I issued them each with a Makarov we helped him infiltrate in that area.

During March 1979 I was arrested by the Botswana police for being in possession of arms and explosives at my residence and was then deported to Zambia in August 1979 together with 4 other ANC members, after serving four months of my prison sentence.

On arrival at Lusaka airport we were met by SNUKI and taken to a house in Lusaka where we stayed for about four weeks.

A special meeting was held by the National Executive Committee of the ANC to debrief us on what happened in Botswana.

This meeting was attended by:

- Alfred NZO;
- Dillinga MASONDO;
- Joe MODISE;
- Florence MAPOSHO;
- Thabo MBEKI;
- John MOTSHABI.

I was then told by Keith that I was going to be transferred to the Operations Department but first did a few weeks in the Transport Department to learn how to drive.

After serving three weeks on this department I was transferred to the Operations Department with:

- Joe MODISE;
- Keith MOKOAPE; and
- THABO.

My duties were stipulated by Joe MODISE of the National Executive Committee.

I was to

- Act as a driver for him and Keith.
- Act as a courier in Lusaka for the operations department.
- Help with logistical supplies.
- Assist the Revolutionary Council in field duties.

KEITH told me that this department was in charge of operations in Zimbabwe and we were no longer concerned with Botswana. He said that the RC would now take direct charge of Botswana, and control all operations from Lusaka. The existing structure in Botswana was now divided in two groups who would be known as the:

- Military Council; and
- Political Internal Machinery.

During 1979 and 1980 before Zimbabwe's Independence we used to infiltrate cadres from Angola to Zimbabwe. They flew from Angola to Zambia by Angolan Airways or Aeroflot posing as ZAPU cadres. On landing at Lusaka they were transported by ZAPU officials to a ZAPU transit and training camp called CTT camp, of Lusaka.

From here they were transported at night with ZAPU cadres in ZAPU trucks to a large transit camp called "Crossingpoint" situated in Zambia near Kazangula. From Crossingpoint they crossed the Zambezi River in rubber dingies into a strip of Zimbabwe and then into Botswana.

From Botswana they were transported by a ZAPU truck waiting at a pre-arranged rendezvous through Francistown, Selibe-Pikwe, Bobonong, Gobojango, through the Shashe River into Zimbabwe.

These ANC cadres operated with ZAPU in the Tuli, Gwanda and Beit Bridge area throughout the war until independence.

I never heard who planned this operation but I was present when Joe MODISE briefed the second group before they left for Zimbabwe. He told them that their purpose of going to Zimbabwe was to:

- get battle experience;
- know the Zimbabwe area bordering Northern Transvaal;
- get to know the local population in Zimbabwe;
- after the war in Zimbabwe ends they will operate from Zimbabwe into the Northern Transvaal area; and
- operate as ANC units, led by their ANC commander but intergrated in ZAPU units.

These two groups were to reinforce the already existing group of approximately 40 cadres who were already operating in Zimbabwe since 1978.

The command structure of these groups is probably still operating from within Zimbabwe against the RSA in the Beitbridge and Messina area.

After the ceasefire in Zimbabwe the ANC Zimbabwe unit, on instructions from Joe MODISE, presented themselves as ZAPU cadres to assembly point near Beitbridge. Before presenting themselves, the Zimbabwe command structure was instructed to locate safe caches in the Gwai and surrounding area and hide weapons for later use against the RSA.

The Rhodesian Special Branch later discovered this unit in the assembly point and deported them back to Zambia where they were taken to FC camp. The whole command structure managed to evade the Special Branch and are probably still in Zimbabwe.

After the independence of Zimbabwe during April 1980, a large group of the Zimbabwe group of FC were send back to Angola by Aeroflot.

In Zambia I was again in charge of the Zimbabwe group who was still in the FC (ZAPU) camp. I saw that they were properly fed, had enough clothing and transported them to and from hospital. I al-

so transported various ANC officials from Lusaka to the FC camp to deliver political speeches.

I later issued them with 9 AK, 47 plus 3 magazines each and 3 Bren guns to defend the camp sufficiently.

During March 1981 Joe MODISE, Peter MATHEBANE, Mavili MASONDO and I visited FC to prepare the Zimbabwe group before being transferred to various other operational groups.

Joe MODISE divided them into three groups which were the MAPUTO group, ZAMBIA group and DAR-ES-SALAAM group.

A few days later the Maputo and Dar-es-Salaam group left for their various destinations. After we withdrew, this camp was occupied by the Zambian Defence Force.

Towards the end of March 1981 I was told by Joe Modise to take charge of the logistic supplies to the Livingstone group who all lived on a farm that had been used by ZAPU as a transit camp.

The Livingstone group's duties were to ferry ANC cadres across the Zambezi illegally. The spot they always use is about 10 km east of the Zambian borderpost at Kasangula.

I, at a later stage in the course of my duties, assisted:
- COLLEN;
- ALASKA; and
- JOE of the Security department to interrogate
- NDOMBIENTJA, a woman;
- PIPER; and
- PHARO

who were suspected of spying for the S.A. Police. They were all beaten under their feet with a hosepipe. Of the three only PIPER admitted spying. He also implicated a cadre by the name of BALILE, as being a S.A. Police spy.

PIPER, PHARO and BALILE were sent back to Luanda where they are at present in prison.

I also heard that the following cadres were in prison at Luanda for spying:

Sipho FAPLA, he died while being interrogated; OSHKOSH; GRENADE; THABO; DIMAKATSU; BEKIMPI; JABU; MAHAMBA; and DLADLA.

After a meeting of the Revolutionary Council (RC) a meeting of the Operations' Department was convened by Joe MODISE on 19th August 1981, at which Joe said that it had been decided by the RC to also allocate Botswana to us as the existing machinery in Botswana had been destroyed.

Joe said that it had been decided to declare the area east of Beitbridge up to Mafikeng a operational area and that Botswana would in future be used as a springboard for operations against the RSA. This would take place without permission from the Botswana Government who would in any case not be able to prevent these operations. Joe said that it had also been decided to amend the existing strategy of the ANC and begin with rural guerrilla operations. This Botswana operation would in future be referred to as "Operation P".

We the discussed Method and Implementation.

(1) Method

All old contacts involved in the 1979 infiltrations had to be re-activated. The suspect SAP agents in our ranks in Botswana had to be withdrawn to Lusaka. Joe said that he had already selected twenty cadres in Angola who had undergone special training in bush tactics and survival. He said that they had already been issued with false passports by Johnny SEXWALE in Luanda.

(2) Implementation

Joe criticized the previous Botswana machinery for failing in their task. He said that Roller MASINGA, who had been arrested, had been careless and had caused the ANC a lot of harm. He said that had ROLLER not been arrested he would have been recalled to Lusaka, because there were rumours that he was a police agent.

Joe produced a topographical map of the Transvaal/Botswana border area and explained that underground bases had to be

established in Botswana parallel with the RSA/Botswana border about 40 km deep and 15 to 20 km apart. The idea was to establish three bases to begin with and later three more plus a headquarters/hospital.

The bases were to be big enough to house three cadres plus equipment.

Each dugout had to be about one meter deep and have two compartments. The first one was to always be empty, the second main one would branch from the first and be connected by trapdoor. The dugout should only be accessible through a trapdoor in the first compartment which must at all times be boobytrapped by using a handgrenade.

Tarpoles, sleepers or concrete slabs (as used for concrete fences) could be used for the roof. To camouflage the dugout vegetation should be planted over it.

The groups using the other bases were not to know the vicinity of the Headquarters/hospital.

It was also decided by Joe that Keith and I would accompany the first group to Botswana because we knew the Sikwane area from where operations would begin. Joe said that after the completion of the first three bases targets had to be selected. The following possibilities were mentioned:

- Coin unit, Derdepoort;
- Coin unit, Skilpadshek;
- Batavia military base near Derdepoort;
- Mining area at Thabazimbi;
- President MANGOPE's palace at Montshiwa; and
- Petrol depot at Mafikeng.

Joe said that we must have the first three bases operational-within one month and already have completed reconnoitring the area. He said that a temporary base could be established between Ootsi and Ramoutse for attacking MANGOPE's palace and the petrol depot at Mafikeng.

He also said that the existing machinery in Botswana would assist us in reconnoitring these targets. Joe said that if we were successful in these missions we could then concentrate on:

- laying mines on farm roads;
- attacking farmhouses;
- ambushing lonely vehicles; and
- attacking small police stations.

By following this strategy the white farmers would leave the area.

He said that the Chief of Staff and Commander of this special unit were expected any time from Angola.

The Chief of Staff and Commander of this special unit were expected any time from Angola.

The Chief of Staff would be KROESTJOFF who I know and the commander SPONI. Both KROESTJOFF and SPONI would accompany us.

On the 10th September Joe MODISE and I visted KROESTJOFF, SPONI, NJEBE and BILLY and started briefing them on our planned mission.

On 14th September SPONI and I left Lusaka by train for Botswana via Plumtree and arrived on 17th September at Mochudi. I was travelling on my Swazi passport in the name of Sophia THEKU issued by Johnny SEXWALE. At Mochudi we went to MABANDLA's house. We spent that night there.

On 18 September 1981 KROESTJOFF arrived at Mochudi as pre-arranged by us in Lusaka before our departure.

I left alone that same day to Nge THIPE's house at Matubudikwane near Sikwane. Nge was not at home. The purpose of my visit was to reconnoitre the area before KROESTJOFF and SPONI joined me the following day.

On the 19th September 1981 KROESTJOFF and SPONI arrived at Sikwane where I met them and told them to return back to MABANDLA's house and I had not yet completed reconnoitring the area. I then boarded the Gaborone bus and left for Gaborone.

On arriving in Gaborone I unsuccessfully tried to locate Dan TLHOOME's house and then went to 2067 Bontleng, and later met THIPE, an old friend. After a short while SEDUMO and KEITH arrived at this residence.

On 20th September 1981 KEITH picked me up and drove to SEDUMO's house. On the way he said that SEDUMO had bought our supplies plus a spade. He also said that he had already received the blankets and sleeping bags from CASIUS. On our arrival at SEDUMO's house we met SEDUMO, Nat SERAKE and CASIUS.

NAT and I then left for Mochudi and went straight to MABANDLA's house where we got KROESTJOFF and SPONI. We then all left for SIKWANE. We travelled right through Sikwane in a eastern direction on a dirt road that runs parallel with the RSA/Botswana border. We travelled through Mathubudikwane and Mololwane where we stopped somewhere in the Borakallo area (plus minus 20 km east of Malolwane). We offloaded everything and I organised with NAT to meet me on Saturday the 26th September at one o' clock for more equipment and to report on our progress.

We then moved deeper into the bush and I then told KROESTJOFF and SPONI to wait for me while I look for a place to spend the night. I moved in a northern direction and found a spot but could not then locate KROESTJOFF and SPONI. I spent that night alone. During the night I started doubting this whole operation and my involvement in the ANC for the first time since I left the RSA.

The following morning on 21st September 1981 I managed to locate KROESTJOFF and SPONI and we then tried to locate the place where I spent the night with our food and blankets. This was unsuccessful and I then told them to wait while I searched again.

While searching for the place where I had spent the night I made up my mind to surrender myself to the S.A. Police. I then started walking towards Derdepoort. I spent that night in the bush near Mathubudikwane and arrived the following day on the 22nd September 1981 at Derdepoort borderpost where I surrendered myself.

Senator DENTON. We will now hear from the next witness.

Good morning, Mr. Bosigo, and welcome. Please stand for a moment so that you can take an oath. Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please, sit down. Do you have an opening statement, sir?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, I have an opening statement.

Senator DENTON. You may present it at this time.

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY MOTUTUZELE BOSIGO

Mr. BOSIGO. I was born on November 3, 1959, in Soweto. I began my education at the primary school at Kganhelo, Naledi, and after my parents moved to Mafeking, I attended the Ramosadi Lower Primary School. In 1975, I transferred to the Kebalepele Secondary School and remained there until the end of 1976.

During 1976, in August, while I was still at school, riots broke out at Montshiwa. I was involved in these riots and, as a consequence, I was arrested and I was later charged in Kimberley Regional Court and sentenced to six cuts with a light cane and 3 years' imprisonment, which was suspended.

In 1976, in December, while Gordon Moshoeu and I were returning home from a nightclub, we became involved in a stone-throwing incident in which a motor car's windshield was broken. The owner of the car reported the case to the police and they commenced an investigation. Gordon Moshoeu was at this time one of the accused in a rape case.

We decided to leave the country. Approximately 1 week before Christmas, 1976, Gordon and I crossed the border fence between South Africa and Botswana. We were taken to Lobatse Jail and held there for 3 days. Keith Mokoape visited us in prison and when we told him that we wished to continue our schooling, he said that he would make arrangements for us. Two days later, he succeeded in having us released.

We did not know Keith and Snuki were members of the African National Congress and, in fact, did not discover this until we arrived in Lusaka. We were also not really aware of what the African National Congress was and thought that it was an organization which helped South African refugees to continue their studies.

In Gaborone, we stayed in the ANC house at Bontleng. After a week, we traveled by train to Francistown, where we stayed for a week. We were still under the impression that we would be going to continue our schooling abroad. At Francistown, we waited for an airplane to take us to Lusaka.

On December 29, 1976, we were taken to the airport. We arrived in Lusaka on the same day and we were met by Max. Max told us that there were no schooling facilities in Zambia and that we would meet other refugees in Luanda, in Angola, where we would see what would happen. We spent the night in the airport building in Lusaka.

The next day, December 30, 1976, we traveled to Luanda on an Alitalia flight. We were met at Luanda Airport by a man called Mzwai and we were taken to the Engineering Camp. We stayed at the Engineering Camp for about 3 weeks. During this period, I realized for the first time that I would be receiving military training.

While we were in the camp, we had theoretical lessons in military and combat work, South African politics, explosives, drill and physical exercise, topography, and tactics. Our daily routine consisted of physical exercises, drill sessions and lectures.

We were issued uniforms consisting of a shirt and a pair of trousers. We wore MLPA camouflage uniforms when we left the camp. While I was in Engineering Camp, a group of approximately 25 recruits left the camp to go for further training in East Germany.

After I had been at the Engineering Camp for about 3 weeks, 200 of us were transferred to the Benguela camp near Lobito. Our training at the Benguela camp began in February 1977. We received instruction in the following subjects: Politics, tactics, topography, engineering, weapons—two Cubans supervised our instruction in weapons—physical education, divisional drill, guerrilla warfare, hand grenades, and bayonet practice. Our classes were mainly theoretical.

In politics, we studied the history, purpose and existence of trade unions, political economy and South African history.

In tactics, we studied the planning of ambushes, how to seek cover, reconnaissance, planning of depots, and dead letter boxes.

Weapons training involved handling the following weapons: AK-47, AKM, Papashai, PMKM, RPG-7, G.3, R.1, and UZI. In engineering, we were taught about different types of explosives and the use of these, as well as various types of detonators. We received lectures on how to destroy bridges, pipelines and buildings by placing the explosives strategically.

During February 1977, I and some of the other refugees got malaria. Three of the recruits were taken out of the camp to Luanda for treatment. The morale of the recruits at the camp was very bad. Many recruits wanted to go back to South Africa. In March of 1977, one of the instructors shot himself as a result of poor conditions.

At the end of May 1977, we moved to Benguela to a new base, Nova Cantengue. With about 450 cadres in Nova Cantengue, we were divided into four companies, each of which had a commander, a political commissar, and a Cuban commander.

At Nova Cantengue, we again had lectures in different subjects that we had had before. Apart from Umkonto We Sizwe instructors, we also had Cuban lecturers on maps, compass reading, tactics.

In artillery, we had theoretical classes and studied the following weapons: 82-millimeter mortar gun and a 75-millimeter cannon, which is also an antitank weapon.

In politics, we discussed the history of South Africa since the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 and, in particular, the oppression of blacks throughout the years. Every recruit was required to know the Freedom Charter which was adopted by the African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the

South African Communist Party in 1955. We received lectures on Marx, Engels, and Lenin and Communist ideology.

Our training in weapons was intensive. Although we did not have practical range training with all weapons, we did have proper training in the following weapons: AK–47, AKM, PMKM, G.3, R.1, FAL, UZI, Papashai, and RPG–7.

In engineering, we had lectures about landmines; in particular, antipersonnel and antitransport landmines.

On a number of occasions while I was at Nova Cantengue, we did not go to classes. Among the days that I can recall were the following. On July 26, 1977, we celebrated an important Cuban day. The instructors told us it was the day in 1953 when Fidel Castro attacked the Mocadda Barracks, which eventually led to his accession to power. The Cubans presented a play that evening which symbolized the attack.

On the 17th of October 1977, we had the afternoon off to celebrate the Great October Socialist Revolution Day. During our training, no big ANC days were celebrated, and that led to considerable dissatisfaction among the recruits.

At the beginning of December 1977, we were told that a group of 60 persons would be going to Russia for further training. The same evening, we were taken to Luanda, where we stayed in the Engineering Camp for about 2 weeks. After about 2 weeks, we were given Angolan passports with Portugese names in them.

In the Engineering Camp in Luanda, the group of 60 was divided into 5 smaller groups; namely, Grad P, B. 10, Zeke U, Mortar, and Engineering. On the 19th or perhaps 20th of December 1977, our group of 60 traveled to Moscow in an Aeroflot aircraft via Brazaville, Cairo, and Budapest.

When we arrived at the Moscow Airport, we were met by two Russians. We left the airport building and we were taken to a military hotel in a Russian military camp on the outskirts of Moscow. Two days after we had arrived, a group of 45 were taken to the Ukraine. The 15 of us who stayed behind went by aircraft to the Ukraine 4 days after our arrival.

During the week of Christmas, 1977, we arrived in Pirivalnye in the Ukraine. We went to a base about 7 kilometers from the airport by bus. We were issued Russian uniforms.

During our 6-month stay, we had training in Grad P, physical exercises, handling of the AKM, topography, tactics, gas, and gas masks. The Grad P is an artillery weapon consisting of an adjustable barrel 122 millimeters in diameter and approximately 3 meters long; an adjustable tripod on which the barrel is mounted; adjustable OPB sights consisting of a rectangle with number values thereon and equipped for night firing; and an electrical mechanism.

Handling of the AKM: The classes that we had in the handling treatments and working of the AKM were the same as we had received in Nova Cantengue and can be regarded as a refresher course.

The recruits who were divided into the B. 10, Zeke U, Engineering and Mortar groups were accommodated on the same base as we were. Although I did not have training in these subjects, I do know that it involved the following. The B. 10: This is an 82-millimeter

antitank and antipersonnel weapon with a maximum range of 4 kilometers. Mortar: This is an 82-millimeter mortar. Zeke U: This is a 20-millimeter antiaircraft heavy machinegun, but can also be used for targets on the ground. Engineering: All sorts of explosives, including antitank, antipersonnel, and plastic explosives were covered.

During our training in Russia, we visited local schools, farms, and factories to show us the difference between the capitalist state from which we had come and the socialist style of life.

During May 1978, the B. 10 and the Zeke U groups left the Soviet Union to return to Luanda in Angola. In the middle of June 1978, the Grad P group and the Mortar group left the base at Pirivalnye for Moscow. After 3 days, we flew back to Luanda via Budapest, Cairo, and Brazaville. On our arrival at Luanda, we were taken directly from the airport to the new camp at Quibaxe.

At the beginning of August 1978, a man called Obadi took me, Johannes Masimini, and Simpi Malefane to Funda. In Funda, a man called Semelane gave us training in the handling of pistols. We received training in the following pistols: Makarov 9-millimeter, Russian made; Tokarev 9-millimeter, Russian made; Walther 9-millimeter, West German manufactured.

At the beginning of October 1978, Obadi informed Simpi and I that we were going to Zambia for a survival course. The same week, we left for Zambia in an Alitalia aircraft and were taken to a ZAPU base.

On the 23d of October at approximately 8, the Rhodesian Army and Air Force had attacked the base and there was total chaos. When I dived into one of the trenches, I hurt my shoulder. Two hundred and thirty ZIPRA men were killed and a great number hurt. I was later taken to Lusaka hospital for treatment.

After about 3½ weeks in the hospital, I was sent to the survival camp, CGGT, with a group of ZAPU cadres. Here, I saw Simpi again and we completed the course with the ZAPU recruits. The instructors were all ZAPU people. We were taught how to live off food that we could find in the wild, and animals and snakes, and how to look after ourselves while in the wild.

At the beginning of March 1979, we were taken back to a ZAPU base, called FRELIMO Camp. Early in August 1979, Simpi and I were issued two false South African passports. We were taken to Lusaka Airport, and at 9 we left in a Zambian aircraft to Francistown.

When we arrived in Francistown, Bob met us and took us to the Francistown train station. On the 3d of August 1979, Simpi and I arrived at Lobatse station, where we were met by Pat. He took us to Peleng, where we met Pasca and Magaxa. Pasca is the regional commander of the ANC in Lobatse; that is, in Botswana.

The next morning, Simpi, Pat, and I went to Gaborone where we received 3,000 Pula from Tata in order to buy houses in Lobatse. Immediately thereafter, we returned to Lobatse, where we stayed for 2 weeks.

During the middle of August 1979, Pat and I went by bus to Borobadelepe, which is about 5 or 6 kilometers from the border between Botswana and Bophuthatswana. We walked this last distance to the border and hid in a thick clump of bushes for about 5

hours. Pat did a rough sketch of the area on which he marked the observation points.

During the first week of September 1979 while I was staying with my cousin in Broadhurst—that is in Botswana—I went to the Gaborone Police Station, where I reported myself as a new refugee. I applied for political asylum under the name of Oupa Kagisho Mokate, and said that I was a member of the SSRC.

After 2 days at my cousin's, Pasca arrived and ordered me to come with him. I told him that I would be going to the ANC house in Bontleng on the next day. Pasca said that I should go back to Zambia because I had not completed my mission and because I had broken away from the ANC. The next morning, I left Gaborone and moved in with a friend, Monica Dira, in Kanye, where I stayed until December 1979.

While I was staying with my friend, Monica Dira, on the 19th of December 1979, at about 2000 hours in the evening while I was asleep, Pasca and Pat arrived at my friend's house. I heard a motor car door being slammed and looked out of the window and saw the green Dodge Colt which Pasca and Pat used to drive. I saw Pat coming up to the front door and told my friend to open it.

Pat and Pasca came through the front door together, and in the lights of the vehicle, I could see that they had weapons. I jumped out of the back window of the house and rolled down to the fence, from where I ran further. At about 0200 hours on the morning of December 20, 1979, I arrived at Ramotswa, where I spent the rest of the night.

On the 21st of December, I went in to Lobatse, where I caught the train to Rakuna; that is in Botswana. Rakuna is a train station. It was dark when I arrived in Rakuna and I slept in the veld that night until about 0300 hours of the morning of the 22d of December.

At about 6:30 a.m., I arrived at my parents' house in Manyemantshostat. On the 23d of December, I spent most of the day drinking and talking with my friends. At about 1800 hours that evening, my brother and my mother took me home.

On the 24th of December 1979, my father took me to the Montshiwa police station and after he had explained to them what the circumstances were, they told me to come back the next day.

On the 25th of December while I was in my parents' house, the police came to search the house. I hid in one of the bedrooms in a cupboard and they did not find me. I wanted to surrender myself and not be arrested by the police. I stayed there until the evening when my father came to collect me and take me to the offices of the security branch of the police. As there was no one there, he took me home again.

On the 26th of December at about 1000 hours, my father took me back to the police again, where I surrendered myself.

Attached to my written statement are sketches that I made of different camps where I received training. These camps are: Engineering, Benguela, Nova Cantengue, and Qibaxe. I have also attached a sketch of the Grad P weapon in which I received training in the Soviet Union.

Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. We will insert your full statement into the record.

Mr. Bosigo, you have outlined a long and interesting experience to us. I will try to summarize my understanding of the main points, and I will ask you to correct me or fill in where I am wrong.

In 1976, in August, riots broke out; you were involved in those riots and you were sentenced to six blows with a light cane and 3 years imprisonment, which was suspended.

You got involved in a stone-throwing incident with a man who was involved in a rape case. Because of the fact that the police were after you, you decided to get out of the country. You got to Botswana with the idea of continuing your schooling.

Keith and Snuki, two men you met, were members of the ANC, but you did not know that until you arrived in Lusaka. You did not really know what the ANC was, but you thought it was an organization which helped South African refugees to continue their studies.

You remained under the impression that you were going to continue your schooling. You were taken to Zambia, and the ANC told you that you would meet other refugees in Luanda and Angola, and then you would see what would happen.

You were taken to the Engineering Camp where you got training and also met Oliver Tambo. You described the training at the Engineering Camp, and then you were transferred after 3 weeks at that camp to the Benguela camp, located near Lobito.

You served in company 3, platoon 1, section 2. You gave your company commander's name and the political commissar's name. You talk about your training in the Benguela camp; you name a number of people who were involved in the training in each of the courses you took. You describe the camp routine; you talk about handling the AK-7, the AKM, RPG-7 rocket launcher, and so forth.

You were taught about different types of explosives and the use of these, as well as various types of detonators. You received lectures on how to destroy bridges, pipelines, and buildings by placing explosives strategically.

A number of the people at the camp got malaria. You were ill and were treated in the camp. Three of the recruits went mad. The morale of the recruits at the camp was very bad. Many recruits became dissatisfied with the ANC and wanted to go back to South Africa.

You say in March 1977, one of the instructors, Samson, shot himself with an AK-47 while he was on guard duty as a result of the poor conditions. Is that correct?

Mr. BOSIGO. That is correct.

Senator DENTON. You moved from Benguela to a new base, Nova Cantengue, and you were put in company 1, platoon 1, section 2. You name your platoon commander and a Cuban commander and a Cuban interpreter, the camp commander, the chief of staff and the political commissar.

You describe the four companies in which you were divided. You give the names of two of the Cuban commanders, and cannot remember the names of the two others, but you give the names of the political commissar and commanders of each company. You

mentioned the Cubans who assisted with the recruits; apart from Arkimedes and Eduardo, you mention Marero, Armando, and Gastillo.

You had courses in maps, compass-reading, tactics, how to get away from an air attack. You had artillery instruction by a Cuban instructor; political instruction; more weapons instruction; communications instruction.

You celebrated Cuban holidays. You had some more illness in September 1977; the whole camp became sick. The doctors and nurses who came to treat those who were sick were Cuban. And then you say the camp commander and the Cuban instructors then began to question the kitchen personnel. The whole camp was searched and the commander took charge of a camera and a cassette player and old medical stocks which were found in company 1.

Now, I mention these things because some of them were part of your written testimony, but you have presented a summary in your verbal testimony.

You then went to Moscow in December of 1977; you were met by two Russians and saw others arriving there. You got Russian uniforms. You had a routine at the camp in Pirivalnye. It is interesting that you got one weekend per month free to go to Pirivalnye. You had to wear civilian clothes and were accompanied by your instructors into the town. They would only let you see certain parts of the town. They would leave you alone, with the instruction to move around only in a certain area.

Your pay was 20 rubles, which enabled you to buy cigarettes and toilet articles. You learned how to handle some interesting weapons, including the Grad P, which is a 122-millimeter piece of artillery, with a barrel about 3 meters long. That must have been quite a weapon; eight people or less to man it—four people to handle the Grad P itself, and four or more to provide ammunition—with a maximum range of 12 kilometers.

You marched with the Russian soldiers, and during drill sessions, sang your liberation songs. You drilled in the Russian manner, similarly to that which was previously demonstrated by Mr. Mfalapitsa and received more training in weapons and ammunition.

Apparently, all during this time you were not particularly happy because you, eventually, escaped from the situation. You mentioned being assigned the curious job of buying houses for the ANC back in Africa and working at the docks. All this time you possessed the potential to become a military cadre.

At the docks, you unloaded Russian freighters with goods destined for the ANC. The goods included medical supplies, clothes, and shoes from a number of countries.

You had pretty tough treatment at the next camp. They would fire a shot to wake you up at 4 in the morning. You only got 4 hours' sleep a day which is a pretty rigorous routine. Usually, you did exercise or looked for food, and you were taught how to do without food, water, and sleep.

You got gold-colored uniforms from Russia and green-colored uniforms from Holland. You had AKMs and hand grenades.

You eventually got in touch with your family and worked your way into a situation so you could escape. Just prior to your escape,

you saw two men coming after you with weapons, presumably with the intent to kill you because they had learned of your plot to escape. Is that true?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And eventually, you got away.

You have already testified that when you joined ANC, you did not know what it was. You thought it was an organization to help South African refugees continue their studies. When did you first learn that the so-called education ANC was going to give you was military training, not civilian education?

Mr. BOSIGO. In Luanda.

Senator DENTON. In Luanda?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, in the Engineering Camp, at the military base.

Senator DENTON. If someone disagreed with that kind of training and objected to it, what would happen to them?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, normally, what they do is they would call you a traitor or they would lock you into jail somewhere in Angola.

Senator DENTON. A traitor, and lock you into a jail?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. So, you really did not have much choice from the very beginning. Is that correct? You felt intimidated and in danger, and went on with this training for that reason, more or less, from the beginning?

Mr. BOSIGO. I do not get the question.

Senator DENTON. From the beginning, you did not feel enthusiastic about this military training?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. When they say "engineering" in this Engineering Camp, how would you summarize what "engineering" means? What type of training was really given there?

Mr. BOSIGO. Actually, it is a military garrison. Some units will specialize in sabotage; that is, specializing in explosives—destroying of bridges and building materials. In the regular army, there are units which consist of people who are constructing roads and bridges.

Senator DENTON. There are indeed a lot of code words, as Doonesbury said Sunday. "Engineering" does not mean bridge building, but it means to them sabotage, explosives and mines in this case.

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Can you tell us what other groups trained with you in Russia, and what countries they came from, and maybe about how many were in each group?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, I was in with a group from Palestine; they were from Lebanon and Libya—the group of about 400 to 450. There were about 250 from Angola, and then we had SWAPO—200; 20 men from the Republic of Oman; that is an Arab Republic.

Senator DENTON. These people from Libya and Lebanon—about 400 of them—were they associated with the PLO?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, it was a PLO group.

Senator DENTON. It was a PLO group?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes; those were from Libya and Lebanon.

Senator DENTON. What did the Soviets tell you to say about your training to the people in the villages around your camp?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, they just told us that we must not tell the people that we have come for military training. What we have to say is that we are students from South Africa.

Senator DENTON. That you were students from South Africa?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You mentioned political commissars as being over you in every place. Would you please explain what that term means? What are political commissars? How are they selected? Where are they trained and what did they do for you?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, actually, they select from the people who are—let us say we are a group of 10 and I am more educated than the other 9, so they select that somebody who is more educated than the others. So, that means he can understand politics faster than the others, so they select him as a political commissar.

Mostly, they have been trained in Cuba, Russia and East Germany. The schools they attend, they normally call "party schools." Their role is to uplift the morale of the cadres; that is, to teach the cadres to be loyal to the policies of the organization.

Senator DENTON. So, they select them from among those who are the best educated—those best able to understand and teach Marxist-Leninist political theory. Is that generally true?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, that is true.

Senator DENTON. And most of them were trained in Cuba and the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes. Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. You mentioned having celebrated a number of holidays while you were in the Nova Cantengue camp, such as July 26, 1977, commemorating the day Fidel Castro attacked the Mocadda Barracks in 1953, as one holiday, and October 17, 1977, the Great October Socialist Revolution Day.

Did they have you celebrate any holidays associated with the ANC?

Mr. BOSIGO. No.

Senator DENTON. Did that become a factor that led to low morale among your people?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, some of the cadres were dissatisfied.

Senator DENTON. What were some of the other reasons for low morale among that group?

Mr. BOSIGO. For instance, we had malaria sickness and that caused diarrhea. Many of the conditions in the camps were very bad. Sometimes, we found that there was no food. They offered us powdered eggs.

Senator DENTON. How about the rest of them? Were they dissatisfied because they were receiving military training instead of the kind of education that you and maybe they had been promised?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes. There were those who were dissatisfied about not being at school.

Senator DENTON. Could you say that at this point, most or all of the ANC people were unwilling but were feeling it necessary for their safety to continue this program?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What were the most important reasons you had for leaving the ANC?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, first, I was in Zambia. I was to get out with some other cadres, together with the commander in chief's son. Well, by that time, Joe Modise—that is, the chief commander—was not present; he was in Czechoslovakia. He arrived in Lusaka soon after. So, he said that his son mustn't go to the mountains; he is having a special mission. So, he took him back to Angola.

He was later transferred to a base in Cuba for training in the military academy.

Second, I had a friend by the name of Khrushchev; he became dissatisfied with Keith, the regional commander. Then he said he would beat Mr. Keith, and he was later taken to ZAPU cadres and locked in an underground trench.

But, normally, you build a cell; they just dug one underground and put people under there. I left the ANC because of ill-treatment.

Senator DENTON. You have described that you got away as soon as you had an opportunity to get away?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Did you ever receive a salary in the ANC—any money?

Mr. BOSIGO. The only thing I received was a uniform and some food.

Senator DENTON. A uniform and some food?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Except for the time that you were in Russia and they gave you some rubles?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes, at the time I was in Russia.

Senator DENTON. How would you describe the role of the Cubans in Angola? How did they relate to you? What did they impart to you?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, normally, they helped us in training. They normally trained us in guerrilla warfare. Sometimes, they supplied us with uniforms and foodstuffs, of course.

Senator DENTON. For the most part, they were in charge of training in guerrilla warfare and they supplied the uniforms?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Did you say they were essentially, for all practical purposes, ruling in Angola, running the show?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, in Angola, they run—in fact, they position themselves—in fact, they are guarding the strategic installations in Angola in a large number.

Senator DENTON. They take key positions in Angola, which results in their ability to run the show?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Where did you receive your training in the RPG rocket launcher?

Mr. BOSIGO. I received my training on the RPG in Angola, and later a refresher course in the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. Would you show us the RPG and tell us how it works, please?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What is the RPG?

Mr. BOSIGO. Well, it can destroy a fuel tank or a fuel depot, or a plane, or any material which is hard material.

Senator DENTON. It is a rocket launcher which can destroy things with hard material. In other words, dirt would not be a good target for it, but an airplane would be, or a fuel depot?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Please, go ahead.

[Witness begins to demonstrate the weapon.]

[Photo of Mr. Bosigo follows:]



Jeffrey Motutuzele Bosigo, former member of the African National Congress, posing with rocket launcher.—Photocredit: Julia Ferguson.

Mr. BOSIGO. Unfortunately, we do not have a rocket here. [Laughter.]

You put the rocket in. It has a propellant charge behind; you set the propellant charge and then you set the rocket in there.

Senator DENTON. The charge goes in first, and then the rocket.

Mr. BOSIGO. Then you have got the optical sights that are not here, but that is not a problem. This is the rear sight and this is the front sight for aiming at the target. And then here is the shoulder guard, and here is the trigger mechanism [indicating].

Senator DENTON. Do you think that could have been used in shooting down several aircraft in Namibia?

Mr. BOSIGO. We used it against Rhodesian helicopters in Zimbabwe. They used it against the police station in South Africa.

Senator DENTON. Against the police stations?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. The previous witness has described the urban guerrilla phase of war, in which I suppose you could use this. You could also use it in the classical——

Mr. BOSIGO. You can also use it in conventional.

Senator DENTON. Yes. Please, go ahead.

Mr. BOSIGO. Then you have got the chamber where the gas escapes.

Senator DENTON. The chamber where the gas escapes.

Mr. BOSIGO. The gas always escapes from this part, and then here we have got the shoulder gun, and this is the trigger [indicating].

Senator DENTON. In other words, the recoil is reduced by the gas being permitted to escape.

Mr. BOSIGO. And here we have got the trigger, too.

Senator DENTON. How would you aim that? Would you just put that to your shoulder?

Mr. BOSIGO. Unfortunately, there are no supports here.

Senator DENTON. Just hold it up and show how you would use it.

[Mr. Bosigo demonstrated as requested.]

Senator DENTON. So, one man can handle that weapon—aim and fire it?

Mr. BOSIGO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Bosigo, your testimony has been very valuable. I thank you for your clear testimony and your courage in giving it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bosigo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MOTUTUZELE BOSIGO

I was born on 3 November 1959 in Soweto. I began my education at the Primary School at Kganhelo, Naledi, and after my parents moved to Mafeking I attended the Ramosadi Lower Primary School. In 1975 I transferred to the Kebalepele Secondary School and remained there until the end of 1976.

During 1976 in August while I was still at school riots broke out at Montshiwa. I was involved in these riots and as a consequence was arrested and was later charged in the Kimberley Regional Court and sentenced to six cuts with a light cane and three years imprisonment which was suspended. In 1976 in December while Gordon Moshoeu and I were returning home from a nightclub we became involved in a stone throwing incident in which a Valiant motorcar's windshield was broken. The owner of the Valiant reported the case to the police and they commenced an investigation. Gordon Moshoeu was at this time one of the accused in a rape case.

Because of the fact that the police investigation of my activities and those of Gordon would have caused trouble for us we decided to leave the country. Approximately one week before Christmas 1976 Gordon and I went to Motlhabengstat on foot and from there travelled by bus to Pitsane. Having arrived at Pitsane we asked the residents the way to Botswana and having been told how to reach the border we climbed over the border fence on the western side of the police station located on the border. We then asked the residents of the area in Botswana how to get to Lobatse and on the way there spent the evening at the house of the Chief of the Pitsane area. This Chief recommended that we should contact the police in Lobatse and having travelled there by bus we went to the police and explained to them that we had run away from South Africa and that we wished to go to school in Botswana. The police took us to Lobatse jail where we were held for three days. During that period the Botswana "Special Branch" took our photos and fingerprints. Although I was in possession of a valid South African travel document at the time that we left the country I did not use it.

The Lobatse police originally wanted to send us back to South Africa because they said that we were too young to go to school in Botswana and that the Government of Botswana did not have money for that purpose. Keith Mokoape visited us in prison however and when we told him that we wished to continue our schooling he said that he would make arrangements for us. The next day Keith and another man called Snooky visited us in prison and the next day after that succeeded in having us released. We then went with Keith and Snooky to Gaberone.

We did not know that Keith and Snooky were members of the ANC and in fact did not discover this until we arrived in Lusaka. We were also not really aware of what the ANC was and thought that it was an organisation which helped the South African refugees to continue their studies. In Gaborone we stayed for a week in the ANC house at Bontleng. The other residents of the house gave us food and tobacco and would not allow us to leave the house at any time. We did however manage to get out when they were not there. After a week we travelled by train to Francistown and were met at the station by an unknown man in a white Land Cruiser and taken to a house in Minestone in Francistown where we stayed for a week. We were still under the impression that we would be going to continue our schooling abroad. At Francistown we waited for an aeroplane to take us to Lusaka. We were not allowed to leave the house in which we were staying and our host told us again that we were going to Lusaka to continue our studies.

On 29 December 1976 we were taken to the airport. We were given our air tickets by our host and told that someone called Max would meet us in Lusaka. We didn't have any travel documents but our host was in possession of some documents which I didn't see and after he had talked to the Immigration staff we were told to get onto the aeroplane and departed for Lusaka. We arrived in Lusaka on the same day and were met by Max in the airport building. Max told us that there were no school facilities in Zambia and that we would meet other refugees in Luanda in Angola where we would see what would happen. We spent the night in the airport building in Lusaka.

The next day, December 30, 1976, Max came to us again and gave each of us an Alitalia air ticket. When we were on the way to the aeroplane I noticed that a group of approximately 50 South African refugees were climbing into a a chartered flight. I later met half of that group the same day at Luanda airport. The other half I was told was already on the way to the transit camp that was called "Engineering". We were met at Luanda airport by a man called Mzwai and joined up with the other group. We were taken to the "Engineering" camp in 2 GAZ trucks. The camp is approximately 1 Km from the airport. There were about 200 refugees in the camp of whom some had come from Tanzania via Mozambique. We stayed in the Engineering camp for about three weeks. During this period I realised for the first time that I would be receiving military training. While we were in the camp we had theoretical lessons in the following subjects:-

1. Military and Combat Work: Instructor - a Zulu man
2. South African Politics: Instructors - Mark Shope , Joe Slovo, A.N.C. Khuma
3. Explosives: Instructor - Regi
4. Drill and physical exercises: Instructors - Tazana, Tom and Samson
5. Topography: Instructor - Jabu
6. Tactics: Instructor - Peter Ray

We were not divided into specific classes and received all our lectures in large groups either in our dormitories or outside.

The Commander of the Engineering base was Julius Mokwena and the Political Commissar was known as Sizwe. We also met the following A.N.C. high officials while we were in the camp, when they visited it:

1. Oliver Thambo - President of the A.N.C.
2. Joe Modise - Chief Commander
3. Joe Slovo - Second in Command - A.N.C. military operations
4. Piliso Mzwai - Chief of Staff - A.N.C. Angola
5. Cassius - Secretary of the Revolutionary Council

Our daily routine began at 06h00 when we were awakened and then had physical exercise. After washing and cleaning our barracks we had breakfast during which we listened to the news and then began immediately with our drill sessions. After the drill exercises we received lectures until approximately midday and after lunch had a brief rest followed by more lectures until about 15h30 in the afternoon. After dinner in the evenings our time was our own. Some platoons were permitted to go to the local cinema on certain evenings. Every evening at approximately 22h30 we formed up on the parade ground and the company commanders established if all the troups under their command were present. Before we went to sleep we usually sung liberation songs like "Freedom day will never come easy" and "We are the soldiers of Luthuli". We only sang "Nkosi Sikelele Afrika" , which is the national anthem of the A.N.C., on special days and when high officials visited the camp.

We had been issued uniforms when we arrived in Engineering camp. These were either khaki or golden coloured and consisted of a shirt and a pair of trousers. We also received black, blue and blue and white track suits which came from Socialist States. We were only allowed to wear M.P.L.A. camouflage uniforms when we left the camp for example to go to the cinema. While I was in Engineering camp a group of approximately 25 recruits left the camp to go for further training in East Germany.

After about three weeks at Engineering camp we were transferred to the Benguela camp which is located near Lobito. Approximately two hundred of us were transported to Benguela in 8 blue and white Mercedes Benz buses. When we arrived at Benguela Piliso Nzwai addressed us. We spent the first week cleaning up the camp and repairing the facilities which consisted of a double storey house with approximately three external buildings. We also dug trenches around the camp. After we had cleaned up the camp we were divided into three companies. I served in Company 3, Platoon 1, Section 2. My Company Commander was Nhlabankosi and the Political Commissar was

Mavimbela. After about a week at the camp four trucks with Cuban drivers arrived there. The trucks were full of tents, Cuban uniforms and supplies. We received instructions to pitch the tents on the outside of the stone wall which surrounded the house.

Our training at the Benguela Camp began in February 1977. The Chief Instructor was Banda. Other instructors in particular subjects were as follows:

POLITICS	1. SIZWE 2. Marke SHOPE 3. MKIZE
TACTICS	1. Peter RAY 2. JABU 3. MOSS 4. SELBY 5. GEORGE 6. RAYMONT 7. TEMBA
TOPOGRAPHY	1. JABU
ENGINEERING	1. REGGIE 2. DICKSON 3. MOKULA 4. BIKI
WEAPONS	1. CHAIRMAN 2. MOSS 3. CHRIS 4. JAMES 5. CHESTER 6. JOHN (Two Cubans were in supervisory positions.)
PHYSICAL EDUCATION	1. Ben T.N.T. LEKALAKE 2. JULIAS 3. SAMSON
DIVISIONAL DRILL	1. ALFRED 2. CHESTER 3. SAMSON 4. WARRA
GUERILLA WARFARE: HAND GRANADES	1. CHESTER 2. MOSS 3. DONALD
BAYONET PRACTICE	1. BANDA 2. JULIAS

Camp routine was the same as it had been in Engineering Camp. We were wakened at 06h00 by one of the instructors banging a piece of iron against another that was hanging from a branch of a tree. After physical exercises and breakfast the news was read to us on the parade ground by Jola Kamarada. Thereafter we had classes in politics, tactics, topography, engineering, weapons and divisional drill until lunch time. After lunch classes in theory or practice continued until 15h30 after which we pumped water into a small dam and went to go and wash there. For the rest of the evening and over weekends we were free and we practised different types of sport.

The subjects that we were taught were mainly theoretical. These included classes in

1. POLITICS: The history, purpose and existence of trade unions, political economy, and South African history.

2. TACTICS: The planning of ambushes, how to seek cover, reconnaissance, planning of depots and "dead letter boxes". We would do some of these exercises practically by, for example, marching in particular battle formations and checking different places to find an appropriate spot for a "dead letter box".

3. TOPOGRAPHY: Map reading, physical orientation using stars, the Southern Cross, sunflowers, and ant heaps to determine direction.

4. DIVISIONAL DRILL: We did practical drill exercises.

5. WEAPONS: We handled the following weapons during the course:
   (1) A.K. 47
   (2) AKM
   (3) Papashai
   (4) P.M.K.M
   (5) RPG 7 rocket launcher
   (6) G.3
   (7) R.1
   (8) UZI

Lectures on weapons included the specifications and mechanical function as well as practical experience of stripping down and putting the weapons together. We did practical marksmanship with the A.K. 47 and the AKM. We also had lectures on hand grenades both offensively and defensively and every recruit had practical experience of loading a grenade and exploding it.

6. ENGINEERING: We were taught about different types of explosives and the use of these as well as various types of detonators. We received lectures on how to destroye bridges, pipelines and buildings by placing explosives strategically.

During February 1977 I and some of the other refugees got malaria. Some of us were treated at the camp while those who were seriously ill were taken to the hospitals in Lobito or Benguela. I was treated in the camp. Three of the recruits went mad however and they were taken out of the camp to Luanda for treatment. The morale of the recruits at the camp was very bad as a result of the poor food and the increase of malaria. Many recruits became dissatisfied with the A.N.C. and wanted to go back to South Africa. In March 1977 one of the instructors, Samson, shot himself

with an A.K. 47 while he was on guard duty as a result of the poor conditions.

At the beginning of March 1977 about 200 Umkontho We Sizwe - F.A.P.L.A. - cadres arrived at the base. These were members of Umkontho We Sizwe who had received their training with F.A.P.L.A., the armed forces of the MPLA government in Luanda. About 14 of these cadres had had training in Russia and came from a transit camp called Huambo. The rest of them had only half completed their training and came from camps at Kabella and Funda. They received training at Benguela together with for the period that we were still there.

At the end of May 1977 we moved from Benguela to a new base Nova Cantengue. This base is approximately a 100 Km south of Benguela and situated among the mountains. We went there with 8 buses and 2 GAZ trucks. Altogether we were about 400 or 450 cadres in Nova Catengue. The camp looked like an old railway camp and there was a whole lot of unused as well as used railway material lying around. We began to clean up the base and get it in order for training.

I was put in Company 1, Platoon 1, Section 2. My Platoon Commander was Huitsa Mnyaka. The Assistant Commander was Victor. The Cuban Commander was Arkimedis and the Cuban interpreter was called Eduardo. Never Kgalema was the Section Commander and Samson April was appointed as the Section Political Commissar. Julius Mokoena was the Camp Commander and Thame Zulu was Chief of Staff. Mark Shope was the camp Political Commissar.

We were divided into four Companies and as far as I can remember the following persons were in command:

COMPANY 1	Mthlaba NKOSI	-	Commander
	TITUS	-	Political Commissar
	KARBAHLE	-	Cuban Commander
COMPANY 2	Frans TLHAPELO	-	Commander
	Ché O'GARA	-	Political Commissar
	FYRE	-	Cuban Commander
COMPANY 3	Sipho NKOSI	-	Commander
	Dan PETERSON	-	Political Commissar

I do not remember the name of the Cuban Commander

COMPANY 4	Thom KHOZA	-	Commander
	Piper	-	Political Commissar

I do not remember the name of the Cuban Commander

The other Cubans who assisted with the recruits apart from Arkimedes and

Eduardo were Marero, Armando and Gastillo. Gastillo was a mechanic and commanded those recruits who were training to become mechanics.

On 5 June 1977 Tami Zulu showed us all the different sorts of weapons, topographical equipment, maps and medical equipment which we would be using on our training. On 6 June while we were on parade the camp commander Julius Mokoena informed us that the course would begin that day. The daily routine was the same as in the previous two camps except that in the evenings from 20h00 to 22h30 we had to go to class and on Saturdays had the same routine until 12h00 after which we were free for the rest of the weekend.

At Nova Catengue we again had lectures in the different subjects that we had had them in before. Our instructors were as follows:

1. TOPOGRAPHY — Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructor: Jabu
   Cuban Instructor: Marrero
   Cuban translator: Armando

The theoretical training that we had received at Benguela was continued

MAPS: The most important points in map reading were going to determine where north was and how to read the symbols on the maps.

COMPASS READING: We learnt about four different types of "north" of which I can remember three, true north, magnetic north, and geographic north. We learnt to determine true north using the moon and the stars, the behaviour of sunflowers during the day, and the location of the entry of ants into an ant heap. We also learnt how to use a watch and to use cemeteries because the grave stones usually faced east or west. We would do exercises in which a weapon would concealed somewhere in the veld and we would then have to find it using maps and compasses.

2. TACTICS — Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructors: Vice and Selby
   Cuban Instructor: Orlados Karbanelo
   Cuban Translator: Eduardo

Tactics involved the training before, during and after a war situation. We were taught to move in different formations including V-formation, contact and fallback formation, single formation, and arrow formation. While practising these formations we also made use of code signs. Among these signs I can remember the following: "Avion" - which means that a enemy aeroplane is coming and everyone should look for shelter.

A clenched fist held up in the air means that leaders of the Section must go to the Commander.

If the Commander crosses his arms over his chest, that means danger

If the Commander makes a circular movement with both his hands that means that the Section must spread out into a halfmoon shape and get ready for a contact.

We were taught how to attack and to set ambushes and how to camouflage ourselves. We had practical classes at night in which we learnt to listen

to specific sounds, for example loading a weapon or people talking and to learn to judge the distance on the basis of those sounds. Reconnaissance patrols sent out and observation was regarded as most important. During these patrols for example if one were doing reconnaissance of a bridge, one would have to determine the length, breadth and the material of which it was constructed.

3. ARTILLERY Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructor: Uncle
I do not remember the names of the Cuban Instructor or his interpreter.

We only had theoretical classes in artillery and studies the following weapons:

82 mm mortar. Its maximum range is about 3 - 4 Km and its radius of destruction approximately 25 to 30 metres. It can be used against troops, buildings or any other target.

75 mm cannon. This cannon is operated by 4 people. It is used to incapacitate stationary objects at a great distance. The head of the shell is filled with compressed T.N.T. which explodes if it makes contact with the target or even the ground.

4. POLITICS Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructors: Mark Shope, Jack Simons and Bobby Pillay (No Cubans were involved in this course).
During these classes we discussed the history of South Africa since the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 and in particular the oppression of blacks throughout the years. Boers who moved into the interior chased the black people off their lands, we were told. We also learnt about early leaders like Chaka, Cetshwayo and Moshesh and later leaders like Nelson Mandela and Albert Luthuli. Every recruit was required to know the "Freedom Charter" which was adopted by the African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party in 1955. We received lectures on Marx, Engels and Lenin and communist ideology. During all lectures the oppression of the black man in South Africa by the whites was emphasized and we were told that we must fight for our freedom from the South African government.

5. WEAPONS Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructors: Chairman, Peter and Moss
I can not remember the names of the Cuban instructor and the Cuban translator.

Our training in weapons was intensive. We were taught to fire with them and to strip them down and reassemble them in a short time. Although we did not have practical range training with all the weapons we did have proper training in the following:

A.K. 47, A.K.M., P.M.K.M.,G.3, R.1, F.A.L., UZI, Papashai, R.P.G.7

We did not have training in hand guns at Nova Catengue but received it later at Quibaxe.

6. ENGINEERING Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructor: Mkula, Walter
Cuban Instructor: I don't remember
Cuban Interpreter: Eduardo
We had lectures about land mines, in particular anti-personnel and anti-transport land mines.

7. COMMUNICATION Ukuonto We Sizwe Instructor: Titus and Monde
Cuban Instructor: Willy
Cuban Interpreter: Eduardo

We received training in the following radios:

R.D. 25 or R.105D (Russian made)
R.D. 28 or R.105D (Russian made)
TAI 43 (Made in Czechoslovakia)

Both the R.D. 25 and R.D. 28 had spiral aerials (Kulikov) and gave one a communication radius of 8 Km. With an extension aerial attached one could achieve a communications radius of 25 Km. A third aerial, the directional aerial consists of three aerials which were focussed in the direction in which you wished to send the message. You could achieve a communications radius of about 15 Km in this fashion. The R.D. 25 has 21 frequencies while the R.D. 28 has 23 frequencies. Both radios use 9 volt batteries.

The TAI 43 works like an old telephone and has a handle used to contact the other person. These radios are connected with two telephone lines and are used chiefly in the base itself. This radio uses a 4.5 volt battery.

8. FIRST AID Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructor: Nomava, Gwendeline (women ANC members)
Cuban Instructor: Valdez
Cuban Interpreter: Eduardo

We had classes in connection with the different types of bandages and how to use them, how to treat wounds or injuries and how to deal with snake bite. We also had practical experience of how to carry wounded people.

9. PHYSICAL EXERCISES: Umkhonto We Sizwe Instructor: Ben T.N.T. Lekalake.
Cuban Instructor: Pintaolo

Each morning we would do obstacle exercises after which we would run for long distances. During one of the obstacle course exercises a black woman Zukiswa broke her leg. She was taken to the Benguela hospital for treatment.

While I was at Nova Catengue the recruits on a number of occasions did not go to classes and we deviated from the normal routine. Among the days that I can recall were the following:-

- at the end of every month during the afternoon recruits who had had birthdays during that month were congratulated and cake and cool drink was provided. At first this arrangement applied to the whole base, but later because of a shortage of money only those recruits whose birthdays it was were given this treatment.

- On 26 July 1977 we celebrated an important Cuban day. In terms of what the instructors told us it was the day in 1953 when Fidel Castro attacked the Mocadda barracks, which eventually led to his accession to power. The Cubans presented a play that evening which symbolised the attack.

- On 9 August 1977 we celebrated "South African Woman's Day". Florence Maposho, Joe Mode and Mzwai visited the base on that day. Florence gave a speech in which she sketched the history of the black woman in South Africa. She made the statement that women throughout the world are now entering politics and don't merely work in kitchens any longer.

  She used Vietnamese women as an example who helped to free their country from oppression and suggested that the black women in South Africa ought to do the same.

- On 17 October 1977 we had the afternoon off to celebrate the Great October Socialist Revolution Day. During our training no big A.N.C. days were celebrated and that led to considerable dissatisfaction among the recruits.

At the end of September 1977 the recruits began to become ill in their stomachs. Later the whole camp was sick and Cuban doctors and nurses came to treat those who were sick. The camp Commander and the Cuban instructors then began to question the kitchen personnel. The whole camp was searched and the Commanders took charge of a camera and a cassette player and old medical stocks which were found in Company 1. The Commanders could not however find out who or what was responsible for the epidemic.

At the beginning of our training a man called Jomo ran away from the camp because he did not want to do training. Another recruit whose name I have forgotten tried to leave the camp but he was arrested and was sent as far as I know to Benguela jail where he was held in confinement.

At the beginning of December 1977 an old A.N.C. member, Wana, came to our Section and told us that a group of 60 persons would be going to Russia for further training. The same evening we were taken to Luanda where we stayed in the "Engineering" camp for about two weeks. During these two weeks we were issued with western clothing and were medically examined and given the necessary innoculations. After about two weeks we got our Angolan passports which had Portuguese names in them, from Cassius.

In the Engineering camp in Luanda the group of 60 was divided into five smaller groups namely Grad P, B.10, Zeke U, Mortar and Engineering.

On 19 or perhaps 20 December 1977 our group of 60 travelled to Moscow in an "Aeroflot" aircraft by the following route:

We left Luanda at 15h00 in the afternoon to Brazaville where we spent one hour before leaving for Cairo. After we had refuelled at Cairo we travelled on to Budapest and some of the civilians who had come with us from Luanda got off in Budapest. We then travelled from Budapest to Moscow and arrived at approximately 06h00 in the morning on the next day.

When we arrived at the Moscow airport we were met by two Russians. They took our passports and after the necessary formalities had been dealt with gave them back to us. We left the airport buildings and were taken to a military hotel in a Russian military camp on the outskirts of Moscow in three buses. Warm coats, gloves and caps were given to us there. Two days after we had arrived a group of 45 were taken to the Ukraine. The fifteen of us who stayed behind went by aircraft to the Ukraine four days after our arrival.

During the week of Christmas 1977 we arrived in Pirivalnye in the Ukraine. Here the same two Russians who had met us at Moscow airport received us. We went to the base which was about 7 Km away from the airport, by bus. When we arrived at the camp we were given a chance to wash after which we were issued with Russian uniforms consisting of a padded woolen shirt, a woolen long pair of trousers and a woolen coat. We were then taken to the hospital where we were once again medically examined. The weapons that each group would be using during its training were shown to us and our classes were indicated.

Just after Christmas 1977 we started with training in Pirivalnye. Routine at camp was the following:

05h30 - Awakened by a guard who went from dormitory to dormitory. Physical exercises including obstacle courses, running and ordinary exercises then followed.

07h30 - Time to wash and to clean up the dormitories.

08h00 - Breakfast consisting of soup, bread, cheese and tea. We then assembled for parade at which time the world news was read to us by a Russian.

09h00 - Classes, and sometimes practical classes until lunchtime.

12h00 - Lunch which consists of rice, meat, soup, bread, milk and apples. Thereafter a time for a rest during which some recruits rested and others looked at television.

14h30 - Study time. The work that was dealt with during the classes had to be studied.

17h00 - Free for the rest of the day

18h30 - Dinner consisting of milk, tea, rice, meat and brown bread.

21h00 - Parade

23h00 - Lights out

Each group got one weekend per month free to go to Pirivalnye. During these breaks we had to wear civilian clothes and were accompanied by our instructors into the town. After they had shown us certain parts, they would leave us alone with the instruction to only move round in a certain area. At the end of every month every recruit got 20 roubles with which we were able to buy cigarettes and toilet articles.

During our six months stay in Russia we had training in the following subjects:

Grad P - Physical exercises, handling of the AKM, Topography and tactics, gas and gas masks.

1. GRADE P

Theoretical: A Russian with the name of Krasko gave us training in this subject. The Grad P is an artillery weapon consisting of the following parts:

- an adjustable barrel 122mm in diameter in diameter and approximately 3 meters long
- an adjustable tripod on which the barrel is mounted
- adjustable OPB sights consisting of a rectangle with number values thereon and equipped for night firing
- an electrical mechanism

The Grad P is manned by eight people or less, depending on circumstances. Four people to handle the Grad P itself and four or more people to provide ammunition, depending on the target that is being attacked. It has a maximum range of 12 Km. The projectile can penetrate approximately 2 to 3 meters in soft ground and approximately 1 meter in hard ground and has a destructive radius of between 50 to 500²m. The weapon can be used to fire directly on a target for example where the target is visible or indirectly when the target is not visible. In the second case the precise location of the target is determined by a person closer to the target who is in radio communication with the gun crew. The projectile consists of an automatic explosive mechanism with an adjustable pin for immediate or delayed explosion. Behind the detonator which is known as the "warhead" the shell is filled with fifty kilograms of T.N.T. At the back of the projectile there are fins /stabilizers which give stability to the projectile when in flight.

Practical: Only four recruits out of our group had practical experience with the Grad P. A target consisting of a large pile of stones was set up about 6 Km away. It was a direct target and four projectiles were fired at it, only one of which struck it. We were also taught how to strip down the weapon and how to reassemble it and how to treat it after it had been used.

2. HANDLING OF THE AKM

The classes that we had in the handling treatments and working of the

AKM were the same as we had received in Nova Catengue and can be regarded as a refresher course. Every recruit fired only three shots at a stationary target.

3. TOPOGRAPHY AND TACTICS
Both subjects were once again dealt with in essentially the same way as at Nova Catengue except that we used Russian maps during topography.

4. PHYSICAL EXERCISE
Apart from ordinary exercises, obstacle courses and running, a rope was strung between two three-storey buildings over which we had to travel with our hands from one building to the other. Some recruits refused to do this. Large pieces of sponge were put in the street underneath the rope in case anyone fell. During another exercise we had to move underneath a moving armoured car or lie still so that its caterpillar tracks would move past us on both sides.

5. GAS AND GAS MASKS
All the recruits were put in a small room and a teargas grenade was thrown in. Although we had gas masks with us we were not allowed to put them on until the instructor gave the command. During this exercise we had to hold our breaths to prevent us breathing in the gas.

6. DRILL
All the Umkhonto We Sizwe recruits had to march with the Russian soldiers and during drill sessions we sang our liberation songs. We drilled in the Russian manner by bending our left and right arms respectively so that the left fist struck the right shoulder and the right fist struck the left shoulder. We had to lift our legs high off the ground so that the upper leg was horizontal with the ground.

The recruits who were divided into the B10, Zeke U, Engineering, and Mortar groups were accommodated on the same base as we were. Although I did not have training in these subjects I do know that they involved the following:

1. B.10: This is 82mm anti-tank and anti-personnel weapon with a maximum range of 4 Km. It is similar to the 82mm mortar in which we were trained at Nova Catengue but more effective.

2. MORTAR: This is an 82mm mortar consisting of a steel pipe as a barrel, a heavy footpiece and two folding legs. It is an anti-personnel mortar and can also be used to fire flares. It has a maximum range of 3 Km and a destructive radius of 25 to 30 meters.

3. ZEKE U: This a 20mm anti-aircraft heavy machine gun but can also be used for targets on the ground. The bullets are fed through the weapon on a belt.

4. ENGINEERING: All sorts of explosives including anti-tank, anti-personnel and plastic explosives were covered. This group was also trained in the construction of trenches, of bases and bridges and the destruction of enemy bases, airports, bridges and railway lines.

During our training in Russia we visited local schools, farms and factories. These visits were to show us the difference between the capitalist state from which we had come and the socialist style of life. The farms known as collective farms, which we visited, usually had large groups of people who had specialized in different agricultural directions. The profits which are made from the returns go to the state after which the state then pays the workers. The schools that we visited use modern study aids like overhead projectors and television. In almost every classroom there was a photo of Lenin and quotations which are used, are stuck up on the walls.

During May 1978 the B.10, Engineering and Zeke U groups left the Soviet Union and returned to Luanda in Angola. In the middle of June 1978 my group, the Grad P Group and the Mortar group left the base at Pirivalnye and spent three days in Moscow. Before we left the base we put on civilian clothes but we took the Russian uniforms with us. In Moscow we stayed in the military hotel again. During the three days we visited among other places, Red Square and used the money that we had over because we were not able to take any of the roubles out of the Soviet Union. After three days in Moscow we left for the airport and travelled back to Luanda via Budapest, Cairo and Brazaville. On our arrival at Luanda we were taken directly from the airport to the new camp at Quibaxe in a GAZ truck. Here I met some of the recruits who had left Russia before us. The other members of the three groups had already either been sent on a mission or had been given tasks such as truck drivers. We also had some untrained recruits in the camp who had very recently arrived in Angola. We were once again divided into companies and all the trained recruits were in the trained companies. The camp Commander was Paka, an old man, and the Political Commissar was Connie.

At the beginning of August 1978 a man called Obadi took me, Johannes Masimini and Simpi Malefane to Funda. Before we left for Funda, Obadi questioned a group of recruits in order to determine whether we had any business skills. I told Mobadi that I had worked in my father's shop and had experience of money matters. Simpi had also worked in a business enterprise before and therefore he also knew something about money. I only realised later when I and Simpi were sent to Botswana to buy houses for the A.N.C. that Obadi had selected us for this particular mission.

In the Funda camp a man called Semelane gave us training in the handling of pistols. We received training in the following pistols:

- MAKAROV 9mm (Russian manufactured)
- TOKAREV 9mm (Russian manufactured)
- WALTHER 9mm (West German manufactured)

We had training in cleaning, stripping and reassembly. We were taught various firing positions, for example dead rest over the forearm, double hand gripped and kneeling position. We did a considerable amount of practical firing exercises at stationary targets. When we were not busy with range work or the theoretical study of the pistols we worked in the vegetable garden of the base or helped to build a kitchen and diningroom.

During the second week of September 1978 Simpi Malefane and I at the instructions of the camp Commander, Zakes, went to Luanda where we worked at the docks. Johannes Masimini was sent to Zambia because he was sick and could not work at the docks.

While working at the harbour we unloaded goods such as food, medical supplies, clothes and shoes which came from Holland, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Russia and other countries. Most of the supplies which we handled were intended for the A.N.C. The goods came on Russian freighters. While we were working at the harbour Simpi and I stayed at the ANC house, called "Embassy". Four women and three men from South Africa and a group of Angolans also lived at this house but we were not permitted to mix with them.

At the beginning of October 1978 Obadi informed Simpi and I that we were going to Zambia for a survival course. The same week we left for Zambia in an Alitalia aircraft and were met on our arrival at Lusaka airport by Snooky of the ANC and Amros of ZAPU and taken to a ZAPU house ("Zimbabwe House" which is located in the eastern suburbs of Lusaka. Snooky then took our civilian clothes and gave us ZIPRA uniforms. Snooky and Amros took us to a ZAPU base called "Frelimo Camp" in Chikumbi on the same day. In this ZAPU base the camp regulations were explained to us and we were shown where to sleep and where to eat.

On 23 October 1978 at approximately 08h00 while everyone in the ZAPU base was busy with their daily routine a tremendous noise suddenly exploded. The Rhodesian army and airforce had attacked the base and there was total chaos. Everyone ran for trenches. When I dived into one of the trenches I hurt my shoulder. After about 45 minutes the Rhodesians withdrew. Two hundred and thirty ZIPRA men were killed and a great number hurt. Toni, a trained ANC cadre, was also killed during the attack. I was later taken to Lusaka hospital for treatment.

After about 3½ weeks in the hospital I was sent to the survival camp C.G.G.T. with a group of ZAPU cadres. This camp is in the eastern part of Zambia approximately 80 Km away from Lusaka. Here I saw Simpi again and we completed the course with the ZAPU recruits. The instructors were all ZAPU people. Our daily routine while we were in the camp was as follows:

04h00 - One of the instructors fires a shot to wake us up. Physical exercises during which we had to run with full equipment, roll down mountains and do general exercises.

07h00 - Theoretical classes in survival. We were taught how to live off food that we could find in the veld and animals and snakes and how to look after ourselves while in the veld.

12h30 - Lunch. After lunch we did physical exercises again then theoretical classes.

19h00 - Dinner after which we did physical exercises or field work until midnight.

We were only allowed four hours sleep - from midnight to 04h00 in the morning each day.

The days which we were not in the camp were not organised. Usually we did exercises or looked for food and were taught how to do without food, water and sleep.

At the beginning of March 1979 we were taken back to the ZAPU base called Frelimo Camp. We were given gold coloured uniforms from Russia and dark green uniforms from Holland. We were also all in possession of AKM's with spare magazines and hand grenades. Two days after my return to this base most of the group left the base for either Gazankulu, Botswana or Rhodesia in order to infiltrate into South Africa. While I was busy with the survival course this group, while on their way to Livingstone, were involved in an accident which had delayed their mission.

Three days after our return to the camp Simpi Malefane and I were taken to ANC houses in Lusaka. First we stayed at Chunga house. After that we went to Emmasdale house where we stayed for approximately three months. After Emmasdale we were taken to Kaunda Square where we stayed for a few days before Keith Mokoape and Tom Nkobi, the treasurer, advised us about our mission to Botswana. Keith told us that when we arrived in Francistown we should go to Lobatse where one called Pat would meet us. He would arrange accommodation for us as well. Tom Nkobi instructed us to buy houses in the vicinity of Lobatse and told us that we would get the money for this from someone called Bob in Gaberone.

On either 1 or 2 August 1979 Simpi and I were issued with two false South African passports. Keith gave us these passports. I can't remember the surname that I travelled under but I remember that the name was Sipho. An unknown ANC man took us to Lusaka airport. Here I met my brother

Godfrey Mompati Bosigo. He had booked the places for us on the aeroplane. At 09h00 we left with a Zambian aircraft to Francistown.

When we arrived in Francistown Bob met us and took us to the Francistown train station. He gave us thirty Pula which we used to buy train tickets to Lobatse. On 3 October 1979 Simpi and I arrived at Lobatse station where we were met by Pat, whose real name is Guy Motjale. He took us to Peleng where we met Pasca and Magaxa. Pasca is the regional commander of the ANC in Lobatse.

The next morning Simpi, Pat and I went to Gaberone where we received 3000 Pula from Tata in order to buy the houses in Lobatse. Immediately thereafter we returned to Lobatse where we stayed for two weeks. During my stay in Lobatse Magaxa gave Simpi and I a Makarov pistol with one spare loaded magazine so that we could defend ourselves.

During the middle of August 1979 Pat and I went by bus to Borobadelepe which is about 5 or 6 Km from the border between Botswana and Bophuthatswana. We walked this last distance to the border and hid in a thick clump of bushes for about 5 hours. During our observation we were able to see two police patrols pass by. Pat did a rough sketch of the area on which he marked the observation points. A corner of the border fence, west where we were lying and an orientation house, a farmhouse approximately 1.5 Km east of where we were.

During the first week of September 1979, while I was staying with my cousin in Broadhurst I went to the Gaborone police station where I reported myself as a new refugee. The police took photos and fingerprints. I applied for political asylum under the name Oupa Kagisho Mokate and said that I was a member of the S.S.R.C. I asked for political asylum in order to get the 30 Pula per month which is paid to such people. After two days of staying at my cousin's, Pasca arrived and ordered me to come with him. I told him that I would be going to an ANC house in Bontleng on the next day. Pasca said that I should go back to Zambia because I had not completed my mission and because I had broken away from the ANC. The next morning I left Gaberone and moved in with a friend, Monica Dira in Kanye where I stayed until December 1979.

During October 1979 I heard that my father was looking for me and he wanted me to go back to Bophuthatswana. During late November 1979 my brother Gilbert Bosigo was in Lobatse and we talked about many things. I told him that I had done military training in Zambia. He advised me not to get involved with the ANC but to continue with

my schooling. I asked him to get information so that I could go back to Bophuthatswana. He told met that he would get in touch with me as soon as he'd found out the facts but he did not come back. While I was staying with my friend Monica Dira, on 19 December 1979 at about 20h00 in the evening while I was asleep, Pasca and Pat arrived at my friend's house. I heard a motorcar door being slammed and looked out of the window and saw the green Dodge Colt which Pasca and Pat used to drive. I saw Pat come up to the front door and told my friend to open it. Pat and Pasca came through the front door together and in the lights of the vehicle I could see that they had weapons. I jumped out of the back window of the house and rolled down to the fence from where I ran further. At about 02h00 on the morning of 20 December 1979 I arrived at Ramotswa where I spent the rest of the night with two refugees from Randfontein and a Motswana woman, at whose house I stayed until 21 December 1979. On 21 December I went into Lobatse where I caught the train to Rakuna. It was dark when I arrived in Rakuna and I slept in the veld that night until about 03h00 of the morning of 22 December. At 03h00 I followed the railway line to approximately half a kilometer from the Gateway border post. I moved away in a Southeasterly direction and encountered the boundary fence again east of the Ramatlhabama border post. I walked from there to where my parents had previously lived in 1421, Montshiwa. I was able to find no one there and so I went to my father's house in Manyemantshostat.

At about 06h30 am I arrived at my parents house in Manyemantshostat where I stayed the whole day. That evening I stole a bicycle from one of my father's employees and rode to Montshiwa where I went to Meriting. I did not go into Meriting but instead to Mr Dithobane Maropofela's shop. I met some friends there and we wnet to two bars to drink some beer. That evening I slept at a friend's house in Montshiwa.

On the morning of 23 December I went to my brother's house and having met a friend there went to go and look for another old friend of mine. I and my friend went to a shebeen where we later met another friend. This last man went to my parents' house with me where I washed and put on other clothes. He then said I should stay at the house and I insisted on going back to Montshiwa. I went back with him and we went to "Mafeking by Night" and drank beer there. There I met other friends. After we had been drinking for a while I rode in my brother's vehicle and having dropped off two friends, went to my brother's place of employment where I left his car. I then went back to Montshiwa and drank some more. At about 18h00 that evening my brother and my mother took me home.

On 24 December 1979 my father took me to the Montshiwa police station and after he had explained to them what the circumstances were they told me to come back the next day.

On 25 December, while I was in my parents' house, the police came to search the house. I hid in one of the bedrooms in a cupboard and they did not find me. I stayed in the house for the whole day. During the afternoon my brother Gilbert took me to my aunt's house because I wanted to surrender myself and not be arrested by the police. I stayed there until the evening when my father came to collect me and took me to the offices of the security branch of the police. As there was no one there he took me home again.

On 26 December at about 10h00 my father took me back to the police again where I surrendered myself.

Attached to this statement are sketches that I made of different camps where I received training. These camps are :

1. Engineering
2. Benguela
3. Nova Catengue
4. Qibaxe.

I have also attached a sketch of the Grad P Weapon in which I received training in the Soviet Union.

GRAD P


Barrel
leveling plates
aiming Sights.
traversing
electric generator
elevating Mechanism
Tric pols.
engeen
Shell
war head
fuse.


logistics and classes.
Road
Barracks
Barracks
Kitchen
Medical point
Trees
oil Machine.
water machine.
Sports ground
FUNDA
pigs cage
MPLA Houses

LICENSE HT · DWELLING




Sugar cane
Sugar cane
Spruce
Kitchen
Barracks
Small Cargo
Brick 2 story House
Road
Barracks and Log Stick
Trees
Trees
Trees


Railway.
Cuban
Medical
Kitchens
Cuban
Kitchens
Fish
washing.
Cuban
Barracks
Cuban ANC
Commander.
Cuban HQ
P.T. Grounds
C.O.3
C.O.4
C.O.5
C.O.7
Cases.


Banana trees.
Stores
Machine
girls barracks
Hospital
Trenches
Instructors barracks.
Parade
Trenches
Trees


Rail Road
Road to Mafeking
House in pelang
Road to Zeerust.
Labatse town
LM Store.
Road to Zeerust.
Way Side Stores.
pelang bridge.
Noisy Road disco.


SSBC House in background
Road to town gates.
Shops.
Chicks office
Library
Road.
toilets.

93-642 O - 82 - 34


Road from town
Gate post
Gate Post
AMPLA
ANC.B.
MPLA
MPLA
MPLA
Cabin
AMPLA armory
P.T grounds
ANC barracks
Road from Bird
ANC kitchen
Cuban
Cuban kitchen

ZAMBIA
E
S
N


N
Garage
Gate
Kitchen door
Dining Room door.
House
Back door.
Gate
LUPANGA Road
Road


1
White House.
Field
By Bétsuanan/
Bophuthatswana
Grens.
R.S.A
Road.
Wire
1. Grenspaal
2. Grenspaal
3 & 4. Tussen hierdie twee huise deur-gaan
Swamp
Botswana.
bush.
Here
2
3
4

Senator DENTON. Our next witness is Bartholomew Hlapane.

Mr. Hlapane, if you will remain standing just for a moment, I will ask you to raise your right hand and take this oath. If you agree with it, you simply say, "I do".

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HLAPANE. I do.

[Photo of Hlapane follows:]

Bartholomew Hlapane, former member of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party.—Photocredit: Julia Ferguson.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated, sir. I want to welcome you to this hearing and thank you for coming. Please present your opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF BARTHOLOMEW HLAPANE

Mr. HLAPANE. I was born on August 24, 1918, in the Ficksburg District of the Orange Free State, South Africa. I became interested in politics in 1948 and joined the African National Congress (ANC) as an ordinary branch member. In 1952, I was appointed the branch secretary of the Jabavu Branch of the African National Congress, and in 1955 I was elected an ordinary member of Transvaal Executive Committee, at the same time being appointed an organizer of the Eastern Transvaal and East Rand regions of the African National Congress. I served in this position until 1959.

The African National Congress' aims and objects were to achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means, and the organization's structure is as follows.

The lowest organ of the African National Congress is a branch, above which are regional committees, provincial committees and, at the top, control is exercised by the National Executive Committee.

The National Executive decided on matters of policy and instructed its organs to carry them out. Members of the African National Congress were recruited and given membership cards, and any African who wanted to join the African National Congress was allowed to do so.

During 1960, the African National Congress was banned and a state of emergency was declared by the South African Government. Almost all the members of the National Executive of the ANC were detained. The only exception was Moses Kotane. I was not detained.

I was then appointed to the National Executive of the African National Congress together with Moses Kotane, Ruth Matswane, Gordon Magote, and a woman by the name of Sebeko. Moses Kotane, Ruth Matswane, and myself also constituted the National Secretariat of the African National Congress.

The above-mentioned committee functioned only up to the end of the emergency. When the emergency ended, the old National Executive took over. A formal meetinq of the National Executive was held and the new committee handed over to the old committee.

Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, Duma Nokwe, Dan Tloome, and Walter Sisulu were all members of the old committee which took over from us and who had to decide whether the African National Congress had to go underground and if the activities had to continue or not. Subsequently, it was decided that the African National Congress would continue its activities underground.

I was then appointed to the Johannesburg Regional Committee of the African National Congress. A meeting consisting of delegates of the African National Congress, the Communist Party, Congress of Democrats, and the Indian Congress was held in Johannesburg during the first part of 1961 to discuss the formation of Umkonto We Sizwe, the military wing of the African National Congress.

Mr. Chairman, here I would say, if you would permit me, Umkonto We Sizwe, in English, was understood to be the "Spear of the Nation."

Senator DENTON. The "Spear of the Nation?"

Mr. HLAPANE. That is correct.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Mr. HLAPANE. I did not attend this meeting, but learned after the meeting that there was serious disagreement amongst the delegates and that no decision had been taken. Shortly after this meeting, Umkonto We Sizwe was formed, at the sole decision of the African National Congress and the Communist Party.

In 1955, I was recruited by Joe Slovo. Mr. Chairman, again, if you would allow me, before I get to that, I think I should explain how the membership of the Communist Party was recruited. I have dealt with the membership of the African National Congress and how it was recruited, but I did not explain how the Communist Party recruited its membership.

Being a Communist, Mr. Chairman, we did not take anybody who wanted to join the Communist Party; its membership was strictly selective. It was a standing rule of the Communist Party that all its members go out to all mass organizations or even community organizations to find out about people who are influential, who are clever, and who could be recruited as members of the party, first of all getting these people interested in the party by giving them pamphlets and some literature concerning the party, and later on getting them into some discussions, and then if we are satisfied that they have interest, get them into some lecture rooms.

I will say now what Joe Slovo did with me. In 1955, I was recruited by Joe Slovo and became a member of the South African Communist Party. Slovo was my tutor and taught me the principles of communism, and later I was placed in a cell of the Jabavu Branch of the South African Communist Party, which at that time had already been proscribed and was operating illegally.

The structure of the South African Communist Party was as follows. The lowest organ of the organization was a cell, then a branch, a district committee, and eventually the central committee. A cell is an organ functioning in an area and composed of not less than three or more than five members. Its main purpose was to work amongst members of national organizations, trade unions and community organizations in order to influence their members to advance the aims and objects of the Communist Party.

The functions of a branch of the Communist Party were to coordinate the functions of the various cells and report to the district committee, which in turn was in charge of the province.

At the beginning, I was only an ordinary member of a cell consisting of five members, one of these being our contact with the branch committee, through whom we got instructions on how to organize and direct the African National Congress, and to recruit members for the Communist Party.

It is a standing rule that members of the South African Communist Party must also belong to a mass organization, such as the African National Congress or the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The idea was to get members to infiltrate any organization

described as reactionary, to undermine the leadership and ultimately gain control of such organizations.

Between 1955 and early in 1960, I belonged to various cells of the South African Communist Party because of reorganization within the party, and during this period I was co-opted into the branch committee of the Communist Party. In October 1961, I was co-opted into the Johannesburg District Committee of the Communist Party, and at the same time was appointed a full-time functionary—that is, organizing secretary—with a fixed salary and given a car. All the organs of the South African Communist Party falling under the Johannesburg District Committee were under my control.

The main functions of the district committee were: (A) to carry out the instructions of the central committee and, in turn, to convey them to the lower organs of the South African Communist Party; (B) to receive reports from lower organs, discuss them, make decisions, and instruct the lower organs as to what action to take; (C) to supervise the branch committees and cells.

At this stage, Joe Slovo was a member of the central committee of the South African Communist Party and was our contact with the central committee.

After being co-opted into the Johannesburg District Committee of the South African Communist Party, I became a link between the National Executive of the African National Congress and the Transvaal Executive of the ANC.

I was also placed in charge of the African Area Committee of the South African Communist Party Johannesburg District Committee. Andrew Kumene and John Motsabi served with me on this area committee. The various area committees were: the African Area Committee, the Trades Unions Area Committee, the Indian Area Committee, and the European Area Committee.

The above area committees, in turn, were responsible to the district committee of the South African Communist Party, and they were similarly directed by the said district committee.

The functions of these area committees were mainly the following: (A) to carry out the instructions of the district committee; (B) to supervise the cells or units; (C) other organizational matters.

I was in charge of the African Area Committee. Joe Slovo was representing the district committee on the central committee of the South African Communist Party.

At this stage, 1961, Ben Turok handled the party's finances. The finances for party purposes were derived from the following sources: (A) advances by the Soviet Union; (B) advances by Communist China; (C) by way of subscriptions by ordinary members of the party; (D) advances by the Communist Party of England.

Finances were mainly used for the following purposes: (A) paying of salaries to all organizers and other paid officials; (B) printing and propaganda matters; (C) purchasing of literature from overseas; (D) transport; (E) to assist other organizations, such as the African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, Congress of Democrats and the Indian Congress, and also for the Federation of South African Women; (F) to pay for the defense of persons arrested for offenses under the Suppression of Communism Act and like offenses.

The Defense and Aid Fund, which at this juncture already existed, was extensively used for the purposes of the South African Communist Party. In turn, cash advances toward the fund were made by the South African Communist Party.

I was co-opted onto the central committee of the South African Communist Party toward the end of 1962 at a national conference of the South African Communist Party. All the Africans were members of the African National Congress, and most of them were members of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress. And in this way, the South African Communist Party was able to influence and control the African National Congress.

Two resolutions were passed at this national conference concerning: (A) the program of action of the South African Communist Party—this was distributed in pamphlet form; (B) plans to organize and step up the activities of Umkonto We Sizwe. It was emphasized that we were embarking on the second phase. Joe Slovo represented Umkonto We Sizwe at this national conference.

Shortly after the national conference, I attended my first meeting of the central committee of the South African Communist Party. Not long after this meeting, Moses Kotane was placed under house arrest by the South African police, and we decided that he ought to leave the country. He went first to Bechuanaland, then on to Dar-es-Salaam.

During May 1963, Joe Slovo and J. B. Marks also left South Africa on the advice of the central committee. We decided that they would be based in London, from where they would contact organizations sympathetic to the African National Congress cause, give prominence to the activities of the African National Congress and Umkonto We Sizwe, and thus further the objectives of the freedom cause.

I was detained for questioning by the South African police on June 24, 1963, and released on December 13, 1963. During my detention on July 11, 1963, the police raided Lilliesleaf, a small holding at Rivonia, and arrested the members of the high command of Umkonto We Sizwe. These arrests led to the so-called Rivonia trial.

After my release by the police, I was suspended from both the ANC and South African Communist Party until April 1964. This was standard practice in both movements to ascertain whether or not a person who had been detained had not perhaps decided to become an informer while in detention.

Shortly before Christmas in 1963, I was, however, told by Dan Tloome to meet Hilda Bernstein at the offices of the Defense and Aid Fund in Kerk Street, Johannesburg. I kept this appointment and met Hilda Bernstein. She grilled me for about 2 hours on the questions put to me by the police while under detention and the answers I gave to them. She did not intimate to me whether she was satisfied with the answers I gave her or not.

I am convinced that there was suspicion against me for having disclosed the whereabouts or existence of Rivonia, and I attribute my long suspension to this.

During March 1964, I was approached by Gabula Mahlasela. He informed me that due to other duties which had been imposed upon him, he could no longer carry out his duties on the regional

committee of the African National Congress, and he nominated me to replace him on this committee.

Before Mahlasela could, however, introduce me to the regional committee, he was detained and I was once again left very much in the dark.

Early in April 1964, I was approached by Mike Dingaka. He informed me that I was to act on the regional committee of the African National Congress, as informed by Mahlasela prior to his arrest. He instructed me to report at the house of Letooane in Westcliff Extension on a given evening to meet the members of this Committee. Soon thereafter, I went to Letooane's house, as instructed.

I acted on this regional committee in a supervisory capacity and did not represent an area. At these and subsequent meetings of the regional committee, we discussed the program of the African National Congress in an attempt to find means of effectively reorganizing it.

Soon thereafter, as part of the reorganization, I was co-opted onto the national secretariat of the African National Congress, where I served with Mike Dingaka, Levy Soloro, Nkonyana, and Mike Ngobeni.

At this stage, Dan Tloome and Alfred Nzo had left the Republic. Dan Tloome had been sent to Northern Rhodesia—Northern Rhodesia is today Zambia—in an effort to organize the establishment of a new headquarters for the African National Congress.

The Lukasa prospect of new headquarters was abandoned. Alfred Nzo was a member of the National Executive of the African National Congress, but because of hardships which he had suffered, it was felt that he had taken much punishment and that he should leave South Africa.

Bri Bri (Wilton Makwai) was solely responsible for their departures, as he was handling all such matters because he had the necessary pilots and contacts which minimized the risks pertaining to the organizing of escapes to Bechuanaland. Both Dan Tloome and Alfred Nzo are still outside of South Africa, and I understand that Nzo is now secretary-general of the African National Congress and Tloome deputy secretary-general.

I was detained by the police again on September 2, 1964, not long after my co-option onto the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress, on which I served with Bri-Bri (Wilton Makwai), Mike Dingaka, and Gabula Mahlasela.

During the 5 months betweeen April 1964 and my detention on September 2, 1964, I was also brought back into the South African Communist Party. In April, I was approached by Mike Dingaka and informed that the district committee of the Communist Party had decided that I should serve on the African Area Committee of the party. I was subsequently introduced by Mike to the members of the African Area Committee.

We discussed various matters concerned with the African National Congress and the Communist Party. It was decided that I would also be drafted into an African cell of the Communist Party.

We held the first meeting of the cell at the house of Beauty Magote. We discussed the African National Congress and the Com-

munist Party. The main program was the reorganization of the party and the African National Congress.

Toward the end of May 1964 and about a week before Dan Tloome left the country, I was summoned to his office. Dan Tloome informed me that I had been co-opted to the central committee of the Communist Party, as he was about to flee the country.

Dan told me that I would have to take over the finances in his absence. He told me also who my contacts were. He said I would be informed as to the origin of such funds by the central committee.

During June 1964, I was approached by Mike Dingaka, who said that I would be met by an Indian called Mack. I would find Mack seated on a certain day in the Kapitan Cafe in Kort Street, Johannesburg. I was to approach this Indian by saying, "Are you Mack?" And when he said "yes," I would introduce myself as Arthur.

I carried out instructions as outlined above on the prearranged day, and there I met Mack for the first time. Mack informed me that a meeting of the Communist Party would take place on a Saturday soon thereafter. Mack said that he would pick me up in his car for this meeting.

On the Saturday morning in question, Mack collected me and took me to a block of flats in Berea. In the flat which Mack indicated, I found Hilda Bernstein and Ivan Schermbrucker. Mack then joined us. Later in the morning, Abraham Fischer joined us and took the chair.

Among other matters, we discussed my position as treasurer. I was told that Mack was to be my contact and that whenever I needed cash, Mack would obtain it from Piet Beyleveld and Ivan Schermbrucker. Mack and I were to meet once a week to check up and to find out if there were any emergencies.

Second, we discussed the position of the African National Congress. I was not in possession of all the facts and the issue was left over for the next meeting.

Next, we discussed the position of Mack. He was asked whether he had severed all his connections with all other committees, including the Umkonto. This, however, included the district committee of the South African Communist Party, of which Mack was a member. Mack reported that he had not as yet finalized his association with such other committees and was still tied up to the Umkonto group. He was instructed to finalize these issues.

Next, we discussed the code system which would be handled by Hilda Bernstein. She explained that she had written to an address in London. All correspondence for any other center beyond the borders of the Republic were sent directly to London, from where it was readdressed to the persons and places intended. This London address——

Senator DENTON. Mr. Hlapane, excuse me, sir. You are the most experienced witness we have in the ANC and in the South African Communist Party.

Since we have your full prepared statement, which has been distributed, and since we are short on time, I would ask your permission to proceed to the questions, with the understanding that your entire statement will be included in the record.

Would you agree to that, sir?

Mr. HLAPANE. I have no objection, sir.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

You have presented us with a remarkable narrative of your involvement in politics, of your experience and participation in the African National Congress, and of your experience and membership in the South African Communist Party.

You were a high official; you were involved as an individual in some of the most important events in the modern history of South Africa, indeed of Africa and, to a degree, of the entire world. So, I would like to ask you some questions in order to draw further from that valuable experience.

Would you please tell us why you decided to leave the ANC and the South African Communist Party?

Mr. HLAPANE. I decided to part with the African National Congress and the Communist Party, first, as a result of their treatment of my family. Every time I got locked up, promises that were made to my family were never fulfilled; promises that were made to all the people that were locked up in jail were never fulfilled.

Many men were locked up; women and children were starving. All the promises that had been made that they would provide food for them were never fulfilled. And those who had been arrested, we promised to pay for them in jail or even to defend them. Those promises were never fulfilled.

I personally found that the Communists were dishonest and most of them had run out of the country and left us in this mess. And the families of many people who were never released came to my house and demanded now to get food and help from me. I was left with this baby in my hands and I did not know where to turn to.

I discovered that the African National Congress policy had now been changed. Now, the Umkonto We Sizwe was brought into the picture; that was not the original policy of the African National Congress. I joined this organization under the understanding that whatever we are doing, we are going to achieve democratic rights by peaceful means, but we were now changing to violence and we intended now overthrowing the state of the Republic of South Africa: That was not the original aim.

And when people like Chief Luthuli pulled out in 1961 and said, "Now that you are entering in violence"—1961 was when Umkonto We Sizwe was formed—I felt that we no longer followed, really, what we told the people of South Africa.

And I started thinking about all the presidents of the African National Congress. I can name them: Reverend Tansi, Dr. Moroka, and Chief Luthuli; none of them ever supported a policy of violence.

And these are the matters that came to me strongly when I kept on going into jail and finding that the Communists were dishonest and they misled us. And to come to the rescue of many people, I decided to pull out and openly cooperate with the police, because innocent people were being arrested and did not know that the Communist Party had, in fact, captured the leadership of the African National Congress. And the African National Congress could not do what they wanted, except to get permission from the Communist Party.

Those are some of the things that influenced me to pull out of it.

Senator DENTON. That is not only an informative answer but, if I may say so, sir, a very statesman-like answer. I am very happy for the free world that you are no longer on the side of those who would undo it.

You have been given a list of the members of the National Executive Committee of ANC. Please look at that list and tell us if you see any names of people whom you know or who you believe to be members of the South African Communist Party.[1]

Mr. HLAPANE. May I understand the question clearly, sir?

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Mr. HLAPANE. Would you like me to mention names of people I know here, or only those of the Communist Party.

Senator DENTON. Those whom you know to be members.

Mr. HLAPANE. For instance, we have Oliver Tambo there right on top. I know him, but I do not know him as a Communist.

Senator DENTON. Yes; those whom you know to be members of the Communist Party.

Mr. HLAPANE. Dan Tloome.

Senator DENTON. Dan Tloome.

Mr. HLAPANE. Josiah Jele, Joe Slovo, Reginald September, Thabo Mbeki, Stephen Dlamini, John Nkadimeng. I think that is all, sir.

Senator DENTON. Who was the one, sir, after John Nkadimeng? Did you mention another name after him?

Mr. HLAPANE. I beg your pardon?

Senator DENTON. John Nkadimeng is the last one you mentioned as a Communist, or did you mention one more?

Mr. HLAPANE. John Nkadimeng.

Senator DENTON. That is the last one you mentioned?

Mr. HLAPANE. Yes, that is the last one I mentioned.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir; thank you. Seven out of 22; one-third of the National Executive Committee are known Communists.

As you have pointed out, the aims of the African National Congress were originally peaceful. As you stated, the aims were to achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means.

What were the aims and objectives of the South African Communist Party?

Mr. HLAPANE. The short-term policy of the South African Communist Party was to achieve democratic rights for the African people, like all other organizations, which was the first step. The second step was to go forward and establish a socialist state; that is the long-term policy.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir. That is consistent with all of the testimony we have previously received. The short-term stage is liberalization in the sense that the ANC wanted it, but by violent means; then, the second stage is clearly the establishment of a socialist state.

In your opinion, does the ANC, as it is presently composed and operating, represent the will of the people of South Africa?

Mr. HLAPANE. I would not say so at the present moment. There was a stage when the African National Congress represented the feelings of the people of South Africa, the blacks.

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[1] The chart Mr. Hlapane was given appears on p. 34 of the March 22, 1982, hearing record.

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Mr. HLAPANE. That was before it was banned; that was before it embarked on the policy of violence. That was at the stage when the people even in the countryside, some of them—the chiefs, and so on—supported the policy of the African National Congress.

For instance, the coming of Chief Luthuli to become the president of the African National Congress does show the interest that the people in the countryside had in the policy of the African National Congress.

But I think a parting of the ways started when the Communist Party applied pressure on the leadership of the African National Congress to embark on a violent policy. We can now go further and say their position in South Africa is now different from what it used to be.

You have what we call these separate developments. That was the intention of the South African government, though I do not really say I agree with that. But they have done something, and whether we like it or not, the situation is there.

They have got this separate development, you know; they have got each tribal group in a position. For example, you take the Transkei, you take Bophuthatswana, you take Zululand, and you take other tribal groups—Basotho, and so on. They placed them in their own areas where they say, "Well, you can make laws to govern yourselves and you can do this for yourselves, and your own people control you," and so on. "We have the whites out of you," and so on.

And the chiefs have taken this up, and I can assure you, you will find it difficult if you go to South Africa today to try and say that the Prime Minister of South Africa is wrong by so doing. Some people may find it, you know, wrong to divide South Africa into portions and call them states.

I agree with them to some extent, but it is there. What do you do? These people now support the government of South Africa. In fact, if I may call upon my friend, Mr. Tambo, to go back to South Africa and try and say that he is a member of the African National Congress and he will be sending the ANC and doing away with all these legal things—say, for instance, "Now, Matanzima (phonetic), you do away with this nonsense; we want you to fall under the African National Congress." He would be killed on the spot.

I think that is the situation we are facing in South Africa, and, as a result, one would definitely say that the African National Congress today has not much support amongst the black people of South Africa.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. I will ask you a question now from Senator East, who is another member of this subcommittee.

You have mentioned Joe Slovo as one of those who is a communist. Did you know Joe Slovo's wife?

Mr. HLAPANE. I know his wife, Ruth Slovo, her maiden name being Ruth First.

Senator DENTON. Her maiden name is Ruth what?

Mr. HLAPANE. First, F-i-r-s-t.

Senator DENTON. Ruth First?

Mr. HLAPANE. That is right. She is the daughter of Mr. First, who owned a carpentry factory in an area called Industria in Johannesburg; that is what her father owned.

Senator DENTON. Would you describe what you know of her activities in the South African Communist Party?

Mr. HLAPANE. I know her to have been a member of the Communist Party, and she was a reporter for a newspaper of the Communist Party, called Advance, and I think it was called New Age later when it was finally banned.

Senator DENTON. Under the original constitution of the ANC, were the members permitted to resign?

Mr. HLAPANE. You were allowed to resign as you wished.

Senator DENTON. Why and how was Umkonto We Sizwe formed?

Mr. HLAPANE. I do not follow you.

Senator DENTON. The organization Umkonto We Sizwe—I think you have already established that that was formed by the ANC and SACP only. Is that correct?

Mr. HLAPANE. That is correct.

Senator DENTON. Did all funds for that organization—"the Spear for the Nation," in English—did all funds for it reach the movement through the South African Communist Party? Did they receive all their funds from the South African Communist Party?

Mr. HLAPANE. They received all their funds from the Communist Party of South Africa.

Senator DENTON. Is there anything that you have not stated about the purposes of Umkonto We Sizwe that you would like to express now?

Mr. HLAPANE. I do not have anything at the moment.

Senator DENTON. What was the Freedom Charter, and what role did Joe Slovo play in its creation?

Mr. HLAPANE. The Freedom Charter is a document adopted at a conference held in Kliptown by the Congress Alliance. Let me go further to explain that it consisted of organizations such as the African National Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, Colored People's Organization, and the Indian Congress.

It is a document that I came to know about just having been drafted by Joe Slovo at the request of the central committee, and finally approved by the central committee of the Communist Party and sent down as a document that embodied all the demands of the people, as they were collected from all areas. It was placed before them for adoption, and finally it was adopted there.

Senator DENTON. In your written statement, which has been submitted for the record but which you did not reach in your verbal testimony, you say that when you were treasurer of the South African Communist Party, you had to pay large sums of money each month to Bri-Bri, Tiny Nokwe and Mike Dingaka. What were these funds for?

Mr. HLAPANE. I think it would be correct to say these were sort of departments that I dealt with. Bri-Bri was responsible for Umkonto We Sizwe, and to carry out his work he needed money for all the activities of Umkonto We Sizwe—for transport, paying out functionaries, and other matters. The same applies to the others.

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Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. Have any threats or promises been made to you by anyone with respect to your testimony before this subcommittee?

Mr. HLAPANE. I had no promises made to me.

Senator DENTON. How about threats?

Mr. HLAPANE. I beg your pardon?

Senator DENTON. Any threats made to you?

Mr. HLAPANE. No threats at all. I am doing this freely.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. We have a series of documents supporting your testimony which we will include in the record—the constitution of the ANC adopted in January 1958 and chapter 15 of the book "An African Explains Apartheid," by Jordan K. Kgubane, which is entitled "African Nationalism Sabotaged." Mr. Ngubane explains clearly, as you did, how the SACP gained control of the ANC. The final document is the "Constitution and Rules" of the SACP which was originally adopted in 1921.

I thank you again. You could give me lessons in the English language, as well as in international relations and many other fields. I express my admiration for you, Mr. Hlapane, and I wish you a long, healthful and successful life.

Mr. HLAPANE. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hlapane follows:] [1]

Prepared Statement of Bartholomew Hlapane

I was born on the 24th August, 1918 in the Ficksburg district of the Orange Free State, South Africa. I completed ten years of schooling and received my Standard Eight certificate.

I became interested in politics in 1948, and joined the African National Congress (ANC) as an ordinary branch member. In 1952 I was appointed the branch secretary of the Jabavu branch of the ANC and in 1955 I was elected an ordinary member of the Transvaal Executive Committee, at the same time being appointed as organizer of the Eastern Transvaal and East Rand regions of the ANC. I served in this position until 1959.

The ANC's aims and objects were to achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means, and the organisation's structure is as follows:

The lowest organ of the organization is a branch, above which are regional committees, provincial committees and at the top control is exercised by the National Executive Committee.

The National Executive decided on matters of policy and instructed its organs to carry them out. Members of the ANC were recruited and given membership cards and any African who wanted to join the ANC was allowed to do so.

During 1960 the A.N.C. was banned and a State of Emergency was declared by the S.A. Government. Almost all the members of the National Executive of the A.N.C. were detained. The only exception was Moses Kotane.

I was not detained.

I was then appointed to the National Executive of the A.N.C. together with Moses Kotane, Ruth Matswane, Gordon Magote and a woman by the name of Sebeko.

Moses Kotane, Ruth Matswane and myself also constituted the National Secretariat of the A.N.C.

The abovementioned committee functioned only up to the end of the emergency.

When the emergency ended the old National Executive took over. A formal meeting of the National Executive was held and the new committee handed over to the old committee.

MOSES KOTANE, J.B. MARKS, DUMA NOKWE, DAN TLOOME AND WALTER SISULU WERE ALL MEMBERS OF THE OLD COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK OVER FROM US AND WHO HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER THE A.N.C. HAD TO GO UNDERGROUND AND IF THE ACTIVITIES HAD TO CONTINUE OR NOT.

SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE A.N.C. WOULD CONTINUE ITS ACTIVITIES UNDERGROUND.

I WAS THEN APPOINTED TO THE JOHANNESBURG REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE A.N.C. TOGETHER WITH ANDREW MLANGENE, PHILEMON MATOLE, ABEL MTEMBU, JOHN MOTSHABI, TOM NKOBI, ALFRED NZO, STEPHEN SEGALE AND DAVID MAHOPO.

A MEETING CONSISTING OF DELEGATES OF THE A.N.C. , THE COMMUNIST PARTY, CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS AND THE INDIAN CONGRESS WAS HELD IN JOHANNESBURG DURING THE FIRST PART OF 1961 TO DISCUSS THE FORMATION OF UMKONTO WE SIZWE, THE MILITARY WING OF THE ANC.

I DID NOT ATTEND THIS MEETING BUT LEARNT AFTER THE MEETING THAT THERE WAS SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT AMONGST THE DELEGATES AND THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

SHORTLY AFTER THIS MEETING UMKONTO WE SIZWE WAS FORMED, AT THE SOLE DECISION OF THE A.N.C. AND THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY.

IN 1955 I WAS RECRUITED BY JOE SLOVO AND BECAME A MEMBER OF THE SA COMMUNIST PARTY. SLOVO WAS MY TUTOR AND TAUGHT ME THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNISM, AND LATER I WAS PLACED IN A CELL OF THE JABAVU BRANCH OF THE SACP, WHICH AT THAT TIME HAD ALREADY BEEN PROSCRIBED AND WAS OPERATING ILLEGALLY.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SACP WAS AS FOLLOWS:

THE LOWEST ORGAN OF THE ORGANIZATION WAS A CELL, THEN A BRANCH A DISTRICT COMMITTEE AND EVENTUALLY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. A CELL IS AN ORGAN FUNCTIONING IN AN AREA AND COMPOSED OF NOT LESS THAN THREE OR MORE THAN FIVE MEMBERS. ITS MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO WORK AMONGST MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE UNIONS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THEIR MEMBERS TO ADVANCE THE AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

THE FUNCTIONS OF A BRANCH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WERE TO CO-ORDINATE THE FUNCTIONS OF VARIOUS CELLS AND REPORT TO THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE WHICH IN TURN WAS IN CHARGE OF THE PROVINCE.

AT THE BEGINNING I WAS ONLY AN ORDINARY MEMBER OF A CELL CONSISTING OF 5 MEMBERS, ONE OF THESE BEING OUR CONTACT WITH THE BRANCH COMMITTEE, THROUGH WHOM WE GOT INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO ORGANIZE AND

DIRECT THE ANC AND TO RECRUIT MEMBERS FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IT IS A STANDING RULE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SACP MUST ALSO BELONG TO A MASS ORGANISATION, SUCH AS THE ANC OR THE SA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS. THE IDEA WAS TO GET MEMBERS TO INFILTRATE ANY ORGANISATION DESCRIBED AS REACTIONARY, TO UNDERMINE THE LEADERSHIP AND ULTIMATE GAIN CONTROL OF SUCH ORGANISATIONS.

BETWEEN 1955 AND EARLY IN 1960 I BELONGED TO VARIOUS CELLS OF THE SACP BECAUSE OF REORGANIZATION WITHIN THE PARTY, AND DURING THIS PERIOD I WAS CO-OPTED INTO THE BRANCH COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN OCTOBER 1961 I WAS CO-OPTED INTO THE JOHANNESBURG DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF THE SACP, AND AT THE SAME TIME WAS APPOINTED A FULL-TIME FUNCTIONARY, I.E. ORGANIZING SECRETARY, WITH A FIXED SALARY AND GIVEN A CAR. ALL THE ORGANS OF THE SACP FALLING UNDER THE JOHANNESBURG DISTRICT COMMITTEE WERE UNDER MY CONTROL.

THE FOLLOWING PERSONS SERVED WITH ME ON THE DISTRICT COMMITEE:

BOV HEPPLE
BEN TUROK
ESTHER BARSEL
ANDREW KUNENE
AHMED KATHRADA ; AND
JOE SLOVO

THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE WERE:

(A) TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IN TURN TO CONVEY THEM TO THE LOWER ORGANS OF THE SACP.

(B) TO RECEIVE REPORTS FROM LOWER ORGANS, DISCUSS THEM, MAKE DECISIONS, AND INSTRUCT THE LOWER ORGANS AS TO WHAT ACTION TO TAKE.

(C) TO SUPERVISE THE BRANCH COMMITTEES AND CELLS. AT THIS STAGE JOE SLOVO WAS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP AND WAS OUR CONTACT WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE ANC WAS PROSCRIBED DURING 1960 AND IT DECIDED TO GO UNDERGROUND. WE THEN FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO OPERATE AS AN ORGANIZATION ON ITS OWN, AND HAD DIFFICULTY IN GETTING PEOPLE WHO COULD BE EMPLOYED AS FULL-TIME ORGANIZERS AND HAVE OFFICES THAT WERE NOT KNOWN TO THE POLICE. MOST OF THE LEADING MEMBERS HAD ALSO GONE UNDERGROUND AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ORDINARY ANC MEMBERS.

AFTER BEING CO-OPTED INTO THE JOHANNESBURG DISTRICT OF THE SACP I BECAME A LINK BETWEEN THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE ANC AND THE TRANSVAAL EXECUTIVE OF THE ANC.

I WAS ALSO PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE AFRICAN AREA COMMITTEE OF THE SACP JOHANNESBURG DISTRICT COMMITTEE. ANDREW KUMENE AND JOHN MOTSABI SERVED WITH ME ON THIS AREA COMMITTEE. THE VARIOUS AREA COMMITTEES WERE :

THE AFRICAN AREA COMMITTEE
THE TRADE UNIONS AREA COMMITTEE
THE INDIAN AREA COMMITTEE
THE EUROPEAN AREA COMMITTEE

THE ABOVE AREA COMMITTEES WERE IN TURN RESPONSIBLE TO THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY AND THEY WERE SIMILARLY DIRECTED BY THE SAID DISTRICT COMMITTEE.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THESE AREA COMMITTEES WERE MAINLY THE FOLLOWING:

(A) TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE

(B) TO SUPERVISE THE CELLS OR UNITS.

(C) OTHER ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS.

AT THE SAME TIME I SERVED IN THE SECRETARIAT OF THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE, WITH

BOB HEPPLE
BEN TUROK
AHMED KATHRADA

KATHRADA WAS IN CHARGE OF THE INDIAN AREA COMMITTEE
BOB HEPPLE WAS IN CHARGE OF THE TRADE UNIONS AREA COMMITTEE
BEN TUROK WAS IN CHARGE OF THE EUROPEAN AREA COMMITTEE

I WAS IN CHARGE OF THE AFRICAN AREA COMMITTEE.

JOE SLOVO WAS REPRESENTING THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY.

AT THIS STAGE, 1961, BEN TUROK HANDLED THE PARTY'S FINANCES. THE FINANCES FOR PARTY PURPOSES WERE DERIVED FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:

(A) ADVANCES BY THE SOVIET UNION.
(B) ADVANCES BY COMMUNIST CHINA
(C) BY WAY OF SUBSCRIPTIONS BY ORDINARY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY.
(D) ADVANCES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ENGLAND.

FINANCES WERE MAINLY USED FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:

(A) PAYING OF SALARIES TO ALL ORGANISERS AND OTHER PAID OFFICIALS
(B) PRINTING AND PROPAGANDA MATTERS

(C) PURCHASING OF LITERATURE FROM OVERSEAS
(D) TRANSPORT
(E) TO ASSIST OTHER ORGANISATIONS, SUCH AS A.N.C., S.A.C.T.U., CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS AND THE INDIAN CONGRESS AND ALSO FOR THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN WOMEN
(F) TO PAY FOR THE DEFENCE OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR OFFENCES UNDER TH SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM ACT AND THE LIKE OFFENCES.

THE DEFENCE AND AID FUND WHICH AT THIS JUNCTION ALREADY EXISTED, WAS EXTENSIVELY USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY. IN TURN, CASH ADVANCES TOWARDS THE FUND WERE MADE BY THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY.

I WAS CO-OPTED ONTO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP TOWARDS THE END OF 1962, AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SACP ATTENDED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS, AMONG OTHERS:

MOSES KOTANE	AHMED KATHRADA	WALTER SISULU
M P NAIKER	GOVAN MBEKI	JOE SLOVO
JOE MATTHEWS	MICHAEL HARMEL	DAN TLOOME
RUTH SLOVO	DUMA NOKWE	RUSTY AND HILDA BERNSTEIN
J B MARKS	BOB HEPPLE	STEPHEN DLAMINI
FRED CARNESON	BILLY NAIR	MARK SHOPE

ALL THE AFRICANS WERE MEMBERS OF THE ANC AND MOST OF THEM WERE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ANC AND IN THIS WAY THE S A COMMUNIST PARTY WAS ABLE TO INFLUENCE AND CONTROL THE ANC.

TWO RESOLUTIONS WERE PASSED AT THIS NATIONAL CONFERENCE CONCERNING:

(A) THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS WAS DISTRIBUTED IN PAMPHLET FORM.
(B) PLANS TO ORGANISE AND STEP UP THE ACTIVITIES OF UMKONTO WE SIZWE IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT WE WERE EMBARKING ON THE SECOND PHASE. JOE SLOVO REPRESENTED UMKONTO WE SIZWE AT THIS NATIONAL CONFERENCE.

SHORTLY AFTER THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE, I ATTENDED MY FIRST MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY. THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS WERE PRESENT:

MOSES KOTANE
DUMA NOKWE
J.B. MARKS
WALTER SISULU
JOE SLOVO

RUSTY BERNSTEIN
BOB HEPPLE
MICHAEL HARMEL
ABRAHM FISCHER
RUTH SLOVO
BARTHOLOMEW HLAPANE

NOT LONG AFTER THIS MEETING, MOSES KOTANE WAS PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE AND WE DECIDED THAT HE OUGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. HE WENT FIRST TO BECHUANALAND, THEN ON TO DAR-ES-SALAAM.

DURING MAY 1963 JOE SLOVO AND J.B. MARKS ALSO LEFT SOUTH AFRICA ON THE ADVICE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. WE DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD BE BASED IN LONDON FROM WHERE THEY WOULD CONTACT ORGANISATIONS SYMPATHETIC TO THE ANC CAUSE, GIVE PROMINENCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ANC AND UMKONTO WE SIZWE AND THUS FURTHER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FREEDOM CAUSE.

I WAS DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE ON 24 JUNE 1963 AND RELEASED ON 13 DECEMBER 1963. DURING MY DETENTION ON 11 JULY 1963 THE POLICE RAIDED "LILLIESLEAF", A SMALLHOLDING AT RIVONIA, AND ARRESTED THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF UMKONTO WE SIZWE. THESE ARRESTS LED TO THE SO-CALLED "RIVONIA TRIAL" AFTER MY RELEASE BY THE POLICE I WAS SUSPENDED FROM BOTH THE ANC AND THE S A COMMUNIST PARTY UNTIL APRIL 1964. THIS WAS STANDARD PRACTICE IN BOTH MOVEMENTS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED HAD NOT PERHAPS DECIDED TO BECOME AN INFORMER WHILE IN DETENTION.

SHORTLY BEFORE CHRISTMAS IN 1963 I WAS, HOWEVER, TOLD BY DAN TLOOME TO MEET HILDA BERNSTEIN AT THE OFFICES OF THE DEFENCE AND AID FUND IN KERK STREET, JOHANNESBURG.

I KEPT THIS APPOINTMENT AND MET HILDA BERNSTEIN. SHE GRILLED ME FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS ON THE QUESTIONS PUT TO ME BY THE POLICE, WHILE UNDER DETENTION AND THE ANSWERS I GAVE TO THEM. SHE DID NOT INTIMATE TO ME WHETHER SHE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE ANSWERS I GAVE HER OR NOT.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS SUSPICION AGAINST ME FOR HAVING DISCLOSED THE WHEREABOUTS OR EXISTENCE OF RIVONIA AND I ATTRIBUTE BY LONG SUSPENSION TO THIS.

DURING MARCH, 1964, I WAS APPROACHED BY GABULA MAHLASELA. HE INFORMED ME THAT DUE TO OTHER DUTIES WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOSED UPON HIM, HE COULD NO LONGER CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES ON THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE A.N.C. AND HE NOMINATED ME TO REPLACE HIM ON THIS COMMITTEE.

BEFORE MAHLASELA COULD HOWEVER INTRODUCE ME TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE, HE WAS DETAINED AND I WAS ONCE AGAIN LEFT VERY MUCH IN THE DARK.

EARLY IN APRIL, 1964, I WAS APPROACHED BY MIKE DINGAKA. HE INFORMED ME THAT I WAS TO ACT ON THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE A.N.C. AS INFORMED BY MAHLASELA, PRIOR TO HIS ARREST. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO REPORT AT THE HOUSE OF LETOOANE IN WESTCLIFF EXTENSION ON A GIVEN EVENING TO MEET THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE. SOON THEREAFTER I WENT TO LETOOANE'S HOUSE AS INSTRUCTED.

THERE I MET THE MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE, WHO WERE THE FOLLOWING:

LETOOANE
JERRY JOE
MOLEFE
NKOSI BOVU
SHUMO
MOHALE

AT THIS MEETING, ONLY ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED.

I ACTED ON THIS REGIONAL COMMITTEE IN A SUPERVISORY CAPACITY AND DID NOT REPRESENT AN AREA.

AT THESE AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE WE DISCUSSED THE PROGRAMME OF THE ANC IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND MEANS OF EFFECTIVELY REORGANIZING IT. SOON THEREAFTER AS PART OF THE REORGANISATION, I WAS CO-OPTED ONTO THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ANC WHERE I SERVED WITH MIKE DINGAKA, LEVY SOLORO, NKONYANA AND MIKE NGOBENI.

AT THIS STAGE DAN TLOOME AND ALFRED NZO HAD LEFT THE REPUBLIC. DAN TLOOME HAD BEEN SENT TO NORTHERN RHODESIA IN AN EFFORT TO ORGANISE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW HEADQUARTERS FOR THE A.N.C.

AS IT WAS FELT THAT THE TIME HAD ARRIVED TO MOVE THE ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS TO A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOUR STATE. WHEN THIS SCHEME BECAME KNOWN BEYOND THE BORDERS OF OUR COUNTRY, IT WAS CRITICISED AND TURNED DOWN AS IMPRACTICAL AND UNDESIRABLE, AS IT WAS FELT TO BE CREATING THE IMPRESSION OF A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.

THIS ISSUE WAS FINALISED BY WAY OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM OVERSEAS AND THE LUSAKA PROSPECT OF NEW HEADQUARTERS WAS ABANDONED.

ALFRED NZO WAS A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE ANC BUT BECAUSE OF HARDSHIPS WHICH HE HAD SUFFERED, IT WAS FELT THAT HE HAD TAKEN MUCH PUNISHMENT AND THAT HE SHOULD LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA.

BRI-BRI (WILSON MAKWAI) WAS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR DEPARTURES, AS HE WAS HANDLING ALL SUCH MATTERS, BECAUSE HE HAD THE NECESSARY PILOTS AND CONTACTS WHICH MINIMISED THE RISKS PERTAINING TO THE ORGANISING OF ESCAPES TO BECHUANALAND. BOTH DAN TLOOME AND ALFRED NZO ARE STILL OUTSIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND I UNDERSTAND THAT NZO IS NOW SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ANC AND TLOOME DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL.

SINCE THE RIVONIA TRIAL THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE ANC HAD GIVEN BRI-BRI A FREE HAND IN ALL MATTERS CONCERNING UMKONTO WE SIZWE WHICH HAD BY THEN BECOME A FULLY INDEPENDENT ORGANISATION. THIS DECISION, TO MY MIND, WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COULD NOT MEET AS A UNIT, FOR THE DETENTION OF MEMBERS AND IN SOME CASES THE FREEING OF OTHERS. SINCE RIVONIA, THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE HAD GIVEN NO DIRECTIVES AS TO WHAT TAPGETS TO BE ATTACKED BY UMKONTO WE SIZWE.

I WAS DETAINED BY THE POLICE AGAIN ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1964, NOT LONG AFTER MY COOPTION ONTO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ANC ON WHICH I SERVED WITH BRI-BRI (WILTON MAKWAI) MIKE DINGAKA, GABULA MAHLASELA.

DURING THE FIVE MONTHS BETWEEN APRIL 1964 AND MY DETENTION ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1964, I WAS ALSO BROUGHT BACK INTO THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY.

IN APRIL I WAS APPROACHED BY MIKE DINGAKA AND INFORMED THAT THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD DECIDED THAT I SHOULD SERVE ON THE AFRICA AREA COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY. I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY MIKE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN AREA COMMITTEE, WHICH CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

MYSELF
MIKE DINGAKA
JOSIAH JELE
RASEMETSI

WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS MATTERS CONCERNED WITH THE A.N.C. AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IT WAS DECIDED THAT I WOULD ALSO BE DRAFTED INTO AN AFRICAN CELL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE NAMES OF THE OTHER CELL MEMBERS WERE:

LEVY SELORO
BEAUTY MAGOTE
GORDON MAGOTE
EUPHIMIA HLAPANE
LOABILE

WE HELD THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CELL AT THE HOUSE OF BEAUTY MAGOTE. WE DISCUSSED THE A.N.C. AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE MAIN PROGRAMME WAS THE REORGANISATION OF THE PARTY AND THE ANC

TOWARDS THE END OF MAY, 1964, AND ABOUT A WEEK BEFORE DAN TLOOME LEFT THE COUNTRY, I WAS SUMMONED TO HIS OFFICE.

DAN TLOOME INFORMED ME THAT I HAD BEEN CO-OPTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AS HE WAS ABOUT TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.

DAN TOLD ME THAT I WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OVER THE FINANCES IN HIS ABSENCE. HE TOLD ME ALSO WHO MY CONTACTS WERE. HE SAID I WOULD BE INFORMED AS TO THE ORIGIN OF SUCH FUNDS BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I HAD TO PAY R1,270,00 TO BRI-BRI MONTHLY, R600.00 TO TINY NOKWE (WIFE OF DUKA NOKWE), R400.00 TO MIKE DINGAKA, R160,00 TO MYSELF, WHICH INCLUDED SALARY AND TRAVELLING EXPENSES AND A BALANCE FOR EMERGENCY USES. SHOULD FURTHER MONIES BE REQUIRED I WOULD BE TOLD AT THE MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HOW IT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. DAN TLOOME GAVE ME R600.00 AS PART DEPOSIT TO PURCHASE A CAR FOR USE BY ME. HE THEN ARRANGED FOR ME TO MEET HIM ON THE CORNER OF KERK AND RISSIK STREETS, JOHANNESBURG ON A CERTAIN AFTERNOON AT 3 P.M. FROM WHERE HE WOULD TAKE ME TO THE PLACE WHERE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING WOULD BE HELD.

DAN TLOOME HOWEVER FAILED TO KEEP THE APPOINTMENT AND WHEN I SAW HIM LATER HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PROPOSED PLACE WAS TIPPED OFF. DAN TLOOME TOLD ME THAT I WOULD BE APPROACHED FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. NO NAME OF ANY CONTACT IN THIS CONNECTION WAS MENTIONED.

DURING JUNE, 1964, I WAS APPROACHED BY MIKE DINGAKA, WHO SAID THAT I WOULD BE MET BY AN INDIAN CALLED MACK. HE DESCRIBED MACK TO ME AS A PERSON WITH A TINY FACE, CHIN BEARD, SIMILAR TO THAT WORN BY GENERAL SMUTS. I WOULD FIND MACK SEATED ON A CERTAIN DAY IN THE KAPITAN CAFE IN KORT STREET, JOHANNESBURG. I WAS TO APPROACH THIS INDIAN BY SAYING : "ARE YOU MACK", AND WHEN HE SAYS, "YES", I WOULD INTRODUCE MYSELF AS ARTHUR.

I CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS AS OUTLINED ABOVE, ON THE PRE-ARRANGED DAY AND THERE I MET MACK FOR THE FIRST TIME. MACK INFORMED ME THAT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD TAKE PLACE ON A SATURDAY SOON THEREAFTER. MACK SAID THAT HE WOULD PICK ME UP IN HIS CAR FOR THIS MEETING.

ON THE SATURDAY MORNING IN QUESTION MACK COLLECTED ME AND TOOK ME TO A BLOCK OF FLATS IN BEREA. IN THE FLAT WHICH MACK INDICATED

I FOUND HILDA BERNSTEIN AND IVAN SCHERMBRUCKER. MACK THEN JOINED US. LATER IN THE MORNING ABRAHAM FISCHER JOINED US AND TOOK THE CHAIR.

AMONG OTHER MATTERS WE DISCUSSED:

(1) MY POSITION AS TREASURER. THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER DAN TLOOME HAD GIVEN ME THE NECESSARY INFORMATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS AND WHETHER I HAD THE NECESSARY CONTACTS WITH THE AFRICANS CONCERNED. AFTER THE COMMITTEE WAS SATISFIED I WAS TOLD THAT MACK WAS TO BE MY CONTACT AND THAT WHENEVER I NEEDED CASH, MACK WOULD OBTAIN IT FROM PIET BEYLEVELD AND IVAN SCHERMBRUCKER. MACK AND I WERE TO MEET ONCE WEEK TO CHECK UP AND TO FIND OUT IF THERE WERE ANY EMERGENCIES.

(2) THE POSITION OF THE A.N.C. I WAS NOT IN POSSESSION OF ALL THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE WAS LEFT OVER FOR THE NEXT MEETING.

(3) THE POSITION OF MACK. HE WAS ASKED WHETHER HE HAD SEVERED ALL HIS CONNECTIONS WITH ALL OTHER COMMITTEES INCLUDING THE UMKONTO. THIS HOWEVER INCLUDED THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY OF WHICH MACK WAS A MEMBER. MACK REPORTED THAT HE HAD NOT AS YET FINALISED HIS ASSOCIATION WITH SUCH OTHER COMMITTEES AND WAS STILL TIED UP TO THE UMKONTO GROUP. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO FINALISE THESE ISSUES.

(4) THE CODE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE HANDLED BY HILDA BERNSTEIN SHE EXPLAINED THAT SHE HAD WRITTEN TO AN ADDRESS IN LONDON. ALL CORRESPONDENCE FOR ANY OTHER CENTRE BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE REPUBLIC WERE SENT DIRECTLY TO LONDON, FROM WHERE IT WAS RE-ADRESSED TO THE PERSONS AND PLACES INTENDED. THIS LONDON ADDRESS WAS HOWEVER NOT MENTIONED AND WAS NEVER DISCLOSED.

NEW CODE BOOKS WERE THUS AWAITED FROM LONDON AND IN FACT A LETTER HAD ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED, WHICH COULD NOT BE DE-CODED, BECAUSE IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ON A NEW CODE BOOK. AS SOON AS THE NEW CODE BOOK ARRIVED IT WOULD BE PASSED ONTO MACK TOGETHER WITH A LETTER TO DECODE. LATER ON I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MACK FOR THE A.N.C. THIS CAME FROM DAR-ES-SALAAM, VIA LONDON. THIS LETTER WAS IN FACT ALREADY DE-CODED BY MACK. MACK GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEW CODE BOOK HAD NOW BEEN RECEIVED AND IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE WERE TWO CODE BOOKS. ONE FOR THE A.N.C. AND ONE FOR USE BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY. I MYSELF AM NOT IN A POSITION TO EXPLAIN THE CODE SYSTEM.

5. PROPAGANDA. IT WAS DECIDED THAT NO PAMPHLETS WERE TO COME

OUT UNDER THE NAME OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AS THE FREEDOM FIGHTER WHICH IS IN FACT A COVERT COMMUNIST BULLETIN, APPEARS TO BE SERVING THE DESIRED PURPOSE AND MACK HAD TO SEE THAT THIS BULLETIN WAS TO APPEAR REGULARLY ONCE A MONTH. PROPAGANDA DISCUSSIONS DID NOT COVER A FIELD BEYOND THE FREEDOM FIGHTER.

6. FINANCES: FUNDS WERE RUNNING LOW AND HILDA BERNSTEIN WAS INSTRUCTED TO WRITE TO LONDON TO APPEAL FOR FUNDS.

ABRAHAM FISCHER REPORTED THAT SOME R36,000.00 WAS WITH JOE MATTHEWS IN BASUTOLAND. I WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS IN FACT FUNDS SENT FOR THE PARTY TO HIM AND THAT HE THUSFAR FAILED TO PAY OVER ANYTHING. FISCHER SAID THAT ALL ATTEMPTS SOFAR MADE TO GET THIS MONEY HAD FAILED. HE LATER ON ADMITTED THAT R8,000.00 HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM JOE MATTHEWS IT WAS SAID THAT THE LATE MRS. MOLLY FISCHER HAD MADE VARIOUS TRIPS TO BLOEMFONTEIN IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN THIS MONEY.

TOWARDS THE END OF JULY, 1964, I WAS INFORMED THAT I MUST MEET ABRAHAM FISCHER AT THE SAME ADDRESS IN BEREA, AT 4 P.M. I KEPT THE APPOINTMENT AND MET ABRAHAM FISCHER AND ELI WEINBERG.

DISCUSSIONS CENTRED AROUND THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE A.N.C. AT THIS STAGE RUSTY BERNSTEIN AND HILDA BERNSTEIN HAD LEFT SOUTH AFRICA. I WAS IN A POSITION TO GIVE A DETAILED REPORT ON THE A.N.C. COVERING THE FOLLOWING FIELDS:

(A) THE WEAKNESSESS IN THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT, WHICH OBVIOUSLY WAS NO LONGER IN TOUCH WITH OTHER CENTRES EXCEPT JOHANNESBURG.

(B) THE REGIONAL COMMITTEES WHICH WERE QUITE UNABLE TO ASSIST IN RE-ORGANISING THE ORGANISATION.

(C) THE SET-UP OF THE ENTIRE ORGANISATION, WHICH COVERED THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT, THE REGIONAL COMMITTEES AND AREA COMMITTEES. THESE COMMITTEES IN MY OPINION WERE USELESSLY INADEQUATE AND NOTHING COULD SEEM TO BE DONE ABOUT THE SITUATION. MY REPORT ON THE A.N.C. NO DOUBT, WAS A DISTURBING REVELATION. THEY WERE CLEARLY SHOCKED AND IT WAS EVIDENT THAT DAN TLOOME HAD CONCEALED THIS DETERIORATING POSITION FROM THEM. FISCHER AND WEINBERG COULD OFFER NO SOLUTION, BUT SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULD MAKE EVERY ENDEAVOUR TO PULL THE POSITION STRAIGHT.

THIS MEETING WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR WAS THE LAST MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH I ATTENDED.

AFTER MACK WAS DETAINED IN JUNE 1964, I WAS CALLED UPON TO HANDLE

THE FINANCES DUE TO THE A.N.C. SECTION. TOWARDS THE END OF JULY, 1964, I OBTAINED FROM ABRAHAM FISCHER R4,900.00 IN CASH, WHICH WAS FOR WAGES, TRANSPORT EXPENSES AND FOR THE UMKONTO MOVEMENT. THIS MONEY WAS TO COVER ALL SUCH EXPENSES FOR JULY AND AUGUST, 1964.

FISCHER ASKED ME TO REQUEST TINY NOKWE TO COMPILE A LIST OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL PERSONS SHE PAID AND TO MAKE SAME AVAILABLE TO FISCHER. THIS ACTION SEEMED PROPER AS WE KNEW THAT TINY NOKWE WAS TO LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA BY THE END OF JULY. SHE ACTUALLY DID LEAVE THE REPUBLIC AT THE END OF JULY, 1964 IN THE COMPANY OF REGINA NZO, THE WIFE OF ALFRED NZO AND MIKE DINGAKA.

FISCHER WAS GOING TO ARRANGE THAT ALL THE PERSONS WHO WERE NORMALLY PAID BY TINY NOKWE WOULD BE PAID DIRECLTY FROM LONDON. THIS AGAIN WAS A SECURITY MEASURE, AS IT WAS FELT THAT I WAS NOT TO BE USED IN THIS CONNECTION, WHEREBY MY POSITION MIGHT BECOME KNOWN TO THE POLICE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE A.N.C. AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS WITH WHICH I WAS ASSOCIATED.

ISSY HAYMAN ALSO PASSED R2 450,00 TO ME AT THIS TIME WHICH HE SAID WAS FROM IVAN SCHERMBROCKER. THIS WAS FOR WAGES AND TRANSPORT FOR THE VARIOUS OFFICIALS OF THE A.N.C. AND UMKONTO WE SIZWE AND COMMUNIST PARTY. HE SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED ON TO ME R1,600.00 ALSO FROM IVAN SCHERMBRUCKER. THIS WAS FOR BRI-BRI AND HIS UMKONTO WE SIZWE COMMITMENTS. LATER ISSY HAYMAN GAVE ME A MESSAGE TO MEET IVAN SCHERMBRUCKER AT THE JOHANNESBURG MUNICIPAL MARKET. I KEPT THIS APPOINTMENT AND WAS MET BY IVAN SCHERMBRUCKER, WHO HANDED ME R400,00. THIS WAS CASH ADVANCED TO ME FOR EMERGENCY USES.

DURING THE PERIOD THAT I SERVED IN THE ANC AND THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY, NO MAJOR DECISION COULD BE TAKEN BY THE ANC WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE S.A. COMMUNIST PARTY. MOST MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS WERE IN FACT INITIATED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. AMONG EXAMPLES OF THIS, I WOULD CITE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) AT A MASS MEETING OF THE PEOPLE AT KLIPTOWN IN JUNE 1955 THE FREEDOM CHARTER WAS OFFICIALLY ADOPTED AS THE CHARTER OF THE CONGRESS ALLIANCE. THE CONGRESS ALLIANCE CONSISTED OF THE ANC, SA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS, COLOURED PEOPLES ORGANIZATION, CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS AND THE SA INDIAN CONGRESS. THE FREEDOM CHARTER WAS HOWEVER, DRAWN UP BY JOE SLOVO ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP, AND APPROVED BY THE SA COMMUNIST PARTY BEFORE IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE ANC AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS ALLIANCE.

(B) THE MILITARY WING OF THE ANC, ALSO KNOWN AS UMKONTO WE SIZWE,

WAS THE BRAINCHILD OF THE SACP AND AFTER THE DECISION TO CREATE IT HAD BEEN TAKEN, JOE SLOVO AND J B MARKS WERE SENT BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP TO MOSCOW TO ORGANIZE ARMS AND AMMUNITION AND TO RAISE FUNDS FOR UMKONTO WE SIZWE.

(C) JOE SLOVO WAS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP IN THE HIGH COMMAND OF UMKONTO WE SIZWE, AND WAS IN FACT ORIGINALLY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF UMKONTO WE SIZWE.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY ACTED INDEPENDENTLY OF MOSCOW ON THE OPERATIONS LEVEL, WHILE I WAS A MEMBER I.E. IT MADE ITS OWN DECISIONS AND DID NOT NEED TO GET APPROVAL FROM MOSCOW ON EACH DECISION. WHEN THE SPLIT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING OCCURRED, THE SACP DECIDED TO FOLLOW THE MOSCOW LINE. ALTHOUGH THE SACP WAS OPERATIONALLY INDEPENDENT, IT WAS, OF COURSE, INFLUENCED BY MOSCOW AND ALSO SUPPORTED FINANCIALLY, MATERIALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

Senator DENTON. This hearing stands in recess until Monday morning, March 29, 1982, at 10:15 a.m., when we will continue an examination of these issues. Witnesses for Monday will be Andrea Shipanga, chairman of the SWAPO Democratic Party in South West Africa/Namibia, and two witnesses who are former members of SWAPO.

The press conference mentioned earlier will take place immediately upon recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Monday, March 29, 1982.]

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A



MK IN ACTION

AS MASS POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO THE RACIST REGIME MOUNTS ARMED ACTIONS BY THE PEOPLE'S ARMY, UMKHONTO WE SIZWE HAVE ROCKED THE S.A. STATE. BELOW WE LIST SOME OF THE ACTIONS REPORTED DURING 1981.

January 26
Time-bomb explodes in warehouse belonging to government official near Durban

February 7
Bomb explodes outside Daily News building, Durban

April 21
Electricity substation near Durban attacked with explosives

May 6
Bomb explosion on railway line near Cottondale

May 19
Railway line near Port Elizabeth cut by explosion

May 25
Power lines cut near Vrede, Orange Free State

May 25
Railway line at New Canada cut by explosion

May 25
Railway line cut by explosion near Durban

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May 25
Police station at Fort Jackson near Mdantsane attacked

May 25
Police patrol attacked near Mdantsane

May 27
SADF Recruiting office in Durban attacked with bomb

June 6
Grenade explodes in home of Mdantsane security policeman

June 11
Durban-Empangeni rail-link cut by explosion

June 26
Monument destroyed by explosion in centre of Durban

June 28
Railway line between Felixton and Port Durnford (Natal) cut by explosion

July 3
Limpet mine found on oil storage tank in Alberton depot

July 21
3 Power stations in E. Transvaal sabotaged

July 26
2 Durban motor showrooms damaged by explosives

August 6
Bomb explodes in Port Elizabeth shopping area

August 11
Voortrekkerhoogte military base hit by rocket attack in Pretoria

EXHIBIT B


SECHABA
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national congress south africa
THE FIRES OF FREEDOM
1982 - 1 - 11

SECHABA

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LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM

Voice of the African National Congress and Umkhonto We Sizwe on:

Radio Madacascar —
shortwave 49 m band. 6135 KHz.
8-9pm daily.

Radio Lusaka —
shortwave 41 m band, 7.3 MgHz.
8.30-9am daily.

Radio Luanda —
shortwave, 40 & 30 m bands: medium wave 27.6 m band, 7.30pm daily.

Radio Tanzania —
shortwave, 19 m band, 15,435 KHz.
8.15pm Sunday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday; 31 m band, 6.15am Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday.

EDITORIAL

THE FIRES OF FREEDOM

It was at 11.40pm when many white residents were shocked, shaken from sleep, streamed from their homes and braved the biting cold in pyjamas and morning gowns to watch the red flames — billowing towers of flame and smoke rising high into the sky.

Sasol and Natreff staff, police, traffic officers and local commandos were called out to deal with the fires — a sea of flames, the fires of freedom, the most beautiful fire which symbolised the largest act of sabotage ever in South Africa. Fire engines with sirens screaming raced to the blazing tanks — 8 of them. At least 20 fire engines from Sasolburg and other towns in the Vaal Triangle and the Wiwatersrand were fighting the blaze.

Besides this confusion, there was another commotion: an intensive manhunt. The Chief of the South African CID, General Kobus Visser, took charge of it and Security Police officers aided his men and a Special Police Task Force moved into the Vaal Triangle. Roads in the vicinity of the two plants were closed and motorists had to use alternative routes. Even traffic policemen from nearby municipalities were roped in by the South African Police to seal off Sasolburg and the vicinity with road blocks.

At the House of Assembly there was chaos and pandemonium: the explosions caused a "rumpus".

The blaze turned night into day.

What caused so much anxiety, curiosity and nervousness?

We must remember the significance of oil for the South African industry and the military-industrial complex. The production of oil from coal is an expensive exercise. South Africa does not have oil resources. Oil imports, details of which are classified information were believed to amount to some 250,000 barrels a day (b/d) in 1978: almost 80% of the transport system depends on liquid fuel power and virtually all the regime's military machine. Shell, BP, Caltex, Mobil and other multinationals are involved.

There is the other aspect to this problem. The growing intensity of the struggle inside the country makes the enemy shiver. The sophistication of the attack, the selection of highly symbolic targets, the coordination of attacks at three different points almost simultaneously, the skill in execution contrast sharply and negates the whole philosophy of Apartheid namely that Africans "have slow thinking processes".

It is significant that this highly successful operation takes place at a time when South Africa is witnessing throughout the country an upsurge of boycott, involving thousands of black students, at schools, colleges and universities, supported by white university students, in protest against inferior education imposed on the black: when the super-exploited black workers in many parts of South Africa are engaged in strikes for higher wages and better working conditions; when there are demonstrations and marches by the clergy against the iniquities of the apartheid system as well as a nation-wide campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners.

It is in this context that the units of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC guerilla army attacked the oil production complex which fuels South Africa's terror machine.

The writing is on the wall and the South African racists can clearly read it. The two pronged offensive by SWAPO and the ANC is part of the build up towards the final assault on the last bastion of racism and colonial reaction on the African continent.

In successive policy statements the ANC has called on the people of South Africa to attack the colonial racist system on all fronts, while the international community is taking steps to isolate the regime politically, economically and in the field of sport.

The fires of freedom are burning furiously and inextinguishably inside the heartland of apartheid colonial domination.

In this Year of the Charter, the Year of the Workers, the African National Congress pledges to intensify the armed liberation struggle until final victory is attained.

1



EXHIBIT C

"An injury to one is an injury to all"

WORKERS UNITY

Organ of the South African Congress of Trade Unions

Issue No. 28 November 1981

70 years of struggle

SACTU extends warm fraternal greetings on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the African National Congress of South Africa. We pledge to play our part in continuing to strengthen the fighting alliance of our organisations and to make 1982 truly a year of unity in action.

We together, as the spear and the shield of the nation, pledge to organise and mobilise the workers and trade union movement as a whole in our common struggle for a free South Africa.

ZIMBABWEAN WORKERS PLEDGE SOLIDARITY

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) recently reaffirmed its solidarity with the continuing struggle of South Africa's workers.

In an August press release the General Secretary, Albert Muzaba, called upon "the workers of Zimbabwe individually and collectively to give every possible support to our struggling brothers and sisters in South Africa. The victory of the South African people over apartheid ... will mark the last phase of the enslavement of the African people by colonialists and settlers. The victory ... will be a glorious moment for all progressive forces the world over."

This principled call for an end to apartheid comes in spite of South African threats against Zimbabwe if it supports our struggle and its training of counter-insurgency forces and sabotage squads.

The founding congress of the ZCTU, February 28th, 1981, brought together over 50 unions in an historic step towards developing a united working class movement. SACTU welcomes the founding of the ZCTU and will work towards our unity in the struggle of the workers of South Africa and Zimbabwe.

FORWARD WITH THE COMMON STRUGGLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND ZIMBABWEAN WORKERS!

A LUTA CONTINUA

UNITY IN ACTION

[illegible] workers went on strike. Six days later Paulus Mahlangu was shot and killed. 18 Sigma workers from negotiating team were dismissed. The murder and repression of workers will not go unchallenged!

EXHIBIT D

RESISTER
Bulletin of the Committee on South African War Resistance
London · Oct–Nov 1981 · No 16
20p
1982 1 11
PRETORIA
ANGOLA: SOUTH AFRICA'S DESTRUCTION

MK STRIKES

Guerillas hit key targets

Guerillas of the liberation movement struck right at the heart of the apartheid war machine when they attacked the military headquarters at Voortrekkerhoogte near Pretoria in mid-August. But this is just one action among many - the authorities themselves have admitted at least 40 attacks on various strategic, military and symbolic targets in South Africa this year.

The rocket attack on Voortrekkerhoogte clearly showed that the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, is capable of swift, sophisticated and increasingly successful surprise attacks on key targets. The guerillas fired four 122mm rockets at the base from the nearby Indian township of Laudium and then in classic guerilla fashion, 'melted' into the surrounding densely-populated area. The military and police, obviously shaken, launched an immediate manhunt - the biggest ever - and imposed a news clampdown.

Police and soldiers set up roadblocks on all main and secondary roads in the Transvaal, and the large black townships around Pretoria and Johannesburg were sealed off.

The press were 'requested' not to mention that the attack was carried out by the ANC, and were shown only damage done to the servant's quarters of the home of a senior military officer. It is possible that military personnel were killed or injured in the attack - the deaths of two soldiers were announced in an undisclosed incident in 'the operational area' on the same day.

The Voortrekkerhoogte operation followed the sabotage some weeks earlier of two huge power stations in the Eastern Transvaal and an electrical substation near Pretoria. The co-ordinated attacks on Camden, Arnot and Middleburg power stations caused a partial blackout and damage estimated at several million rands. Again, extensive roadblocks and a massive police hunt failed to net the ANC soldiers responsible.

Other major guerilla operations in August and September have included:

- A lightening attack in early September on the Mabopane police station in Bophutatswana that left two policemen dead and caused extensive damage to the police station. Amid the general panic the press reported up to 40 guerillas involved; the numbers are now believed to be less than half-a-dozen. Once again police roadblocks and cordons failed and the guerillas disappeared into the crowded residential areas of Mabopane.

- The shooting of two Transkei security policemen, one believed to be a senior officer, in early August. This was followed by a police-guerilla shootout at a roadblock near Elliot in which two guerillas were killed and two policemen injured. Another three guerillas escaped, one of them was captured and a massive search for the other two was launched by the combined forces of the SA Air Force, the Transkei Police and the SA Police. They were finally cornered at a farm near Barkly East and killed in a fierce gunbattle.

- The blowing up of two motor car display rooms in central Durban. Both firms, Sigma and Leyland, are multinational companies that have recently been rocked by large strikes by the workforce triggered by dissatisfaction over wages.

It is clear that the ANC is starting to deploy its guerilla forces on a more widespread basis against carefully-chosen targets. The aim of the operations is partly to reinforce political struggles. The sabotage of the SASOL oil-from-coal installations last year, for instance, reinforced the demand for oil sanctions, the attack on the Leyland offices was designed to reinforce the strike by Leyland workers and bring attention to the role of the company in exploiting black labour in SA. To take another example, the ANC's journal 'Mayibuye', describing the massive united opposition to the apartheid Republic Day celebrations at the end of May, said:

'These mass actions were given added impetus by the effective, well co-ordinated, armed actions by the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe - actions which also demonstrated the unity in our struggle between mass political and armed resistance.'

The article went on to explain:

'The sabotage on railway lines in Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Durban and other areas gave concrete support to the stay-at-home, whilst the daring attack on the recruiting centre of the racist SADF strengthened the growing resistance of many white youth to forced conscription into the army of oppression, at a time when the democratic white youth were in action side-by-side with their black compatriots.'

The response of the apartheid regime to the increased military and political strength of the liberation movement has been to increase repression and issue dire warnings of the need to further militarise the apartheid laager.

There is growing evidence that the Botha-Malan regime has long since lost the political initiative and is responding to events with intensified repression and militarisation. To try and crush the spirit of resistance, apartheid courts are imposing severe sentences on ANC guerillas - including death.

On August 19, three young freedom fighters, Johannes Shabangu (26), David Moise (25) and Antony Tsotsobe (25) joined the Pretoria Three (Mashiya, Manana and Lubisi) in the death cells. They were sentenced for alleged involvement in the attacks on SASOL, Booysens Police Station and other targets - the charges included 'high treason'. After their arrest the three were brutally tortured by the police until they 'confessed'.

After sentence was passed, singing crowds blocked traffic outside the courtroom in Pretoria. The sentences were condemned by the SA Council of Churches, the UN Security Council expressed its 'concern', and the ANC called on the international community to campaign for the granting of Prisoner-of-War status to all captured freedom fighters.

The death sentences are a violation of the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of warfare, and a breach of international law. All six guerillas awaiting execution - the Pretoria Three as well as the so-called SASOL Three - are seen as heroes by the oppressed population of South Africa. It is crucial that their lives are saved if the situation is not to deteriorate to the point where the regime can simply order the secret execution of guerillas - as happened in Rhodesia under Smith. Captured ANC freedom fighters are entitled under international law to Prisoner-of-War status.

ACT NOW TO SAVE THE LIVES OF TSOTSOBE, MOISE AND SHABANGU. JOIN THE CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE LIVES OF THE PRETORIA THREE AND THE SASOL THREE. PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS NOW!

RESISTER and COSAWR (U.K.)

RESISTER is written and produced by the COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICAN WAR RESISTANCE (COSAWR) in Britain, and contributions are received from COSAWR in the Netherlands. It is aimed mainly at those South Africans who are in exile as a result of their resistance to the South African military. It is also produced for the many people and organisations in Britain and throughout the world who are participating in the international campaign against apartheid.

COSAWR(UK) was formed in London in December 1978, and consists of exiled South African war resiters who have been active in many spheres of anti-apartheid work. It has the following aims and functions:

- Raising the issue of the increasing militarism of the apartheid state and the resultant resistance to it;

- Campaigning for the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on member states to grant asylum and assistance to refugees from the South African military; and campaigning in support of war resisters imprisoned or persecuted in South Africa;

- Researching into the South African military and resistance;

- Producing publications, like this bulletin, information booklets, campaign documents, etc.;

- Providing assistance to military refugees from South Africa in the form of advice regarding asylum, employment, accomodation;

- Involving exiled SA war resisters in discussion groups, seminars, and public meetings on the South African situation, as well as in anti-apartheid solidarity work in Britain.

COSAWR-Netherlands does similar work.

ADD YOUR NAME TO OUR MAILING LIST:

If you don't receive RESISTER regularly, and would like to, please fill in this slip and send it to us. Do the same if you know of others who you think would like to receive RESISTER. (Please also let us know if you change your address.)

We ask for a minimum donation of £3-00 a year to cover printing and distribution costs-- £4-00 airmail overseas please. Cheques should be made out to COSAWR.

(Readers in the Netherlands should get in touch with COSAWR-NL, Postbus 543, 1000AN Amsterdam - Subscriptions Hfl. 8.--)

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Send to: COSAWR (UK), B.M. BOX 2190, London WC1N 3XX

EXHIBIT E

CONSTITUTION OF THE ANC

John Dube — Co-founder of the ANC

1. NAME

The name of the organisation shall be the African National Congress, hereinafter referred to as the 'Congress'.

2. AIMS AND OBJECTS

The aims and objects of the Congress shall be:

(a) To unite the African people in a powerful and effective instrument to secure their own complete liberation from all forms of discrimination and national oppression.

(b) To promote and protect the interests of the African people in all matters affecting them.

(c) To strive for the attainment of universal adult suffrage and the creation of a united democratic South Africa on the principles outlined in the Freedom Charter.

(d) To support the cause of national liberation and the right to independence of nations in Africa and the rest of the world.

3. MEMBERSHIP

(a) Membership of the Congress shall be open to any person above the age of 18, who accepts its principles, policy and programme and is prepared to abide by its constitution and rules.

(b) Any person desiring to be a member of the Congress shall apply to the secretary of the nearest branch or to any member of the Congress authorised to receive application for membership. Such secretary or member shall immediately submit the application for consideration by the local branch committee, or in the absence of a branch committee, such application shall be made to the provincial secretary who shall refer it to the provincial executive committee within whose jurisdiction the applicant resides.

(c) The branch committee or provincial executive committee, as the case may be, shall have power to accept or refuse any application for membership submitted to it, provided that the acceptance or refusal of any application by any organ of the Congress shall be subject to review by the next higher organ.

(d) Upon any application for membership being granted by a branch committee or provincial executive committee, a membership card, signed by the Treasurer-General and endorsed by the secretary of such branch or provincial secretary, as the case may be, shall, on payment of the prescribed subscription and subject to the result of any review instituted in terms of sub-clause (c) above, be issued to the applicant.

4. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Congress shall consist of the following organs:

(a) The National Conference, which elects the National Executive Committees.

(b) The Provincial Conferences, which elect the provincial Executive Committees.

(c) The Regional Conference, which elects regional committees.

(d) The branch meetings, which elect a branch committee.

5. DECISIONS

Subject to the rules and regulations of

Congress:

(a) Decisions of the National Conference and those of the National Executive Committee shall be binding on all members and lower organs of Congress.

(b) Decisions of a provincial conference and those of the provincial executive committee shall be binding on all members and lower organs of the Congress in the particular province concerned.

(c) Decisions of a regional committee shall be binding on those members and lower organs of the Congress whose branches are constituent parts of that regional committee.

(d) Decisions of a branch meeting and of a branch committee shall be binding on all members and generally.

(e) Decisions of the majority shall be binding on all members and those of higher organs shall be binding on lower organs.

(b) DUTIES: A member shall have the duty:

i) To take an active part in the work of his branch;

ii) To understand thoroughly and to carry out the policy, aims and programme of Congress;

iii) To raise the level of his understanding of the political, economic and social problems of South Africa;

iv) To explain the policy and programme of the Congress to the people;

v) To combat any propaganda which is detrimental to the interests of the Congress;

vi) To observe discipline and to submit loyally to the decision of the majority or to decisions of the higher committee; and

vii) To inform his branch committee before leaving his area, and to report to the branch secretary of the area to which he has moved.

6. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS

(a) RIGHTS: A member shall have the right:

i) To take part in the discussion and formulation of the policy of the Congress;

ii) To criticise any official or decision of the Congress; such criticism shall be made to members of Congress or at a properly convened meeting of the members of the Congress;

iii) To take part in the elections and to be elected to any committee, commission or delegation of the Congress; and

iv) To submit proposals or statements to his branch and to his provincial executive committee.

7. AUXILIARY BODIES

A. WOMEN'S LEAGUE

Women who are members shall enjoy equality of status in the Congress and shall be entitled to join ordinary branches and take part in elections for and be elected to any position or office in the Congress. However, in order to arouse the interest and assist the widespread organisation of women, there shall be established an auxiliary organisation to be known as the African National Congress Women's League. The League shall:

(a) Be under the political direction and control of the Congress and shall follow the policy and programme of the Congress.

(b) Recruit and organise the African women 13

into a strong organisation which shall act as an auxiliary force to the Congress in the struggle for national liberation.

(c) Take up special problems and issues affecting women.

(d) Carry on propaganda against apartheid and discriminatory laws among African women.

(e) Be entitled to have its own rules and regulations provided that these shall not be in conflict with the policy of Congress.

B. ORGANISATION FOR YOUTHS

For the purpose of drawing the youths into the struggle and preparing them for leadership, the Congress shall organise the African youths into an organisation for youths to be known as the African National Congress Youth League, which shall be open to any person whose age does not exceed 30 years provided that such person shall upon reaching the qualification for Congress membership become a registered member of Congress subject to all the privileges and obligations of Congress membership in addition to such special privileges and duties of a member of the Youth League. The League shall:

(a) Mobilise the African youth and mould their political and social outlook in accordance with the Congress principles.

(b) Promote social and cultural activities among the young people.

(c) Popularise the policy, programme and decisions of the Congress among the youth; and

(d) The provisions of Clause 7.A,(c), shall mutatis mutandis apply to the Youth League.

8. NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The National Conference shall be the Supreme ruling and controlling body in Congress. It shall:

(a) Consist of delegates from the branches of the Congress elected by branch general meetings on the basis of one delegate for every twenty members; provided that the number of delegates from any branch shall not exceed ten; provided further that members of the National Executive Committee may attend ex-officio and shall have the right to speak and vote.

(b) Be held once a year; provided that Special National Conferences may be convened by the National Executive Committee at its own instance at such times as it may deem fit, and shall be convened upon requisitions addressed to it by not less than two provincial conferences.

9. DUTIES AND POWER OF THE ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The National Conference shall:

(a) Decide and determine the policy and programme of the Congress.

(b) Receive and discuss the reports of the National Executive which shall include the Presidential address and the Treasurer-General's report, the Provincial Executive Committees' reports, the African National Congress Women's League report.

(c) Lay down the basic principle and policy, examine and where necessary revise the programme and constitution of the Congress.

(d) Have the right and power to review, ratify, alter or veto any decision taken by any of its constituent bodies or unit of the Congress.

(e) Elect the President-General, the Deputy President, the Secretary-General, the Treasurer-General and eight other National Executive Committee members,

who shall hold office for three years and be eligible for re-election. Nomination shall be by delegates at the Conference; and elections of all officials and members of the National Executive Committee shall be by ballot.

(f) Have the power to elect or appoint any Commission or committee and assign specific tasks and duties to such Commission or committee.

10. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The National Executive Committee, which is elected by the National Conference once every three years, shall:

(a) Consist of the President-General, the Deputy President-General, the Treasurer-General, eight other members, the provincial presidents and secretaries of the Congress or their respective deputies, and the national presidents or national secretaries of the African National Congress Women's League and the African National Congress Youth League, who shall be ex-officio members of the National Executive Committee.

(b) Meet on the day of its election to appoint the National Headquarters, the National Speaker, the Deputy National Speaker, the National Chaplain and shall thereafter meet at least twice a year. The National Speaker, the Deputy National Speaker and the National Chaplain need not be appointed from among the members of the National Executive Committee.

(c) Appoint from among its members the National Working Committee of not less than seven persons residing within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the National Headquarters.

(d) Appoint the National Organising Secretary.

(e) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the National Conference.

(f) Issue and send directives and instructions to and demand and receive reports from the provincial committees, regional committees and branches.

(g) Supervise, direct and control the work of the Congress generally.

(h) Be responsible for ensuring that provincial committees and other committees of the Congress discharge their duties and functions properly and efficiently.

(i) Supervise the work of the auxiliary bodies.

(j) Manage and control all the national property and funds of the Congress.

(k) Submit annual reports to the National Conference.

(l) Do all things necessary in furtherance of the policy and programme of the Congress.

11. NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE

The National Working Committee is a sub-committee of the National Executive Committee. It shall:

(a) Meet as provided for in the rules and regulations.

(b) Carry out decisions and instructions of the National Conference and the National Executive Committee.

(c) Conduct the current work of the Congress and ensure that the provinces, regions and branches carry out decisions and instructions of the Congress.

(d) Issue propaganda and educational material to the provinces; and

(e) Submit a report to every National Executive Committee meeting.

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12. DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF OFFICIALS

(1) President-General:
The President-General is the head and chief directing officer of the Congress and the leader of the house in a National Conference. He shall:

(a) Present to the Annual Conference a comprehensive statement of the state of the nation and the political situation generally.

(b) Make pronouncements for and on behalf of the National Executive Committee outlining and explaining the policy or attitude of the Congress on any question.

(c) Preside over meetings of the National Executive Committee and conduct the business in conformity with the Constitution, bye-laws and rules of procedure adopted by the National Executive Committee.

(d) Be an ex-officio member of the National Working Committee; and

(e) Have a casting vote only.

(2) Deputy President-General:
The Deputy President-General shall assist the President-General and deputise for him whenever necessary.

(3) Secretary-General:
The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the Congress. He shall:

(a) Keep the minutes of the National Conference, the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee, as well as other records of the Congress

(b) Conduct the correspondence of the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee and send out notices of all conferences, National Executive and National Working Committee meetings.

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(c) Convey the decisions and instructions of the National Conference, the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee to the Provincial Committees, regional committees and shall see to it that all units of the Congress carry out their duties properly; and

(d) Prepare yearly reports on the work of the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee and such other documents which may from time to time be required by the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee.

(4) Treasurer-General
The Treasurer-General is the chief custodian of the funds and property of the Congress. He shall:

(a) Receive and bank all monies on behalf of the National Executive Committee, and shall, together with any two National Executive members, operate a banking account.

(b) Keep such books of account as may be necessary to record clearly the financial position of Congress.

(c) Submit annually to the National Conference a report showing the Income and Expenditure Account and the Balance sheet of the Congress for the past year, and shall submit periodical reports to the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee; and

(d) Be responsible, together with the President-General and the Secretary-General, for working out plans and schemes for the raising of funds for the Congress, and shall direct and take an active part in a campaign for the raising of funds.

(5) National Speaker:
The National Speaker shall preside over and sign minutes of all National Conferences. In

his absence the Deputy Speaker shall preside at such Conference.

(6) National Chaplain:
The National Chaplain shall lead the delegates in prayer at National Conferences and shall conduct the National Service or otherwise provide spiritual leadership for the organisation.

(7) National Organising Secretary:
It shall be the duty of the National Organising Secretary acting in consultation with and under the direction of the Secretary-General, to organise the Congress nationally and to strengthen the organisational machinery throughout.

13. PROVINCE

For organisational purposes the country shall be divided into provinces. A province shall be determined and defined by the Congress.

14. PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE

The Provincial Conference shall:

(a) Be the highest organ, subject to Clause 8 and 10, of the Congress in each Province.

(b) Be held annually in each province. Special provincial conferences may be convened at such times as the Provincial Committee may deem fit, and shall be convened upon the requisition addressed to the Provincial Executive Committee by at least one-third of all branches or one Regional Committee.

(c) (i) Delegates from local branches of the Congress in the province who shall be elected by local branch meetings on the basis of one delegate for every twenty members, provided that no branch shall be represented by more than 10 delegates, shall attend.

(ii) Members of the Provincial Executive Committee who shall attend ex-officio and shall have the right to speak and vote.

(d) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the National Conference, the National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee.

(e) Receive and consider reports submitted by the Provincial Executive Committee.

(f) Elect the Provincial President, Secretary, Treasurer and eight other members of the Provincial Executive Committee; and

(g) Carry out the policy and programme of the Congress in the Province.

15. PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Provincial Executive Committee, which is elected annually by the Provincial Conference, shall be the administrative body of the Provincial Conference. It shall:

(a) Consist of the Provincial President, the Provincial Vice-President, the Provincial Secretary, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial President or Secretary of the African National Congress Women's League and the African National Congress Youth League, and eight other members of the Provincial Committee.

(b) Meet on the day of its election to elect the Provincial Working Committee, and shall thereafter meet at least once every three months.

(c) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the Provincial Conference and the National Executive Committee or the National Working Committee.

(d) Manage and control the funds and property of the Congress in the Province.

(e) Submit reports to the National

Executive as often as required on the state of organisation, the financial position of the province and such other matters as may be specified.

(f) Appoint the Provincial Organiser, the Provincial Speaker and the Provincial Chaplain, all who need not be members of the Provincial Executive Committee.

(g) Organise and establish branches and Regions in the Province.

(h) Enforce the Constitution of the Congress in the Province.

(i) Give members of the Congress in the Province political education; and

(j) Carry out the policy and programme of the Congress and do all things necessary to further the interests, aims and objects of the Congress.

16. PROVINCIAL WORKING COMMITTEE

The Provincial Working Committee is the sub-committee of the Provincial Executive Committee. It shall consist of not less than seven members who reside within a radius of 100 miles of the Provincial Headquarters, and shall:

(a) Perform the duties and functions of the Provincial Executive Committee; and

(b) Submit reports to the Provincial Executive Committee.

17. DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS

With the exception of Clause 7, provisions of Section 12 shall with necessary alteration of detail apply to the duties and functions of the provincial officials of the Congress.

18. REGION

Any three or more branches in a given area may, for the purpose of coordination of activities and better organisational efficiency, be formed into a region at the instance of the Provincial Executive Committee or on application to the Provincial Executive Committee, by at least two branches within an area of a proposed region.

19. REGIONAL COMMITTEE

Whenever a region has been established the branch executive of such region shall at a properly convened meeting, elect a regional committee, which shall consist of a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, two members, and a member from each branch within the region. The duty of the Regional Committee shall be:

(a) To meet as provided for in the rules and regulations.

(b) To coordinate the work and activities of the constituent branches and submit reports to the Provincial Executive Committee; and

(c) To see to the implementation of the instructions of the National Executive Committee, Provincial Executive Committee or the Provincial Working Committee.

20. BRANCHES

(a) The basic unit of organisation in the Congress shall be the branch.

(b) The branch shall consist of a minimum of twenty members, provided that the National Executive Committee or Provincial Executive Committee may establish a provisional committee as provided by the rules and regulations.

(c) Every new branch shall apply to the Provincial Executive Committee for registration.

(d) The branch shall:

i) Meet as provided for in the rules and regulations.

ii) Elect at an annual branch general meeting, a branch Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and six other branch committee members.

21. BRANCH COMMITTEE

The branch committee shall:

(a) Meet on the day of its election to elect a branch sub-committee and thereafter shall meet as provided for in the rules and regulations.

(b) Carry out propaganda and organisational work among the people in its area in pursuance of the policy, programme and decisions of the Congress.

(c) Build and increase the numerical and political strength of the Congress within its area.

(d) Submit reports on its work to the branch meeting, to the Regional Committee periodically as provided in the rules and regulations and to the Provincial Executive Committee every quarter; and

(e) Carry out such instructions as may from time to time be issued by the Provincial Committee or the Provincial Working Committee.

22. CONGRESS FUNDS

(a) The basic membership subscription for Congress shall be two shillings and sixpence (2s. 6d.).

(b) All subscriptions shall be payable in advance.

(c) The National Executive Committee may impose a national levy on all members of the Congress and all such money derived from a national levy shall be paid into the national treasury.

(d) The Provincial Executive Committee may with the prior approval of and subject to such conditions as may be laid down by the National Executive Committee, impose levies on all members of the Congress in their respective provinces. All money from Provincial levies shall be paid into the provincial treasuries.

(e) All levies, national and provincial, shall be for stated periods and specific amounts.

(f) The branch Treasurer shall pay to the Provincial Treasurer and National Treasurer respectively, one third of the total subscriptions.

(g) The Provincial Executive Committee shall pay to the National Executive Committee an agreed proportion of all money received by them through donations, collections, concerts, functions, etc.

(h) Proper records shall be kept of all money received and expended by branch committees, regional committees, Provincial Executive Committees and the National Executive Committee.

23. DISCIPLINE

(a) A branch committee, Regional, Provincial and National Executive Committee shall have power to reprimand, suspend, expel or take any other disciplinary action against a member for breach of the Constitution or conduct detrimental to the interests of the Congress or the African people.

(b) Any higher organ of the Congress shall have power to investigate, reprimand, reorganise, suspend, dissolve, dismiss or take any other appropriate disciplinary action against any lower organ under its jurisdiction for breach of the Constitution or conduct detrimental to the interests of the Congress or the African people.

(c) Before any disciplinary action is taken against any member or organ in terms of clause (a) and/or clause (b) of this section (section 23), such member or organ shall, in the absence of extra-ordinary circumstances justifying the contrary, be given an opportunity to appear before the relevant tribunal and there admit, deny or otherwise account for the conduct complained of.

(d) Any member or body of members against whom disciplinary action has been taken by any organ of the Congress, shall have the right to appeal to the next higher organ and the National Conference shall be the final court of appeal.

(e) When a member is suspended, the committee suspending him shall state the period and conditions of such suspension.

(f) A member who fails to pay his subscription for a period of six months and who does not pay his subscription after he has been personally spoken to about the matter, by a representative of his branch committee, shall be lapsed from membership.

(g) All cases of suspension, dismissal, expulsion or dissolution by way of disciplinary action shall be fully reported to the Provincial Executive Committee and the National Executive Committee.

(h) No case of expulsion by a branch or region shall be published in the press without the consent of the Provincial Executive Committee.

24. QUORUM

(a) A third of the members shall form a quorum.

(b) Fifteen members or 50 per cent of the branch membership, whichever is the lesser, shall form a quorum of all meetings of a local branch.

(c) Delegates from 40 per cent of the total number of branches in a province shall form a quorum for all provincial conferences.

(d) In the case of a National Conference, delegates from two provinces, representing at least thirty three and one third per cent of the total membership of the Congress, shall constitute a quorum.

25. VACANCIES

The office of any member of a committee of the Congress shall be vacated by resignation suspension, expulsion or absence from meetings for a period prescribed in the rules and regulations.

26. RULES AND REGULATIONS

(a) The National Executive shall have the power to frame rules and regulations relating to the control and administration of the affairs of the Congress.

(b) Each Provincial Executive Committee may frame rules and regulations for the conduct and management of the affairs of Congress organisation within its jurisdiction, provided that any rules and regulations so framed shall not become operative until they have been approved by the National Executive Committee.

(c) Rules and regulations framed in terms of clause (a) and clause (b) of this section

(section 26) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution.

27. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION

This Constitution may be amended by resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of the delegates present and voting at a National Conference. Notice of such a resolution shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General not later than six months before the date of the National Conference. The National Executive Committee shall circulate all proposed amendments to the Constitution to the Provincial Executive Committees and all branches of the Congress at least two months before the National Conference.

28. GENERAL

The Congress shall have perpetual succession and power, apart from its individual members, to acquire, hold and alienate property, enter into agreements and do all things necessary to carry out its aims and objects.

(Signed) A J LUTULI
President-General

(Signed) O R TAMBO
Secretary-General

January 1958

Chief A.J. Luthuli, Nokukhanya, his wife and M.B. Yengwa

EXHIBIT F

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID

JORDAN K. NGUBANE

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER
Publisher • New York

$5.50

(*continued from front flap*)

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID

By JORDAN K. NGUBANE

A native South African speaks out courageously and frankly on one of the most critical issues of our time—apartheid. An active opponent of racial oppression all his life, Jordan K. Ngubane has written a remarkably temperate, thoughtful, yet passionate analysis of the doctrine by which the Government of South Africa enforces the separation of its black and white citizens. Unless a positive alternative to apartheid is soon found, he warns, racial tensions may erupt in further bloodshed and even ignite a world conflagration. What happens in South Africa, therefore, is of the gravest international concern.

Yet Mr. Ngubane is no prophet of easy doom and quick destruction. "One can, however, be certain about one thing," he concludes his book, "speed and effective action can still stop bloodshed in South Africa." It is for this reason that he has written AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID, motivated neither by hatred for the white Afrikaner nor by pity for the black African. He writes, of course, from the African point of view; but in so doing, he provides startlingly fresh perspectives upon racial relations in South Africa during the past three hundred years —the longest period of continued interracial contact in history. Whether he is giving an insider's account of the growth of the African National Congress or an African's interpretation of South African history, he writes with disarming honesty and displays acute insights into the psychology of his frightened white masters. This book is, above all, a very personal and moving document, expressed in plain but dignified language, revealing a humane man committed to the principles of the free moral life.

(*continued on back flap*)

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID is a positive and hopeful book too. The author believes that the most powerful nations in the world today are the mixed communities whose peoples are united not by race but by the moral values they share. To achieve his goals, Mr. Ngubane offers a 12-point program for eliminating apartheid in South Africa and an 18-point program for ensuring that all South Africans, regardless of race and belief, may live in harmony. It testifies to his own high moral standards that he is as much concerned with the future of the Afrikaner as with that of the African, for he proposes not that the oppressor exchange places with the oppressed but that each accept the other as his equal in a democratic society of free individuals.

THE AUTHOR

Jordan K. Ngubane has lived in South Africa all his life. He was educated at Adams College, a school originally established by the American Board Mission and since taken over by the South African Government, and he became interested in writing and journalism at an early age. He has written plays in Zulu, served on a number of newspapers—including *Indian Opinion*, the paper founded by Mahatma Gandhi—and has been deeply involved in African politics for much of his adult life. At present he is vice-president of the Liberal Party of South Africa.

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BOOKS THAT MATTER

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DEDICATION

To
my valued friends,
Hilda and *Leo Kuper*,
of
the University of Natal,
whose love, loyalty,
wisdom, encouragement,
and humanity were always
pillars of strength
in my moments of trial,
this humble effort
is
most gratefully
dedicated.

15 • AFRICAN NATIONALISM SABOTAGED

AGAINST the background of war clouds on the horizon, the All-African Convention split in half. Communist propaganda took the line that the war would be a collision between two rival imperialisms, and as Hitler brought more European countries under his heel, the Communist press increasingly warned against participation. One of the reasons for such an interest in participation was that large numbers of nonwhites were joining the war to ensure that Nazism and its race consciousness was defeated. Even when Smuts refused to recognize them as active combatants, they still persisted in regarding enlistment as an effective form of protest against Nazi racialism.

But when Russia entered the war, the Communist line changed sharply: Then the war became the people's struggle against fascism. African opinion was shaken badly by this about-face. People wanted to know where the real loyalties of the Communists were; had they been good South Africans, they would have stuck to the line that was best for their people; yet on the entry of a foreign country into the war, the local Communist line had changed almost overnight.

By this time, the group of young men who were later to form themselves into the Youth League had emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Communist line. One of its cardinal objectives was to build up a stable leadership which would command the respect of the African's enemies and enjoy the com-

munity's confidence by its proof of effectiveness. The names of Luthuli and Matthews frequently came up for discussion in Youth League circles as they searched for the men who would be the symbol of the new spirit of resistance. The moment Luthuli won the backing of the Natal League, it became obvious that his way to the leadership of the ANC was clear.

As soon as the war was over, the League intensified its pressure for a definite stand against race oppression. Although the resistance movement of 1951 was launched in time, the long debates which preceded this demonstration are perhaps more interesting. For the Youth Leaguers regarded the campaign primarily as a tactical move to train the African masses in the use of peaceful collective action. Some of them selected this weapon for reasons of principle, but others said that expediency had decided the issue for them. At first, the Communists dismissed the idea of a nonviolent demonstration; but when it became clear that African opinion supported the resistance campaign, the line changed. They were heart and soul for a Gandhian campaign. In the meantime, they had worked hard behind the scenes to create a coordinating committee representing all the organizations behind the campaign. The acceptance of equal representation on it by the Johannesburg Youth Leaguers, who were coming increasingly under the influence of the Communist leader, Dr. Yussuf Dadoo, imposed severe strains inside the League. After the campaign, however, Communist pressure on Youth League unity was intensified. Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, and other Youth Leaguers visited Iron Curtain countries—with disastrous effects on Youth League unity. The consequent tensions led finally to the capture of the League by the Communists. And that was its end.

After the resistance movement, Communist policy stressed the need for action against race oppression rather than subversion of state authority. The idea was to stage dramatic stunts designed to administer continuous and indecisive shocks to the economy of the land in order to keep it in a state of chronic malaise. Anti-pass campaigns, boycotts, and mass demonstrations ensued. One

of the most famous and best organized of the latter was the secret trip of 20,000 women to Pretoria, without the knowledge of the police, to protest against race oppression. They demanded an interview with the Prime Minister, J. G. Strijdom, who found it convenient to remain securely behind barred and guarded doors. In all such protests, the idea was not to shock the government into making concessions—no Communist would be so naïve—but to impair the health of the country's economy.

These demonstrations were all said to have been organized by the Congress Movement. People who sat in the inner councils of this alliance stated privately that the ANC tended to accept instructions rather than to participate decisively in the formulation of policies. Dr. Wilson Conco, who was for a long time Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown gathering, in 1955, which produced the Freedom Charter; but on his return, he said he had seen the document for the first time at the conference. And Luthuli himself had not known who had drafted the charter. The coordinating committee of the alliance was, as a matter of fact, not the real originator of policy. The bosses of the underground Communist Party did the planning and made policy decisions. They approached men like Luthuli and other non-Communist leaders merely, in actual practice, to acquaint them with what had already been decided. One example will illustrate this point. Just before he went to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, Moses Kotane—the former Secretary-General of the Communist Party—traveled from Johannesburg to Groutville to inform Luthuli that he too was attending the conference. The latter, a key member of the ANC, was in no position to approve or disapprove; Kotane had come merely to inform him.

This remote control of the ANC was facilitated by the bans on Luthuli. The government had forbidden him to move outside the boundaries of his magisterial district. His head office was in distant Johannesburg. The Communists had successfully resisted pressure to transfer the head office to Durban, which was only about forty-eight miles from where Luthuli lived. Johannesburg

did not keep him as well informed on developments as they should have done. One case will illustrate this contention. When the government threatened to eject the Africans from Sophiatown, near Johannesburg, the ANC promised to lead the resistance. Luthuli, assured that the will to oppose government plans was irresistible, committed himself to the public statement, as a result of the advice he had received, that Sophiatown would be a Waterloo either for the ANC or the government. By this, he meant that the ANC would accept the Sophiatown challenge and resist removals because the people were behind it. When the day of removals came, the subtenants and the tenants dumped their goods and jumped into police and army lorries, singing. Manilal Gandhi often used to say that he did not see any sign of ANC resistance when the police showed up; in 1955, he had traveled especially to Johannesburg to see Luthuli's followers disgrace apartheid.

This was not just a piece of bungling. The withholding of vital information from Luthuli was part of the plan to destroy, whenever necessary, any African leader who was not completely under the control of the Communists. And there was an important complement to this plan of subtle destruction. The South African Congress of Trade Unions was one of the members of the Congress Movement. Unlike the other four allies, it was mixed racially, although the Africans were, of course, in the majority. African members of SACTU were encouraged to join the ANC and vice versa; Moses Mabhida was the Communist-sponsored chief of SACTU, and Luthuli led the ANC. Under this arrangement, the African member was deliberately given a dual loyalty and leadership as a precaution against Luthuli's defecting one day. If he were to do that, Mabhida would assert himself as SACTU leader against Luthuli. Since Mabhida was always with the workers, he stood a better chance of pulling a very substantial section of them in any showdown with Luthuli. And in any crisis not involving Luthuli, he could easily be upheld as the leader of the Africans.

It was all part of a complicated plan to reduce Luthuli to the

position of an impotent prisoner of the Communists. Locked up as he virtually was in Groutville, he was not free to make any impact on outside opinion. In the meantime, the Communist press was taking advantage of every conceivable opportunity to boost Mabhida. Hence, the type of leadership the Youth League had tried to establish was being subtly undermined and African nationalism sabotaged.

The treason trial started shortly after Sisulu had returned from Moscow and Peking. The trips to Bucharest, Moscow, and Peking by prominent ANC leaders had been clever moves to commit the organization by implication. Luthuli might argue that he and his movement were not Communist; but if his right-hand man could go to Iron Curtain capitals without his knowledge, the world would ask Luthuli who was the real boss of the ANC. If he said, as he did, that he did not know who had paid for these costly trips—his treasurer was saying publicly that the ANC was in the red financially—then it would be clear he was no longer boss. In the event of a showdown, he would not have enough world support to embarrass the Communists.

The government felt it was time to strike at the leadership of the Congress Movement. With characteristic maladroitness, it locked up the Communist and non-Communist leaders of the Movement, together with a few anti-Communists outside of the congresses. In evidence during the trial, it became increasingly clear that Luthuli did not have a real hand in formulating policy for the Congress Movement; therefore, the charge against him and some of his more immediate supporters was dropped. After nearly five years, the government case collapsed, and the accused were free men again. In short, the trips to Iron Curtain capitals had forced the government to show its hand, for it was going to act ruthlessly against all who challenged or opposed apartheid, regardless of whether or not they were Communists. And the same rule applied to the bannings.

The story that went around Durban after the return of each Congress leader from Peking was that China had been most insistent on building up rural pressures. True or not, there was a significant change noticeable in Congress Movement strategy

after the visits to Iron Curtain countries. Although efforts were made to organize urban workers, the greatest stress was laid on the need to attract the people in the rural reserves. Money flowed into the republic, and paid organizers were employed in some of the most sensitive areas of the country. The idea was to start tension piling up in the reserves to complement the pressure in the towns. There was a twofold advantage in this strategy: If the towns went on strike there would be no scab labor from the reserves; second, if there was trouble in both urban and rural areas, the police and the army would exercise little control over the whole situation because of the distances between them and the disparity in population ratios.

In the meantime, the nationalist revolt against Communism's tightening grip on the ANC was gaining momentum. In the Transvaal ANC members, and in Natal, to a lesser extent, anti-Communists, were being purged systematically. In Cape Town, Tom Ngwenya held out against Communist pressure and led a long and bitter fight almost precisely in the way Professor Thaele had, and at the same place, during the 1920's. But when the nationalists realized that it was impossible for them to change the leadership of the ANC, they left it to form the PAC. This was the most spectacular split the Communists had brought about in African opinion, and it left the Congress Movement without real opposition to Communist policy. It became increasingly dangerous for the moderates who stayed behind to want to deviate; numerically, the PAC walkout had weakened them.

The volume of support the PAC got for its campaign, both internally and externally, gave the Communists a nasty jolt. Some members of the Congress Movement had for a long time agitated for another dramatic stand against apartheid, but the leadership, still involved in the treason trial, had not been keen on a mere stunt. The PAC took advantage of this clamor, which was, in fact, popular, to stage its antipass campaign and write Sharpeville into the history of African nationalism. Luthuli at first refused to collaborate with the PAC in the antipass campaign; but after the massacre of scores of men, women, and children in various parts of the country, he called for a day of mourning. This

was supported widely by all sections of the nation and sent the government into a rage. It banned the PAC and the ANC for a year, declared a state of emergency, and forced some of the ablest Communist leaders to flee the country. Two PAC executive members had been instructed to leave before the campaign to present the PAC case overseas.

Politically, the PAC and the ANC were not on speaking terms. But when both sides got to London, it became necessary for them to speak with one voice as South Africans. They formed the United Front. The balance of forces was against the PAC from the very beginning, and opinion in South Africa was divided sharply on the wisdom of forming a United Front in which the pro-Communists and their supporters constituted the biggest element. In any case, the United Front had no mandate to speak on behalf of all the nonwhites, since whatever authority it possessed derived only from the organizations represented in it. It soon became necessary for it to have a mandate and attain status in the republic—particularly since press reports were circulating to the effect that the Front was being pressed to constitute itself a government in exile. Inside the Congress Movement, discussion had started on who would be the first prime minister; the pro-Communist wing wanted Dr. Dadoo, but most of the younger Africans felt insulted by this. The head of the government, they felt, had to come from that section that had borne the brunt of oppression: They wanted Luthuli.

While all these things were happening, it became obvious that the political vacuum caused by the bans on the African resistance organizations had to be filled. Leaders of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation (IDAMF) stated that an attempt to regroup on a different plane should be made and that a new basis for African unity should be found. IDAMF held a position of unique importance in the African community, for it represented the clergy and could therefore speak with authority on African problems. It had the following and was nonsectional. Since it had, in 1956, also called a conference of leaders in Bloemfontein, where apartheid was formally rejected, it came under

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increasing pressure to call another to agree on a formula of unity. But in this case it could not move very fast because it was engaged in delicate negotiations with the government on purely church matters.

Then, almost without warning, the Communists began to interest themselves in the idea of a new regrouping and in private conversations exerted pressure for the immediate calling of a national conference. The idea was being canvassed almost everywhere, and Alan Paton, speaking for the liberals, had even suggested a third force between apartheid and African racialists. In response to these pressures, Luthuli and Matthews, among others, sent out invitations to a consultative conference of African leaders, which met in Orlando, Johannesburg, toward the end of 1960. The idea was to consolidate African unity.

It emerged quite early in the deliberations of the conference that a group of the delegates had come with a ready-made plan of action which they wanted the others to endorse. Real unity was not what they sought; they merely wanted the mandate to carry out their own plan. Feeling in the conference was so strongly in favor of real unity, however, that a committee was subsequently appointed to work out plans for the calling of a national conference of all intellectual leaders in the African community. These, in turn, would ask the government to call a national convention to draft a new constitution. Little time was wasted: The continuation committee elected by the conference, in its first session, presented a fairly detailed plan, according to which it was to move events to a particular climax. After the steps described in the conference, attempts would then be made for a showdown with apartheid.

But during the functioning of the machinery which the continuation committee set up to carry out its mandate, it soon became clear that the committee was intended merely to be a rubber stamp to endorse the actions of an invisible hand that moved events toward its own goal. This hand wanted its plan adhered to rigidly, no matter what happened, and expected it to be carried out in a hurry. As long as the requisite speed and con-

formity were maintained, money was available for this purpose in incredibly large quantities. At social parties organized in the locations for members of the continuation committee, expensive dinners were given, at which whisky, brandy, and gin were served in quart bottles. Members of the committee from Durban, for example, flew to Johannesburg, and cost was no deterrent in the printing and dissemination of literature. Never in the history of African nationalism had so much money been available.

There was, however, something very peculiar about this money. First, it did not come through the hands of the treasurer elected by the committee. Second, no proper statements of accounts were given. When the committee pressed for these, shoddy, unprofessional documents that meant absolutely nothing were handed in. Third, no receipts were requested in return for the money paid out to delegates. Finally, the real source of this money was not revealed; it was said that it had been donated by certain individuals, whose names were never given. Naturally, the mystery surrounding the funds started tensions in the continuation committee.

At the same time, the committee was being committed to lines of action that some members felt were not in the mandate given to it by the conference. After the walkout by the former PAC member on the committee, the invisible hand pushed events in the direction of isolating the heroic wing of African nationalism. Since no genuine effort was made to meet the objections of the delegate to some of the committee's emphases, the feeling grew among some of those who remained that the invisible hand was not interested in genuine African unity, that it was using the committee merely to advance its own ideological ends. These became more apparent in the kind of literature sent out on the "all-in" conference of African leaders that was to meet in Maritzburg, Natal, for the emphasis was on the interests of the workers. Stormy debates took place in the committee on the perspectives from which the pamphlets approached the race crisis, and some members felt that they were being committed by implication to Communist approaches, which they could not sup-

port. Telegrams were sent to pro-Soviet leaders outside the republic, and, of course, to others, without the authorization of the committee. When the members met, they often found themselves faced with accomplished facts. When they protested, they received assurances that the "mistakes" would not be repeated, but no sooner had they left than the invisible hand proceeded with its plans as though nothing had happened.

In the meantime, reports from Basutoland reached Johannesburg through people close to the Communist underground that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was one of the influences behind the financing of the continuation committee. Couriers were said to be carrying money between the protectorate and South Africa. When these matters came up before the continuation committee, they were denied—although the couriers were well-known personalities. But the persistent circulation of these reports and the denials merely added to the strains and suspicions that were threatening to break up the continuation committee. The last straw came when one section of the committee pressed for the postponement of the Maritzburg Conference in order to heal the breach caused by the walkout of the former PAC member. The invisible hand would not hear a word of this. Then the section that pressed for negotiations argued that the walkout altered the basis on which the continuation committee had been set up and that the United Front could no longer be expressive of the will of the Orlando meeting if the basis was changed. The invisible hand was no longer interested in African unity. The important thing was the Maritzburg Conference. There was to be no modification of the timetable, even if it meant splitting the continuation committee. Events galloped toward a crisis, and when the dissenting section resigned from the continuation committee, that brought an end to the United Front.

As the day of the Maritzburg Conference neared, its nature emerged in clearer light. It was no longer to be a conference of intellectual leaders from all walks of life, for press statements from the organizers or their supporters indicated that delegates

and nondelegates would be invited. The high light of the conference was Nelson Mandela's dramatic appearance, his ultimatum to the government, and his equally sudden disappearance into the underground. The conference called for a stay-at-home strike for May 29–31, and Mandela's speech detailed the type of action to be taken if the government did not acquiesce to the conference's demands.

The element of secrecy is an important ingredient in political or military warfare. Mandela gave a detailed description of what would be done, where, and how, and he gave the government plenty of time to take precautions. It passed a law through Parliament enabling it to detain a person suspected of prescribed activities for twelve days without being brought up for trial. Partial mobilization was ordered. The army and police reserves were called up. "Dangerous" men were detained. Thousands of African youths in the locations were arrested. The African residential areas in the urban areas were patrolled twenty-four hours every day. Saracen tanks stood at the gates. Loudspeakers on vans blared out police propaganda against the leaders of the stay-at-home, who had suddenly deserted their followers and gone into hiding when the arrests started. The air force was called in. Military planes zoomed menacingly above the locations. By the time the day of the strike came, there was nobody to lead the African masses. Some of the volunteers who had been especially trained to lead strikers were the first to go to work when they saw no sign of their leaders. In the face of these developments, large numbers of Africans went to work.

To stop merely at seeing state power or heroic opposition as the causes of the failure of the stay-at-home is to ignore facts. Throughout all the events described here, Luthuli was deliberately kept in the background. First, in a really serious demonstration the masses of the African people expected him, not Mandela, to give guidance. Second, the crack in the continuation committee destroyed the United Front internally, for it showed that no single section of political opinion can afford to march on its own to freedom in the present circumstances. The rigidity that the

invisible hand had insisted upon in the continuation committee showed that it had overestimated its power. Those Africans who supported the bloc that resigned had serious doubts about the tactics employed at Maritzburg. Third, there had not been efficient, thorough, and painstaking organization, in spite of the large sums of money available. One got the impression that the organizers of the conference did not really take themselves seriously. If they had gotten a mob to shout endorsement of their line, and in that way given them or Nelson Mandela status, they would have been satisfied.

On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to ignore one very important achievement of the stay-at-home: By forcing the government to order mobilization, it had administered a shock to the economy of the country, which opened the way to economic paralysis. Millions of rand were poured down the drain by the government simply because a few thousand Africans had met in Maritzburg and threatened to do certain things.

EXHIBIT G

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

(South African Section of the Communist International.)

CONSTITUTION AND RULES.

ADOPTED BY THE CAPETOWN CONGRESS, JULY 30-31 & AUGUST 1, 1921.

Official Organ, "The International," Box 4179, Johannesburg.

Rules of the Communist Party.

(South African Section of the Communist International.)

As adopted at the Congress held in Capetown on July 30th, 31st, and August 1st, 1921.

1. The Party accepts the "21 Points" of the Communist International.

2. Any person may be a member of the Party who–

(a) Signs a pledge to abide by these rules.

(b) Is proposed, seconded and duly elected by a branch of the Party or, where no Branch exists, by the Central Executive.

(c) Pays the subscription levied by his Branch or, in the case of members not attached to a Branch, by the Central Executive. The minimum subscription to be one shilling per month.

(d) Subscribes to the official organ of the Party. Provided that when two or more members belong to one family one annual subscription to the official organ shall be deemed sufficient.

(e) Any member may by a vote of his branch be suspended from membership pending the next Party Congress, which shall either expel or reinstate him.

3. (a) New branches shall be formed subject to the approval of the Central Executive.

(b) Branches shall consist of ten or more members.

(c) They shall appoint a Branch Secretary and such other officers as may be necessary.

(d) They shall meet not less than once a month.

(e) They shall pay to the Central Executive not less than one-half of their members' branch subscriptions and one-fourth of their other income.

4. The Central Executive or the Party Congress may–

(a) Permit any branch to levy a subscription of less than one shilling per month.

(b) Partially or wholly exempt the members of any branch or any of them from subscribing to the official organ of the Party; Provided that such branch as a whole subscribes for one or more copies in any event.

5. (a) The Central Executive shall be located in Johannesburg until otherwise decided by the Party Congress.

(b) It shall consist of a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, and nine other members, all appointed by the Congress and three other members respectively appointed by the Cape, Natal, and Free State branches.

(c) It shall fill vacancies in its number arising between Congresses provided that vacancies among the nominees of the Cape, Natal or Free State shall be filled by the branches appointing them.

(d) Any member of the Central Executive absent for three consecutive meetings without leave shall cease to be a member thereof.

(e) Subject to these rules, the Central Executive shall control all the work of the Party between Congresses.

6. (a) The Party Congress shall consist of (1) delegates of the branches, appointed by them in the proportion of two for every 25 members or part thereof, such part not being less than 10; (2) representatives of the members not attached to a branch, such representation to be arranged in the like proportion by the Central Executive.

(b) The Congress shall meet at least once a year at such place and time as may be decided upon by the previous Congress, and may also be specially convened by the Central Executive or on the requisition of at least three branches.

(c) The Congress shall be the supreme organ of the Party.

The Twenty-One Points.

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

1. THE GENERAL PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION should bear a really Communist character, and SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PROGRAMME AND DECISIONS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL. The entire party press should be edited by reliable Communists who have proven The dictatorship of the proletariat should not be spoken of as simply a current hackneyed formula, it should be advocated in such a way that its necessity should be apparent to every rank and file working man and woman, to each soldier and peasant, and should emanate from everyday facts systematically recorded by our press day by day.

All periodical and other publications, as well as all party publications and editions, must be subject to the control of the presidium of the party, independent of whether the party is legal or illegal. It should in no way be permitted that the editors abuse their autonomy and carry on a policy not fully corresponding to the policy of the party.

Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labour unions or co-oppratives—it is indispensable for them not only to denounce the bourgeoisie, but also its assistants and agents—reformists of every colour and shade.

2. Every organisation desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labour movement (party organisation, editors, labour unions, parliamentary faction, co-operatives, municipalities, etc.) all reformists and followers of the "centre," and to have them replaced by Communists even at the cost of replacing at the beginning "experienced" men by rank and file working men.

3. The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering upon the phase of civil war. Under such conditions THE COMMUNISTS CAN HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN BOURGEOIS LAWS. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus which at the decisive moment should do its duty by the party, and in every way possible assist the revolution In every country where in consequence of martial law or of other exceptional laws the Communists are unable to carry on their work lawfully, a combination of lawful and illegal work is absolutely necessary.

4. A persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation is necessary in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organisation. Wherever owing to repressive legislation this becomes impossible it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.

5. A SYSTEMATIC AND REGULAR PROPAGANDA IS NECESSARY IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS. The workers can gain no victory unless they possess the sympathy and support of at least part of the rural workers and of the poor peasants, and unless other sections of the population are neutralised. Communist work in the rural districts is acquiring a predominant importance during the present period. It should be carried on through Communist workmen of both city and country who have connections with the rural districts. To refuse to do such work or to transfer such work to untrustworthy half reformists, is equal to rejection of the proletarian revolution.

6. Every party desirous of affiliating to the Third International should renounce not only avowed social patriotism but also the falsehood and the hypocrisy of social pacifism; it should systematically demonstrate to the workers that without a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international arbitration, no talk of disarmament, no democratic reorganisation of the League of Nations will be capable of saving mankind from new imperialist wars.

7. Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognise the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the "centrists," and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party membership, without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The Communist International demands unconditionally and peremptorily that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. The Communist International cannot reconcile itself to the fact that such avowed reformists as, for instance, Turatti, Modigliani, Kautsky, Hillquit, Longuet, Macdonald, and others, should be entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. This would make the Third International resemble the Second International.

8. In the Colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities there is necessary an especially distinct and clear line of conduct of the parties of countries where the bourgeoisie possesses such colonies or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of "its own" imperialists in the colonies, SUPPORTING, NOT ONLY IN WORDS BUT PRACTICALLY, ALL MOVEMENTS OF LIBERATION IN THE COLONIES. It should demand the expulsion of its own imperialists from such colonies and cultivate among the workers of its own country a truly fraternal attitude towards the working population of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, and carry on a systematic agitation in its own army against every kind of oppression of the colonial po··lation.

9. Every party desirous of belonging to the Communist International should be bound to carry on systematic and persistent Communist work in the labour unions, cooperatives and other labour organisations of the masses. It is necessary to form Communist groups within these organisations which by persistent and lasting work should WIN OVER THE LABOUR UNIONS TO COMMUNISM.

These groups should constantly denounce the treachery of the social patriots and of the fluctuations of the "centre." These Communist groups should be completely subordinated to the party in general.

10. Any party belonging to the Communist International is bound to CARRY ON A STUBBORN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AMSTERDAM "INTERNATIONAL" OF THE YELLOW LABOUR UNIONS. It should propagate insistently amongst the organised workers the necessity of rupture with the yellow Amsterdam International. It should support by all means in its power the International union of Red Labour Unions adhering to the Communist International.

11. Parties desirous of joining the Third International shall be bound TO INSPECT THE PERSONNEL OF THEIR PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS, to remove all unreliable elements therefrom, to control such factions not only verbally but in reality, to subordinate them to the Central Committee of the party, and to demand from each proletarian Communist that he devote his entire activity to the interests of real revolutionary propaganda.

12. All the parties belonging to the Communist International should be formed on the basis of the principle of democratic CENTRALISATION. At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to do its duty when it is organised in a sufficiently thorough way, when it possesses an iron discipline and when its party centre enjoys the confidence of the members of the party, who are to endow this centre with complete power, authority, and ample rights.

13. The Communist Parties of those countries where Communist activity is legal should make a clearance of their members from time to time, as well as those of the party organisations, in order systematically to disembarrass the party from the petty-bourgeois elements which penetrate into it.

14. Each party desirous of affiliating to the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary forces. The Communist Parties should carry on a precise and a definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any kind of military equipment intended for fighting against Soviet Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on propaganda among troops sent against workers' republics, etc.

15. All those parties which up to the present moment have stood upon the old social-democratic programmes should within the shortest time possible DRAW UP A NEW COMMUNIST PROGRAMME IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THEIR COUNTRY, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. As a rule the programme of each party belonging to the Communist International should be confirmed by the next Congress of the Communist International or its Executive Committee. In the event of the failure of the programme of any party being confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the said party shall be entitled to appeal to the Congress of the Communist International.

16. ALL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESSES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ARE BINDING FOR ALL PARTIES JOINING THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. The Communist International, operating under the conditions of most acute civil warfare, should be centralised in a better manner than was the Second International. At the same time the Communist International and the Executive Committee are, naturally, bound in every form of their activity to consider the variety of conditions under which the different parties have to work and struggle, and generally binding resolutions should be passed upon which such resolutions are possible.

17. In connection with the above, all parties desiring to join the Communist International should change their names. EACH PARTY DESIROUS OF JOINING THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL SHOULD BEAR THE FOLLOWING NAME: COMMUNIST PARTY OF SUCH AND SUCH A COUNTRY (BRANCH OF THE THIRD COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL). The question of the naming of a party is not only a formal one, but one of great importance. The Communist International has heclared a decisive war against the entire bourgeois world and all the yellow Social Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every rank and file worker should be able clearly to distinguish between the Communist Parties and the old official "Social Democratic" or "Socialist" parties, which have betrayed the cause of the working class.

18. ALL THE LEADING ORGANS OF THE PRESS OF THE PARTIES OF EVERY PARTY ARE BOUND TO PUBLISH ALL THE MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

19. All those parties which have joined the Communist International as well as those which have expressed a desire to do so are obliged in as short a space of time as possible, and in no case later than four months after the Second Congress of the Communist International, to convene an Extraordinary Congress in order to discuss these conditions. In addition to this the Central Committees of these parties should take care to acquaint all the local organisations with the regulations of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

20. All those parties which at the present time are willing to join the Third International, but have so far not changed their tactics in any radical manner, should, prior to their joining the Third International, take care that not less than two-thirds of their Committee members and all their Central Institutions should be composed of comrades who have made an open and definite declaration prior to the convening of the Second Congress as to their desire that the party should affiliate to the Third International THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL HAS THE RIGHT TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION ALSO FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE "CENTRE" AS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 7.

21. Those members of the party who reject on principle the conditions and the these of the Third International are to be excluded from the party

This applies also to the delegates at Extraordinary Conventions of the Party.

General Office:

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Box 4179. Phone 6035.

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THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:27 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

Today, we continue our hearings looking into the role of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba in fomenting terrorism in southern Africa.

Last week, these hearings included the testimony of the Honorable Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Dr. Peter Vanneman, a sovietologist and associate professor of political science at the University of Arkansas. We then heard the testimony of Miss Nokonono Kave, a former Black Consciousness organizer and African National Congress member; Ephraim Mfalapitsa and Jeffery Bosigo, former ANC cadres; and Bartholomew Hlapane, a former ranking official of the ANC and the South African Communist Party.

Today, witnesses will focus specifically on SWAPO and its relationship with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba. We will hear from Dickson Namolo and Emanuel Hashiko, two young men who were brought into SWAPO with the expectation of receiving education and academic training.

On Wednesday, we will hear from Andreas Shipanga, president of SWAPO–D, who, with Sam Nujoma, organized the Ovambo People's Organization.

Mr. Shipanga was scheduled to present his testimony today but he has not arrived in the United States yet. Therefore, we have rescheduled his appearance for Wednesday morning in anticipation that he will arrive in time to testify.

We will also hear the testimony of Advocate F. J. Kozonguizi, Director of Liaison Services of the Council of Ministers of South West

Africa/Namibia. The final witness will be Mr. Adriano Bomba, a former member of FRELIMO in Mozambique.

I should note for the press and the people here today that our previous witnesses were able to testify before us in their second language and spoke English almost fluently. For these witnesses today, English is their third language, after their native African tongue and the Afrikaner language. I mention this and ask for patience in the event we proceed more slowly in order to communicate.

I want to welcome Mr. Dickson Namolo, our first witness this morning.

Please stand, Mr. Namolo, so I can administer the oath. Please raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you; please be seated.

Do you have a prepared statement which you would like to present to us?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF DICKSON NAMOLO

Mr. NAMOLO. I am an Ovambo male and I was born on August 1, 1956, at Odibo in Namibia. I attended school at an Anglican Mission School at Odibo. I passed Standard 6 at the end of 1974.

[Photo of Mr. Namolo follows:]

Dickson Namolo, a former member of SWAPO.—Photocredit: Julia Ferguson.

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Mr. NAMOLO. In March 1975, while I was doing my Form 1, I decided to go to Angola with a group of five—two females and three males. Some of my friends had previously left Namibia to go to Zambia and had written letters to their relatives saying they were studying in Lusaka and enjoying it. I then decided to go to Lusaka and study to become a teacher.

At this stage, I had not received any political training and did not belong to any political party. I was not recruited by anyone.

I was young and single and had discussed the matter with my friends, and we all decided to go to Zambia for further academic training. We had decided to cross into Angola and to make contact with SWAPO soldiers. We would then tell them that we wanted to further our education. We hoped that they would send us to Lusaka or any other place where we could study. It was not our intention to go for military training and at no stage did we discuss the possibility of going for military training.

One morning, we all came together and each took a few items of clothing and blankets and left for Angola. Our village is close to the Namibian/Angolan border and we walked to the border post at Oshikango. The border post was manned by Portuguese, who asked us where we were going. We said we were going to Onjiva, and were allowed to go into Angola without any passport or travel document. In 1974 to 1975, many Namibians crossed the border in this way.

We took a bus to Onjiva where we met and spoke to the SWAPO representative. We told him that we wanted to go to Zambia to further our education. He agreed to this and said we would leave the following day to Zambia.

The following day, our group of five and about 60 other SWAPO left by bus to Viera de Ponto, and from there to Serpa Pinto, where we met with another SWAPO representative. We boarded another bus and traveled to Serva Porto and spent the night in a barrack of the UNITA organization. We were given food by the UNITA soldiers.

We met another SWAPO representative at Serva Porto who arranged for us to travel by train to Munjango. At Munjango, we were told by this SWAPO representative that we would not be going to Zambia but would instead receive military training at Okashapa in Angola. After our training, we would be sent into Namibia to fight in order to liberate Namibia.

At that stage, the whole group had been under the impression that they were going to Zambia for further academic training. We were all surprised to hear that we were to receive military training but we agreed to go.

We were taken to a SWAPO base at Okashapa to be trained. This base is situated in Angola near the Angolan/Zambian border. It is very far from the Angolan/Namibian border. Only SWAPO members were present in the camp and only SWAPO members were trained there while I received my training.

On our arrival in the camp, we were met by the administrative officer of the camp, Kalunga. He told us we would receive military training at the camp. He divided us into platoons and told us the camp rules. He also told us about guard duties at night and kitchen duties. He told us of the training schedule and the daily roster.

There were several hundred men and women in the camp and the camp commander was one Nakada, an Ovambo from Ombaranhu in Namibia. A few of us were issued with uniforms, but most of the cadres trained in civilian clothes. I did not have a uniform. Everybody was issued with a pair of boots. We all lived in barracks made of poles and grass. We constructed our own beds from poles and grass. We did our own laundry in a river. Our food was prepared in a communal kitchen and consisted of mealie (maize) meal, beans, and fish.

I received training at Okashapa for 5 months up to September 1975. I received infantry training in the following weapons: AK–47, PPSH, and a carbine that looks like a Mauser.

Our training in firearms consisted mainly of stripping and assembling the weapons. We never fired any of the weapons at Okashapa, but were taught the theory and handling and aiming of the weapons. We spent approximately 2 hours a day receiving instruction on these weapons.

We all were taught to march and we had approximately 90 minutes of drilling every day. We also had physical training and political instruction. In our political studies, we studied the geography of Namibia on maps and were told we had to fight to liberate Namibia. We were taught why we were fighting. We were told about the struggle for the Angolan and Mozambican independence. We were taught the history of SWAPO and also were taught about socialism and communism.

I enjoyed the training and thought it was good. After the training, I was fit and knew how to handle a weapon. Toward the end of my training, a number of young cadres—boys and girls under 14—were sent to Zambia for academic education. Approximately 100 were sent to Zambia. The youngest in the group was 10 years old.

In September 1975, about 160 of us were sent to Oluma camp near the Angolan/Namibian border. The camp is approximately 100 kilometers from the Namibian border and is a SWAPO training camp. There were approximately 800 SWAPO members in this camp. Some had completed their training whilst others were still in training. Nakada was still the camp commander.

I did no training at Oluma except for physical training every morning, and afternoon parades. After our arrival in the camp, we were issued with uniforms and firearms. I was issued with a PPSH submachine gun with two magazines and ammunition.

I was also issued with a military uniform consisting of a brown shirt and trousers and a cap. We were issued with water bottles, a belt, boots, blankets, military rucksacks. Whilst I was at Oluma, I used to go approximately twice a week into the bush outside the camp and practice firing my PPSH.

I spent approximately 3 months in Oluma, leaving early in 1976 to a base called Onamuidi. The commander was Pondo. The deputy commander was Andre, and the base was situated roughly 35 kilometers from the Namibian border. There were approximately 30 trained SWAPO cadres in this base. We were all issued with AK–47 rifles. I had previously handed my PPSH over to the stores at Oluma. There were also a few RPG–7 rocket launchers and a Soviet-made machine gun at Onamuidi.

The camp at Onamuidi consisted only of trenches, no buildings. The camp was close to the border and we had to be prepared in the event of an attack on the base camp. We stayed at Onamuidi for about 18 months until middle 1977.

During our stay at Onamuidi, we undertook approximately six missions into Namibia. On each mission, a section of seven men would be sent into Namibia to make contact with the villagers in order to obtain information on the movements, weapons, routine, strength, and location of the security forces. We also tried to obtain food and water from the villagers. The section would surround the village and the section commander alone or with one other would enter the village to speak to the villagers.

In the middle of 1977, the whole platoon, under the command of Pondo, moved into Namibia and stayed in the Ondanga area. We did not establish a fixed base because of the security forces in the area, but moved from one position to the next on a daily basis. After a while, Pondo was sent back to Angola and his place was taken by Agapandi.

Whilst we were in Namibia, we encountered the security forces on four occasions. While the security forces were tracking us, we would fall back and prepare ambushes. During one of these contacts, Agapandi was shot and killed by the security forces. We lost a further two men in the contacts. I do not know if any members of the security forces were killed.

We normally only carried water with us and obtained our food from the villagers at Ovambo. Some of these villagers supported us and supplied us with food and information.

At the beginning of 1978, I was informed by my commander, Foreman, who had taken over when Agapandi was killed, that I was to return to Angola. Another SWAPO cadre and I returned to Angola and went to the Ohapeto camp, which is situated approximately 30 kilometers from the Namibian border. There were about 500 trained cadres in the camp under the command of Burumganga.

I spent about 2 months at Ohapeto. I had been told that I would receive further training, but I did not know when or where. At the beginning of May 1978, 12 of us were taken by truck to Okashinga, where we remained for 2 days. We were then taken in a Gaz truck to Lubango, where we spent a week. It was at Lubango where we were informed that we were to be sent to the Soviet Union for training. They did not specify what kind of training we were to receive.

Thereafter, our group of 12 was taken to Luanda where we were accommodated in a warehouse that is used to store some of the SWAPO supplies. There were other people accommodated in the warehouse and we totaled approximately 70.

The SWAPO members who work in the Luanda office issued our group of 12 with travel documents. These travel documents had blue covers. Sonny Shikololo was appointed leader of our group and James was appointed as deputy commander. We were given air tickets valid for a trip from Luanda to Moscow. On May 4, 1978, we boarded an Aeroflot bound for Moscow. The aircraft refueled at Brazzaville and Budapest. At Budapest, we got off the plane for 1 hour.

We arrived at Moscow on May 5, 1978, and our group was met by a Soviet official called Alexander. He welcomed us and took us to an apartment in Moscow. He told us that SWAPO had sent us to Moscow to study underground work and intelligence. He said we were going to study for 6 months. He told us to hand over our travel documents to him for the duration of our stay in Moscow.

We spent the first day sightseeing in Moscow with Alexander. Our lectures began on May 7, 1978, with Russian language classes and political classes. Our Russian teacher was called Natasha. Our political instructor was called Alex, and Sasha interpreted the lectures into English. In our lectures on political theory, we studied books printed in English on Leninist teachings and political economy. We also studied the origin and development of communism and Leninist teachings.

We were being trained as intelligence personnel and in underground work. In our course on security and underground measures, we concentrated on physical security—how to protect people as bodyguards.

We were instructed on the use of the Makarov pistol—stripping, assembling and firing the weapon. In our training on underground work, we were taught how to work with the civilians, how to organize people, get their cooperation and recruit them as informers. Alexander, who met us at the airport on our arrival in Moscow, was our instructor in this part of the course. I am of the opinion that he works for Soviet intelligence.

We started our program at 8 on weekdays. After breakfast, we went to our classes for lectures which lasted for 6 hours—2 hours each for Russian, politics, security and underground measures. We studied 5 days a week for 6 months. Alexander told us that it had been intended to teach us codes, secret writing, and "criminalistics," but that it had been decided at a later stage that it was not necessary to teach us these topics.

We finished our course near the end of 1978. We were allowed to keep some of our notebooks but had to hand in the rest of our books which we had used for our studies. Alexander returned our travel documents to us and we returned by Aeroflot via Budapest directly to Luanda, arriving in November 1978.

On our return to Luanda, we were taken to the same SWAPO warehouse where we had previously been accommodated. We were instructed to surrender all the notes we had made in Moscow and thereafter were taken to Lubango, where we stayed for a week before moving on to the Matale base.

Matale base is situated in Angola approximately 250 kilometers from the Namibian border and was commanded by Kapuleko. There were approximately 200 trained cadres in Matale, mostly Ovambos, but also a few Kavangos, Damaras, and Caprivians. Here, we were divided into three groups.

There are three operational SWAPO regions in Angola; namely, the Northern, Eastern, and Western operational regions. I was the only one in my group to be sent to the Northern region. The other members of the Moscow group were sent to the Eastern and Western regions.

In the Northern operational region, I was attached to an information group consisting of 15 trained cadres. Some of us were

armed with AK-47's and others with Makarovs. Shikoka was our commander and Nikongo was our deputy commander. Our task was to debrief SWAPO cadres who returned to Angola from Namibia.

From early 1979, I was instructed by Shikoka to infiltrate into Namibia to make contact with Ovambo civilians in order to get information on security force movements. I used to cross into Namibia and spend 2 to 3 days at a time, collect the information, and then move out. I had completed about eight missions and on each occasion, I was dressed in civilian clothes and armed with a Makarov pistol.

I was arrested in Namibia on March 14, 1981, by the police while on such a mission. David Mashianga is a SWAPO member inside Angola, and I always used his documents when I went into Namibia because I had lost my own documents. When I was approached by the police on March 14 at Okatale, they found that my documents were not in order and arrested me. They found my pistol and took me into custody.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Namolo.

Your experiences appear less complex than those of the previous African witnesses who have testified before us.

Your story seems to be one of having been induced to travel to join SWAPO—induced under false pretenses, with the expectation that you were going to receive an education. The statement in your prepared statement says, "It was not our intention to go for military training and at no stage did we discuss the possibility of going for military training."

You were then trained both in Africa and in the Soviet Union. You said you enjoyed the training in Angola, and you did indeed return to fight there prior to your arrest by the South African police. You have told us a relatively direct story which simply confirms by one more witness the pretenses used by such groups as ANC and SWAPO to lure people into service.

As those of you who have been following these hearings have heard, in some cases, those who tried to depart from the indoctrination, training and fighting which they were asked to do, were tortured, sent to the Soviet Union, given injections, or killed.

This gentleman has no such story to tell, and we are not trying to represent it as a dramatic story at all.

Mr. Namolo, you have said that you are an Ovambo. How many tribes make up the Ovambo people?

Mr. NAMOLO. There are seven tribes making the Ovambo people: Kwanyama, Ndonga, Kwambi, Kwaluudi, Mbalantu, Ngandjera, and Eunda-Nkolokaadhi.

Senator DENTON. Where do the Ovambo people live?

Mr. NAMOLO. The Ovambo people live in the north of Namibia.

Senator DENTON. Is it true that you departed Namibia with the intention to get an education and become a teacher?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes, it was true. My aim to leave Namibia was to get a further education.

Senator DENTON. And where were you first told that you would not be continuing your education, but would receive military training in Angola?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes. SWAPO just told me that I am not going to get an education, but I am going to get military training.

Senator DENTON. So, you received military training. Did you ever get any education to become a teacher from SWAPO?

Mr. NAMOLO. No, I did not get an education.

Senator DENTON. Has any of your family ever been kidnaped by SWAPO?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes. One of my brothers was kidnaped by SWAPO. He was at school at Odibo and then he was taken to Angola where he was sent to GDR for training.

Senator DENTON. He was sent to the German Democratic Republic for training?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes, yes.

Senator DENTON. You have said that you enjoyed your training. When you were in the Soviet Union receiving military training and study, what did you tell the Russian people about who you were and why you were there?

Mr. NAMOLO. I was telling the Soviet people that I was coming from Zambia and I am studying at Patrice Lumumba University.

Senator DENTON. So, that was what we call a cover story?

Mr. NAMOLO. This is a cover story.

Senator DENTON. Who told you to give that cover story to the civilian people in the Soviet Union?

Mr. NAMOLO. Alexander, our instructor, told me to use a cover story for security reasons.

Senator DENTON. And they told you that it was a cover story. Is that correct?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes, they told me it was a cover story.

Senator DENTON. Do you know of anyone who has tried to return to SWAPO after having come back to Namibia?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes, I heard about two who were returned to SWAPO and then were killed.

Senator DENTON. They were killed?

Mr. NAMOLO. By SWAPO.

Senator DENTON. Why were they killed?

Mr. NAMOLO. It is one of these things that they were suspected of having cooperated with the South African Government.

Senator DENTON. So, they had a break in service for SWAPO, tried to return to SWAPO——

Mr. NAMOLO. Again.

Senator DENTON. And they were killed because they were suspected of cooperating with the government?

Mr. NAMOLO. Of South Africa.

Senator DENTON. After your experiences, do you still think SWAPO is a good organization?

Mr. NAMOLO. Sorry; repeat that. I do not understand.

Senator DENTON. Do you like SWAPO, after all you have been through? You have said you enjoyed your training; you liked your training; you fought with them.

I have no idea what your answer is going to be, but do you still like SWAPO? Do you think they are a good organization?

Mr. NAMOLO. No, I do not like SWAPO anymore.

Senator DENTON. What do you think would happen to you if you decided to return to SWAPO?

Mr. NAMOLO. I think that if I returned to SWAPO, SWAPO is going to kill me.

Senator DENTON. You think they would kill you.

What would they do to you if they find you are testifying today?

Mr. NAMOLO. If they find me while I am testifying here, they are going to kill me.

Senator DENTON. They would kill you?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Do you know of any chiefs, head men, who have been attacked or killed by SWAPO?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes. I know the chief of the Ovambos, Nghux Ulifa, was attacked by SWAPO at Engere, and the chief of Hereros was also killed by SWAPO.

Senator DENTON. Why does SWAPO kill important people like the head men?

Mr. NAMOLO. SWAPO intimidates the head men and the people in order not to cooperate with the South African Government.

Senator DENTON. They are trying to intimidate those head men and also the people under them to keep them from cooperating with the South West Africa Security Forces?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you, Mr. Namolo, and I want to congratulate you on your courage. I have just read your testimony and heard it; I really did not know what you were going to say when I said, "Do you still like SWAPO," because you were arrested when you were still serving them. And you believe now that they would kill you, were you to return, because they would suspect that you have cooperated with the Government and they would not like the fact that you testified before this subcommittee in the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. NAMOLO. Yes. I think that the time when I spent nearly a full year in the hands of the South African Government—then they think that I revealed some of the information and then if I go back to SWAPO, they are going to kill me.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much again, Mr. Namolo.

Mr. NAMOLO. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Our next witness is Mr. Emanuel Hashiko, another former member of SWAPO.

Mr. Hashiko, would you stand and raise your right hand? I am going to ask you to state that what you are about to say before this subcommittee is the truth.

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Is what you are going to say here the truth, and you will take an oath?

[No response.]

Senator DENTON. Do you swear that what you will say here today is the truth?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you; please be seated. Would you read your opening statement for us, please?

TESTIMONY OF EMANUEL HASHIKO

Mr. HASHIKO. OK, thanks.

I was born at Edundja in Ovambo on August 31, 1954. I am the oldest child and have one brother and seven sisters. I attended school at Edundja and eventually completed Form 1 at St. Mary's Mission at Odibo in 1975. Odibo is 1½ kilometers from the border between Namibia and Angola.

I had heard from my minister, Jesaj Wahongo, of the Elok Luthern Church of Edundja, about SWAPO. He had informed me that SWAPO was a good organization and that it represented all the people of Namibia. He organized people to leave the country and to join SWAPO.

In May 1976, three friends and I decided to leave the country. The schools in my area were all overcrowded. There were 70 to 80 students in some classes, and we had discussed the problem and decided to leave the country in order to further our education.

As a result of Jesaj Wahongo's influence and of what we heard over Radio Freedom, we decided to go to Angola, join SWAPO, and get further academic training. On SWAPO's radio program over Radio Freedom, the people of Namibia, and especially the young people, were told to leave Namibia and go to Angola to join SWAPO, who would see to it that they received further education. At that stage, I did not belong to any political party, but all the students at St. Mary's Mission used to listen to Radio Freedom. Pastor Wahongo told me of Freedom Radio and suggested that I listen to it.

The four of us took our clothes, money, and all our school books and walked to the border, where we crossed into Angola. The following day, we came across a group of about 20 SWAPO cadres near Ouhongo, which is in Angola about 12 kilometers from the border. They were dressed in uniform and were all armed.

They interrogated us separately and asked questions about our reasons for leaving Namibia. We told them that we had left to further our education. They then asked if we had been sent by the Boers and warned us that people sent by the Boers would be killed by SWAPO.

These SWAPO cadres told us to remain at Ouhongo and not to leave without authority. They said they did not believe that we had come to further our education, but had come to spy on SWAPO. We remained at Ouhongo for 2 days and then the commander of the SWAPO group sent us to the Oruma base, which is a whole day's walking from Ouhongo. We were escorted by four SWAPO cadres.

On our arrival at Oruma, I found that it was a SWAPO camp with more than 100 SWAPO cadres based there. Nakada was the commander of the camp. Nakada questioned us and told us to forget about academic education because SWAPO had no time for academic education; it only had time for military training.

He said SWAPO's aim was to liberate Namibia. He said there was only one way to join SWAPO, and that was to go for military training. As we had no choice in the matter, we decided to go for military training. Nakada had informed us that no one had the right to resign from SWAPO. If a person wanted to leave SWAPO,

it could only be done in a military way; that means the person has to be killed. I asked Nakada the reason for this. He said it was done so that the other cadres would remain in SWAPO.

We remained in the camp for 2 weeks, during which time we received political training on the history of SWAPO and Namibia. The lectures were given by a Namibian instructor, Nakale, who was the political commissar of the camp. We were taught how to march, but used sticks instead of guns. We were told that we knew nothing about guns and it would be dangerous for us to handle them. They also said that we might desert if we were issued with guns. The conditions at Oruma were bad. There was a shortage of food.

After 2 weeks, it was decided to move us to another camp that was further away from the border. By this time, many more recruits had arrived at Oruma and we were about 150 recruits that were taken to the new camp.

At the new camp, called Efuto, we trained for 3 months. The commander was called Zulu and the deputy commander was Kapanya. There were only two instructors in the camp. We received instruction in the use of the American-made PM—pistol machine gun—the G–3 rifle, as well as general infantry training.

In addition, we received political lectures and I was trained as a medical orderly by a Namibian nurse. I was taught how to give first aid to wounded persons and how to prepare food for patients.

At the beginning of September 1976, we were sent to Oukwanghari, where we stayed for 1 month. We were waiting to go to another camp for further training. Thereafter, I spent some time in Cassinga and also in Nova Lisboa.

At the end of December 1976, I was taken in a group of 180 to the Tobias Ha Inyeko Training Center at Lubango for further training. Here, I received 2 months' training as a medical infantryman. Our instructors were mostly Russians. The training concentrated on politics, military combat work, and first aid.

I attended the following courses: infantry—the instructor was Julius, a Russian; politics—Alexander, Russian; military combat work—Michael, Russian; radio—Sergei, Russian; medical—Haindongo, a SWAPO doctor who is in the leadership of SWAPO.

After our training, we were divided into various groups and my group of 15 moved south and eventually we arrived at Vietnam, a SWAPO base camp and regional headquarters which was situated about 40 kilometers from the Namibia/Angola border. Nakada was the regional commander and Mbango was the regional political commissar.

I was appointed as the medical orderly in a SWAPO detachment that was operating on the Angolan/Namibian border. Hamala was the detachment commander and "Jungle Fighter" was the political commissar. I worked with this detachment from March 1977 to May 1978.

During this time, the detachment did general patrolling in the border area and crossed into Namibia from time to time. On three occasions, we made contact with the South African Security Forces, and in the process we lost seven men and a further five were seriously wounded.

We withdrew from the border area in May 1978 after the South African forces had attacked Vietnam base and a large number of SWAPO cadres, including Nakada, had been killed. We withdrew to a place called Oshankongo. We stayed there for 2 weeks and came under the command of FAPLA, the armed forces of the MPLA government. Oshankongo is a FAPLA camp. Whilst we were there, I saw many Cubans in armored cars in the area.

We were later moved to Lubango, where we were visited by Sam Nujoma and Peter Nanyemba, who had discussions with the leaders of our group. We later moved to Okahama, where Sam Nujoma and the SWAPO leadership visited our camp. Nujoma told us that SWAPO had lost more than 150 in Vietnam and had lost more than 750 at Cassinga. He told us not to be afraid, as SWAPO would take revenge.

Kanana was appointed as our regional commander. We were told by Kanana that the chief of PLAN—People's Liberation Army of Namibia—Dimo Hamaambo, had given instructions that we were to move to the Onjiva area. We moved to Onjiva in August 1978 in a group of about 220 men.

We were told to settle about 10 kilometers from Onjiva and to operate against UNITA forces to the east of Onjiva in the Oshitumba area. Our SWAPO forces were integrated with FAPLA units to make a total strength of more than 400 men. We fought together with FAPLA forces against UNITA. During this time, we had more than 10 contacts with UNITA forces and more than 30 UNITA men were killed. Many more were captured.

We operated in this area until December 16, 1978, and were then moved to Oiputa base. At that stage, our detachment consisted of 170 men. We stayed in Oiputa for a few days and received fresh supplies. We were then sent back to the Namibian/Angolan border area and our detachment operated in the Osala, Odisana, and Ohaimona areas until November 1979.

We then broke up into smaller groups. I was in a group of 9 which was later joined by a further 10 SWAPO men. We were instructed to infiltrate into Namibia to check on the roads, waterholes, the terrain, in general, and to try and teach the locals politics in order to get their support. For this purpose, we had two political commissars attached to our platoon. We also had two guides who knew the area and could guide us to the villages.

In February 1980, we had a contact with the South African Security Forces. One of our political commissars was killed and I and another member were wounded. I had been wounded in both thighs. We were removed by helicopter to a hospital for treatment. I spent a week in the hospital.

The SWAPO morale, when I was captured, was poor and many of the cadres did not want to fight anymore. Many complained that their aim had been to go for education and not for military training. Many members of SWAPO were deserting. I heard that deserters are regarded by SWAPO as traitors and that they are killed by SWAPO when they are captured.

I am finished.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Hashiko.

For the record, I will mark my own interest in Mr. Hashiko's having been informed that SWAPO was a good organization by the

Lutheran Church minister, who was actively organizing people to leave the country to join SWAPO. That minister presented SWAPO as a good organization and as representing all the people of Namibia.

You joined SWAPO, as the previous witness, to get further academic training. You did not enjoy your training, as did Mr. Namolo, at first. Indeed, you testify that you were told by SWAPO that SWAPO had no time for academic education; only time for military training and that there was only one way to join SWAPO, and that was to go for military training.

You have stated that since you had no choice, you went for military training. Your leader informed you that not only did no one have the right to resign from SWAPO, but that if a person wanted to leave SWAPO, it could only be done in a military way. "That means the person has to be killed." You asked the leader the reason for this, and he said that people were killed so that the other cadres would not also decide to leave SWAPO.

For the information of those listening to this hearing, although in the United States the word "c-a-d-r-e" usually is a collective term and connotes a group, it is pronounced and connoted differently by South Africans. It is pronounced "cadre," and a cadre is one person—apparently one soldier or operator. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. OK.

You received some political training on SWAPO and Namibia, but you were not given a gun for quite some time because they said you might try to desert. You named your instructors in a camp at Lubango, and it is interesting that, of the five principal course directors, only the medical course director was an African. The other four—infantry, politics, military combat work, and radio course instructors or supervisors were Russians.

This term "Vietnam" is a code name for a camp 40 kilometers from the Namibia/Angola border. You named the people there; you talked about some of the battles you took part in. You lost a considerable number of men in some of these encounters. You were told that 750 were lost in Cassinga—a battle there.

Your emphasis is more negative with respect to SWAPO and your experience in it than the previous witness, who has decided that SWAPO is not a good organization. You never thought it was good but served in it for fear of your life, very much as Miss Kave served in ANC for some time.

Mr. Hashiko, how did you first hear or learn of SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. First, I heard it from our Lutheran pastor that SWAPO is a good organization.

Senator DENTON. And he was organizing people to leave Namibia to join SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes, that is quite correct.

Senator DENTON. What was Radio Freedom, and what was it saying about SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. I have also heard a voice of SWAPO broadcasting from Zambia that SWAPO is a good organization. Then they call all of the students, especially the younger ones, to join SWAPO in order to get further education.

Senator DENTON. It is true, as I said, that you do not like SWAPO. There was not fair treatment; you cannot resign; there were no rights for the cadres. You had no rights in SWAPO to simply resign. They would have killed you. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes, that is correct.

Senator DENTON. It is correct that when you asked SWAPO for the academic education, they told you they have only military training. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. But you did not expect that from what the pastor had told you or what the radio station had told you. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Pardon?

Senator DENTON. The radio station and the pastor, the Lutheran minister, did not tell you before you departed that you could not get academic training?

Mr. HASHIKO. No.

Senator DENTON. Can you now receive the education you wanted in Namibia?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Things have changed in Namibia and you could receive your education there now. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Why do you think the military training that you received was conducted by the Soviets and not by Ovambo?

Mr. HASHIKO. I have received the training by the Russian experts because they say that the Soviet people, they are experts about military equipment.

Senator DENTON. You have told us about some of the fighting in which you engaged. We are also interested in other aspects of terrorism. Do you know anything about kidnaping of Namibian schoolchildren by SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes, I know.

Senator DENTON. Would you tell us something about it?

Mr. HASHIKO. OK. One day in 1977, I was in a group of 100 men of SWAPO and they were kidnaping some students from Otapi school. And before we did this, we were divided in two groups. One group is supposed to make an ambush by the road because there was a military base nearby that secondary school.

And after that, when we made an ambush, we cut the telephone wires and the second group was going inside the mission and they took all of the students.

Senator DENTON. And what happened to these children?

Mr. HASHIKO. Many of the children were crying because they did not want to go to Angola; it was not their willingness. And after that, we bring the students in Angola, up to Vietnam, where the regional commander stayed. And when Nakada saw the students, he called his political commissar so that he could speak to the students; it means to give them some politics.

I know all the students were trained as military men or cadres.

Senator DENTON. So, in 1977, you were ordered to kidnap school children to be cadres, and 80 to 100 of you traveled to South West Africa and went to the Otapi Secondary School. Your group split in

half; one group got into a position for an ambush between the school and the road.

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And the second group actually went into the school and took more than 150 students back to Angola?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. You say many of these students were crying. Did you break the communications between the school and those who would have protected those students? What did you do to prevent your operation from being interrupted? Did you cut the telephone lines, for example?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes; we cut the telephone lines before we did this because we did not want the contact.

Senator DENTON. The subcommittee has documents supporting this witness' statement regarding the kidnaping of children and of others, which documents will be inserted into the record at a later stage of the hearings.[1]

There are shops called cuca shops, which are small privately owned stores where people go to drink beer. Do you know of any kidnaping or taking of people from cuca shops by SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes; I know it very well because I was also there.

Senator DENTON. You were there?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. How many men were taken?

Mr. HASHIKO. There were more than 70 men.

Senator DENTON. More than 70?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What would have happened if those men had tried to escape?

Mr. HASHIKO. If they try to escape, we shoot them.

Senator DENTON. You would have shot them?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Would you give the place and date those 70 men were taken from the cuca shop?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes. It was May 1979—1979.

Senator DENTON. Did you have a standing order in SWAPO to shoot anyone who tried to escape such a raid?

Mr. HASHIKO. That is quite correct.

Senator DENTON. And you have already testified that anyone trying to resign from SWAPO would be killed. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And the killing of one or two who tried to escape—that killing is done to frighten the remainder to stay. Is that correct?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. What do you think would happen to you now, after testifying here, were you to be available to SWAPO?

Mr. HASHIKO. I think that I am going to be killed.

Senator DENTON. You feel that you are going to be killed?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

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[1] Aforementioned documents can be found as exhibit C in the appendix of the March 31, 1982, hearing, at p. 740.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you for your testimony this morning. You have risked your life, Mr. Hashiko. I think that you have risked your life because by doing so, you may bring some truth before the world which might help it be a better world. And stop some of the things that are going on that are not known.

Did you understand what I just said?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Is that a true statement?

Mr. HASHIKO. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hashiko.

Mr. HASHIKO. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Before we close this hearing, I would like to again highlight the reason for the subcommittee's interest in evidence indicating the Soviet presence and role in terrorism in southern Africa.

Soviet intentions for Africa were made crystal clear in a statement by Leonid Brezhnev made in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1973. Brezhnev said:

> Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa.

It is not my prerogative or intention to debate U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa in this forum. However, I find it relevant as a U.S. citizen and as a Senator to note that there is an economic relationship, not just a military, political or strategic relationship, between events in Africa, especially southern Africa, and the Mideast. Events in Africa have had a tremendous effect on the rest of the world, just as events in Southeast Asia did. Furthermore, these events will have an even greater effect if the forces and trends operating there, such as the increasing and indiscriminate use of terrorism, are not understood and addressed realistically. It is not just a matter of economics, but it is also a matter of survival for those of us who value individual freedom and self-determination.

I am delighted and encouraged that the real issues of our day are at least sometimes mentioned in the media here in Washington. For example, in today's Washington Post, there appeared in the Style Section an article called "Reminders of Russia: Warm Friends Toast Slava's 55th On a Cold Night", about the 55th birthday party for Mstislav Rostropovich, a Russian emigre. The article concludes as follows:

> Rostropovich concluded the toasts with an emotional political warning. He is here for the first time since the orchestra's February tour of Europe and expressed distress with anti-nuclear movement there. "Americans do not like to suffer. In the U.S. you have such a beautiful life. Your freedom is a gift from the gods. But you must protect it. You don't realize as I do what it is like in the other half of the world. Do not be naive . . .
>
> "Believe me, I love people so much. And I hate war. These demonstrations are not for peace that can last; they are not for peace, but for weakness."
>
> Then he turned to Maxim Shostokovich. The two men embraced, with tears welling in their eyes.

[The full text of the article is in the subcommittee files.]

We ignore at our peril such insights and warnings given by those who have experienced firsthand the reality of the Soviet system, whether in the Soviet Union or in southern Africa.

On Wednesday, we will resume our proceedings and hear from Andreas Shipanga, president of SWAPO-D; Advocate F. J. Kozonguizi, Director of Liaison Services of the Council of Ministers of South West Africa/Namibia; and Adriano Bomba, a former member of FRELIMO in Mozambique.

We have asked both the African National Congress and SWAPO to testify at these hearings. However, we have not received acceptances yet. I have a copy of SWAPO's constitution which will be made a part of the record.[1]

This hearing stands adjourned until Wednesday of this week.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Wednesday, March 31, 1982.]

APPENDIX



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CONSTITUTION
OF THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO)
OF NAMIBIA

Adopted by the meeting of the Central Committee
July 28th-August 1st 1976, Lusaka, Zambia.

Published by the SWAPO Department for Publicity and Information,
Provisional Headquarters: P.O. Box 577, Lusaka, Zambia.

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CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I

Name

The name of the organization is the South West Africa People's Organization (hereafter to be referred to as SWAPO or, interchangeably the Organization) of Namibia.

ARTICLE II

Definition

SWAPO is a national liberation movement rallying together, on the basis of free and voluntary association, all freedom-inspired sons and daughters of the Namibian people. It is the organized political vanguard of the oppressed and exploited people of Namibia. In fulfilling its vanguard role, SWAPO organizes, unites, inspires, orients and leads the broad masses of the working Namibian people in the struggle for national and social liberation. It is thus the expression and embodiment of national unity, of a whole people united and organized in the struggle for total independence and social liberation.

ARTICLE III

Aims and Objectives

A. PREAMBLE

(1) Whereas Namibia is still under foreign domination;

(2) Whereas the Namibian people's inalienable and imprescriptible right to self-determination and national independence is denied;

(3) Whereas the occupying colonial power persists in its refusal to unconditionally withdraw all its repressive military and police forces and its administration from Namibia;

(4) Whereas the occupying colonial regime persists in its efforts to consoli-

date its illegal occupation by intensified repression and the fragmentation of Namibia into bantustans; and

(5) Whereas the regime continues to disregard the Namibian people's deep yearning for freedom;

B. Now, therefore do declare the basic aims and objectives of SWAPO as follows:

(1) To fight recentlessly for the immediate and total liberation of Namibia from colonial and imperialist occupation;

(2) To unite all the people of Namibia, irrespective of race, religion, sex or ethnic origin, into a cohesive, representative, national political entity;

(3) To foster a spirit of national consciousness or a sense of common purpose and collective destiny among the people of Namibia;

(4) To combat all reactionary tendencies of individualism, tribalism, racism, sexism and regionalism;

(5) To co-operate to the fullest extent with all the genuine national liberation movements, progressive governments, organizations and individuals throughout the world towards complete elimination of the colonial system of imperialism;

(6) To establish in Namibia a democratic, secular government founded upon the will and participation of all the Namibian people;

(7) To ensure that the people's government exercises effective control over the means of production and distribution and pursues a policy which facilitates the way to social ownership of all the resources of the country;

(8) To work towards the creation of a non-exploitative and non-oppressive classless society;

(9) To ensure that a people's government in an independent Namibia co-operates with other States in Africa in bringing about African unity;

(10) To see that the people's government works in close co-operation with all peace-loving States towards world peace and security.

ARTICLE IV

Membership

There shall be two categories of SWAPO membership:

(a) Indiyidual membership, and

(b) Affiliate membership.

A. Individual Membership

(1) Membership of SWAPO shall be open to every Namibian who accepts the aims and objectives as set out in Article III and who, in addition; is of the age of 18 years and above.

(2) A person wishing to become a member of SWAPO shall make his or her application on SWAPO application form and submit it to the Secretary of the appropriate District Branch of the Organization.

(3) To be accorded SWAPO membership, a person must not be a member of any other political organization; only a member of the age of 18 and above shall be eligible to vote

(4) Upon admission to membership, he or she shall pay an admission fee of one (SA) Rand to SWAPO and a receipt thereof shall be given. In addition, he or she shall pay a monthly subscription of 50 (SA) cents.

(5) Membership in SWAPO may be lost through:

(a) resignation; and

(b) expulsion under Article V A (6) and VI (II).

(6) In the event of either resignation or expulsion, no refund of admission fee or subscription shall be made.

B. Affiliate Membership

(1) Affiliate Membership of SWAPO shall be open to any bona fide organization (e.g., a trade union, student union or a professional organization) which accepts the aims and objectives of SWAPO as set out in Article III.

(2) Any organization wishing to become an affiliate member of SWAPO shall apply in writing, enclosing a resolution to the effect of its decision, to the Administrative Secretary of SWAPO.

(3) The Administrative Secretary of SWAPO shall place the application before the National Executive Committee of SWAPO which shall decide whether or not to grant membership.

(4) Upon admission to the membership, the organization shall pay an admission fee of twenty Rands.

(5) An affiliate organization may be called upon by SWAPO to make such financial contributions towards the funds of the organization as may be agreed between SWAPO and that organization.

(6) Affiliate membership may be lost through:

(a) withdrawal by the organization; and

(b) expulsion from SWAPO under Articles V A (6) and VI (11).

(7) No affiliate organization may withdraw from SWAPO unless it has given notice to that effect six months in advance.

(8) No refund of fee shall be made upon with-drawal or upon expulsion.

(9) A member of SWAPO has the following obligations:

(a) To act in the spirit of self-sacrifice, dedication and boundless commitment to the cause of national and social liberation in Namibia:

(b) To be an example of human conduct, comradeship and collectivism;

(c) To respect, take care of and protect the property of the Organization;

(d) To attend meetings of the Organization called by the organs he or she belongs to, as well as any other meeting he or she may be summoned upon by the Organization to attend;

(e) To express in meetings his or her opinions and contribute to discus-

sions and participate in the adoption of the decisions of the Congress;

(f) To observe and comply wioth decisions, resolutions and directives of the majority, even though he or she might have voted against them or upheld a diverging opinion during the discussion;

(g) To contribute to the strengthening of the organic unity of the Organization and the political consciousness of its rank and file;

(h) To be ever vigilant against infiltration of the ranks of the Organization by persons not worth the honour of SWAPO membership;

(i) To oppose factionalism and defend the Organization;

(j) To strive constantly to explain the policy and programme of the Organization to the masses;

(k) To promote and exercise criticism and selfcriticism with a view to overcoming any defects, errors or deviations in the Organization;

(l) To be sincere, honest and never to distort or hide the truth; and

(m) To protect the Organization's secrets.

(10) A member of SWAPO has a right:

(a) To demand the fulfillment of what is established in this Constitution, as well as of resolutions, decisions, directives and agreements of the Organization;

(b) To participate in forums and meetings of SWAPO organs and affiliate organizations to which he or she belongs and to freely discuss in them the policy and activity of the Organization;

(c) To put forward propositions and defend his or her opinions before agreement is rached on the matter under discussion;

(d) To participate in the Congresses, forums and meetings of the organs to which he or she belongs;

(e) To vote at meetings on decisions to be taken in relation to matters discussed;

(f) To elect and be elected to positions of authority in the Organization;

(g) To state matters and address questions, petitions and proposals to the appropriate organs; and

(h) To receive concrete and timely answers to his or her questions.

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

ARTICLE V

National Organs

A. THE CONGRESS

(1) There shall be a Congress of SWAPO.

(2) The Congress shall be the supreme organ of the Organization.

(3) The Congress of SWAPO shall be composed of:

(a) All members of the Central Committee;

(b) All members of the Nattional Executive Committee;

(c) Four delegates from each of the Regional Executive Committees;

(d) Four delegates from the People's Liberation Army of Namibia;

(e) Four representatives from each of the following wings of the Organization:

SWAPO Youth League

SWAPO Women Council

SWAPO Elder's Council

(4) The Congress shall have the power to set policy of the Organization, to

review and assess the overall activity and development of the Organization between two Congresses.

(5) The Congress shall have the power to confirm, amend, repudiate or revoke any decision made by any organ of the Organization.

(6) The Congress shall evaluate the work of the Central Committee, consider and adopt reports and recommendations thereof.

(7) The Congress shall determine the programmatic orientation of the Organization and decide on all important matters of internal policy and the basic courses of activity in international afairs.

(8) The Congress shall have the power to adopt and amend the Constitution of the Organization; a majority of twothirds of the votes shall be required for such purpose.

(9) The Congress shall elect the Central Committee of the Organization.

(10) A regular Congress of the Organization shall be held after every five years.

(11) The Congress shall be called by the Central Committee three months prior to work of the Congress.

(12) The Central Committee when calling for the holding of the Congress, shall make known the agenda which it proposes to guide the work of the Congress.

(13) The Central Committee may on its own initiative, or at the request of at least two-thirds majority of all Regional Executive Committees, convene an extraordinary Congress of the Organization.

(14) The agenda of an extraordinary Congress shall be proposed by the initiators of such a Congress.

(15) The extraordinary Congress shall be held not later than two months after the proposal for its convocation has been made.

(16) The quorum of the Congress shall be half of the voting delegates.

ARTICLE IV

The Central Committee

(1) There shall be a Central Committee of SWAPO.

(2) The composition of the Central Committee shall consist of 45 members.

(3) A minimum of 5 years of membership in SWAPO shall be required for a member to be eligible for membership in the Central Committee.

(4) The Central Committee shall be the highest organ of authority between two Congresses.

(5) The Central Committee shall discuss, review, annul or adopt resolutions, decisions and recommendations of the National Executive Committee.

(6) The Central Committee shall convene the Congress of SWAPO.

(7) The Central Committee shall meet annually or as often as it shall be requested by the National Executive Committee.

(8) The Central Committee shall elect from amongst its members, the National Executive Committee and all national officers other than the President, the Vice-President, the National Chairman and the two members of the National Executive Committee from the People's Liberation Army of Namibia.

(9) The Central Committee shall consider current issues of the policy and practice of SWAPO, adjust political views, respond timely to new problems and determine concrete political stands towards solutions to such problems.

(10) The Central Committee shall determine the most appropriate ways and means of promoting the political education and development of the cadres of the Organization.

(11) The Central Committee shall have the power to expel any member of the Organization for serious misconduct or violation of the Constitution.

(12) The Central Committee shall establish norms to ensure periodic exami-

nation of revenues and disbursements of funds and other properties of the Organization.

(13) The quorum of the Central Committee shall be a simple majority of its members.

ARTICLE VII

The National Executive Committee

(1) There shall be a National Executive Committee of SWAPO.

(2) The National Executive Committee shall be the chief political bureau of the Central Committee.

(3) The composition of the National Executive Committee shall consist of 17 members, including:

(a) the President;

(b) the Vice-President;

(c) the National Chairman (person); and

(d) two members appointed by the President from the Military Council of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia.

(4) The National Executive Committee shall be responsible for putting into practice all decisions, resolutions and directives of the Congresses and the Central Committee.

(5) The National Executive Committee shall be responsible for policy formulation in the period between Central Committee meetings.

(6) The National Executive Committee shall be responsible to and render accounts periodically to the Central Committee on its own work, on that of the Regional Executive Committees as well as on that of the Secretariat.

(7) The National Executive Committee shall appoint a Secretariat which shall assist it in executing the day to day work of the Organization.

(8) All members of the National Executive Committee shall be compulsorily required to attend all meetings of the National Executive Committee, except those who may be on specific missions or duties of the Organization.

(9) A member of the National Executive Committee who fails to be present at three consecutive meetings without valid reasons shall immediately cease to be a member of the National Executive Committee.

(10) The National Executive Committee shall supervise and control the use and maintenance of SWAPO funds and books of accounts at the Headquarters, the Regional, the District and at the Branch levels of the Organization.

(11) The National Executive Committee shall have authority to suspend any member of Affiliate Organization for serious misconduct or violation of the Constitution and refer the matter to the Central Committee for final action.

(12) The National Executive Committee shall have the power to summon extraordinary meetings of the Central Committee as well as of the Regional Conferences.

(13) The National Executive Committee shall appoint officials and cadres to undertake missions abroad on the recommendation of the relevant departments.

(14) The National Executive Committee shall have the power to appoint Regional Officials in case of unresolved dispute in a Regional Executive Committee.

(15) The National Executive Committee shall meet at least once a month and as often as it may be requested by the Secretariat or by a Regional Executive Committee.

(16) A member of the National Executive Committee shall have the right to suggest an emergency meeting of the National Executive Committee.

(17) The National Executive Committee shall have the power to appoint one Deputy to each of the National Officers whose duties and functions are defined under Article IX; this shall exclude the offices of the Vice-President and National Chairman.

(18) The quorum of the National Executive Committee shall be a simple majority of its members.

ARTICLE VIII

National Officers

Besides the President, the Vice-President and National Chairman (person), there shall be the following National Officers elected by the Central Committee from amongst its members:

(1) Administrative Secretary

(2) National Treasurer

(3) Secretary for International Relations

(4) Secretary for Defence

(5) Secretary for Information and Publicity

(6) Secretary for Transport

(7) Secretary for Economic Affairs

(8) Secretary for Legal Affairs

(9) Secretary for Education and Culture

(10) Secretary for Health and Social Welfare

(11) Organising Secretary

(12) Secretary for Labour

(13) Secretary for Youth

(14) Secretary for SWAPO Women Council

(15) Secretary for SWAPO Elder's Council.

ARTICLE IX

DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL OFFICERS

The duties and functions of the National Officers shall be as follows:

(A) THE PRESIDENT

(1) The President of SWAPO shall be the leader and the Chief Executive Officer of the Organization;

(2) He or she shall be Commander-in Chief of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia's armed forces;

(3) He or she shall be the Chairman (person) of the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee;

(4) He or she shall appoint or dismiss members of the Military Council of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia on the recommendations of the Military Council;

(5) He or she shall appoint representatives abroad and revoke such appointments;

(6) He or she shall conduct his or her duties and functions in consultation with the National Executive Committee;

(7) He or she shall be elected by the Congress for a five year term of office;

(8) He or she shall be eligible for re-election; and

(9) He or she may be removed from office by Congress resolution by at least two thirds majority of the delegates.

(B) VICE-PRESIDENT

(1) The Vice-President shall be elected by the Congress for a five year term of office;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by Congress resolution sup-

ported by at least two-thirds majority of the delegates;

(4) He or she shall be the principal assistant to the President in the discharge of the duties and functions of the Organization;

(5) He or she shall exercise all such functions as may be delegated to him or her by the President; and

(5) He or she shall exercise all such functions as may by delegated to him or her by the President; and

(6) He or she shall exercise the same power and carry out all the duties and functions of the President in the absence of the President.

(C) NATIONAL CHAIRMAN (PERSON)

(1) The National Chairman (person) shall be elected by the Congress for a five year term of office;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by the Congress resolution supported by at least two-thirds majority of all the delegates;

(4) He or she shall be the assistant to the President and the Vice-President in the discharge of the duties and functions of the Organization;

(5) In the absence of the President and the Vice-President the National Chairman (person) shall perform all the duties and functions of the President;

(6) He or she shall preside over all national rallies and meetings of the Congress; and

(7) He or she shall perform such functions of the Organization as may be assigned to him or her by the President.

(D) ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY

(1) He or she shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds majority of the members;

(4) He or she shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization for the supervision, co-ordination and efficient administration of the day to day activities of the Organization;

(5) He or she shall be Secretary to the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee;

(6) He or she shall record the business of the Congress, the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee;

(7) He or she shall maintain a register of the Organisation's membership;

(8) He or she shall be in constant correspondence with all the Regional Executive Committees;

(9) He or she shall regularly visit Regional offices to acquaint himself or herself with problems facing such offices;

(10) He or she shall be responsible for sending out invitations, by letter or other approved methods, to the Congress, the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee meetings;

(11) He or she shall keep records, minutes and correspondence of meetings and decisions of the National and Regional organs as well as of the affiliate organizations; and

(12) He or she shall be co-signatory to all cheques at the National Headquarters.

(E) SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS

(1) The Secretary for Foreign Relations shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds majority of the members;

(4) He or she shall be primarily responsible for promoting friendship, co-operating and active solidarity with all anti-imperialist, and democratic forces and movements fighting for the liberation of man from all forms of oppression, exploitation and foreign domination;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for contacts and interactions between SWAPO and foreign governments, national and international organizations;

(6) He or she shall be responsible for all foreign correspondences of the Organizations;

(7) He or she shall transmit foreign correspondences to the office of the Administrative Secretary and the other relevant departments for prompt action; and

(8) He or she shall be responsible for transmitting National Executive Committee decisions and guidelines to SWAPO representatives in missions abroad.

(F) SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE

(1) The Secretary for Defence shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds majority of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for the training supply and equipment of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for the political education and revolutionary discipline of the military cadres of SWAPO;

(6) He or she shall be responsible for enforcing strict observance of the

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Rules, Regulations and Standing Orders governing the conduct of the members of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia;

(7) He or she shall be a member of the Military Council of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia; and

(8) He or she shall recommend to the President for promotion, demotion, suspension or dismissal of any member of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia for violation of its Rules, Regulations and Standing Orders.

(G) NATIONAL TREASURER

(1) The National Treasurer of SWAPO shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee from amongst its members;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall receive and bank all the monies belonging to the Organization within 7 days of receipt of such monies;

(5) He or she shall keep and maintain account books, vouchers, financial documents, reports and stockcard of the Organization;

(6) He or she shall prepare and present to the National Executive Committee and the Central Committee, at the end of each financiel year, up to date accounts of income and expenditure of the Organization;

(7) He or she shall have the power to check SWAPO banking accounts and books in the Regional and District Offices as well as in missions abroad and reports the finding thereof to the National Executive Committee;

(8) He or she shall be responsible for making SWAPO payment and for keeping copies of all receipts thereof;

(9) He or she shall prepare all cheques and payment vouchers;

(10) He or she shall study possibilities and make proposals about the appropriate ways and means of raising funds for the Organization; and

(11) He or she shall be co-signatory to all cheques at the National Headquarters.

(H) SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY

(1) The Secretary for Information and Publicity shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for gathering, analysing, publishing and disseminating information on the socio-economic and political conditions in Namibia as well as on the struggle for liberation;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for composing, editing and issuing SWAPO press releases and publications and for arranging press Conferences as may be directed by the National Executive Committee, the Secretariate or the President of SWAPO;

(6) He or she shall be the principal supervisor and co-ordinator of SWAPO radio programmes, and

(7) He or she shall be responsible for the propagation, explanation and defence of SWAPO policy and programme through the press of the Organization or any other approved medium of communication.

(I) SECRETARY FOR EDUCATION AND CULTURE

(1) The Secretary for Education and Culture shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for the training and education of the members of the Organization by organizing scholarships and SWAPO institutions of learning;

(5) He or she shall advise SWAPO students as to the most essential technical and professional skills with regard to both the liberation struggle and the future reconstruction of the country, and

(6) He or she shall be responsible for the promotion of the artistic creativity and spiritual values of the members of the Organization.

(J) SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT

(1) The Secretary for Transport shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by a simple majority of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for the acquisition and proper maintenance of vehicles of the Organization;

(5) He or she shall keep stock-card on vehicles of the Organization and co-ordinate with the National Treasurer regarding financial implications of such vehicles; and

(6) He or she shall properly and equitably assign vehicles and the use thereof to all departments.

(K) SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS

(1) The Secretary for Legal Affairs shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall study all the racist laws and regulations that are used as instruments of oppression and exploitation in Namibia and make recommendations thereon to the National Executive Committee;

(5) He or she shall study all "treaties" purportedly entered into on behalf of Namibia by previous colonial administrations and the illegal South African regime and make recommendations thereon to the National Executive Committee;

(6) He or she shall maintain contacts with national and international legal bodies and represent the organisation in international conferences on legal matters in the interest of Namibia.

(L) SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

(1) The Secretary for Economic Affairs shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall study forms and extent to which Namibias natural resources are being exploited by South Africa and world monopoly capital and make recommendations thereon to the National Executive Committee;

5. He or she shall study the potentialities and possibilities for an all-round economic development in a liberated Namibia and make recommendations thereon to the National Executive Committee;

6. He or she shall consult and co-ordinate with the United Nations Council for Namibia as well as the United Nations Institute for Namibia; and

7. He or she shall endeavour to attend international economic conferences and meetings on behalf of SWAPO and in the interests of Namibia.

(M) SECRETARY FOR LABOUR

(1) The Secretary for Labour shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall be the principal link between the Organization and Namibia's toiling masses in the mining industries, factories, farms, in the service and construction industries;

(5) He or she shall propagate, explain and defend SWAPO policy and programme to the working people;

(6) He or she shall study at all times the state of minds of the working people, their opinions, concerns and requirements and report these to the National Executive Committee with proposals as to the measures to be adopted to improve the situation of the workers;

(7) He or she shall encourage and support efforts of the working people to organize themselves into trade unions;

(8) He or she shall encourage bona fide trade unions in Namibia to seek affiliate membership with SWAPO; and

(9) He or she shall maintain contacts with rational and international labour movements and represent the Organization in conferences of such movements.

(N) ORGANIZING SECRETARY

(1) The Organizing Secretary shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for the strengthening and deepening of the relations between the Organization and the masses;

(5) He or she shall explain to the masses the aims and objectives as well as the policy and programme of the Organization; and

(6) He or she shall ensure the implementation of the resolutions, decisions and directives of the Organization.

(O) SECRETARY FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

(1) The Secretary for Health and Social Welfare shall be elected by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for the health and medical care of the members of the Organization;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for the establishment of SWAPO para-medical and nurses training centres as well as for the organization of mobile clinics; and

(6) He or she shall be responsible for the just and equitable distribution of all the social amenities which the Organization may organize in the interests of its members.

(P) SECRETARY FOR YOUTH

(1) The Secretary for Youth shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the voting members;

(4) He or she shall be accountable to the National Executive Committee;

(5) He or she guide the activities of the SWAPO Youth League on the

basis of the directives of the National Executive Committee;

(6) He or she shall promote and coordinate contracts and solidarity activities between the SWAPO Youth League and other progressive Youth movements throughout the world; and

(7) He or she shall ensure that the SWAPO Youth League shall be a militant reserve of the Organization and a transmission belt of SWAPO policy, ideology and Programme.

(Q) SECRETARY FOR THE SWAPO WOMEN'S COUNCIL

(1) The Secretary for the SWAPO Women's Council shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) She shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) She may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by at least two-thirds of the members;

(4) She shall be accountable to the National Executive Committee;

(5) She shall be responsible for the articulation of SWAPO policy and programme among the Namibian women;

(6) She shall supervise the activities of the SWAPO Women's Council;

(7) She shall give guidance in the formulation and execution of the plans and programmes designed to promote the specific interests of the women;

(8) She shall preside over SWAPO women's conferences and meetings; and

(9) She shall promote co-operation and solidarity with other national and international women's organizations.

(R) SECRETARY FOR THE SWAPO ELDERS' COUNCIL

(1) The Secretary for the SWAPO Elders' Council shall be elected for a five year term of office by the Central Committee;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Central Committee supported by two-thirds of the voting members;

(4) He or she shall be accountable to the National Executive Committee;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for the explanation of SWAPO policy and programme amongst the Namibian elders;

(6) He or she shall encourage elders to play an active role in the running of the Organization by availing to SWAPO, their experienced guidance and tried wisdom; and

(7) He or she shall supervise the activities and preside over the meetings of the SWAPO Elders' Council.

ARTICLE X

Secretariat

(1) There shall be a Secretariat of SWAPO;

(2) The Secretariat shall be appointed by the National Executive Committee;

(3) The composition shall be as follows:

(a) heads of departments;

(b) one representative of SWAPO Youth League;

(c) one representative of SWAPO Women's Council;

(d) one representative of SWAPO Elders' Council;
(e) one representative of each of the affiliate organizations; and
(f) technical cadres appointed on the basis of their particular expertise.

(4) The Secretariat shall assist the National Executive Committee in the implementation of the decisions, resolutions and directives of the Congresses and Central Committee;

(5) The Secretariat shall be responsible for the co-ordinated functioning of the technical and administrative mechanisms of the Organization;

(6) The Secretariat shall have the power to call for emergency meetings of the National Executive Committee;

(7) The quorum of the Secretariat shall be simple majority of its members.

ARTICLE XI

Regional organs

(1) There shall be the following organs of SWAPO at the regional level:
(a) Regional Conference; and
(b) Regional Executive Committee.

A. Regional Conference

(2) There shall be a Regional Conference for each Administrative Region.

(3) The composition of the Regional Conference shall be as follows:
(a) Members of the Regional Executive Committee;
(b) Four delegates from each of the Districts in the Region;
(c) Four delegates from each of the affiliate organizations;
(d) Four representatives from each of the following wings:
SWAPO Youth League;
SWAPO Women's Council; and
SWAPO Elders' Council.

(4) The Regional Conference shall be the highest organ of authority in the Region.

(5) It shall be competent to discuss and decide on matters of Regional concern and may make recommendations thereon to the National Executive Committee.

(6) The Regional Conference shall elect the Regional Executive Committee.

(7) The Regional Conference shall elect the Regional Chairman.

(8) It shall consider and adopt reports submitted to it by the Regional Exe-

cutive Committee on the activities of the Organization within the Region.

(9) The Regional Conference shall be convened by the Regional Executive Committee once every two years and shall do so immediately before the Congress of the Organization.

(10) An extraordinary Regional Conference may be called on the initiative of either the National Executive Committee or the Regional Executive Committee or at the request of both.

(11) The quorum of the Regional Conference shall be simple majority of the delegates entitled to attend.

(B) REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(1) There shall be a Regional Executive Committee for each Administrative Region;

(2) The composition of the Regional Executive Committee shall be as follows:
- (a) the Regional Chairman(person);
- (b) the Regional Secretary;
- (c) the Regional Treasurer;
- (d) the Regional Publicity and Information Secretary;
- (e) all District Chairmen(persons) in the Region;
- (f) all District Secretaries in the Region;
- (g) one delegate from each of the affiliate Organizations; and
- (h) one representative from each of the following wings:
  - SWAPO Youth League;
  - SWAPO Women's Council; and
  - SWAPO Elders' Council.

(3) The Regional Executive Committee shall be responsible for the implementation, in the Region, of the decisions, resolutions and directives of the Congress, the Central Committee, the National Executive Committee and those of the Regional Conference.

(4) The Regional Executive Committee shall be responsible to the Regional Conference and to the National Executive Committee.

(5) The Regional Executive Committee shall be responsible for the political mobilization of the masses for broad participation in the activities of the Organization.

(6) The Regional Executive Committee shall have the power to suspend any member, in the Region, for serious misconduct or violation of the Constitution and refer the matter to the National Executive Committee for ratification.

(7) The Regional Executive Committee may appoint such sub-committees as may be necessary for the better implementation of the policy and programme of the Organization in the Region.

(8) The Regional Executive Committee shall meet at least once in three months and as often as may be requested by a majority of District Executive Committees.

(9) The Regional Executive Committee shall appoint one deputy to each of the Regional Officers.

(10) The quorum of its meeting shall be simple majority of the members entitled to attend.

ARTICLE XII

Duties and functions of the Regional Officers

(A) Regional Chairmain(person)

(1) The Regional Chairman(person) shall be elected by the Regional Conference for a two year term of office;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Regional Conference supported by at least two-thirds of the delegates;

(4) He or she shall take overall charge of the activity of the Organization in the Region.

(B) Regional Secretary

(1) The Regional Secretary shall be elected for a two year term of office by the Regional Conference;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Regional Conference supported by at least two-thirds of the delegates;

(4) He or she shall maintain a register of the Organization's membership in the Region;

(5) He or she shall be in constant correspondence with all the District Executive Committees;

(6) He or she shall frequently visit the District Offices to acquaint himself or herself with problems facing such offices;

(7) He or she shall keep minutes of the meetings of the Regional Executive Committee and record all business thereof; and

(8) He or she shall be co-signatory to all cheques at the Regional Headquarters.

(C) Regional Treasurer

(1) The Regional Treasurer shall be elected for a two year term of office by the Regional Conference;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Regional Conference supported by at least two-thirds of the delegates;

(4) He or she shall receive and bank, within 7 days of receipt, all the monies belonging to the Organization at the Regional level;

(5) He or she shall be responsible for making SWAPO payments and keeping account books, payment vouchers, receipts and copies of financial statements and reports as well as stock cards.

(6) He or she shall study possibilities and make proposals concerning the raising of funds; and

(7) He or she shall be co-signatory to all cheques at the Regional Headquarters.

(D) Regional Information/Publicity Secretary

(1) The Regional Information/Publicity Secretary shall be elected for a two

year term of office by the Regional Conference;

(2) He or she shall be eligible for re-election;

(3) He or she may be removed from office by resolution of the Regional Conference supported by at least two-thirds of the delegates;

(4) He or she shall be responsible for gathering, analysing, publishing and disseminating information on the social, economic and political reality in the country; and

(5) He or she shall propagate, explain and defend the policy and programme of SWAPO.

ARTICLE XIII

District organs

There shall be the following organs of SWAPO at the District level:
Annual District Conference; and
District Executive Committee.

(A) Annual District Conference

(1) There shall be an Annual District Conference. Its composing shall be as follows:
- (a) members of the District Executive Committee;
- (b) four delegates elected by each Branch in the District;
- (c) a delegate from each of the affiliate organizations; and
- (d) four representatives from each of the following wings:
  - SWAPO Youth League;
  - SWAPO Women's Council; and
  - SWAPO Elders' Council.

(2) The Annual District Conference shall be the highest organ of authority in the District and shall meet annually.

(3) The Annual District Conference shall be competent to discuss matters of district interest and may make recommendations thereon to the Regional Executive Committee and the Regional Conference.

(4) It shall consider and adopt reports on the activities of the Organization within the District Executive Committee.

(5) It shall elect four delegates to the Regional Conference.

(6) It shall elect the District Officer on the pattern of the Regional Officers.

(7) It shall elect the District Executive Committee from amongst the delegates.

(8) The quorum of the Annual District Conference shall be simple majority of the delegates entitled to attend.

(B) District Executive Committee

(1) There shall be a District Executive Committee for each District. Its composition shall be as follows:
(a) the District Secretary;
(b) the District Treasurer;
(c) the District Information and Publicity Secretary; and
(d) one representative from each of the following wings:
SWAPO Youth League;
SWAPO Women's Council; and
SWAPO Elders' Council.

(2) The duties and functions of the District Executive Officers will correspond to those of their respective counterparts in the Regional Executive Committee, with the exception that their term of office shall be one year.

(3) The District Executive Committee shall appoint one deputy to each of the District Officers.

ARTICLE XIV

Branch organs

There shall be the following organs of SWAPO at the Branch or local level:

Branch Annual Conference; and
Branch Executive Committee.

(A) Branch Annual Conference

(1) There shall be a Branch Annual Conference of SWAPO.

Its composition shall be as follows:

(a) members of the Branch Executive Committee;
(b) four delegates from each of the sections in the Branch;
(c) a delegate from each of the affiliate organizations; and
(d) one representative from each of the following wings:
SWAPO Youth League;
SWAPO Women's Council; and
SWAPO Elders' Council.

(2) The Branch Annual Conference shall be the highest organ of authority at the Branch or local level.

(3) It shall elect the Branch Executive Committee.

(4) It shall be competent to discuss such matters of local interest as it may deem fit and may make recommendations thereon to the District Executive Committee and to the Annual District Conference.

(5) It shall elect four delegates to the Annual District Conference.

(B) Branch Executive Committee

(1) There shall be a Branch Executive Committee of SWAPO for each Branch in each Administrative District.

(2) Its composition as well as the term of office and the functions of its members shall correspond to those of the District Executive Committee, except that the Branch Secretary shall compile a monthly enrolment of membership and forward it to the District Secretary every month.

(3) It shall organize SWAPO members and recruit new ones;

(4) It shall raise funds for the Organization by obtaining members' subscriptions.

(5) It shall generally supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the Organization within the Branch and shall report thereon to the Branch Annual Conference.

(6) It may appoint such sub-committees as may be necessary for the better carrying out of the functions and activities of the Organization in the Branch.

(7) It shall meet in ordinary session once a month and as often as may be necessary.

(8) The quorum of the Branch Executive Committee shall be simple majority ot its members.

ARTICLE XV

Section

(1) The basic organ of SWAPO shall be a Section.

(2) The Section shall be established in places such as the following:
(a) factories;
(b) farms;
(c) schools;
(d) hospitals;
(e) military units;
(f) service units; and
(g) places of residence.

(3) At least thirty members of the Organization shall be required to establish a SWAPO Section.

(4) Each Section shall elect a Secretary who will take overall charge of the affairs of the Organization in that Section.

(5) The Section shall educate members of the Organization in the knowledge of SWAPO constitution, policy and programme.

(6) It shall discuss and analyze all the most important documents, agreements, reports and decisions and put forward its observations and suggestions to the Branch Annual Conference and to the Branch Executive Committee.

ARTICLE XVI

Wings of the Organization

There shall be the following wings of SWAPO:
People's Liberation Army of Namibia;

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SWAPO Youth League;
SWAPO Women's Council; and
SWAPO Elders' Council.

(A) People's Liberation Army of Namibia

(1) There shall be a People's Liberation Army of Namibia.

(2) Membership of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia shall be open to all SWAPO members whose age is between 16 and 55 years.

(3) The People's Liberation Army of Namibia shall adopt its own rules, regulations and standing orders governing its activities and administration.

(4) The rules, regulations and standing orders of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and the amendments thereof shall require the approval of the Central Committee of SWAPO before becoming operative.

(B) SWAPO Youth League

(1) There shall be a SWAPO Youth league.

(2) Membership of the SWAPO Youth League shall be open to all Namibian youth who accept the aims and objectives of SWAPO and whose age is between six and thirty-five years.

(3) The SWAPO Youth League shall adopt its own constitution governing its activities and administration, provided that such constitution or amendments thereof shall require the approval of the Central Committee of SWAPO before becoming operative.

(C) SWAPO Women's Council

(1) There shall be a SWAPO Women's Council to which all SWAPO women shall belong.

(2) The SWAPO Women's Council shall adopt its own constitution governing its activities and administration, provided that such constitution or amendments thereof shall require the approval of the Central Committee of SWAPO before becoming operative.

(D) SWAPO Elders' Council

(1) There shall be a SWAPO Elders' Council to which all SWAPO elders shall belong.

(2) It shall adopt its own constitution governing its activities provided that such constitution and amendments thereof shall require the approval of the Central Committee of SWAPO before becoming operative.

SOLIDARITY FREEDOM JUSTICE

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:51 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff Present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

This will be the final in a series of hearings on the involvement of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in terrorism in southern Africa. For me, these hearings have provided information that is shocking in its specifics, but familiar in its general aspects. I believe the testimony and documentation received should be informative to all who prize liberty, democratic values and human rights. It should be of bipartisan interest, and I would have thought special interest, to those who call themselves liberals.

Today, our witnesses are three distinguished men, each of whom brings an important perspective to this inquiry. The first witness will be Jariretundu Kozonguizi who has been active in southern Africa politics since his schooldays spent in South Africa at the time of the Defiance Campaign [1952]. He was also active in the African National Congress at the University of Fort Hare and in Capetown.

Mr. Kozonguizi was a member of an inner group of advisors to the late Chief Hosea Kutako during the years the Chief petitioned the United Nations for the independence of Namibia and, in 1959, he became the petitioner on behalf of Chief Kutako at the U.N.

In 1959, Mr. Kozonguizi was also elected president of the Southwest African National Union [SWANU] and he remained as president until 1966, at which time he took up full time law studies in London. He was called to the English bar in 1970 and is an advocate of the Inner Temple.

During his term as president of SWANU, he was an executive member of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organzation later known as the Afro-Asian-Latin American People Solidarity Organ-

zation [AALAPSO]. In this connection, he visited most of the Socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China as well as Third World countries such as India and Lebanon.

Mr. Kozonguizi was a founder of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London. He has been a May Day speaker at the invitation of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. He has lectured widely on southern Africa and Africa.

Mr. Kozonguizi practiced as a barrister in London until 1976 when he was legal advisor to the Herero delegation to the Turnhalle Conference in Windhoek. In 1977, he became legal adviser and roving ambassador of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. In 1980, he entered government service as Director of Interstate Relations and, at present, is Director of Liaison Services in the Office of the Council of Ministers.

Our second witness will be Adriano Francisco Bomba, who first came to the world's attention on July 8, 1981, when he courageously flew his MIG–17 aircraft from his homeland, Mozambique, to South Africa, where he requested and was granted political asylum.

As a schoolboy, Lieutenant Bomba had been taken out of school and sent by the Popular Forces of Liberation of Mozambique [FRELIMO] to the Soviet Union for training as a pilot. This experience of his is reminiscent of testimony we received at the previous hearing in which Emanuel Hasiko told of participating in the kidnaping of high school children who were abducted for military training. Lieutenant Bomba has been through a similar experience in Mozambique.

Upon the conclusion of his training in the Soviet Union, he was a pilot in the Mozambican Air Force until his dramatic escape. He is in a unique position to give us first-hand testimony on his training in the Soviet Union and on the impact of the Marxist-Leninist regime of FRELIMO on the people of Mozambique.

The third witness, who is still in transit from South West Africa/Namibia, is Andreas Shipanga, president of the SWAPO Democrats in South West Africa/Namibia. It is anticipated that he will arrive here this morning in sufficient time to allow him to testify. Mr. Shipanga was born in Ovamboland in South West Africa/Namibia 50 years ago, and I will give more of his history and biography later. But as the president of the SWAPO Democrats, he is a contemporarily important, influential figure.

I would like at this time to express the subcommittee's gratitude to the U.S. Capitol Police and the U.S. marshal Service for an outstanding job in providing security for many of our witnesses.

Under oath, most of them have testified that their lives are in danger and will remain so when they return to their home continent, if they return. Proper security has necessitated 24-hour, 7-days-per-week details for the U.S. marshals, and we are deeply appreciative of their dedication and devotion to duty which is in the highest tradition of the service, and without which we could not have undertaken these hearings.

Mr. Kozonguizi, before you give your opening statement, I will ask you to stand and raise your right hand while I administer an oath to you. I will ask you to affirm that you will tell us the truth in your testimony. Please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please sit down, sir. You may proceed with your opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF JARIRETUNDU KOZONGUIZI

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Mr. Chairman, apart from the information about myself which I have provided in advance, I should explain that the testimony I am presenting here is borne out of personal experience—that is, personal experience of the politics of the involvement of the Soviet Union, together with Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, in the affairs of Africa and, in particular, in the southern subcontinent.

I must add that the statistics and the photographs are from the official sources of the Government of South West Africa/Namibia, so that there should not be any misunderstanding about that.

Most of the evidence I present to you relates to the deadly effect of the presence of the forces of social imperialism in southern Africa, which evidence underlines the dangerous link between these forces and the South West Africa Peoples Organization; in other words, SWAPO.

In this connection I would like, respectfully and with humility, to ask that due to the time factor, my full statement, with its annexes, be included in the record. I shall, of course, be prepared to answer any questions that you may wish, Mr. Chairman, to ask at the end of my address.

The development of the cold war in Europe and elsewhere is not part of my story. That is something, I presume, on which you, Mr. Chairman, and others can teach me a lot. Suffice to say that the present struggle for the mind and hearts, not to say anything about the body and the heart of Africa, is directly related to the worldwide Soviet strategy and expansionism.

Apart from Namibia, almost the entire continent of Africa is independent, but nowhere else has social or Soviet imperialism triumphed absolutely, except in southern Africa, where it has become the provider of arsenals of deadly weapons used with almost decimating effect by brother against brother.

Is this struggle then a movement which is aimed to take over industrialized South Africa, and indeed from there to find a base for the effective recolonization of Africa, only this time from the east and by a system which has provided "naught for the comfort" of the people of postwar Eastern Europe and elsewhere?

I came across the U.S.S.R. activities, Mr. Chairman, as a young man dedicated to the liberation not only of my own country but of the African continent, and in search of international support. In middle age, I am still dedicated to the liberation of my country and Africa, hence my testimony before you today in an effort to raise alarm on the new threats to African freedom—"the wolf in sheep's clothes," to quote a prominent African leader.

As a young man, I was impressed by the unconfined and more or less unlimited moral and political support which the socialist coun-

tries gave to the cause of Africa. But before long, experience in the Afro-Asian Solidary Organization, of which both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China were members, pointed to the real basis of the Sino-Soviet dispute of those years; that is, the struggle for influence in Africa.

The result of the struggle was that in every area of that continent, the movement for independence was divided into two or more organizations, and the support given did not depend on the extent of popular support of a given organization, but on how gullible that particular organization was to the ideology of the new imperialists—an ideology which was then, as it is today, irrelevant to the struggle of the people of Africa for political independence, social advancement, and economic prosperity.

Outside active politics, my experience of yesteryear has been shockingly enhanced by observations that in every country the Soviets had set foot in, there was destruction, deprivation and death, all in the name of a new world order under which all vestiges of the old colonial order must be eliminated. The pattern is clear: destroy everything and we shall help you reconstruct.

This is the story that is unfolding in southern Africa, and particularly in Namibia. It is even more pathetic here in that it is not only property that is being destroyed, but the very human beings for whom the struggle must bring freedom.

The most deadly danger lies not in that the leaders of southern Africa are Communist—far from it—not even that SWAPO leaders are Communist. But the danger lies in that with their half-baked adherence to communism, they let their countries become the experimental stations for Soviet expertise; that is, in their search for ways to reoccupy Africa as a colonial area. They become agents and puppets in a highly sophisticated machinery to subdue the mind and soul of Africa.

Evidence of this, Mr. Chairman, is that whilst SWAPO denies that it is Communist—and I have underlined that above—the statements of some of the most prominent of their leaders and their publications tell a different, yes, a contrary story.

To give a few examples, in an interview Mr. Timothy Hadimo Hishongwa, described as a member of SWAPO's Central Committee and the representative in Sweden, had this to say, "We believe that not many ideologies exist. One is either progressive-orientated or one is reactionary. A position in between is not existent."

Now, this quotation comes from the writings of Mr. Von Lowis in his writing, "Die SWAPO-Befreiungsbewegung oder Kommunistische Front Organisation."

And another example—and this is from "Namibia—The Struggle for Final Liberation." This is the Political Manual of the Namibian Institute of Revolutionary Studies; it was published in 1977.[1]

He says:

> Although our preoccupation is with the question of the national liberation struggle from colonial domination at the moment, the future of our struggle has to take the form of class struggle and must bring about a society of equal and emancipated people.

[1] The manual is included as exhibit G in the appendix to this hearing.

It is from this point of view that each one of us must adhere to and follow the politics set in the new revised SWAPO political program, as adopted by the last plenary session of the SWAPO Central Committee that met from July 28 to August in 1976 in Lusaka.

A third example—also from the political manual—states:

The ideas of socialist orientation, as stated in the revised political program of SWAPO, have become our way of life and we have now to grasp this great truth that the first step in the revolution currently waged by the Namibian proletariat and the working persons is to raise the two friendly classes in our society to the position of the ruling class, which, at the same time, is the first step to winning the battle of a people's democracy.

It continues:

Only in this way shall we Namibian participants in the current liberation struggle, which we are waging on behalf of the general masses of all our people, be able to use the political supremacy of people's power to wrest state power from the colonial bourgeoise for the purposes of centralizing all the means of production and distribution in the hands of the new state—a state which will be constituted by the alliance of the worker and peasant masses.

Another quotation:

SWAPO of Namibia, ANC of South Africa, and the Communist Party of South Africa are called upon by history to guide the masses who are no longer prepared to wait.

That is also from the political manual. Then, in a document entitled, "The True Nature of Imperialism"—this was distributed in 1978—SWAPO states:

We cannot escape the fact that as long as South Africa remains a bulwark of capitalism, the independence of the rest of the sub-continent is going to be continually threatened.

Nor can we escape the fact that, given our understanding of imperialism as a world system, it is not sufficient to break the hold of South Africa over the subcontinent. To open the path to true liberation, we must break imperialism as a world economic system.

And then on page 14 of a publication called Ombuze ya Namibia—in January 1978—it is stated:

The struggle for the total independence of Namibia is not in isolation to the world struggle against capitalism, racism and imperialism. The situation in Namibia is one of the class struggle; that is, the struggle between the exploited and the exploiters, which means it is a struggle between the workers, proletariat class, and the exploiters, capitalist class.

This was amplified in the political manual. It is stated:

Now, this proves the truth of what Marx, Engels and Lenin discovered and predicted. Their discoveries are being confirmed by historical development, by the triumph and advance of socialism, and by the rapid decline of capitalism. Marxism-Leninism is, therefore, proving to be the only theory enabling the oppressed and exploited classes (the proletariat and the peasantry) to carry out their historical mission; that is, the destruction of the rule of capital and of the system of exploitation of man by man.

In the lead of this struggle are the communist and workers parties which vigorously defend the true interests of the working and oppressed peoples and classes.

Mr. Nujoma, addressing the meeting of the Central Committee of SWAPO in 1976 in Lusaka, said:

As natural ideological allies in the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle, the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, have been persistent and continue to give us concrete material assistance, political, diplomatic and moral support.

We sincerely appreciate and applaud the international task and commitment of the socialist world towards a complete elimination of all vestigates of the system of colonial oppression, infringement of human rights, and equality and all forms of colonialism, racism and exploitation.

That was the President of SWAPO addressing his central committee in Lusaka in July 1976.

On the occasion of the celebration of the 60th birthday of the Socialist October Revolution in Moscow in 1976, the president of SWAPO states:

Together with all peace-loving and progressive forces of the world, SWAPO has the highest esteem for your—

That is, the U.S.S.R.—

Foreign policies which are aimed at stopping the aggressive aspirations of world imperialism at its futile attempts to save the inhumane system of capitalism from its inevitable collapse.

There is no doubt that the material aid the Soviet Union gives to national liberation movements was one of the decisive factors which led toward the victories of the peoples of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, of the peoples of Vietnam and other peoples of Indochina.

The peoples of Namibia who, under the leadership of SWAPO, continue the fight against imperialism and colonialism, know too well that the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the communist party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, will be its steadfast and reliable ally in the liberation struggle.

That was Mr. Nujoma, and he ended up his speech with "Long live the great Lenin; long live the great October revolution; long live the anti-imperialist forces of the whole world."

(Von Lowis article previously cited.)

To strengthen our anti-imperialist international solidarity with the socialist countries, working class movements of the capitalist countries, popular organizations, and friendly governments and ordinary peoples.—Political Guidelines.

The last example I have to give is from the Windhoek Advertiser of March 6, 1978. It quotes Mr. Nujoma as saying:

The question of black majority rule is out. We do not fight for majority rule. We fight to take power in Namibia for the benefit of its peoples. We are revolutionaries.

Mr. Chairman, the words and the quotations and some of the statements quoted above are in plain English, not communistic. But in international political usage, they are expressively Marxist, or used by those who pander to the Marxist ideology.

Mr. Chairman, not that, in theory, Marxism is a danger in itself, but the world today is confronted by a Marxist ideology as interpreted and exported by the Soviet Union, so that the danger for Namibia lies in that an organization conditioned—such as SWAPO—to the usage of such verbiage, when in power, is more likely to call in the Soviet Union or its surrogates for what they might call the proper interpretation and definition of the meaning of those words, and indeed, finally, the implementation of the policy, as defined. That is where the danger lies, Mr. Chairman.

In the second part of my testimony, I would like to refer this committee to the evidence of tons of Soviet equipment and weaponry—I have the photographs here for display so that people can see—which have been placed at the disposal of SWAPO.

[Photographs follow:]

The Russian-built Stalin Organ mobile multiple 122-mm rocket launcher



A typical trench/dugout with overhead cover used by SWAPO terrorists

Captured Soviet tank taken from joint SWAPO/FAPLA forces



Soviet instructor and SNAFO cadres with Soviet artillery

This equipment, in my view, cannot be said to be within the ability of a guerrilla movement to handle, but rather it is indicative of a potential conventional war in the country in which they are used.

And finally, I would like to submit the evidence of wanton destruction and death in Namibia today. This is the direct result of the Soviet presence in southern Africa and the immediate bitter fruits of Soviet weaponry and armaments.

In exhibit A is given an account of acts of terrorism against the local population in Namibia.

In exhibit B, I have the evidence of the murder of Minister Toivo Shiyagaya and of Chief Clemens Kapuuo early in 1978. Letters from the files of SWAPO which are included will speak for themselves.

In exhibit C, there is a description of SWAPO activities by SWAPO and through its own publications.

And then, in exhibit D, I have the photographic evidence of the result of this terrorism in Namibia.[1]

Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by saying that in my view, there is no longer any justification for a struggle for the destruction of life and limb in Namibia. The current negotiations on Namibia, in which the United States of America is taking an active part and is playing a leading role, indicates beyond doubt that the principal of independence for Namibia is endorsed by all concerned, including the Government of South Africa. What remains is the working out of modalities for a peaceful and fruitful transfer of power to the people of Namibia.

That this violence continues today, it is my submission, is due to the presence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in southern Africa, as well as their deadly interference in the affairs of the African Continent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Kozonguizi. Your testimony is very valuable in its perceptions of relative political interrelationships and identities.

I also respect your honesty when you assert that you still are, in your middle age, still dedicated to the liberation of your country and the liberation of Africa itself. Concerning the fact that your background is what one might call leftist, I fully empathize with the kind of progressivism you have devoted your life to, as contrasted with the kind of "progressivism," the Communists espouse which you referred to in your testimony.

It reminds me, if I may say so, sir, of a filmed interview which took place after I had been tortured and which I will never forget. In that interview by a Japanese journalist, I defied my captors and took the chance that somehow what I said in defense of my country would miraculously be reported. The journalist, whom I perceived to be a progressive, later crossed over to the side of the South Vietnamese and I would like to meet him some day.

Immediately following that interview, while I was still supposed to be set up from the torture, they had a man named Wilfred Burchette, who is—and I use the word loosely—a journalist from Aus-

[1] Exhibits A through D appear in the appendix to this hearing.

tralia. He was accompanied by his Russian common-law wife and as I entered the room, they were speaking in Russian among themselves.

Mr. Burchette was well aware that I had been tortured. He was well aware that others whom he interviewed had also been tortured. He expected to get from me the same sort of thing the Japanese interviewer expected to get; he did not.

I find it phenomenal that Mr. Burchette, who has written in many Communist propaganda magazines which were available to us in North Vietnam, and who termed himself as a progressive journalist, is still received in this country, deferred to, and has had his books reviewed in the New York Times as if he were a legitimate, objective journalist.

What I have described, Mr. Kozonguizi, is happening now in this country, so I have something in common with you with respect to the intensity of your feeling of frustration and your desire to see things changed and perceived for what they really are.

I apologize for such a long deviation, but I want you to know that we have some empathy.

Appendixes A through D to which you referred will be included in our record, as will other documents providing evidence of abduction and assassination by SWAPO and PLAN. I would like to take this opportunity to review the photographs and give the press an opportunity.

Is there an explanation of what each of these represents other than that which is pictorially portrayed?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Well——

Senator DENTON. Go ahead. I will come and look at them myself.

[Senator Denton proceeded from the dais to review the photographs.] [1]

Most of them appear to be bodies of people who were——

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Yes, this is a direct result of the terroristic activities that go on in my country, which I think are not at this point necessary, and which I think, more than anything else, go on because the Soviet Union would not like to accept the present efforts for a negotiated settlement that are going on.

So, they must continue to support this kind of thing by which they hope to frustrate the peaceful negotiations that are going on.

These are, of course, the pictures of the equipment they provide—equipment which no guerrilla movement, in my view, sir, can be expected to use, but I think equipment which is in preparation for an entry of the Cubans or the Russians or the East Germans who can use this equipment.

May I point out that the present negotiations at this point, sir, do not provide for a security force which would govern the country and which would look after law and order after the elections that are proposed. This is where these weapons come in, in my opinion.

Senator DENTON. I would observe that the historical context in which we find ourselves, with Africa playing such an important part, is the inescapable and evident fact that in many areas of our world, including some parts of the United States, there is need for

[1] See photographs which appear as exhibit D in the appendix to this hearing.

social, political, and economic reform as judged by our standards and, I think, by the standards of human justice.

In those areas there is friction; there is often friction to the point of hostilities. And we pick up, we liberal Americans—and believe it or not, I consider myself one—we pick up on the need for those reforms. We join with the people in those countries who are the underdogs.

But we fail to see that the Communist or Socialist movement too often becomes the principal supplier of those who desire reform and subsequently the influencer of the events which take place. Then, instead of preparing for, as you have indicated, justice or order in the sense of a social order within the state, or even a security order within the state, they bring in tanks, mines, heavy artillery, and so forth, with which they operate against other countries.

We have seen this take place in South Vietnam, for example, where the same kinds of killings, of tribal chiefs, the same kinds of terrorism, and the same kinds of intimidation took place. We witnessed the same feeling that somehow in Vietnam, things were not right enough and that the South ought to be left alone against the North, in order to resolve the problems.

Somehow, in the name of human rights and improved justice, we see what we have there now—the spectacle of the boat people, the reindoctrination programs, the conquests of Cambodia and Laos, the fighting over the human and natural resources of those lands by Communist rivals. We did get the Chinese and the Soviets apparently caught in an area of conflict of interest there, but it is a Communist situation. It is hardly a human rights situation that has been improved, nor is it an economic situation which has been improved.

As you point out, the nations in Eastern Europe which the Soviet Union took over after World War II are all worse off; they are bled, exploited and rendered less efficient by the system of Soviet imperialism imposed on them.

These historical facts are so evident yet so totally inconspicuous as a news item, as an issue in our Nation. According to the newspapers of this country, the issue of the day, is the insistence of the American people upon nuclear disarmament.

At the last hearing, I quoted an article about the Russian emigre, Mstislav Rostropovich, who decried this situation and said, ". . . These demonstrations are not for peace that can last; they are not for peace, but for weakness."

Why do they want weakness? Our opponents do not have weakness. They are spending over twice as much of their gross national product as this country on arms. They are spending perhaps 20 times as much for arms for Central America, and I do not know what the comparison would be for Africa.

I do not understand why we Americans, liberals, conservatives, Democrats, and Republicans do not see this together as that which is determining the fate of our world. Could it be that the governments of South West Africa and of South Africa are fighting the Communists in Namibia and Angola because they perceive and understand that whatever happens, whatever the rate of improvement within their own countries, that the worst thing that can occur is a takeover by international communism, not only for those

countries such as Namibia or South Africa, but for the rest of Africa? Once a foothold is established, communism spreads and an effort is made to gradually, patiently take over all that surrounds it.

Is that a reasonable question to ask?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Sir, whatever other things are happening in South Africa, whatever views one may hold on South Africa, there is something that is very clear about the stated position of the South African Government, and that is they feel that they have to fight in Namibia or in Angola.

What they are fighting there is the Communist infiltration into southern Africa, and they feel strongly that the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union is South Africa itself, from which, as I have indicated in my testimony, it is hoped to build a strong foundation, to be able now to move strongly into Africa, no longer having to provide the African continent assistance from a distance as far as Europe. But they will now have to provide the African continent—buy it off with the minerals which will be theirs in their occupation of South Africa.

Senator DENTON. As important as those minerals are—and we have quoted former General Haig and others on the subject of the treasury of minerals in Africa—and recognizing that the Soviet Union is almost self-sufficient in those minerals and the denial of them to the United States is of interest to the Soviets, not just the acquisition thereof—the subcommittee received the testimony of a former Cuban DGI officer several weeks ago, who said that as important as Africa is, the Soviet Union views Africa as a step toward domination of the United States.

Indeed, he testified that in Cuba they are taught that the Cuban involvement in Africa is only one phase of the attack upon the United States of America, which is the only major defender of freedom left in terms of its strength.

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I can say, sir, the Soviet Union, in my experience, whatever else they want, today, their view is that the Third World, and in particular Africa, is extremely important. They have seen the dominance—the dominating position, as it were—of the African group and the Third World in the United Nations.

They feel that if they were to rally these groups or these countries to their cause, it would mean their objective is half achieved. I have no doubt that in a world where they have to fight for supremacy, definitely their final objective would have to be the country that really is the real frustrating element in whatever they really want to do, and in this particular case it is the United States of America, which I think has frustrated them to a very great extent in Europe.

They want to come to where they want to, through Africa and the Third World, because they failed to do so through Europe.

Senator DENTON. Many times, the United States and the Soviet Union are pictured almost identically in terms of their nobility or ignobility. Have you seen any signs of American, or what could be perceived as American, influence in terms of arms that is comparable in any way to that of the Soviet Union in Africa?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I have not, sir. What I know is that there is more chicken and more things like that from America in Africa

than real war equipment. I am not saying there is not any; I am not saying that. But comparatively speaking, the Soviet Union has more of that in Africa than anything else.

Senator DENTON. You have referred to the almost limitless supplies being poured into southern Africa from the Soviet Union. The same thing has been said by Cuban defectors with respect to Latin America. And yet, the United States, as a factor in this struggle, has an arms embargo against South Africa. They are relying principally on their own resources. I simply want to point out the fact that we have an arms embargo against them as our principal policy in that area.

We have organizations, like Amnesty International, pointing out human rights violations—torture, and so forth—that take place around the world. However, it does not seem to strike anyone as significant that Amnesty International is not crawling around and investigating in the Communist totalitarian states to see what goes on there; they are not permitted in and I feel this fact is significant.

I am required for a few minutes, I hope, at another hearing. I shall have to depart. I want to express my thanks and admiration to you, Mr. Kozonguizi.

My staff director, Mr. Lisker, will continue asking you questions, but before I go, I will swear in the next witness. Please request Lieutenant Bomba to come into the hearing room?

You can stand right inside the room, Lieutenant Bomba. I will swear you in, and then depart and return.

[Senator Denton spoke in a foreign language to the witness.]

Senator DENTON. I understand you speak a number of languages.

[Senator Denton again spoke in a foreign language to the witness.]

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And I know you speak English well. Would you raise your right hand? Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Lieutenant BOMBA. I do, sir.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

I will turn the hearing over to Mr. Lisker now.

Mr. LISKER. Advocate Kozonguizi, you have testified and provided the subcommittee with photographic evidence of the results of terrorism in Namibia. Would you tell us in what other ways the campaign of terror being waged by SWAPO has impacted the people of Namibia?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I can say that apart from the photographs, you find that we have had in Namibia people coming in from Angola as refugees. It is a pity that some of the international organizations, which are doing charity work have not been able to provide for these refugees who come out of Angola.

But the people of Namibia themselves in the north have been able to accommodate these people to a very great extent. But I can say that these people come from Angola and provide evidence of what is happening in Angola. It is ironic, that in their simplicity—I have to state that these people under Portuguese colonial rule

seem to have had a better life than they are having under the rule of the independent government of Angola.

The people of Namibia, of course, looking at these people who do come over and seeing them in that state, having heard and having it repeated to them every day by Radio Luanda that SWAPO is being supported by the MPLA government in Luanda, the Soviets and the Cubans realize that, should SWAPO now come with a government in Namibia, perhaps that would be the fate that awaits them.

This is something that scares many of the people in Namibia, in that they should be looking as emaciated and as hungry and as unclothed as the people whom they see everyday coming in from across the border; that is, from Angola.

Mr. LISKER. Do you have any idea as to the number of refugees crossing the border from Angola to Namibia?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I would not be able to give you the numbers. This is a very, very difficult one in terms of the control. While the Government is trying to control the terrorists from coming in, they cannot keep out the genuine refugees who are coming in.

Thus, insofar as the numbers of the refugees are concerned, I am unable to provide that now.

Mr. LISKER. Are the refugees leaving with belongings or simply with the clothing on their backs?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Many of them or almost all have no belongings to come across with. So, they usually come without anything.

Mr. LISKER. Is the Namibian Government, with the aid of the churches in Namibia, able to deal with the refugee problem?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. The Government of Namibia at this particular point is quite capable to deal with this situation. I can say that charity organizations—for example, some branches of the International Red Cross and the South African Red Cross, through its branch in Namibia, have also been able to help in this respect.

Mr. LISKER. The distances, I would imagine, are fairly great. What means of transportation do the refugees use?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Many of them just come on foot because it is merely a matter of crossing the border from Angola. What distances they walk inside Angola I do not know.

Mr. LISKER. But are all the refugees inhabitants of the immediate border area, or are they coming from northern parts of Angola?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. What did happen, actually, originally, many of those who are of Portuguese origin—that is, who originally came from Portugal—did come, and these were helped to go to Portugal. They flew to Portugal. Those with skills have come, and some of them originally came out with money; those have been able to be accommodated in terms of being given jobs or setting up businesses, and so on. There are some who come from the north and other area of Angola.

But many are those, who have been living in the south—some of them having relatives across the border, and so on; these are people who just walk across, as they used to in the past.

Mr. LISKER. When it was Portuguese West Africa, before the independence of Angola?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Yes. There were no restrictions in terms of these people moving, you know, from Namibia into Angola and vice versa.

Mr. LISKER. In your opening presentation, your opening statement, you have stated that it was in 1964 during the Sino-Soviet dispute that you first perceived the real Soviet motives for involvement in southern Africa, and that they did not involve the struggle of the people of Africa for political independence, social advancement, and economic prosperity.

Have you seen any indications since that time that Soviet motives have changed?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Well, as I have stated, if any change—it has been an intensification of the Soviets in the direction as perceived. I may add that what I experienced in 1964 was quite clearly compounded, as it were, in Havana in 1966, where I saw for the first time in reality the struggle for the Soviet occupation of Africa.

Then, at the Afro-Asian solidarity conference which was held in Havana, the Soviets did not at that particular point like the influence of Egypt which hosted conference secretariat. And because Egypt was being supported by the African groups, including ourselves, the Soviets had to use the Cubans in order to try and bring the headquarters of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization to Havana.

And I could say that I learned a lot in 1966 about the maneuvers, backroom maneuvers, trying to do this. In the end, of course, the Soviets had their own way with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, but the intrigues that applied then did teach me a lot.

Even today, it is easy for me to be able to make out what they are really trying to do, whether it be in Mozambique, whether it be in Angola, or anywhere else.

Mr. LISKER. So, you were not merely a spectator; you were an active participant at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization meeting in Cuba, and you were deeply involved, at that time, in attempting to get the organization underway and you were in a special position to understand the true motives of the Soviet Union at that time?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Very much so, because not only that, but I was an executive member of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. So, I was able to understand what was happening, and this is why I continue to emphasize the fact that there is an erroneous belief that many of the leaders in Africa are Communist.

But my fear is the fact that because they are not Communists, they could become Communist dupes, and that is where the danger lies, rather than them being Communists themselves.

Mr. LISKER. I see; thank you.

One factor that is many times overlooked by those not familiar with the situation in southern Africa is that of tribalism or——

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Ethnicity.

Mr. LISKER. Ethnicity; thank you.

In connection with a trip that several people on the staff took to South West Africa and South Africa in order to gather materials for these hearings, and in interviewing the Hereros and the Ovambo and the Caprivi and the Bushmen, we, I must say, became

acutely aware of some of the differences which go back 800 years or more.

Could you explain tribalism and tell of its place in a proper understanding of the problems of southern Africa?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I can say this, sir—and before I say what I have to say on that, let me put it this way. I am one person, by education, by background, and by experience—I lived in Europe for about 17 years—who is far from being a tribalist; indeed, if anything, I should be antitribalism, which I am anyway.

But there is an ethnic situation which you find in southern Africa, and in particular in Namibia. The Hereros live here, the Ovambos there, the Damaras here, and so forth, in the reservations, or even in the cities they do live as Hereros in one section, Ovambos in one section, and Damaras in another section.

Now, we can go back into history to try and find out who is responsible for that. It could be the South African Government policy, the "Odendaal" policy; it could be the Germans; it could be the people themselves before the Germans came to the country.

But whoever is responsible, that is not relevant at this point, in my view. What is relevant is you have to find a dispensation that is convenient for the people of the country, and this is where the rub comes in because even before you find a government arrangement, or political arrangement that would suit us who are not tribalists, you still have to go back to the ethnic groups, to the ethnic leaders, and you still have to convince them that the essential thing in Namibia is that we should have only one country and one nation.

Now, that is one thing which the present government in Namibia has been able to do at this point. They have been able to convince everybody, every group in the country, that we need a united Namibia. There is no question of the country having to be divided into Bantustans or into independent parts.

They have convinced all the groups, whether they are Kavangos in the north or whether they are Damaras or Namas in the south; they are convinced that progress for Namibia lies in it being one country.

But the problem at this particular point is simply this: How do you establish a government that is acceptable to all these ethnic factions? How do you do it? It has been tried by many others—at party level—who are in opposition to the present government. They have accused the present government in Namibia as promoting ethnicity by having an arrangement which accommodates all these tribal groups.

But, sir, I can say this: None of them have been able to provide an alternative—a unitary, if you like, alternative. Indeed, every group that is in opposition to the present government can be identified with some ethnic base.

So, I can say this, sir, in answer to your question, that this is one of the big problems we have, and this is one of the problems which the Soviet Union does not realize they are really magnifying. They are magnifying this in the sense that whatever they are doing in encouraging the activities going on in the northern part of Namibia, is being interpreted in the south as being the kind of thing that could come down south.

And the people in the south, some of them, feel this is the kind of thing they are not going to allow. And the result of that would be that they might start feeling that, well, if the people of Ovamboland would allow that kind of thing to happen in their part of the country, they are not going to have anything to do with the Ovambos.

That would go against the principle which has been adopted by the people of Namibia as a whole that every group in that country belongs to the country as a whole. But this kind of thing is bound to lead to some of the groups beginning to reassess their positions vis-a-vis the Ovambo people in the north, which will be, in my view, very unfortunate.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you, Mr. Kozonguizi.

What, in your view, would become of SWAPO if the Soviets withdrew their support?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. SWAPO would disappear, as far as I am concerned, overnight, let me say, politically speaking. I am not saying that they are going to disappear from existence. But politically speaking, they are going to disappear because their image, as far as I know, depends on their external activities. That is the origin of their activities inside the country. I am not saying SWAPO has no support. They have got support. But it depends on their external image.

As things go, their main support is the political, the moral, one from the international community, and particularly the material support they do get from the countries of the Socialist part of the world.

So, today, as it is, they have not been able to exert maximum impact; let me put it this way: in spite of the fact that they have all that political and moral support internationally, which is total, SWAPO in the country has not done very well organizationally. I know there are parties, if they were to be given that kind of international support, who would do much better than SWAPO within the country.

So, today, in my view, comparatively speaking, in proportion to the support they get internationally speaking, they have not been able to do very well in all parts of Namibia, the only thing that keeps them going and keeps their influence going is what is happening in the northern part which depends on external support.

That is the support they are getting from the Angolan Government and from the Soviet Union, and if that was to be cut, then, in my view, SWAPO, as a political organization will continue to exist, but only as a political force.

And may I add also that there is one central point in the present negotiations that needs attention. In the original settlement proposal and the new initiative there is no provision for a security force to maintain law and order in Namibia after the election.

And the question that arises is if a fair and free election comes to Namibia and Mr. Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, wins that election: Has anyone thought about how he was going to maintain law and order, because he can have his landslide, but if, for example, the Hereros alone decide that he is not going to rule, he simply will not be able to rule in Windhoek with the support from Ovamboland?

How is he now going to control these people, for instance, maintain law and order in the same way Mr. Mugabe is able to maintain law and order in Zimbabwe with the forces that were there before—the forces he was fighting against?

How is Mr. Nujoma going to maintain law and order? The fear of the people in Namibia is that that would be his chance and his opportunity to bring in the Russians and the Cubans. Those who are looking into this matter, most definitely must look at the possible chaotic situation that could emerge from that eventuality.

What I am pointing out is in relation to what you have asked me about if the Soviet Union was not there. So if the Soviet Union was not there supporting SWAPO, SWAPO as a political force in Namibia would find itself in an extremely difficult position.

Mr. LISKER. Would it be correct then to draw as one inference, at least, from your exposition that the Soviet Union controls SWAPO, or at least exerts a controling influence in it?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. They have a controling influence, in my view, especially in Angola because they are the only people who do give weapons at this point, to my knowledge, or effective weaponry, to SWAPO.

As far as I am concerned, not even China has that much influence on SWAPO as the Soviet Union has.

Mr. LISKER. Do you know Mr. Kaakunga of the Office of the Administrative Secretary of SWAPO?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I do know him.

Mr. LISKER. How do you know him, sir?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. I do know him, let me say, as a Namibian whom I have met several times. May I state that I am not in a state of hostility to SWAPO, so I do know many members of SWAPO. I am on speaking terms with many of them. Some of them, I have brought them up politically and we have differed in the course of time.

Mr. LISKER. Senator Denton has indicated to me that he would like to place in the record a document which is a general briefing document, dated January 25, 1978, in which Mr. Kaakunga sets out the entire structure of SWAPO—and I think there is one paragraph that Senator Denton wanted to read and I will read on his behalf ending the first page of the document and briefly on the second page, and that is:

> It is in this regard concerning the central committee that I inform you that the opening session of the Lubango meeting was glorified by the presence of the Presidents of two Revolutionary sister states—Comrade President Augustinho Neto of the People's Republic of Angola, and Comrade President Luis Cabral of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, and later the presence of the Soviet and Cuban military representatives at the same opening session, demonstrates these countries total support to SWAPO, and the harmony our Revolution has with significant events in the history of world like, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, et cetera.

Senator Denton has indicated that this document will be placed in the record.[1]

At this point, I would like to also enter in the record, at Senator Denton's direction, an article by Dr. Henning von Löwis, assistant

[1] The document referred to can be found as exhibit H in the appendix to the March 22, 1982, hearing, at p. 122.

professor of political science at the University of Cologne, West Germany, on SWAPO and its connection with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. I note you have quoted Dr. Henning von Löwis in your opening statement. Also, the first two chapters of a paper by John M. Starrels entitled "East Germany: Marxist Mission in Africa" are to be inserted at this point.[1]

Finally, I will ask you, do you know the organizing secretary of SWAPO, Mr. Kaluenya?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Mr. Kaluenya is now the late Mr. Kaluenya. He is dead now. I have known him; he was a very active member of—in fact, he was a youth leader to start with in SWAPO. And I happened to know him simply because he was a close friend of mine back in 1972.

Mr. LISKER. Well, in an undated 13-page statement dealing with the battle of the masses and of ideas which he authored, at page 4, he mentions you in passing and says that "Many of them"—and he is talking about the cadres—"such as Cornelius Ndjobas, Kapuuos, Kozonguizis in Namibia, or Matanzimas and Butelezis, et cetera, in South Africa has their minds turned out completely, and have committed themselves to the colonial system. They have become what Tsombe was to Congo [Zaire], Roberto/Shavimbi to Angola, Ojuku to Nigeria, or Shimango to Mozambique. They are traitors to the people and countries which once were theirs. They did all this because they have accepted the theories of the so-called supremacy of the whiteman, and for the minimal benefits they receive from this system of humiliation and subjugation." Do you have any comment on that statement?

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. All I can say—well, I mean I can understand what he is saying, but he is saying somewhere there "countries that were theirs," which means that these countries are no longer ours. But Mr. Kaluenya was writing from outside the country he calls his own, whereas I come now from inside the country that is what he calls "was mine."

I can tell you here, sir, that in my country I do move freely; I do not move with bodyguards. So, if my people were to regard me as a sellout or a traitor, I would not be existing now.

Mr. LISKER. At Senator Denton's request, a speech given by Sam Nujoma in Zambia in 1976, which mentions two of our witnesses, Mr. Kozonguizi and Mr. Shipanga, will be inserted in the record.[2] The undated paper entitled "The Battle of the Masses and of the Ideas" has already been made part of the record of the March 22, 1982, proceedings. [See exhibit E, p. 98.]

Thank you very much, sir. On behalf of Senator Denton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, I want to thank you for your appearance—for your long journey and your appearance here today, and the excellent and forthright testimony which you have delivered. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KOZONGUIZI. Thank you; it is a pleasure.

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[1] These articles are included as exhibits E and F in the appendix to this hearing.

[2] The speech by Sam Nujoma appears as exhibit F in the appendix to the March 22, 1982, hearing, at p. 111.

Mr. LISKER. We have also received a copy of the Political Manual from which you quoted in your testimony and, at Senator Denton's direction, I shall insert the manual in the record.[1]

Our next witness is Lt. Adriano Bomba. Let me state that Senator Denton has been called away. He is expected to return momentarily, but you have been sworn prior to his departure so that you remain under oath.

Do you have an opening statement?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, I have got my statement and I would love to read it.

Mr. LISKER. You may begin.

TESTIMONY OF LT. ADRIANO FRANCISCO BOMBA

Lieutenant BOMBA. I was born on May 7, 1958, in Matola, Maputo Province, Mozambique, son of a Mozambican father and a South African mother. Born to a Catholic family, my upbringing was strict and ruled by religious beliefs.

I attended primary school in Matola and since the early times at school, I was given the opportunity to have my first concept of FRELIMO. FRELIMO, so we were told and believed at that stage, was a liberation movement fighting against the Portuguese colonist rule in my country of birth.

Due to the differences of social treatment between blacks and whites, I immediately identified with FRELIMO's national cause, in spite of my poor political knowledge. When I started attending preparatory school, I was able to air my views on FRELIMO and even hold discussions with Portuguese friends and colleagues, who obviously took an opposite stand as a result of their family upbringing.

Despite our early age and bare political ignorance, when in the company of black friends, we used to refer to FRELIMO as "ours." In 1972, after completion of the prescribed preparatory cycle, I enrolled at the Antonio Enes High School in Maputo.[2]

FRELIMO was no longer in the forefront of our themes during this period. Another trend had, in the meantime, emerged: that of pop music and guitar playing. I was then in the third year [3] when Mozambique came to grips with the coup d'etat in Portugal. When I heard about the coup d'etat, nothing changed in me, as I could not possibly grasp the full impact of its meaning.

Only the euphoria of others and the comments of the more politically enlightened made me realize that something awful had, in fact, happened. By the start of the following school year, FRELIMO implemented "Grupos Dinamizodores," [4] which were active at

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[1] The document was received for the record and appears as exhibit G in the appendix to this hearing.

[2] Then Lourenco Marques.

[3] Equivalent to first year of high school.

[4] Pro-FRELIMO, politically orientated agitators active at schools and in all walks of life, that held endless meetings in residential areas, with the purpose of enforcing the new-born political awareness. As a matter of curiosity, I should add here that at the beginning of September Mozambique witnessed the emergence of the "Dragon of Death," a movement consisting of Portuguese citizens who opposed Mozambique being handed over to FRELIMO on the grounds that FRELIMO was not willing to tolerate the participation of the various social strata in decisions about the future of Mozambique. The movement took over both the radio stations, one in the capital and the other in Matola, and occupied several strategic points in the city as well as suburbs. Moved by a lust of adventure, I joined the movement, which, despite its deeply rooted patriotic motivation lacked political consequence. It eventually collapsed.

schools and brought about an intensive campaign amongst the student masses.

Scholastic methods suffered several changes; namely, pedagogical and disciplinary liberalization and the relinquishment of the individual for the sake of groups of individuals. In the context of the new political setup and in a bid to adapt school terms to the Mozambican climate, FRELIMO delayed the opening of schools to a much later date, in February and no longer in September as before.

These "Grupos Dinamizodores," each with a specific mission, were in charge of promoting political awareness and of allocating to the people regardless of their social position, tasks that ranged from mopup operations at schools, streets, et cetera, and the setting up of several collective farms. I took part in these campaigns, although with some amount of aversion.

As for my school curriculum, the "GD" had brought a more "Frelimistic" character to the school system and brought in some changes. Instead of morals and religion, we studied political education, which dealt with the history of FRELIMO and the introduction to FRELIMO's ideology. Pupils, backed by the "GD's," claimed they should no longer study the history of the world but the history of FRELIMO.

The following year, ninth class, our history curriculum included the Leninist version of the history of human societies. The literature used consisted of "Marxist Political Economy and African Reality," and other similar works. It was in this year that the physics and chemistry teacher invited me to become a militant of FRELIMO, which I refused without further ado.

In 1977, when I enrolled for 10th class, pupils were not able to attend school. Amazed at these developments, we sought an explanation which was never given to us. The government had so decided. At the end of the first month of school, we were summoned to meet the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moises Machel, on March 8, 1977.

During the meeting, after referring to the revolutionary realities of the country and to the pressing needs to form cadres, the President explained that 10th and 11th classes had been suspended and that these students would be taken away from schools and sent overseas where they would be trained in subjects and fields more suitable to the needs of the country.

Some days later, we were interviewed by a few teachers who had previously been screened and selected on the grounds of their adherence to FRELIMO and whose task was to probe our career plans. When necessary, they changed these career plans in order to instill in us the motivation to serve the country above our personal ambitions.

At the end of these interviews, we held a meeting with the Minister of Education who, in her speech, followed the same theme as that of the President. When we left the conference room, we were given a list of students and the courses in which each was to be enrolled. The list was subsequently canceled for unknown reasons.

Days later, we were handed over to the Ministry of Defense and only male pupils born in Mozambique were included in the new list drafted by that ministry. We were all examined medically at the

military hospital and taken to the camp on March 24, 1977. A group of 75 men, including myself, left for the Soviet Union on March 28.

We boarded an Aeroflot airplane, called at Dar-es-Salaam, Aden, Cairo, Odessa, and finally landed in Moscow. In Moscow, we boarded another plane to Frunze where, on arrival, we were taken straight to the military camp. The following day, we were welcomed by a Soviet, Colonel Klatchkow, who briefed us on the rights of foreign military students in the Soviet Union, subsidies, and on Soviet history in general. We flew the next day to Djamboul, where our training camp was situated.

On arrival at the camp in Djamboul, we were divided into two major groups corresponding to our specialities: technicians and pilots. I was included in the group of pilots. Our curriculum included the following subjects: Russian, mathematics, physics, military topography, military administration, Soviet Union, military tactics, massive destruction arms.

At the end of our preparatory course in Djamboul, we were stationed at different bases according to our specialities; pilots: 30 went to Kant Air Base, radio technicians to Tokmak Air Base, and the remainder to Frunze Air Base.

Training started at the end of October and the subjects were: air dynamics, air navigation, construction and handling of the engine, construction and handling of the airframe, aviation equipment; aviation armament, aviation tactics, principles of scientific socialism, and Russian. Technical subjects, except aviation tactics, were related to the training aircraft L–29 of Czechoslovakian manufacture.

In early December, I was admitted to the hospital of the Frunze Air Base and stayed there for a month during which time I befriended a Soviet major, Doronin, second in command of the squadron I would join at a later stage.

We wrote exams on the technical subjects at the end of February and had a 15-day-long holiday afterwards. On March 15, we started practicing on parked aircraft and on April 1 started flying.

The program for the L–29 air training was restricted to photoshooting and photobombing. On days we did not fly, we had lectures on tactics, Russian, and principles of scientific socialism.

We were visited by the Mozambican Minister of Defense, Alberto Joaquim Chipande, who happened to be in the U.S.S.R. doing a course at the Soviet Military Academy. It was on this occasion that we were informed that FRELIMO had stipulated that all elements of the group become party members. In August, we were visited by Armando Emilio Guebuza, national political commissar of the FPLM.[1]

We finished our flying hours in the first week of October and, by then, our group had been reduced to 22, this reduction being due to two failures and the remainder for health reasons. Following a fixed pattern, we had been divided into groups of three, each having a Soviet instructor. Our instructor, Major Sagdeiev, was a rather kind person and helpful to his trainees. Speaking about a

[1] Forcas Populares de Libertacae de Mocambique. Popular Forces of Liberation of Mozambique.

fixed pattern, the teacher giving the first class every morning was expected to provide some political information for 10 to 15 minutes.

After a month-long holiday, we were transferred to Tokmak where we were supposed to start our training on a Mig-17F. Classes started early in December and the prescribed subjects were: air dynamics, air navigation, construction and handling of the engine, construction and handling of the airframe, aviation equipment, aviation armament, fighter bomber aviation tactics, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, principles of pedagogics and military psychology, educative work in the armed forces, massive destruction weapons, and Russian. Technical subjects were related to Mig-17F and to UTI Mig-15.

At the end of the exams, we had a 15-day-long holiday and were allowed to spend a 5-day-long stay in Tashkent, under the custody of Lieutenant Colonels Teterin and Kautiushin. On our arrival at the camp, we practiced for 15 days on parked aircraft and then started flying training.

I was a member of the second squadron, and my instructor was Lt. Tchmiwkhow Mikhail Vacilievitch, who was eventually stationed in Mozambique even before the end of the scheduled training.

During this period, we received the official visit of Colonel Mangueira, chief of staff, logistics, of FPLM. This visit would somewhat change my life, inasmuch as due to Mozambican military realities—the presence of the enemy inside our borders—the nation desperately needed the existence of an air force capable of fighting back any intruders.

Hence, the first patrol—I was a member thereof—was given priority over the other and we soon left for Lugovaia in order to get acquainted with gun firing and bomb raids, all on ground targets. Training was suspended temporarily due to bad weather, for which reason we were sent back to Tokmak. We returned later and were able to complete the required training hours.

Taking a general look at all bases we visted, I should stress that Mozambicans were not the only foreign military trainees, as there were also Angolans, Tanzanians, Congolese, Ethiopians, Somali—they withdrew when the Somali Government cut off diplomatic relations—Libyans, Chadians, Malians, Algerians, Yemenis, Afghans, Vietnamese, Cubans, East Germans, Bulgarians, Romanians.

In addition to our scheduled classes, we also held meetings to discuss aspects of FRELIMO's history, the history of Marxism-Leninism, and sessions for self-criticism. In our free time, we had access to sport activities, TV films and the camp's library. We left Frunze on December 3, 1979, and spent the night in Moscow.

We left Moscow on December 4 in the company of the Mozambican minister of defense who completed by then the "Inter-Arms" course at the Vwisstrel Academy. We called at Luanda for refueling and during our short stay we had time to visit Agostinho Neto's mausoleum where the minister placed a wreath.

At the Third Congress, held in February 1977 in Maputo, FRELIMO ceased to be just a liberation front and became a Marxist-Leninist party. Subsequently, the private sector was nationalized in a bid by the Government to restructure the old colonial state ma-

chine in accordance with the newly implemented Marxist-Leninist trends and dogmas.

In 1978 Samora Machel started a campaign whereby whoever had been previously attached, directly or indirectly, to the former regime would find himself persona non grata for the new government with all the negative implications attached thereto. Such people were invariably ex-members of the Portuguese special units.

Mozambique had by now come to grips with a rather precarious economic situation: Shortages of raw materials had been aggravated by the exodus of skilled personnel. Hence the Government started appointing newcomers to fill vacancies left by the Portuguese. These promotions and appointments were subject to adherence to and partisanship toward the ruling party. Thus the mediocrity of the promoted people and the economic chaos.

The private sector had been strangled by the newly implemented state-owned sector and collective farms. This proved to be detrimental to the economy, which started producing much less than before, and the whole bureaucratic machine started crumbling, too.

This was the deplorable situation we were faced with on our arrival in Mozambique.

We were invited to several receptions held by top government personalities and given 15,000 Escudos for pocket money to be spent during leave that followed.

Government personalities we came in contact with during those receptions included the President himself, Chief of the Air Force, Joao Americo M'Pfumo; Minister of Defense, Alberto Joachim Chipande; Chief of Staff of FPLM, Sebastiao Marcos Mabote; Political Commissar of the FPLM, Armando Emilio Guebuza; and the Soviet adviser to the Minister of Defense.

On January 9, after a long stay at the military hotel, we were sent to Nacala Air Base where we met four Soviet pilots and many Soviet technicians. I was appointed here as patrol commander. Living conditions in Nacala were extremely bad due to poor food, lack of equipment, and personnel shortages. We didn't have national flying overalls and we had to wear those of the Soviet Air Force. Often we had to work as mechanics during the flights of our colleagues of one squadron, and vice-versa.

We were eventually stationed at Beira Air Force Base where problems encountered were essentially the same.

The country was, indeed, witnessing the chaos brought about by a wild attempt to adapt Marxist-Leninist theories to Mozambican realities.

In September 1980 the Government introduced the use of ranks for all members of the armed forces. During the ceremony, Samora Machel stressed in his lengthy speech that every officer of the FAM should necessarily be a Communist. This didn't take us by surprise.

Officers stationed in Beira received their ranks in November that same year and I was given the rank of lieutenant.

I was on leave in Maputo at my parents' house when the South African raid on the ANC houses in Matola took place. This was on January 30. After that date the Minister of Defense decided that six Mig-17's with the respective crews should be stationed in

Maputo on a permanent basis and carry out patrols along the border with the RSA.

In June, when busy with preparations to leave for Maputo, it suddenly occurred to me that even though this system was to bring Mozambique down, I was in fact defending it. As it was impossible to resign from the armed forces, I decided to desert. Thus, during a navigation flight on July 8, I left the prescribed route and entered South African air space, and subsequently landed at Hoedspruit, having been intercepted by two South African Mirage aircraft, which ascertained my intentions and escorted me down.

I was received normally at Hoedspruit and decided to continue with my plans and ask for political asylum which was not, obviously, granted immediately. This request was made in public during a press interview at that air base.

A press conference was held 1 week and 3 days later, also at Hoedspruit, which enabled me to explain my reasons for desertion, my expectations and plans for the future.

I underwent afterward an intensive interrogation by the military intelligence authorities that ended on August 31. I then left for Cape Town where, while flying an Impala training aircraft, my background knowledge and military experience were tested. I returned to Pretoria in November.

Early in 1982 I was able to visit the operational area in northern Namibia. It was here that I was faced with reality in Namibia brought about by SWAPO.

I saw, specifically, the result of a landmine explosion which had destroyed a civilian ambulance transporting civil patients from the Eenhana base hospital to a larger one equipped with better medical and surgical material. It may sound like a mere coincidence, but SWAPO knows perfectly well that the security forces in Namibia always make use of antimine vehicles. Thus, we can assume that in laying mines, their prime target is the civil defenseless population.

Like FRELIMO, SWAPO also enjoys full support from the Soviet Union. Well, Soviet support alone isn't bad. Yet history has proven that wherever the Soviet Union has supported those parties or movements more vulnerable and more receptive to Russian power—FRELIMO [Mozambique], MPLA [1] [Angola], PAIGC [2] [Guinea-Bissau]—this same Soviet aid was accompanied by subtle infiltration of these liberation movements, the end result being the transformation of a genuine nationalist movement into surrogates of the U.S.S.R. in Africa once such movements come to power.

Therefore, I appeal to those who have a say and an active role in international affairs, particularly those pertaining to the free world, to take a more realistic look at Africa and not to place Africans in general in specific categories without being fully aware of what is in fact taking place in our continent. Foreign forces, totally alien to us, are taking over our states and reducing us to a miserable state. So miserable is the situation in black Africa that developed countries should shudder at this sight.[3]

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[1] People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
[2] African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.
[3] A speech by President Machel appears as exhibit H in the appendix to this hearing.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you very much, Lieutenant Bomba. I might add that the witness preceding you, Advocate Kozonguizi, as part of his presentation used certain photographs of civilian victims of landmine disasters. In further support of your statement concerning the use of mine-proof vehicles by the South African Defense Force, when members of the subcommittee's staff were in South West Africa/Namibia, all of the military travel was in mine-proof vehicles. The only people who were really vulnerable to the land mines were people who were traveling in small motor cars or conventional vehicles.

You have given some indication in your opening statement, Lieutenant Bomba, as to some of your reasons for leaving Mozambique. Can you amplify that in terms of your own experiences under FRELIMO, and also could you respond to the question as to whether or not some day you would like to return to Mozambique?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, I would love to return back to Mozambique, but not to that Mozambique ruled by FRELIMO. I believe that Mozambique can be free one day. FRELIMO, in fact, at the beginning was a liberation movement, when President Edward Mondlane was alive, FRELIMO was a liberation movement. But the Soviet infiltration transformed FRELIMO into just one puppet of the Soviet Union.

And after the independence, what happens is that the Soviets, they replaced the Portuguese, and the Soviets are more cruel. I can say, that before the independence in Mozambique, the conditions of life were better. For example, I didn't decide that I wanted to become a fighter-bomber pilot; I was studying only to become an engineer. But FRELIMO has got power. They decided that I would become a fighter-bomber pilot to defend the power of themselves.

Mr. LISKER. Well, under Portuguese colonial rule, would you have been free to select engineering as a profession?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, I was free to select what I wanted.

Mr. LISKER. So that when FRELIMO replaced that rule and Mozambique became independent, you were no longer free to make your own choice as to what your future would be?

Lieutenant BOMBA. No.

Mr. LISKER. In discussions with subcommittee staff, you have indicated that 3 years after the independence of Mozambique, the second stage of the revolution was instituted and FRELIMO ceased being a national liberation organization, and in fact became a Marxist-Leninist party.

How did this transformation occur?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Well, this transformation, it's not just a coincidence, because the Communists, they have got their ideology and they have got the sequence that must be followed. At the beginning, the liberation movement must fight to have the political power; after they have got the power, they begin with the democratic revolution of the masses, to get influence among the masses, and to have control over all the population.

After that, what comes is the socialist revolution. That is what happened. In the 3d Congress FRELIMO became a Socialist party, Marxist-Leninist—it was a Communist party at the beginning of the Socialist revolution.

Mr. LISKER. When you were in the Soviet Union, what were you told about the United States of America?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Well, I was told that the United States of America was the No. 1 support of the Portuguese colonialist regime in Mozambique; also that the United States was supplying the Portuguese Government. The Portuguese Government was fighting against the freedom of Mozambique, and the United States are the imperialists that are fighting against the liberation of any people in this world. Where there is the United States, there is no freedom, there is no development; there is only exploitation.

That is what they told me about the United States.

Mr. LISKER. On a scale of 1 to 10, what was your perception of where the United States ranked as an enemy of the Soviet Union?

Lieutenant BOMBA. I did not understand the question.

Mr. LISKER. Did they give you any impression in the Soviet Union as to whether the United States generally was to be regarded as a friend or an enemy of the U.S.S.R.?

Lieutenant BOMBA. In the U.S.S.R. the United States is regarded as the enemy No. 1. When we studied tactics, all the comparisons they do—for example, they compared the actions with the Soviets—obviously they said they helped the people, they do this, they do that, and they supply weapons and food and so forth, while the United States is just fighting against the people. All the examples are, the Soviet Union doing good things and the United States just exploiting the people.

Mr. LISKER. You have stated that you trained with other military trainees such as Angolans, Tanzanians, Congolese, Libyans, and Cubans, among others, while you were getting pilot training on the Mig-17 in the U.S.S.R.

Were all of these people receiving training on the Mig-17, or were they receiving training on more-advanced aircraft?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Well, the Angolans and Mozambicans were receiving training on the Mig-17, but the Cubans, the Bulgarians, the East Germans and the Rumanians, they are receiving training on more-advanced aircraft, like Mig-21 and Mig-23.

Mr. LISKER. Could you describe the differences between the Mig-17, the Mig-21, and the Mig-23?

Lieutenant BOMBA. The Mig-17 is a trans-sonic aircraft that can carry about 500 kilos of bombs and has got only cannons and has got a short range. The Mig-21 is a supersonic aircraft. It has got missiles, can carry more bombs. You know, it has got more destructive weapons, more sophisticated. The Mig-23 is more sophisticated even than the Mig-21. The Mig-23 is more or less like the American Phantom.

Mr. LISKER. In your view, why were the Angolans, Tanzanians, Congolese, Libyans, not being trained with the more-advanced aircraft?

Lieutenant BOMBA. No, the Libyans also were training on some advanced aircraft. There were also groups on the Mig-17.

But the reason is just because, for example, Libya can receive advanced aircraft, because the Soviets have got bases in Libya. But the Mozambicans, they don't receive advanced equipment, because the Soviets, they still want to have control. For example, in Mo-

zambique we very often see some Soviet frigates that are doing military maneuvers in the Mozambican waters.

The Tanzanians and the Congolese are also the same, more or less the same case. They haven't got that strategic position, and they are not so much controlled by the Soviets; they don't trust them enough.

Mr. LISKER. In your prepared statement you made mention several times of the presence of Soviets in Mozambique, such as one of your instructors, Lieutenant Vacilievitch, who was eventually stationed in Mozambique, the Soviet adviser to the Mozambican Minister of Defense, and the four Soviet pilots, and many Soviet technicians at Nacala Air Base.

The subcommittee has also received testimony from Under Secretary of Defense, Fred Ikle, that the Cubans have approximately 600 to 700 civilian advisers in Mozambique.

Can you give the subcommittee an idea of the number of Soviet, Cuban, and East German military and civilian advisers that there are now in Mozambique?

Lieutenant BOMBA. I can't give a number, but I can give you a general idea of how many. For example, the Soviets—we have only Soviet advisers in the air force, only Soviet advisers and instructors, only Soviets; in the Navy also; and in the ground forces, but high-level, high-ranking officers, and so forth.

And civilian personnel, just a few. We have got also Bulgarians, a lot of them. They are more attached to the health services, and in some fields such as agriculture, only Bulgarians.

East Germans, they are only responsible for the security forces. The Cubans, some in the ground forces, instructors, and some advisers—but they are mainly instructors, the Cubans.

Mr. LISKER. Do the Soviet pilots fly missions for Mozambique?

Lieutenant BOMBA. The Soviet pilots only fly on training missions, not combat missions.

Mr. LISKER. Do they fly Soviet missions out of Mozambique, using Mozambique as a base of operations?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Well, I don't know whether they started, but from some meeting that took place with the Minister of Defence and some other commanding officers of the Mozambican Armed Forces, I heard from a friend of mine that was in those meetings that the Soviets wanted to have some facilities on Nacala Air Base for refueling, and some equipment of the Soviet strategic reconnaissance aircraft.

Mr. LISKER. Do the Soviets maintain naval facilities there for access to the Indian Ocean?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, they usually go to Nacala, to the port of Nacala, Beira, and Maputo, some frigates of the Soviet navy, and they have maneuvers in Mozambican waters.

Mr. LISKER. In 1979, David Newsom, who is the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, testified, and it was before a Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, that there were 41,680 Communist military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa, 20,300 in Angola, and 1,130 in Mozambique. Senator Denton has asked that the Subcom-

mittee enter into the record the testimony of former Under Secretary Newsom.[1]

In interviews with the subcommittee staff, you have told startling stories about reeducation camps, located mainly in northern Mozambique.

Could you please tell us in some more detail about these camps for the benefit of those who are here today?

Lieutenant BOMBA. The reeducation camps were created by FRELIMO since independence. Those camps were created for the repression of the people that oppose the regime in any way, and some other criminals.

For example, from 1975 on, a lot of people in Maputo were taken just because they didn't have identification cards. They were taken to those reeducation camps. And when they arrived at those reeducation camps, they didn't see anything; it's just the bush, where there are animals—lions, snakes, and other wild animals. The authorities said: You must create here the conditions for your living; you are going to be reeducated here—and they are guarded by soldiers. And they are very often tortured, and many of them die in these reeducation camps.

And now there is a movement that is fighting in Mozambique against the FRELIMO government. This movement was created by one man that was in the reeducation camp of Ruarua. This man escaped from the reeducation camp and because of the experiences he had there decided, no, I must fight against the Mozambican Government. And he created the resistance movement that is fighting against the Mozambican Government.

Mr. LISKER. In the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981, which was submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate by the Department of State, dated February 1982, there is ample support for the testimony concerning reeducation camps which you have just given, beginning on page 176 of that document, which Senator Denton has asked that we place in the record of this hearing.[2]

I am going to read just briefly from this document. It says:

Torture is prohibited by the constitution—

They are speaking of Mozambique now.

President Machel admitted in a speech on November 5, however, that police and security officials had on occasion illegally used corporal punishment and intimidation in order to obtain confessions.

And then it goes on to say, under the heading "Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment":

Extremely Spartan conditions in places of detention reflect societal conditions and are not imposed for purposes of discipline. Prisoners of all types were forcibly detained in isolated detention camps called by the government "reeducation centers" in the period following independence. Those still confined in these centers reportedly are individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary acts or attitudes. No other dis-

[1] A portion of Under Secretary Newsom's testimony on U.S. Interests in Africa before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, October 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29, and November 13 and 14, 1979, appears as exhibit I in the appendix to this hearing.

[2] The report was received for the record and appears as exhibit J in the appendix to this hearing.

tinction by type of penalty is apparent. Conditions in some of the camps are reportedly severe, reflecting official neglect of the camps. During the last year fourteen individuals were convicted of capital crimes and nine executed by order of revolutionary military tribunals for 'crimes against the people and state security.' In the absence of a supreme court, there is no right of appeal in such cases, although there is a presidential review.

And there is much more extensive elaboration of conditions in Mozambique which are incorporated in this report and will, as I said earlier, at Senator Denton's direction, appear as part of the record.

What happens to those who rebel from the Marxist-Leninist line now espoused by FRELIMO?

Lieutenant BOMBA. People who are against the Marxist-Leninist ideology, they have got a place in the reeducation camp or in prisons. If they can, they escape; usually they cross the border to South Africa and, through South Africa, they go to Portugal. Even here in the United States there are many Mozambicans that run away from that country because of that idea.

Mr. LISKER. Well, I am not talking of people who rebel in the sense of taking up arms against the FRELIMO regime, but I am talking about people who simply speak against the regime in either a public or private way.

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, that's enough for FRELIMO, that's enough. You don't have to take an arm and fight against them; if you don't agree with them, you are an enemy—just not agree. They don't accept even neutrality. They say, if you are not a member of FRELIMO, to what organization do you belong? If you are not a member of FRELIMO, that means that you belong to some organization that opposes the government of FRELIMO, so you are named an enemy.

Mr. LISKER. But surely there must be a gray area. If you don't belong to FRELIMO, aren't there those who, while not advocating the overthrow of FRELIMO, have differences with FRELIMO and the way in which it carries out its responsibilities? I mean, isn't any sort of dissent tolerated?

Lieutenant BOMBA. FRELIMO, they don't allow anybody to disagree with them.

Mr. LISKER. I see.

Lieutenant BOMBA. Who does not agree with them is an enemy—they are radical on that.

Mr. LISKER. A moment ago we were talking about the flying of missions and the support for missions by the Soviets. In interviews with the subcommittee staff you have indicated that the Mozambican air force is deployed internally. Now, what would the reason for that be?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Internally, because all the missions that the Mozambican air force carries out are against the internal forces that are fighting against the Mozambican Government. They don't go to South Africa to carry out combat missions or to Rhodesia—before its independence—to carry out combat missions, only inside the borders of Mozambique.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you very much.

[At this point, Senator Denton returned to the hearing.]

Senator DENTON. Lieutenant Bomba, you mentioned being familiar with SWAPO. Do you see similarities between what is happening in Angola and in Namibia and in what occurred in Mozambique through FRELIMO? Do you see similarities among the events in Angola and in Namibia with those in Mozambique?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, I see it, because the methods of SWAPO are the same methods that FRELIMO used at the beginning to terrorize the people to get their support. You know, people when they are afraid of something, they go to it, just to keep their lives. And this is the same method that SWAPO is using in Namibia now.

In Angola, the case is the same, and the Soviet support. And what happened later, when the liberation movement came into power, was that the liberation movements didn't lead the country in a national cause; they led the country to the Soviet bloc. For example, Mozambique now has got a Marxist-Leninist party. Marxism-Leninism is communism. FRELIMO was a liberation movement, but now it is a Marxist-Leninist party. They even refused traditions of the people in the name of communism.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. In the statement of President Machel, attached to your prepared testimony, he stated that "We want happiness, prosperity, and wellbeing," and that "We will build new hospitals, schools, dams, roads, and factories. We will improve our life."

In what ways, in your perception, has the Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO provided any of that happiness, prosperity, and well-being, or improved the lives of the Mozambican people?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Well, I can say, for example, what they did to improve the life of the Mozambican people, for the happiness of the Mozambican people—for example, now one Mozambican can only buy two kilos of rice per month—those are the limits they have. And who does not agree with the FRELIMO policy goes to the reeducation camps. And many people die of diseases because they don't have enough hospitals, they don't have enough doctors. They have weapons, they have got many weapons—about that, no problem. But with weapons nobody can produce food. The Mozambican people don't need weapons; the Mozambican people need food.

Senator DENTON. I saw the same thing in North Vietnam which was simultaneously reporting to the world remarkable statistics on the improvement of health in their country. My prisoner colleagues and I all had more pity for the North Vietnamese citizens than we had for ourselves. Toward the end, when we were being fed better after the torture stopped, I think we were getting better food than the people in North Vietnam.

But there were plenty of weapons, and, to encourage their zeal in communism, they were chained to their artillery pieces. This is the sort of thing that our people never learned about that conflict and about that nation.

I watched one-legged men inducted into the armed services there, screaming and fighting. Over a period of days they were subdued until they could be fitted with an artificial—with what amounted to a peg leg and then, having previously been on crutches, they went into combat on the peg leg.

We used to refer to such an individual as one who was "imbued." That was a sarcastic reference to his attitude, which was really just one of being terrorized.

From your experience in the Soviet Union and from your experience in Mozambique and other parts of southern Africa, what is your opinion as to the real Soviet objective in southern Africa? Is it to liberate and assist the peoples of Africa?

Lieutenant BOMBA. The Soviets in Africa, they are not in Africa to help the African people. They use the intentions of the African people in their own—to their own plans; for example, they convert liberation movements into their surrogates. It is just to have control of Africa, to control all that part of Africa, because the last intention of the Soviet Union is to control all the world. They want to kill the Western World by controlling the roots in Africa. If they can control—they have got now Mozambique, they have got now Angola, they are controling Zimbabwe now, they want Namibia now, they are going to South Africa. If they can control South Africa, this route of the Cape, goodbye to it.

And what does this mean? It means that all the stuff that is coming from South Africa and all the routes that pass the Cape won't come to the Western World, and the Western World won't have enough power to resist against the Soviet Union. That is their last intention; they don't want to liberate the African people. The African people must liberate themselves without the Soviets.

The intentions of the Soviets are clear. For example, if one can go to Mozambique to watch—not officially, because if you go officially, they will give you some people of FRELIMO to accompany you, to show you to special places separated for that. If you send, for example, a commission of the United Nations, what are they going to see there? They are going to show us what they want them to see, not the reality. If you talk with the Mozambican people, you ask them what is going on in Mozambique, you look at the streets, look at the shops—empty; you only see queues, people sleep in the street to be the first in the next day; they stay in the queues during the nights. Is that liberation? Is that development? I don't know, it may be—I don't understand it quite well. But what I was taught in school, it's quite different. Development is nothing like that.

The Portuguese, they were not interested in developing Mozambique; they were colonialists. Despite that we had enough food, we could decide what we wanted to do, we were free to express our opinion—of course, with some limits, we had some limits. But now, with FRELIMO, it's this: what's not in this line, no place for it. That is the freedom that FRELIMO brought for us with the Soviet control.

Senator DENTON. Do you see some parallel between FRELIMO and SWAPO?

Lieutenant BOMBA. Yes, I see that FRELIMO and SWAPO, they were bred in the same bush. They have got the Soviets behind them. And, you know, the history of the liberation movement, they can't decide what they want to do; they are so controled that they have to do what the boss wants them to do—the boss is in the Kremlin.

Senator DENTON. I want to state for the record that as a Senator and a person exposed to this mechanism as it operates around the world, that in many places, such as in Africa—and in Latin America, there are many in liberation movements who, although they hate the hand that is feeding them, the Communist hand that is feeding them, continue to operate or deal with them hopeful that somehow they will in the end, after achieving their victory in one sense, get the Communists out of it. And in every case they fail, and in every case you and I know they are foredoomed to fail—that is one of the tragedies of our day.

Lieutenant Bomba, I want to thank you for taking this long trip, for the clarity of your testimony, for your courage. You are excused, sir. Thank you very much.

Lieutenant BOMBA. It was a pleasure.

Senator DENTON. Our third witness, Andreas Shipanga, has just arrived after a rather hectic trip from Africa. We are now in the process of having his opening statement duplicated for distribution.

Since I must leave to go vote, I will turn the hearing over to Mr. Lisker.

Mr. LISKER. After some to-do, Mr. Shipanga finally was able to get here; the flight was late, and we are very appreciative of the fact that the Marshal Service again came to our rescue and intervened and was able to bring him here expeditiously from the connecting flight.

From 1953 to 1955, Mr. Shipanga was a teacher in Namibia, born in Ovamboland. However, in 1955 he left the country to go to Portuguese West Africa, which, of course, is now Angola. From there he went to Johannesburg and then to Cape Town. It was in Cape Town that he and several colleagues, including Advocate Kozonguizi, who was our first witness today, established the Ovamboland People's Organization, known as the OPO.

This was transformed into the South West Africa People's Organization in 1960, now, of course, called SWAPO. Mr. Shipanga became the first representative of SWAPO in Congo Leopoldville and he traveled extensively throughout the world on behalf of SWAPO.

In 1975 he was arrested by the army in Zambia on the orders of Sam Nujoma, the present president of SWAPO, and was imprisoned for 3 months. He was then transferred to Tanzania where he spent another 22 months in jail. All of which, by the way, was without benefit of trial or, I think as Mr. Shipanga will tell you, without even an interview.

He subsequently was granted political asylum.

I think at this point we will ask Mr. Shipanga to come in. We will ask the notary to administer the oath in the absence of the Senator.

[Mr. Shipanga is duly sworn.]

Mr. Shipanga, at the outset, let me apologize for Senator Denton, as he had to go rather hurriedly just a moment ago to vote, and he will be returning shortly. If you would like to wait for your opening statement to be duplicated, we can do so; if you would prefer to proceed, you may do that.

Mr. SHIPANGA. If possible, I should like to read the statement.

Mr. LISKER. All right, we will take a few minutes' break until the statement arrives.

[A short recess was taken.]

Now we can resume.

TESTIMONY OF ANDREAS SHIPANGA, PRESIDENT OF THE SWAPO-DEMOCRATS

Mr. SHIPANGA. Thank you, sir. My name is Andreas Shipanga, and I am the president of the SWAPO-Democrats based in Windhoek, capital of Namibia.

I was one of the founding leaders of the original SWAPO. Others were Herman Toivo ja Toivo, who is serving 20 years on Robben Island, South Africa, as a political prisoner, and Mr. Solomon Mifima and Mr. Emil Appolus, who are senior executive officers in SWAPO–D and are also residing in Windhoek.

Your hearings, Mr. Chairman, come at a time when your administration is taking very important initiatives in conjunction with the other four Western Powers to bring about an overall peaceful settlement in the independence dispute concerning my country and people. We fully support these efforts of the five Western Powers and we are hopeful that they will succeed in this endeavor.

I hope, furthermore, that before you embarked on this investigation of the Soviet, GDR, and Cuban involvement in SWAPO you investigated the real cause of the troubles, upheavals, and bitterness that are up to now besetting Namibia and South Africa. I do hope you did this, because to investigate Namibian and South African problems purely on the basis of East-West ideological and big power rivalries at a time like this can, in my humble view, be of no help at all to the cause of those blacks and whites in Namibia as well as in South Africa who are trying hard to find each other, understand each other's problems and find common coexistence that will assure everyone of security, prosperity and thus breaking down the old walls that are built on insane foundations of racist bigotry, hatred, and inequalities.

On the other hand, the only forces that can benefit from simplistic ideological and big power rivalries on a highly complex issue such as Namibia, are the forces that want to live in the past, burying their heads in the sand like so many ostriches and invite their own self-destruction in the short and the long term. In Namibia and in South Africa there is ample evidence of this. I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, to give any semblance of respectability or implied sympathy or support to the forces of the status quo, racist domination and oppression, will not be of any help and will not even be in your country's interests.

It was not an easy decision to accept your kind invitation to appear before your committee, Mr. Chairman. Personally I don't like to appear before foreign committees, Mr. Chairman, especially when those committees are branches of a governmental setup. Second, the subject matter under investigation is not really a field of my interest. But I have decided to come here for two reasons.

First, to defend the genuine cause of my people's aspirations to self-determination and national independence.

Second, since I was one of those Namibian patriots who founded the original SWAPO, I feel I have a political and moral obligation to expound the reasons why our people are struggling against the South African colonial rule in Namibia.

As a born and bred Namibian, I can witness here and now how it feels to be black and ruled by successive South African white supremacist regimes ever since South Africa was given the mandate to rule Namibia by the defunct League of Nations over 60 years ago. When one is told you are a subhuman and treated as such in a country of your birth, one is sure to react to such a system in one way or another. There can be those who will submit meekly and accept their lot as slaves to foreign racist masters. But the majority of my people have never and will never accept such a status now or in the future.

When we founded the original SWAPO in 1958, we were aware and proud of the fact that we were just following in the footsteps of our gallant forefathers who fought the German colonial occupation and Portuguese encroachment into our country.

We were, as we are now, convinced that the struggle for our people's right to self-determination and independence is just and noble. The SWAPO movement believed from the begining until about 1966 that the South African rulers through a combination of pressure by our people and the international community would see the light and grant our country its independence. From 1958 to mid-1966 our policy, formally and publicly, was based on the philosophies of two great men: Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi—nonviolent struggle. If it was not for the intransigence of those South African rulers during that time, I am convinced that what happened later on and is still going on could never have happened.

That brings me to the subject matter you have called me here for, the U.S.S.R., GDR, and Cuban involvement with SWAPO.

Like all black Namibians who live in my country, I had never met a single Soviet or a Cuban until the South African rule in my country forced me into exile in 1963. There in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, I came across the Soviet diplomats and others from Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China.

Apart from South African whites and the settled Germans, the only whites I had come across were those from North America and Western Europe. They were not mere tourists but also people with investments in my country. Their behavior toward the blacks was not distinguishable from that of whites from South Africa. They all enjoyed the life of white racial paradise they found there. To them it was a mystery why the blacks could complain, let alone stand up and demand their rights at all. In short, they identified themselves with the South African Government and its system of colonial rule over Namibia.

The best example of this attitude is summed up in a statement from Tsumeb Corp. Ltd. [TCL] managing director in the late 1950's. He said, and I quote: "We know the people (whites) and the government of South Africa and we will back them with our dollars and reputation * * *."

Tsumeb Corp. at that time was owned and controlled by two U.S. companies; namely, American Metal Climax and Newmont Mining

Corp. They was quite happy to pay black Namibian workers $4 U.S. per month, irrespective of whether they had families or not. Furthermore, Tsumeb Corp., like other multinational corporations operating in Namibia, was not only the largest employer of the so-called contract laborers but also a shareholder of the South West Africa Native Labour Association [SWANLA].

SWANLA was until 1973 a profitable company that had trafficked in human beings in the true sense of the word. It sold my people to the white employers for a profit. Its demise came at around the end of 1972 when the black workers really got organized and struck until this unholy company called SWANLA was dissolved.

These are the whites we knew very well and I can witness what they did to my people and to myself.

Now coming back to the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans.

What makes people in your country and South Africa to think that a black man or woman is so prone to manipulation or indoctrination by these countries? Is it again the theory of white racism? Is it a secret admission that the capitalist system is inferior to that of communism? One can't help to wonder.

When I left my country with many more of my fellow compatriots in 1963, we were motivated by one imperative task: to gain as many supporters for our struggle for our people's right to self-determination and independence as possible. Either it was because of grave naivete or some strange illusion that the first rounds we made in Dar es Salaam was to knock on the doors of the Western embassies. We really believed that it was possible to convince the Western democracies that our right to self-determination and our struggle against South African rule was noble, just and worthy of their support.

All we met with was open and not-so-open hostility and contempt at the hands of the various Western diplomatic missions in Dar es Salaam and, in my case, in Leopoldville—now Kinshasa—Accra, Cairo, and Algiers.

The first time I went to London and Paris in 1966 to put our case before the foreign ministries of those countries, it was even worse. The South African Government propaganda division had done its homework seriously: No black who talks about oppression and injustice is his own man—behind him must be the Russians, they said. The West agreed, too.

The next target countries we turned to were the newly independent African countries, and they were not many at that time. There were also some Asian diplomatic missions in Dar es Salaam. The African and Asian diplomats, naturally, not only sympathized but also supported our struggle for independence.

Finally, it was not the Soviets or East Germans—Cuba at that time did not have an embassy in Dar es Salaam—who took the initiative to contact us. We took the first step. We asked them for support, mainly material but also diplomatic. We wanted them to support all measures being debated in various international forums aimed at compelling South Africa to give independence to Namibia.

At SWAPO's own initiative I went to Moscow, Peking, East Berlin, and to almost all capitals of Eastern Europe in search of support for our people's struggle against the South African rule.

After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in April 1974, some Western capitals started to open their eyes for the first time to the fact that even without their help African peoples could achieve their goal of self-determination and national independence. Several colleagues and I undertook missions to almost all Western capitals and all we received were polite if cool handshakes from those government officials. Old habits die hard.

It has never been a secret that the Soviet Union and its allies support the liberation movements such as SWAPO. I can only talk authoritatively about it from 1963 to April 20, 1976, when I was one of its senior officials. What happened later or what is going on right now, I won't be able to say or pretend to know.

On such visits as I have undertaken on behalf of SWAPO to Moscow and other Eastern European capitals, I can say truthfully that at no time did those people try to make us Communists. They called us friends and never comrades. It is true we were given many volumes of the works of Karl Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung as presents. Surely the purpose could have been that we should read and study and even understand and accept the concept and ideology of Marxism-Leninism. I, for one, and I certainly can say this applied to the rest of the SWAPO leadership during that period, never had time or real interest to read those volumes.

Reading interests among especially the young SWAPO cadres were mainly in the writings of Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro's "History Will Absolve Me," and Mao's "Little Red Book." The reason is not too far to find: These writers and their environmental circumstances were nearly similar to our own. The struggles they went through were almost the same as ours, while Marx's and Lenin's works were based on European intellectual analyses and debate. As I said, I am speaking about SWAPO as I knew it between 1958 and 1976. Anything after that—ask them. They have an office in New York.

Mr. LISKER. We have asked them, but they haven't answered.

Mr. SHIPANGA. I see. Again, Mr. Chairman, people in my country, especially among the blacks, but also among the whites who are not only enlightened but are opposed to racism and to South African rule in Namibia, are puzzled by your investigation. If, as it is well known already, that SWAPO does get Soviet, GDR, and Cuban support, your committee will find the facts. Will this mean that continued South African rule against the wishes of the majority of Namibian people is legitimate? Others ask: Do some people in the United States really believe the bushes and sand dunes of Namibia to be teeming with red blacks, all indoctrinated with Soviet ideology? I can testify here truthfully that in Namibia I have never come across a single Communist black person. I can go further and say: Instead of investigating reds in our bushes, you could easily have caught them by their hundreds in the concrete and glass forests across the whole of the United States.

For in many a mind of oppressed Africans the question arises: Is it true that only the Communists are the opponents of apartheid and racism in Namibia and South Africa? If so, does it really mean that the capitalist West is firmly in cahoots with apartheid and racism as the Communist East says?

I am not expecting answers to this question now. The decision will be yours.

I should just like to say that I hope that you, honorable Mr. Chairman, and members of your committee, will again, in the not-too-unforeseeable future, convene another subcommittee on how to help and encourage those black and white citizens of Namibia who are now working seriously to find common ground in order to end racial injustices, end the war and strife and for the country as a whole to gain its independence; in peace, justice, and security for everyone, and to have a government based on democratic institutions.

That can also be said about our neighbor, South Africa. At the present, voices are going up for or against change. I should like to think that you honorable Senators, ladies and gentlemen, will choose to help those forces which stand for reason and goodwill to each other rather than those forces who believe that the Sun will never go down on racism and oppression.

My own party believes that in order to prevent all sorts of birds of prey that are now descending in that part of our African subcontinent, in order to prevent anybody to be able to fish in our troubled waters, we need your help to cleanse the waters.

Southern Africa can become not only a great economic powerhouse on the African continent, but also a living example of peoples of different races living, building up, and prospering together in freedom, common security, and stability. As far as I am concerned, the time has come for the people who live in southern Africa and indeed the whole of Africa to stop calling others useless names such as fascist racist oppressors and Communist terrorists. All this name calling will lead us nowhere but to sure mutual destruction.

As far as we in the SWAPO Democrats are concerned, we will continue to back the U.S. administration's initiatives as well as those of Canada, France, Britain, West Germany, to solve our problems by peaceful means and to bring a settlement to Namibia. Likewise we will continue to talk to the South African Government to accept a speedy, peaceful, and honorable settlement in our country.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you, Mr. Shipanga, for that very frank exposition of your views.

Senator Denton, in conjunction with the staff, has compiled a series of questions which I will ask you on his behalf, until he returns, and I hope you will answer them as fully as you are able to or feel competent to.

In discussions with the subcommittee staff in Pretoria, you may recall that you mentioned that the OPO, the Ovambo People's Organization, the predecessor of SWAPO, was first established with the support of the South African Liberal Party.

Am I correct?

Mr. SHIPANGA. That is correct.

Mr. LISKER. Does this mean, then, that none of those associated with the establishment of OPO, had any connection with the South African Communist Party?

Mr. SHIPANGA. To the best knowledge of mine. We knew some people who belonged to the then South African Communist Party,

people such as Ruth First, a writer, and Ray Simons, who was a trade unionist.

Mr. LISKER. Excuse me, Ruth First, that is Joe Slovo's wife?

Mr. SHIPANGA. That's right. And then Ray Simons. He was a trade unionist.

Since, anyway, OPO started off as a labor movement, naturally she was interested and we had talks with her. But our allies were the late Patrick Duncan, Alan Paton, et cetera.

Mr. LISKER. Was professor Sir Edgar Brooks in that group as well?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Yes, that's right.

Mr. LISKER. Would you say that one of the major purposes behind the establishment of the OPO was to achieve a fair deal, as you have described it, in the labor field for the people of Namibia?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Yes, indeed. Our first priority, when we started OPO, was actually to cripple this company called SWANLA, to mobilize the workers to strike, because it was really a slave trade, it was nothing else other than a slave trade.

Mr. LISKER. Was that the only way in which the blacks were exploited at that time, commercially, primarily?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Yes, indeed. You can just imagine—the whole black community, even those who were not working on contracts, they could lose jobs because it is too bad to pay the contract laborer, you know, say, $4 a month instead of the one who is not on contract to get $20 a month.

So even those outside the contract system, they also supported us.

Mr. LISKER. After the creation of SWAPO in 1960, was the primary thrust of the organization for change still peaceful?

Mr. SHIPANGA. It was still peaceful. Actually this OPO was founded in 1958. What happened in December 1959 in Windhoek, the time when the South African authorities were forcibly removing the blacks from the place they called the old location, to move 8 kilometers further away from the industrial areas—and then there was a demonstration and the South African police opened up on the demonstrators, peaceful demonstrators, with firearms and killed 11 people. That was a sobering moment for us.

We started asking ourselves, until when can we push our people, because of the peaceful solution, into the muzzles of the South African soldiers and police? That is the way the whole revolution started taking place.

Mr. LISKER. When you were engaged or associated with SWAPO prior to your arrest at the direction of Mr. Nujoma, did SWAPO undertake to engage in military training of its membership?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Yes, indeed. As I say, 1959, December was the watershed in our thinking. But we still have that very great hope with the case in the International Court of Justice, The Hague, which was brought by Liberia and Ethiopia. We honestly believed that it wouldn't be necessary, because if the court decides in favor of Ethiopia and Liberia, then South Africa will have to give our country independence. But, all the same, we started in earnest, I think in 1964, to say if the case gets lost, what are we going to do? I remember a meeting in Dar es Salaam toward the end of 1963—we say now, if the case in the court gets lost, that it went in favor

of South Africa, we have got only two ways to make it: one, to go back to Pretoria with our caps in hands and say, sorry, boss, we were wrong; or to struggle like any other people—in southern Africa we are struggling.

Mr. LISKER. But when you undertook the military training, you must have expected that the training was for a purpose other than mere discipline, that you would one day, if you didn't go back with your caps in your hands and say sorry, boss, that you were going to meet somebody on the battle lines. I mean, were you prepared at that point, was the organization prepared to take on its enemies, real or perceived, in actual combat?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Mr. Chairman, you have to recall that in 1963 was the foundation of OAU, and that first summit of OAU, the heads of state of African countries said all the freedom-fighting movements in Southern Africa, against Portuguese colonialism, or Southern Rhodesia or Namibia or South Africa, they must be helped in any way possible to put pressure on South Africa. The decision was taken in Addis Ababa, and literally all the movements then from 1964, they started preparing for the worst.

Mr. LISKER. When the decision was taken in Dar es Salaam, who were those who took the decision, which groups took the decision? Was it all the membership of the OAU? Were there Soviets or surrogates of the Soviets involved in that decision?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Well, at that time the leading lights in OAU were Kwame Nkrumah, Gamel Abdel Nasser, Emperor Haile Selassie, President Bourguiba, King Hassan of Morocco, and Sekou Toure, et cetera. Those were the leading lights in those days.

I won't say whether they were influenced by the Soviets or by the East Germans, but I wouldn't believe they were influenced in this other than by their desire to put pressure on colonial powers to grant independence to the colonial territories.

Mr. LISKER. Could you explain what happened in 1965, with respect to the U.S.S.R. and China vis-a-vis SWAPO and SWANU?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Yes, indeed. I think it was May 1965, when I was one of those leaders of SWAPO and went to Moscow and on to Peking. While other movements, they clearly identified themselves to be either pro-Soviets or pro-Chinese, only SWAPO continued to have relations with both the Soviet Union and China, and I can assure you: they didn't like it.

When we arrived in Moscow, they said from here where are you going? We said Peking. And they say, look, other movements, you know—Peking is only supported by small movements like SWANU, PAC, ZANU, COREMO, et cetera, but the other movements, you know, they are on our side. And we say, well, in the first place—and I say this truthfully—we are not a Communist organization, we cannot take part in ideological struggle between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, because we are not Communists. This thing will have to be solved by the Communist International, and we are not part of the Communist International. This is true what we say in Moscow as well as in Peking.

We continued until 1975, we continued with this policy.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you. What were the circumstances, if you can develop them for us fully, surrounding your break with Mr. Nujoma, and your subsequent arrest and detention?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Well, there were many factors involved. One, from 1971, when Sam Nujoma sent the SWAPO treasurer to come and study in Pittsburgh, in the United States, without authorization of the rest of the leadership, we knew now that corruption became so rife. That is one.

Another one is that he started talking about, you know, pronouncing something which we never agreed upon in the Congress, like, for example—I think it was 1973, in Prague, he say he believes in scientific socialism. And then we questioned him, where was this adopted as the policy of SWAPO? And that is why we were now demanding the congress—and we set the year 1974 to have a congress, and he starts saying that those who run the congress of SWAPO are South African agents, that SWAPO is not going to have a congress in exile, we will only have a congress in liberated Namibia. But everybody knew that that was a long dream.

But anyway the tensions started coming up and up until, again, because of the geopolitics, you know, the change in the Portuguese, when the Portuguese colonies collapsed, then they became these front-line states, they came in too big, and obviously men like President Nyerere or President Kaunda, they felt, well, they got now the destiny of the whole of southern Africa in their hands, they can make or break. And so they decided that those of us—not only me, we were over 2,000—we must be sacrificed so that Sam Nujoma will be the leader in Namibia.

Mr. LISKER. Excuse me, did you say 2,000?

Mr. SHIPANGA. 2,000—we were 2,000 when we were arrested in April 1976.

Mr. LISKER. What's happened—I mean, you are here, but where are the other 1,999?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Thirteen from the leadership, we were now taken from Zambia to the prisons of Tanzania. We were released May 1978. In April of 1977, Kaunda released 600. And the rest were taken into Angola. We really don't know their fate.

Mr. LISKER. You don't know what happened to them?

Mr. SHIPANGA. No.

Mr. LISKER. Do you have any speculation as to what might have happened to them?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Well, we fear the worst could have happened to them, but this is mere speculation. We really don't know. It is difficult to get any news from Angola or people out of Angola.

Mr. LISKER. Well, what occurred, I think you said in 1975, when Nujoma expressed his interest or the fact that he was now enamored of scientific socialism? What occurred? Did this just come out of the blue, or was there some reason for it?

Mr. SHIPANGA. Well, he was interviewed in Prague by radio Prague, and he says that he believes in scientific socialism. When we confronted him, when he came back, we said, OK, you can believe in something, but being a leader of the organization you have to have the sanction of a congress to change the ideological base of the organization.

Mr. LISKER. When you were detained after your arrest, what charges—what were you charged with?

Mr. SHIPANGA. We spent 25 months, that is, 2 years and 1 month, in prison, and we have never been questioned a single question. In fact, we never saw a Zambian official other than the army, which was guarding us. And then in Tanzania not a single civilian government official asked us a single question. We were just locked up and released, like that.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you.

[Senator Denton returned to the hearing.]

Senator DENTON. Let me again welcome you publicly, Mr. Shipanga. And thank you for making this long journey.

Would it be true to say that SWAPO's political program was amended only in 1976 to provide for scientific socialism and Marxist-Leninist principles?

Mr. SHIPANGA. That is true, Senator. That was amended only August 1976, when we were in our prison already.

Senator DENTON. Was this book, the Political Program of the South West Africa People's Organization, adopted at that meeting, July 18 to August 1, 1976, a meeting of the central committee in Lusaka, Zambia, after your arrest?

[Senator Denton holds up a pamphlet.]

Mr. SHIPANGA. That is correct, Senator.

Senator DENTON. Some resolutions have been highlighted in the book. I would like for you to confirm the correctness of this.

In one paragraph it says:

> To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry, and the progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism.

Another says:

> To work in solidarity with other national liberation movements and other anti-imperialist progressive and peace-loving forces throughout the world with a view to ridding Namibia, the African continent, and mankind of colonialist and imperialist domination.

Another says:

> To work in close cooperation with all progressive governments, organizations, and popular forces for the total emancipation of the African continent.

Further it says:

> To foster and strengthen the anti-imperialist unity amongst the national liberation, world socialist, progressive and peace-loving forces in order to eliminate all forms of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

And, finally:

> Strengthen our anti-imperialist international solidarity with the socialist countries, working class movements of the capitalist countries, liberation support organizations, and friendly governments and ordinary people.

Do those sound reasonably familiar to you, sir?

Mr. SHIPANGA. We never used that jargon before until the time when we were in prison, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. It is jargon with which I have become most familiar. I was in a Communist country as a prisoner for a number of years. I recognize it well. It is standardized throughout the world, and, as you probably know, there is a handbook on urban guerrilla

warfare, written by a man named Carlos Marighella, which can be found not only on your continent but on every continent in the world, and, indeed, in apartments in New York City, Detroit, New Orleans, my own hometown of Mobile. There is a remarkable universality, similarity and unity of technique, and yet it seems to escape those who most need to be aware of it.

We have a copy of the SWAPO Political Program which we will include in the record.[1]

I want to thank you, Mr. Shipanga, and recognize the importance of your position as well as the importance of your testimony. I wish you good health and a long life.

Mr. SHIPANGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. We are now at the end of our hearings on the involvement of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in terrorism in southern Africa.

The hearings have elicited testimony which is at once shocking and familiar. It is familiar to those of us who have experience of the attempts, all too often successful, of Moscow and its agents to infiltrate and manipulate the so-called "National Liberation Movements" in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It is surely shocking to all who prize liberty, democratic values, and human rights.

As my distinguished colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan of New York, has remarked, the Communists have succeeded in appropriating the language of liberty. They cloak totalitarianism in the rhetoric of democracy. They conceal their expansionist goals with praisworthy labels like "liberation" and "freedom." Who in our society would not identify with a "struggle to liberate oppressed peoples from imperialist domination * * * a struggle for freedom?" The true irony is that the Soviets, whose tyranny over their own citizens has been so graphically documented by writers like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and whose brutality toward those in other societies who seek freedom was demonstrated in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Afghanistan in 1979, and in Poland in 1981, nonetheless are allowed to represent themselves as the bearers of the flag of freedom in the developing world.

Some well-intentioned persons argue that the failure of Western governments to support reformist or radical elements in developing societies that, confronted with social, political or economic inequity, attempt to achieve their goals by force, drives them into the arms of the Soviets. According to this school of thought, the proper course for the United States is to be supportive of these radical elements and their general goals in order to preempt Soviet support.

I wish it were so simple. In reality, of course, right and wrong are rarely so clearly differentiated in human society that the choices are obvious or easy.

With admirable clarity, Dr. Henry Kissinger has characterized the policy dilemma in the second volume of his memoirs, Years Of Upheaval. He writes:

> One of the premises of the democratic process is that the loser accepts his defeat and in return is given an opportunity to win on another occasion. It depends on a moderate center whose evolution is almost inevitably thwarted in a developing

[1] A copy of the pamphlet appears as exhibit K in the appendix of this hearing.

country when a totalitarian element succeeds in organizing a guerrilla war. This impels the government into acts of repression, starting a vicious circle that traps both government and opponents and destroys whatever moderate center exists—fulfilling the central purpose of the insurgency. Moreover, the victims of terrorist attacks are almost invariably the ablest and most dedicated officials, leaving in place the corrupt.

The American response to this historical phenomenon is usually expressed in the conviction that a government under seige can best maintain itself by accelerating democratic reforms and by expanding its base of support by sharing power. But the fundamental cause of civil war (of which guerrilla war is a special category) is the breakdown of domestic consensus. Compromise, the essence of democratic politics, is it first victim. Civil wars almost without exception end in victory or defeat, never in coalition governments—the favorite American recipe. Concessions are ascribed to the weakness of those holding power, not to their magnanimity and hence, perversely, may accelerate rather than arrest the disintegration of authority. The proper time for reform is before civil wars break out, in order to preempt their causes—though this does not always work when the insurrection is inspired, financed, trained and equipped from outside the country.

The dilemma that our policymakers confront is all the more difficult when the Soviet Union, ever on the look out for what Assistant Secretary Crocker has described as "* * * targets of opportunity * * * to act counter to Western interests. * * *" succeeds in securing influence with, or control over, the leadership of radical groups. For example, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick describes SWAPO, the South West Africa Peoples Organization, as:

* * * one of those coalitions, of which we have seen a good many in our times, which includes some rather heterogeneous elements: some purely nationalist elements and some not very well-defined elements and some Communist elements and some Marxist-Leninist elements that are explicitly oriented toward the Soviet Union and were trained there.

She also remarked:

* * * (SWAPO) * * * does include in its leadership some significant portion of persons tied to the Soviets by training and by predeliction. And its principal source of arms is of course the Soviet Union or surrogates thereof and we have seen in our times a good many such coalitions come to power only to have the most well-organized unit, which usually turns out to be the Soviet-oriented, Marxist-Leninist, seize control of the coalition.

The testimony that we have heard from our witnesses during these hearings certainly supports this description. Dr. Crocker indicated in his testimony that the administration estimates SWAPO receives about 90 percent of its military support and 60 percent of its overall support from Communist sources. Advocate Kozonguizi also drew our attention to the scale of the Soviet bloc's commitment to SWAPO, pointing to the large quantities of weapons and military equipment made available in Angola. Our younger witnesses, Mr. Namolo and Mr. Hashiko, have testified about their training in Angola by Soviet instructors. They also described their indoctrination in the Soviet Union in "Socialism and Communism," "Leninist teachings" and "political economy."

Documents submitted for the record contain evidence of the training of large numbers of SWAPO "cadres" in the Soviet Union, both in military disciplines and, without exception, in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The position of political commissar is entrenched at all organizational levels of SWAPO from the leadership, in the ranks of which we find a chief political commissar, down to the platoons and sections of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, or PLAN. We have documents that show that these men, selected on

the basis of their educational attainments and understanding of ideology, are trained at the KOMOSOL Party School in the Soviet Union, in the German Democratic Republic and in Cuba.

On the basis both of the testimony that we have received and the documents made available to the subcommittee, which will be printed in the record of the hearings, the conclusion is inescapable that the Soviets and their Communist allies within SWAPO insure that Marxist-Leninist doctrine is systematically taught to all who are recruited for, or pressed into service in, SWAPO and PLAN.

As Advocate Kozonguizi pointed out in his testimony, SWAPO has adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. The quotations from the Political Manual [Namibia: The Struggle for Final Liberation] and from SWAPO's political program show this beyond doubt. Those familiar with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric will easily understand the clear statement of objectives in this passage:

> The ideas of socialist orientation, as stated in the revised Political Program of SWAPO, has become our way of life, and we have now to grasp this great truth, that the first step in the revolution currently waged by the Namibian proletariat and the working peasants is to raise the two friendly classes in our society to the position of the ruling class which, at the time is the first step to winning the battle of a peoples democracy.
>
> Only in this way, shall we Namibian participants in the current liberation struggle (which we are waging on behalf of the general masses of all our people) be able to use the political supremacy of peoples power to wrest state power from the colonial bourgeoisie, for the purpose of centralizing all the means of production and distribution in the hands of the new state, a state which will be constituted by the alliance of the worker and peasant masses. (Political Manual P. 5–6).

The Political Manual states on a later page:

> Now this proves the truth of what Marx, Engels and Lenin discovered and predicted. Their discoveries are being confirmed by historical development, by the triumphs and advance of socialism and by the rapid decline of capitalism. Marxism-Leninism is therefore proving to be the only theory enabling the oppressed and exploited classes (the proletariat and the peasantry) to carry out their historical mission (i.e. the destruction of the rule of capital and of the system of exploitation of man by man).

Similarly, the relationship between SWAPO's efforts in Namibia and the Soviet Union's international war against imperialism is clearly spelled out by SWAPO in a document called, "The True Nature of Imperialism":

> We cannot escape the fact that as long as South Africa remains a bulwark of capitalism, the independence of the rest of the subcontinent is going to be continually threatened.
>
> Nor can we escape the fact that, given our understanding of imperialism as a world system, it is not sufficient to break the hold of South Africa over the subcontinent. To open the path to true liberation, we must break imperialism as a world economic system.

The tragedy of this is illuminated by the testimony of Mr. Andreas Shipanga. He was a founder of SWAPO in 1960 and, in 1958, of its predecessor, the Ovamboland Peoples Organization. He testified eloquently that the movement was not created as a Communist party or as a front for the Communists. On the contrary, he pointed out that the chief ally of the OPO in its struggle for the rights of the people of Namibia was the Liberal Party of South Africa. He noted that the South African Communist Party was originally hostile to the OPO and to SWAPO. Mr. Shipanga stated that it was only after his arrest and that of his followers in April 1976 that the

political program was altered to provide for the reconstitution of SWAPO as an organization espousing Marxist-Leninist principles.

There are clear parallels with the history of Communist infiltration of the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was founded in 1912 and, as Mr. Bartholomew Hlapane has made clear to the subcommittee, its aims were: "* * * to achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means."

Mr. Hlapane, a former member of the central committee of the South African Communist Party and of the National Executive of the African National Congress, is singularly well qualified to comment on the relationship between these organizations, which he served during the years 1955 to 1964. He testified that:

> * * * no major decision could be taken by the ANC without the concurrence and approval of the central committee of the South African Communist Party. Most major developments were in fact initiated by the central committee.

Mr. Hlapane further testified that:

> The military wing of the ANC, also known as Umkonto We Sizwe, was the brainchild of the SACP, and, after the decision to create it had been taken, Joe Slovo and J. B. Marks were sent by the central committee of the SACP to Moscow to organize arms and ammunition and to raise funds for Umkonto We Sizwe.

Joe Slovo, I should note, is officially designated as deputy chief of Umkonto We Sizwe and is still a member of the national executive committee of the ANC and of the central committee of the South African Communist Party. After years of residence in London after his departure from South Africa in 1963, he returned to South Africa in 1975 after FRELIMO's accession to power in Mozambique.

Mr. Hlapane also testified that the sole source of funds for Umkonto We Sizwe during the period that he acted as treasurer of the SACP was the Communist Party itself.

I observe parenthetically that Mr. Hlapane's personal account of the situation during this period is independently confirmed in outline by Mr. Jordan K. Ngubane in his impressive work "An African Explains Apartheid," chapter 15 of which has been included in the record of the hearings.

To judge from the testimony of our younger ANC witnesses, little has changed. Mr. Mfalapitsa received military and political training in Angola and the German Democratic Republic, likewise, Mr. Bosigo in Angola and the Soviet Union. Miss Kave tells a horrifying tale of indoctrination and abuse in Zambia, Botswana, and the U.S.S.R. Describing lectures in politics he received in Angola, at the Nova Catengue base where Cuban instructors, lecturers, and commanders supplemented those of Umkonto We Sizwe, Mr. Bosigo has said:

> . . . Every recruit was required to know the Freedom Charter which was adopted by the African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the South African Communist Party in 1955. We received lectures on Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Communist ideology. During all lectures the oppression of the black man in South Africa by the whites was emphasized, and we were told that we must fight for our freedom from the South African Government."

Certainly the South African Communist Party, whose chairman, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, is vice president of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, has not changed its position toward the ANC since Mr. Hlapane served on the central committee. The text of an

important resolution adopted by the party in November 1979 is reprinted in African Communist, the official journal of the SACP, No. 80, October 1, 1980. Under the heading "The World Communist Movement," we find the following:

We who are part of the liberation movement of South Africa must never fail to appreciate and insist that solidarity is a two-way process, that the aid and support which the socialist countries give so generously and at the expense of their own material gains, to freedom fighters everywhere, can only be reciprocated by unswerving identification with the socialist community in the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

In a statement by the central committee of the South African Communist Party on its 60th anniversary printed in "African Communist," No. 86, third quarter 1981, the committee declared:

From the days of the ICU to the Council of Non-European Trade Unions to SACTU, our Party has always been amongst those in the forefront . . . in their battles against the capitalists class and its racist state. When the situation demanded a turn to organized revolutionary violence in the early 60's, our Party together with the ANC helped bring into existence the fighting arm of the liberation movement—Umkonto We Sizwe.

Today, the SACP is a vital part of the liberation forces headed by the African National Congress. This alliance aims to unite all sections and classes amongst the oppressed and other truly democratic forces for a revolution to destroy white domination. This revolution, whose main content is the national liberation of the African and other black oppressed groups, must put an end to race discrimination in all its forms, restore the land and wealth of our country to the people and guarantee democracy, freedom and equality of rights and opportunities to all.

We believe that the immediate struggle to destroy racist colonialism and to win national freedom is an essential part of the struggle for a future socialist South Africa.

In this struggle the key force has always been, and will continue to be, the black working class in alliance with the masses of the landless rural people. It is this class which finds its most staunch champions in our South African Communist Party.

Further on in the same statement, the committee noted:

South African Communists, whose party 60 years ago was the first to raise the red flag of Marxism-Leninism on our continent, are especially inspired by the newly born states of Mozambique and Angola led by liberation movements which have transformed themselves into Marxist-Leninist vanguards of their working people and are engaged in the continuing revolution to create conditions for the building of socialism in their countries. The spectre of socialism and communism, born of people's liberation struggles, now stares at our common enemy right in the face from the borders of Mozambique and Angola. And the enemy trembles at the knees.

. . . The revolutionary advances in Southern Africa have been won through sacrifice and struggle and with the internationalist support of the socialist world and, more especially, the Soviet Union, the first society ruled by and for workers who captured power in the great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. We are proud that for 60 years our party has been part of the great international brotherhood of workers and Communist Parties which have always stood four-square behind our struggle against racist and capitalist tyranny. The enemy's intensified anti-Communist and anti-Soviet campaign is itself a tribute to the consistent support which our struggle has received, and continues to receive, from the world socialist forces.

Our people will not be taken in by the slander of the racists. They know that wherever oppressed people have been forced to confront the enemy, the AK, produced by Soviet workers, has become the feared symbol of the fight for freedom. They know too it is the socialist world which is the biggest obstacle to the maneuvers of the racists and their imperialist allies in their attempts to turn back the clock of history and to destroy the gains of the African revolution.

When Mr. Hlapane was shown a list of the current members of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, he named seven of them whom he knew to be members of the SACP during the time he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not, however, name Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC and, indeed, he said

that, as far as he knew, Mr. Tambo was not a Communist. I have no firm information that shows Mr. Tambo to be Communist, although he serves, with Alfred Nzo and Yusuf Dadoo, on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council. I, therefore, quote from the speech he gave on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the SACP to illustrate that even those in the ANC who are not members of the Communist Party believe it necessary and appropriate to advance to Moscow's line.

Comrade Chairman, Your Excellencies, and comrades, let me commence by thanking you, Comrade Chairman, and the SACP for inviting the African National Congress to be a party to this occasion and in particular, for the opportunity of sharing a platform with the Communist Party of Great Britain, represented here by the General Secretary Gordon McLennan and with the Communist Party of Ireland, represented by Comrade Michael O'Riordan.

These are our allies; they are part of the international movement of solidarity which gives us strength and confidence in the certainty of our victory. These parties, together with other communist and workers parties around the world, are parties which we can always appeal to for solidarity in the conviction that they will respond.

It is a great pleasure for us, a great honor to participate with them on an occasion of great significance in our struggle in South Africa.

This speech was published in "African Communist" No. 87, fourth quarter 1981, and in Sechaba, the official organ of the ANC, September 1981.

In his speech of the International Preparatory Committee of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on September 23 through 27, 1980, Mr. Tambo said:

We take this opportunity to extend our solidiarity with all peoples fighting against colonialism, racism, zionism, fascism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, for national liberation, peace and social progress.

In this connection, let me declare on behalf of our oppressed masses—the fighting children, youth, workers, women, churchmen, peasants, patriots of South Africa—our firm solidarity with the Palestinian people led by their vanguard, the PLO and its indomitable leader, Yasser Arafat. Together we share the common obligation to defeat the growing and dangerous racist-zionist alliance of South Africa and Israel.

As we have done before, we re-affirm our solidarity with the people of Western Sahara and the POLISARIO, FRELITIN of East Timor and the gallant people of Latin America, including the heroic Nicaraguan people, the people of Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, North America and revolutionaries in Indo-China and other parts of Asia.

Elsewhere in the same speech, Mr. Tambo remarked:

The historic victory of the Vietnamese people against the occupation forces of the United States and their puppets has a significance which goes beyond the fact that Vietnam is today free and united. Vietnam represented the all-around defeat of the bellicose policy of the imperialists in the post-war years in its entirety.

Vietnam confirmed that the international balance of power had shifted irrevocably in favor of the forces of national independence and social progress, what-ever reverses these forces might suffer here and there. Vietnam proved to the forces of reaction that the socialist community of nations, the rest of progressive mankind, and the world anti-imperialist movement, had sufficient political will and strength to resist and defeat the most desperate machinations of these forces of reaction. The rout of the U.S. forces in Vietnam represented also the collapse of the policy of nuclear blackmail followed by the United States since Hiroshima.

This speech, printed in "Sechaba," January 1981, will also appear in the record.

We may well sympathize with the original goal of these two movements, SWAPO and the ANC, to achieve democratic political rights and expanded freedoms for the black peoples of Namibia and South Africa. We cannot, however, delude ourselves that their pur-

pose now is the achievement of those praiseworthy objectives. They have, judging from the testimony we have heard and from the statements and actions of their leaders, been deeply infiltrated by those who seek to advance the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union. They thus work to the obvious detriment of the peoples of the South African region, not to their advantage. Mr. Bomba has testfied eloquently about the collapse of the Mozambique and the regimentation of its society since FRELIMO's accession to power. The State Department has presented the same judgment to Congress in several hearings.

Mr. Kozonguizi has testified about the gruesome effect of SWAPO terrorism on the civilian population in northern Namibia. On the basis of their own experiences, both Mr. Namolo and Mr. Hashiko have testified about incidents such as the execution of a headman and the abduction by force of high school students by SWAPO cadres. Documents made available to the subcommittee confirm that such incidents are routine. The ANC has not yet undertaken terrorist activity on this scale, and most incidents of sabotage have been directed at installations rather than at persons. Mr. Mfalapitsa has testified, however, about plans to assassinate President Mangope of Bophuthatswana, the Tswana homeland in southern Africa. He also testified that Joe Modise, the Chief of Umkonto We Sizwe, proposed a second phase of sabotage in which mines would be laid on farm roads near the Botswana border, presumably with the same horrifying consequences we have seen in Namibia, and farmhouses, single vehicles and small police stations would be attacked. Umkonto We Sizwe has already claimed credit for bombing an urban shopping center and automobile showrooms, and for attacks on small police stations manned by South African blacks.

Many of our witnesses fear for their lives because of their defection from the ANC or SWAPO, and because of their testimony before this subcommittee. On the basis of the evidence we have heard, those fears may have some basis in fact. His former colleagues attempted to kill Mr. Bosigo when he left ANC; a death notice bearing Mr. Mfalapitsa's name and photograph has been circulated by the ANC; Miss Kave has testified to witnessing brutal murders; Mr. Mfalapitsa participated in one disciplinary killing and was present at a meeting where another was planned; Mr. Hashiko was told that one could only resign from SWAPO in a military way, that is, by being killed. As those who have experience of other, similar, movements know, the justice meted out is often summary and violent.

I said at the first of these hearings that our purpose was not to debate U.S. policy toward southern Africa. This subcommittee is not a part of the Committee on Foreign Relations and has no mandate in that regard. Our purpose has been to determine, through the testimony of witnesses and the scrutiny of documents, the extent to which the U.S.S.R. has successfully penetrated and come to control the African National Congress and the South West African Peoples Organization. This has served to illustrated once again the Soviet Union's support for terrorism under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation. The evidence that we have reviewed is deeply disturbing. It suggests strongly that the original purposes of the two organizations have been subverted, and that

the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them.

In his testimony at our first meeting, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker said that the Department of State would pay close attention to the information we developed. I appreciate that commitment and I recommend that the other executive departments and congressional committees responsible for the formulation and oversight of our foreign policy, should join the State Department to study carefully the record of the hearings.

During 1980, after the fall of the Shah of Iran, Dr. Henry Kissinger included these remarks in a speech in Washington:

> It is true that American foreign policy must be grounded in the humane values of our people and of our democratic traditions. We would neither be effective nor faithful to ourselves if we sought to defend every status quo in an age of upheavals.

But—

> . . . Iran should teach us that humane values are not necessarily served by the overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy conducted in the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by making the world safe for anti-American radicalism.

I am reassured by the fact that President Reagan, Secretary Haig, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and Dr. Crocker are all highly sensitive to the wisdom of this advice.

Before we adjourn I would like to thank those of the press who have shown interest by their attendance here. I stand open to them for criticism, comments, questions, at any time on this general subject. I wish to pursue this objectively.

We had invited to this hearing spokesmen from the ANC and SWAPO. We received a response from Johnny Makatini, who is the chief representative in the United States of the African National Congress of South Africa, which said:

> Dear Mr. Lisker: With reference to your request telephoned to us on March 19 asking for some officials of the African National Congress to appear before your Subcommittee, we would like to inform you that we referred this matter to our Headquarters. Accordingly, we will convey the response of our Headquarters to you as soon as it is possible.

We have received no further communication from them. We didn't want it to be a one-sided hearing, but I believe that the sincerity, the authenticity of the testimony we have heard, is evident from the personalities and the manners of the people who have come. We sent a telex message on March 16, 1982, to Sam Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, writing him to testify today. We have not received a response.

[SUBCOMMITTEE NOTE.—Subsequent to the hearings, the subcommittee received the following document put out by the ANC pertaining to this series of hearings:]

THE DIABOLIC AMERICAN SENATE SUB COMMITTEE

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAIN SHOWS ITS UGLY AND DIABOLIC HAND IN A PEOPLE'S JUST WAR FOR FREEDOM. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS, AS IS THE CASE WITH PREVIOUS AMERICAN RULERS, CAME OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE OPPRESSOR AGAINST THE OPPRESSED. THIS TIME THE IMPERIALIST STRATEGY IS PRESENTED UNDER THE LIE OF STUDYING SOVIET 'INVOLVEMENT' IN 'TERRORIST' MOVEMENTS LIKE THE A.N.C. AND SWAPO.

THE AMERICAN SENATE SUB COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM IS AN AMERICAN STRATEGY GEARED TO EXPLAIN THE OPEN SUPPORT THEY GIVE TO THE EVIL OF APARTHEID AND FASCISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THIS IS DONE TO GUARANTEE THE UNJUST EXPLOITATION OF OUR MINERAL WEALTH AND PROTECT THE INHUMAN PROFITS MADE FROM AMERICAN COMPANIES BASED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS DEEMED IT FIT TO ORGANISE A SENATE SUB COMMITTEE ON 'SECURITY AND TERRORISM' IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES INSTEAD OF ORGANISING COMMITTEES GEARED TO ELIMINATE ILLITERACY AND POVERTY IN PLACES LIKE HARLEM AND OTHER SLUM AREAS IN AMERICA. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IS INVOLVING ITSELF NEGATIVELY IN PEOPLE'S JUST WARS BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, VETOING PROGRESSIVE MOTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, INSTEAD OF SOLVING ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS LIKE CRIME, DRUG ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, THE SPHERES IN WHICH AMERICA RATES HIGHEST IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THINKS THE WORLD HAS FORGOTTEN THEIR DIRTY MILITARIST HISTORY LIKE THE SENSELESS BOMBING OF HIROSHIMA MAIMING MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, THE SAVAGE ACT OF ORGANISING GANGS OF MAN (MERCENARIES) TO FIGHT THE POPULAR GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA IN 1975 AND THE ARROGANCE OF TRYING TO PROP UP UNPOPULAR REGIMES IN PLACES LIKE AFGHANISTAN AND EL SALVADOR. THE PROGRESSIVE MANKIND HAS NOT FORGOTTEN THE PINOCHET(AMERICAN PUPPET) REIGN OF TERROR IN CHILE.

THE AMERICAN SENATE SUB COMMITTEE, THE ARROGANT AND HATES OF THE BLOODY MALAN-BOTHA REGIME, HAS BOUGHT PUPPETS LIKE DELPHINE NOKONONO KAVE AND OTHER RACIST GUNNING DOGS TO ISSUE PUBLIC LIES AGAINST THE A.N.C AND SWAPO, AS IT ARTICLED IN THE SOWETAN NEWSPAPER ON THE 26/05/86, IN A FUTILE ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT OUR PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATIONS.

P.T.O

THE A.N.C REMINDS ALL THE IMPERIALIST GOVERMENTS OF THIS WORLD AND THEIR ARROGANT RACIST FRIEND,S.A, THAT NO FORCE ON EARTH CAN STOP A RESOLUTE MARCH OF ANY PEOPLE, NAMIBIANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS INCLUDED, TO FREEDOM.

IN VIETNAM, ANOTHER AMERICAN THEATRE OF HUMAN DESTRUCTION, AMERICAN AGENTS AND SOLDIERS OF AGGRESSION WERE TAUGHT A LESSON WHEN THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO BE EVACUATED FROM ROOF TOPS OF THEIR OFFICES BECAUSE, AGAINST ALL ODDS, THE GALLANT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYING ALL THAT STOOD BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR CHERISHED LIBERATION AND BY THIS ACT MAKING THE VIETNAMESE SOIL TOO HOT FOR THE AMERICAN FORCE OF AGRESSION. THE A.N.C PLEDGES TO REPEAT THIS LESSON TO ANY COUNTRY, AMERICA INCLUDED, THAT STANDS BETWEEN US AND OUR GOAL OF A PEOPLE'S SOUTH AFRICA DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM CHARTER.

D O W N W I T H I M P E R I A L I S M///

F O R W A R D T O A P E O P L E ' S R E P U B L I C//

LONG LIVE THE FIGHTING PEOPLE OF S.A //

LONG LIVE THE A.N.C // LONG LIVE UMKHONTO WESIZWE///

A M A N D L A // M A A T L A // A L L P O W E R T O T H E PEOPLE///

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Senator DENTON. This series of hearings on the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in fomenting terrorism in southern Africa is hereby adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

ACTS OF SWAPO TEPRORISM AGAINST THE LOCAL POPULATION IN NAMIBIA

1. Apart from several methods of intimidating the local population mainly of Ovamboland, such as warnings, assaults, theft, robbery, rape and abductions, many murders were committed by SWAPO terrorists.

2. Statistics of these murders are given below and several cases, picked at random, are sketched.

3. MURDERS FROM 1966 TO FEBRUARY 1982

3.1	1966-1974	2
	1975	23
	1976	93
	1977	117
	1978	81
	1979	188
	1980	220
	1981	199
	to February '82	24

4. INCIDENTS

4.1 4 July 1975, Louis Nelengani, member of SWAPO was executed by SWAPO at Pereira de Eca in Angola. Witnesses reported the incident.

4.2 16 August 1975, Captain Elifas, chief of the Wambo, was assassinated by SWAPO-terrorists at his home.

4.3 11 October 1975, sub-headman, Abiater SHIPOPYENI was killed by terrorists with automatic weapons in the east UUKWANYANA area.

4.4 5 December 1975, attempt to assassiante Tarra

IMBILI, then Minister of Justice of the WAMBO Cabinet.

4.5 31 December 1975, a white construction worker, George Elsin PEPPER and his Wambo concubine, Salima Ismael were killed by SWAPO terrorists while sleeping in a caravan.

4.6 11 March 1976, sub-headman William SHELONGO of the Ohsuwanja area was abducted by SWAPO terrorists and was never heard of again.

4.7 29 March 1976, a white employee of a construction firm, Gernot SCHMIDT, a West-German citizen, was abducted by SWAPO-terrorists and never heard of again.

4.8 11 April 1976, 5 Wambomen, one of them a member of the Legislative Assembly of Owambo, Johannes NANGUTUUALA were abducted by SWAPO-terrorists.

4.9 1 March 1976, Joel DAVID, a well-known businessman at Odibo in Owamboland, was murdered and robbed of R20,000.

4.10 28 May 1977, sub-headman, Sakarias HALUENDO abducted by SWAPO-terrorists and never heard of again.

4.11 8 July 1977, 3 Wambo's were killed and 2 children wounded seriously when their donkey-cart hit a landmine of Russian origin which was placed on a seldom used road.

4.12 13 November 1977, Abraham KANDJIBI, 70 year old retired headman was murdered by 10 SWAPO terrorists. Two women and 5 children witnessed how the deceased was dragged 100 m from his kraal. He was told to lie on his back on the sand and was killed by one shot from an AK-47 rifle in his forehead.

4.13 5 December 1977, a Wamboman was taken from his kraal by twelve terrorists who plundered his shop and then killed him.

4.14 5 January 1978, sub-headman Petrus HANDUMO of the Okadiva-area was abducted from his kraal by 6 armed terrorists. He was tied in a standing position to a tree and killed with a shot from an AK-47 rifle. The skin of the deceased's face and his scalp were removed with a knife.

4.15 8 January 1978, 4 Wambo's were killed, three seriously wounded and four slightly wounded when the truck on which they were travelling detonated a landmine of Russian origin.

4.16 21 January 1978, two armed terrorists forced sub-headman Midiuakusa KAMANJA from his kraal and told him to enlarge an aardvark hole, where, as the terrorists told him, he would be buried after they have shot him. He threw sand into the eyes of the terrorists and escaped.

4.17 7 February 1978, Assassination of minister Toivo SHIVAGAYA (See Appendix "B".)

4.18 24 March 1978, Eino Kambonde JOHANNES, headman in the Ondangwa area was awakened by two men in civilian clothes who pleaded with him to take a sick woman with his private car to a hospital. The deceased obliged and was stopped about 100 m from his kraal. When he climbed out of his car, he was killed. His driver, who witnessed the murder saw two men in civilian clothes and 5 men in uniform committing the crime. 34 bullets hit the deceased and 90 shells of AK-47 bullets and

3 Mararov pistol bullets were found on the scene.

4.19 27 March 1978, assassination of Chief Clemens KAPUUO (See Appendix "B").

4.20 27 July 1978, Mr. K. NGHIPUKUULA refused to accompany armed terrorists to Angola and was shot in his kraal.

4.21 4 August 1978 when sub-headman, Jeremia PAULUS arrived at his home, he was accosted by armed terrorists. They told his wife to leave the place, because they wanted to kill him. Deceased's wife heard four shots and found him dead.

4.22 1 September 1978, Filemon NIKA, organizer for the DTA in Ovambo, was shot by two SWAPO terrorists who were clad in civilian clothes, while he was busy in his shop, and Willam Andrias Lewis ROODT, 3 years, were bayonetted to death by a group of armed terrorists. Two farm labourers saw a, according to them, big group of an unknown number of armed Wambomen, approaching the homestead where the deceased were alone at the time of the incident, i.e., 07h00. Mrs. SMIT was grabbed by three men and stabbed in the chest with a bayonet. The labourers then ran away to report the incident to the police. On the arrival of the police, the two children were lying outside the house mutilated by wounds inflicted with bayonetts. The little boy tried to hide under a car after he was wounded, but was dragged out and stabbed several times. The House was then ransacked and left in a disorderly state.

4.23 13 December 1978, Timotheus Sacheus NAMUHUYA, Wambomale, 47 years old and senior broadcaster was murdered in his home in Katutura. The deceased arrived home accompanied by his wife and lay down on a bed, because he was feeling ill. His wife left for the bathroom at 22h00 when her daughter opened the door for a stranger.

Mrs. NAMUHUYA heard her husband and the stranger talk about his work for the South West African Broadcasting Corporation when shots were fired. The deceased limped to the bedroom and died in the arms of his wife. A male person walked past the bedroom-window and warned that anybody touching the telephone will be killed, too.

Several times during the night, Mrs. NAMUHUYA heard someone walking around the house.

Only the following morning did Mrs. NAMUHUYA notify the police of the murder.

Investigations proved that the deceased was hit by six bullets fired at close range with a Makarov pistol.

4.24 26 March 1979, Mr. Karl Franz Josef BUCHHOLZ, 59 years old, farming near Otavi, was murdered by five armed terrorists when he was supplementing cattle lick at one of the posts. A black assistant of the white farmer witnessed the killing and how the terrorists removed the wristwatch of the deceased.

4.25 4 April 1979, Barnd August Adolf HENNIES visited his farm in the Otjiwarongo area. In the veld

four terrorists in uniform blocked the road and killed HENNIES behind the steering wheel of his truck. Hendrik MOGAB, a black employee, witnessed how the terrorists undressed the deceased and left with his clothes.

4.26 9 May 1979, Mrs. Johanna Hendrina SMIT, 64 years, and her two grandchildren, Jenifer Anna STEVENS, 6 years and Willam Andries Lewis ROODT, 3 years old, were bayonetted to death by a group of armed terrorists. Two farm labourers saw a, according to them, big group of an unknown number of armed Wambomen, approaching the homestead where the deceased were alone at the time of the incident, i.e., 07h00. Mrs. SMIT was grabbed by three men and stabbed in the chest with a bayonet. The labourers then ran away to report the incident to the police. On the arrival of the police, the two chidlren were lying outside the house mutilated by wounds inflicted with bayonetts. The little boy tried to hide under a car after he was wounded but was dragged out and stabbed several times. The house was then ransacked and left in a disorderly state.

4.27 20 May 1979, Sam SAMUEL, 35 years old Ovambomale, was killed in the TOWNSHIP near Tsumeb by terrorists, using two Makarov pistols.

4.28 16 July 1979, Thomas PHILLIPUS, a well-known 48 year old businessman at Oshakati was shot from behind in the head with a pistol while he was busy on the telephone.

4.29 29 October 1979, Paulus Hamalua HEITA, 43 year old member of the Legislative Assembly of Ovambo

who accompanied by six other men in his car when three terrorists in uniform opened fire and killed him instantly. The other occupants of the car fled, but were accosted by another twenty armed terrorists who shot at them and killed Adam HAUWANGA, 23 years old.

4.30 5 January 1980, Thomas SHIKONGO, 48 year old minister in the Ovambo Cabinet, Natengwe HAWANGA, 24 years old, Puhleni NENGANDI, 25 years old, Jafet SILAS, 19 years old, Jason VILHO, 17 years old, and Ruben HILENDE, 45 years old, were killed in a landmine explosion. The landmine of Russian origin was planted 200 m from the entrance of the minister's homestead and he had to use this road with his car.

4.31 9 January 1980, 50 terrorists launched a heavy attack on the kraal of headman Silas ISAK of the Oshikuku area. The headman was killed by the explosion of a mortar and 10 year old Johannes NGIPUNDJA was fatally wounded in the stomach.

4.32 13 January 1980, Heleni KAPEPO, 46 year old shop-owner was murdered in the Ouhango area. Deceased was sleeping with her friend, Johannes ALTINAS in their home, when they were awakened by two black men, wearing green uniforms armed with AK-47 rifles. Deceased and her friend were ordered to dress and open the shop of deceased. Nineteen black men clad in green uniforms and armed, joined them. They plundered deceased's shop and consumed liquor. All the loot was loaded on Johannes ALINA's light truck and deceased was ordered to sit in front of her shop. From the truck, one

black man aimed his AK-47 rifle at her and killed her.

After arriving at the border with Angola, the insurgents disembarked the truck took the loot and sent Johannes ALINA back home.

4.33 26 January 1980, Oswald ANDAWA, 50 year old, member of the Legislative Council of Ovambo was in his kraal when two armed men arrived. According to the deceased's wife the intruders searched for her husband and he tried to flee but was killed from behind with an AK-47 rifle.

4.34 14 March 1980, David SHEEHANA, sucessful 47 year old businessman was awakened by two unknown men at 03h00 in the morning and told to hand over his money to them. His wife, who was with him in the bedroom, obliged and the intruders fired several shots at the deceased. They also shot at the deceased's wife, but only wounded her. Twenty-one shots with an AK-47 rifle were fired. After the murder, the terrorists set the shop and three cars of the deceased on fire.

4.35 21 March 1980, several men accompanied 52 year old headman of the Oikokola area, Elias SHIIMI, to a festivity. While on their way, several shots were fired at them by unknown persons. The men scattered in all directions. The body of the headman was found 400 m from the point of contact riddled with bullets fired by AK-47 rifles. 23 year old Shaanika NUSHONA was apparently killed by a handgranade in the same attack.

4.36 19 April 1980, Titus KAPANGELA, 60 year old member of the Legislative Council of Ovambo, was told by

three armed intruders at 21h00 to pack his belongings and accompany them to Luanda in Angola. Initially the deceased refused but was intimidated by three shots which were fired into the air.

According to the wife and son of the deceased, who witnessed the episode, Mr. KAPANGELA took his 3 rifles and other personal belongings, opened his shop so that the terrorists could help themselves to food and drink and then left. The next morning at 08h00 the deceased's son found him lying on his back about 1 km from his shop with many bullet wounds in his chest. Apparently the deceased was already dead for a few hours.

4.37 29 April 1980, Matheus ELAGO, 36 year old businessman from Oshakati reversed his truck up the driveway from his home when it detonated a landmine which killed the deceased. Apparently the Russian-made landmine was planted behind the right front wheel of the truck.

4.38 7 June 1980, the corpse of an unknown Wamboman was found. Deceased was hit by 43 bullets fired from an AK-47 rifle.

4.39 31 October 1981, senior headman, Liaius ALUUMA was admitted to the hospital at Ombalantu to be treated for high blood pressure. About 23h30 two terrorists in uniform ordered deceased to accompany them but he refused. He was dragged from his bed and shot. The two patients who shared the ward with deceased, witnessed one of the murders returning and shooting another 5 shots at the deceased.

4.40 10 November 1980, 7 terrorists abducted Amantha NGUDU from his kraal. His corpse was found later in the day mutilated with bayonets.

4.41 10 December 1980, Toini PHILLIPUS, 22 years old, and her sister Sandra, 20 years old, were busy opening a parcel when the parcelbomb exploded. Both girls were killed instantly.
Toini and Sandra were the daughters of Thomas PHILLIPUS who was murdered on 16 July 1979. (See para. 4.28)

4.42 30 December 1980, several children were drawing water in Ovambo when one of a group of 15 terrorists demanded water from one of the children. The girl refused and was killed by the terrorist with an AK-47 rifle. Two other children were wounded.

4.43 2 January 1981, Thimatheus LENITO, family of Minister Daniel SHOOYA of the Ovambo Cabinet, was murdered when 12 terrorists cut his throat with a knife.

4.44 30 January 1981, headman Phillipus PHANJERE was abducted from his kraal by an unknown number of terrorists and was murdered.

4.45 11 February 1981, 37year old Wambowoman, Terut AMTENVA, went to collect her pensions when she was confronted by two terrorists who accused her of having visited Mrs. Albert KWENDA, wife of a member of the Legislative Council of Ovambo.
Mrs. AMTENYA was shot with an AK-47 rifle.

4.46 22 February 1981, sub-headman Simbamba of the Omutundunge area was shot dead by SWAPO terrorists.

4.47 2 March 1981, Phiripos NKATHINGO's corpse was found by his daughter. He was tied up and was killed with four stabwounds in the back and one in the neck. About 24 terrorists were involved.

4.48 14 March 1981, one terrorist entered the kraal of Petrus NINANENE, dragged 55 year old Mrs. Trica HAHALONGE out and shot her in the right leg and head.

4.49 23 March 1981, four terrorists entered a kraal and forcefully abducted a woman. With her they went to the neighbouring kraal where they abducted another woman. Both women were then killed with bayonets.

4.50 19 April 1981, Natheus SHIKONDOMOORO who had the courage to voice his anti-SWAPO sentiment, was killed by five terrorists while he was in his kraal.

4.51 1 July 1981, 16 local population were travelling on a light truck on a road which was searched for landmines the previous day, and detonated two landmines connected to each other. Seven persons died while 9 were injured, most of them seriously.

4.52 6 July 1981, Ehistus JOHANNES was confronted by 30 terrorists who accused him of collaborating with the police. Four shots were fired at him, one from a Tokarev and three with a Makarov pistol.

4.53 17 July 1981, three terrorists inquired at three kraals for sub-headman, Nabod KAKWAMBO. When they found him, they forcefully abducted him and shot him from behind in the head. The terrorists returned and shot the deceased's wife also from behind in the head while she was in the kraal.

4.54 19 July 1981, the corpse of Serina AMIDILLA was found, after she was reported missing. She was shot through the head and her left arm was cut off with a knife.

4.55 8 September 1981, five terrorists killed a Wambo-woman with a light machinegun with no apparent reason.

4.56 24 September 1981, two terrorists arrive at a Cuca shop and ask for Trans KAMBONDE. He was loaded onto a light truck. Four km further his corpse was found and his neck cut with a knife.

4.57 24 November 1981, the corpse of an unknown man was found. He was tied up and was shot at 9 times.

4.58 22 December 1981, headman Moses KAPRURWA of Onaheke died after he was inflicted several stab-wounds by 8 terrorists. Three men, 12 women and 6 children were abducted from the same kraal by the same terrorists. 28 head of cattle as well as Cuca shops in the immediate vicinity were robbed. Approximately 40 terrorists were involved.

4.59 10 March 1081, five terrorists arrived at the kraal of headman Matheus ALBERTUS and asked to see him. The headman was not present. The terrorists demanded R3,000 and ordered the 11 people present to stand in a row. They opened fire and killed 8 of those innocent people. The same group of terrorists then moved to a neighbouring kraal and murdered Jonas KORNELIUS and Charlo THOMAS. Both had their throats cut.

EXHIBIT B

ASSASSINATIONS OF MINISTER TOIVO SHIYAGAYA AND CHIEF CLEMENS KAPUUO

South West Africa People's Organisation

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

Rua Coronel Artur de Paiva No.
P.O. Box 954
LUANDA
PEA

Ref. No. SWAPO/LO/ /77

8th August, 1977

Comrade Ndadi
Lubango Office
PEA

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Comrade,

This is to inform you that we received a telephone call from the President in New York. He received or got information that some members of the Turnhalle group are going to visit Northern Namibia very soon within this week or next.

He instructed me to take a plane immediately to inform you that you send a message to the Front, that Kapuuo's group should end their lives in the North (killed). They should not leave the are alive.

Please if you could send a message or instructions to the Front immediately.

Revolutionary greetings
Yours in struggle

T. A. Mufalali
DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE

Swapo D. HQ
P. O. Box 512,
Tel. 21352,
Lubango.
11/8/ 1977

Comrade Commander,

I have received a messege from Luanda send by comrade President that the Tunchalle pupets are in the way coming to visit the Northern Regeon. But he say: Please give order so that those pupets can be eliminated.

Please send even a sucied squard to take up this task immediately. I am also put the letter from Luanda in so that you can read it youself. I hope you understand the whole situation. The war material you have asked are in the way coming. Please return the letter from Luanda.

Yours forever,

J.H.Ndadi.

CASSINGA,
15.09.1977.

REPORT BY THE REGIONAL POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE N/FRONT CDE MARTIN KITO-ARRIVED BY HELICOPTER MASINUS NGHEDE AND ESCORTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CDE NDAKU NAMOMBO MI MAMBOLO.

We left the RHQ on 11/7/77 and crossed the borders on 14/7/77 with a mission to go into the South,with the Group of Ndafongwe.

We found it impossible to cross into the South due to the Etoshapan.We decided upon probing into the possibility of going through the Onamutoni Gate to check the situation inside the country. I left with a group of three for Omuntele ,met cde Ruawho gave me but a little information about the South.

We contacted Kilian Amupolo ,talked and explained to him the aims of SWAPO. He then gave us some civillian clothings and promised us accomodation at a farm he would open soon so as to facilitate our activities there. We then contacted Jason Amulungu,then Rua again . We discussed maters concerning transport and food and the need to contact the South to set up an acquitable coordination.

We sent cde Elifas Kamanja to cde Tauno Katuiklipi in the South for consultation but due suspicions and mistrust no reliable informations could be secured.

Meanwhile I and cde Nghede went to see the Bishop Auala and other reverends(six) plus Dr Iimuxua.Our talks concentrated on mass consciousness and the clafication on Party Line. The talks went off well.

We intended to report back on 22 .8.1977 but decided instead to celebrate 26 th August,inside the country at an isolated place with the local people.During that night the SWAPO Secretary of Transport introduced himself as cde Wilbard Nangolo,declaring at the same time his readiness to take us to the South as we requested.

The next day we set off(I and cde Nghede) leaving the other two behind. Cde Wilbard brought us civillian clothings. The black guards at the Gate were given "beer" and no passes were demanded . 3.00 pm on 27 th August,brought us in Oshakati. We found the Turnhalle gathering dispersing following the clash between them and SWAPO supporters which resulted in the injuring of ten SWAPO supporters by police fire.

spent the night at a house of a certain SWAPO member where a SWAPO "braaivleis" was held. We were introduced to a pastor from SWAKOPMUND by the name of Naholo.

During the following day ,28 th, a SWAPO rally was held by SWAPO and was overattended.

We left for Windhoek that very day and arrived there thenext morning at 3.00 am on 29 th August. We talked with Tuhno Hatuikulipi ,Nangolo and the pastor Naholo and came to the following conclusions:

1. That there be a sound coordination and cooperation between the South and the North.
2. Financial assistance to armed units.
3. That two vehicles be provided to transport materials for underground activities inside the country.One will be provided to the N/-and one to the N/W/Front.
4. A farm will have to be opened in Gobabis area where underground training of members inside the country.
5. Civillian clothings will be provided from inside.
6. R 1000.00 was provided us.

Prior to our arrival a SWAPO rally was held in Windhoek in memory to the Namibian Day. oA clash followed when Turnhalle gruop tried to sabotage the meeting. Two puppets were killed and six police vans later received damages while they were trying to arrest SWAPO leaders ón support of the Turnhalle.

Before we left we re-met Hatuikulipi in elaboration on details on the planned farm,the problem of identity cards, Some handgrenade and a pistol left in the hands of Hatuikulipi. Recommendation was also made on the setting up of a broadcasting System nearer to the border to provied full -day service to the Namibian people.

We left on the third day.Went to Oniipa,Ondangwa and Oshakati. In Ondangwa we contacted Boas Mweondeleli.We also contacted Nangolo Jacob who gave us R 60.00 . We went back to Omuntele were we met Ndafongwe and decided upon hasting the report to the RHQ.

As for the militayy situation:
Namutoni-Ondangwa there are 4 bases.
Ondangwa - 2 minor and the big one at the Airport with two Radar Systems.
Oshakati - 1 base.

the Political understanding of the masses is very high. We are only discouraging them to leave the country as we see the need to train them [illegible] right inside the country itself.

As for Ndjemba and Kapuuo ' s we are gathering informations about them . Ndjemba is said to have a love relation with a girl ,a soft somebodywé who could be used.

Also worth mentioningis the fact that we receive medicines right from our supporters inside Onandjokwe itself. We also received information inside that there are about 8 of the comrades who went into the South last year somewhere in the Gochas area. The pastor from SWAKOPMUND also mentioned a man he met three times in Otjiwarongo who was backing for help an' identified himself as Heinjeko.

Hatuikulipi is also going to meet ede John ya Otto in Botswana some time possibly on elaboration on SOUTH -NORTH coordination.

Two fighters will have to serve as a link between supporters and units.

N/REGIONAL PLAN FOLLOWING THE REPORT.

1. Sent in about 25 fighting and sabotage unit.
2. Smuggle in small arms and demolision utilities(explosives)
3. Four Officers for coordination of work.
4. About 4 cadres to train people on the said Farm.

Some handgrenades already smuggled in and results could be expected at any time. Things to be done or plan to be put into practice before those handgrenades could be used as it would result in the tough checking measures at Oshivelo.

The"PLAN" received the stamp and blessing of the CHQ.

MURDER : TOIVO SHIYAGAYA : MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND HEALTH OF THE OVAMBO CABINET AND MEMBER OF THE D.T.A.

On 7 February 1978, minister SHIYAGAYA accompanied by chief Clemens KAPUUO, President of the D.T.A., Pastor CORNELIUS NDJOBA, chief minister in Ovamboland and Vice-President of the D.T.A. and Mr. Billy MARAIS, chief Secretary of the D.T.A. and Barney BARNS, member of the D.T.A.to address a public meeting at Okahao in the Northwestern part of Ovambo about 60 km. from the border with Angola.

The deceased was acting as chairman of the meeting. After the speaker have addressed the audience, Pastor NDJOBA left the stage to grant an interview to journalists. The meeting was closed with a prayer to God.

Chief KAPUUO congratulated minister SHIYAGAYA on the good meeting as did Mr. MARAIS when the assassin fired 5 shots with a tokarev pistol at close range. 4 of these shots hit the deceased. Turmoil ensued in the hall and the assassin mounted his bicycle to flee, but was sho dead by a security guard about 200 metres from the hall where the murder took place.

MS.35?.
15/38/197.

REPORT ON THE SPECIAL OPERATION THAT LEFT ZONVO CHEMUNYA DEAD

On 29th of January 1978 a mission was assigned to comrades.-

1. Kaghaneni Theodor combat name
   Christoph Kadhikwa real name and

2. Shifidi Fudukeni combat name
   Petrus Niitembu real name.

The tasks of the mission was as follow:-

1. To collect and to confirm the information about that the South African Army and a number of UNITA bandits were concentrating at Ohamu near Anamulenge in Ombalantu. The UNITA banlits were said to have come from Okavango.

2. To closelly watch the movements of the puppets of the Turnhall Democratic Alliance who were to hold meetings in the Northern Region during the month of February.

3. To see to it that the means at their disposal were effectivelly used to eliminate one or even all three top puppet leaders of the Turnhall Democratic Alliance, i.e. Mudge, Kapuo and Jo Ndjoba.

4. To locate the whereabout of the four comrades who weresgigned a mission commencing from January to March 1978; i.e. to find out whether those comrades where in the South or North of our country.

5. To collect our needs previously affanged; e.g. cameras.

6. To collect information about the enemy's rear and about the moral of the enemy soldiers.

The duration of the mission was to be as from January 30 - February 28, with reports being send in at. ....

... /o

THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION

As to the circumstances, the cadres were not able to deal with all the tasks of their mission. They concentrated on the accomplishment of the second and the third tasks. The puppet were closelly observed at their meetings. They, for quite good reasons, decided to fulfil the third task of their mission.

The decision was as follows:-

On 07/02/1978, Kapuo and Ndjoba to be eliminated at Okahao after their meeting is over, just at the time when they are moving about in the crowd while people are eating and drinking.

The two comrades travelled to Okahao the day before the day puppets were to adress their meeting there. They arrived there at night. No body, except our collaborator new know about their arrival.

The puppet meeting started in the afternoon of the 7th February 1978. The two comrades arrived at the meeting and checked the the situation which they found to be well and went away to reorganise themselves as to how to act.

~~CHRISTOPH KADHIKWA~~

THEY THEN DECIDED THAT:

1. The action must be taken after the meetings as previously planned.
2. Christoph Kadhikwa was to eliminate the Kapuo and Ndjoba, using a pistol, T.T.
3. Petrus Niilambu was to through a hand granade the same cause confuqion.
4. To run to their biycles after the mission was completed and to disappear from the scenn of the action.

ACTION

The two comrades went back at the scoen of the meeting which is the hall open in the sides, near the tribal Offices. The meeting was attended by about 150 people. They, the comrades attended the meeting, one setting infront of the audiance, in the last row of the audiance and the other was sitting [illegible]

[illegible] waiting for the meeting to come out sothat they not, they planned. The hall was surrounded by the puppet troops.

The meeting got over. The puppets left the hall and went in the Office. At that moment, a certain school boy, the son of Tomeh Iimbili who knows Christoph Kadhikwa very well, reported him to one of the puppet soldier who in turn reported the matter to the boer soldier. Kadhikwa realised the danger and signalled his comrade Niitembu. The audience was told not to leave the hall.

The boer to whom the matter was reported went to report to Toivo Shiyagaya who was in the Office, that has a door leading to the hall where the meeting was held. The puppet troops were advancing towards the crowd while cocking their F.N sub-machineguns.

Toivo Shiyagaya brought his chest out of the Office. The boer soldier started whispering into Toivo' ear.
Kadhikwa pulled his already cocked T.T. Two bullets struck Shiyagaya and two other bullets struck the boer soldier who was reporting Niitembu shot two bullets into Shiyagaya. Both Toivo and his boer informer died instantly.

The crowd ran to see well how Shiyagaya was being shot. Kadhikwa fired into the air to scare the crowd sothat they could run together. The crowd did not move. He shot one bullet on the cement floor to scare the crowd. From the floor the bullet hit the boy amongest the crowd in the ankle, then the crowd started to dispersed. The puppet troops retreated while the comrades were firing.

The two comrades run to their bicycles and rode them. After a short distance they took two different ways.

The boer and puppet troops chased them, fired on them. It appears that the enemy wanted to capture them alive. Each Kadhikwa's bicycle was shot in the for wheel. The boers behind him were near. He shot two of them dead and he ran away. He was fired upon from two sides but he managed to escape and ran into the water.

The boers went back, but when Kadhikwa crossed the water he heard the firing. It is asumed that they were firing at comrade Petrus Niitembu. From the time they parted the two comrades did not

MURDER : CHIEF CLEMENS KAPUUO, PARAMOUNT CHIEF OF THE HERERO AND PRESIDENT OF THE D.T.A. : 55 YEARS OLD, LIVING IN KATUTURA

On 27 March 1978, 10 senior members of the Herero tribe were summonsed by the deceased to talk to him at his shop in Katutura.

After the discussions ended at about 18h00, six shots were fired at chief KAPUUO of which four hit him. Eye witnesses saw two black men in cicilian clothes aiming their pistols at the deceased and running away after the assassination.

The chief died on his way to the nearby hospital.

Several eye-witnesses saw the two Wamboman running to a light truck which was waiting for them and sped off at a high speed.

Ballistic tests showed that the shots were fired with two russian made Tokarev pistols at a close range.

THE MURDER OF PARAMOUNT CHIEF CLEMENS KAPUUO

On 27 March 1978 the Paramount Chief of the Hereros, chief Clemens KAPUUO, was assassinated by two SWAPO-terrorists armed with Tokarev pistols in Katutura (Windhoek).

These terrorists were never arrested but investigations by the Police led to the arrests of several collaborators of the murderers and the names of these terrorists are known.

In the subsequent court hearing on the death of Chief KAPUUO the judge ruled that the chief was murdered by two SWAPO-terrorists who have fled the country to Angola.

SWAPO's attitude towards the murder

1. In the beginning of 1978 Sam NUJOMA, President of SWAPO, issued a written order to his terrorists that prominent black leaders who partake in the search for a democratic political solution for SWA/N must be eliminated. The name of chief KAPUUO was prominently mentioned. (This document was seized on 4 May 1978 during a raid by the SA Security Forces on SWAPO bases in Southern Angola).

2. On 9 February 1978 SWAPO's radio service "Voice of Namibia" warned that those who collaborate with the South African Government will be killed.

3. On 13th February 1978 SWAPO declared over the same radio station:

—"In most revolutions traitors are liquidated without much ado. He deserved to be killed ..... liquidation of traitors may have to be intensified if the revolution (is) to succeed. The dirty work SHIYAGAYA was doing in serving the enemy was and is still paining a lot of people in our country, and it could be seen from all indications that puppet SHIYAGAYA and other puppets will meet their tragic end in that way. In future their (collaborators) miserable lives will be ended by bullets through their heads".

(Toivo SHIYAGAYA, Minister of Education and Health in the Owambo-cabinet, was gunned down by a SWAPO-terrorist after delivering a speech at a public meeting in February 1978 in Owambo).

4. In a message to the Secretary-General of the UN on 7th March 1978, SWAPO claimed: "The S.A. Government has instigated one of its puppets, Clemens KAPUUO, the so-called chief of the Hereros to unleash a terror-campaign against suspected SWAPO-supporters. KAPUUO issued a general order to his tribal followers for mass-killings". More serious allegations could not have been made against any political leader.

5. Prior to the assassination of the Herero-chief, SWAPO has addressed several warnings to Mr. KAPUUO in public media as well as privately. In all cases Mr. KAPUUO was labelled a traitor and an enemy of the people, only because he was one of the first black leaders who internationally denounced SWAPO.

6. Chief KAPUUO died in the late afternoon of 27 March 1978 after he was hit by three of six bullets fired with Tokarev pistols by two SWAPO-terrorists.

7. That night and the following day bon-fires were lit and victory dances were held in several places in SWA/N by SWAPO-members to celebrate chief KAPUUO's assassination. In Walvis Bay the joy was so great that the police had to suppress the emotions of SWAPO celebrators to prevent a riot.

8. On 28 March 1978 Sam NUJOMA denied that SWAPO was responsible for the murder of chief KAPUUO.

9. Over Radio Zambia's Voice of Namibia SWAPO broadcasted the following statement on 28th March 1978:

"The Namibian traitor and puppet chief Clemens KAPUUO yesterday collided with a bullet from a Tokarev pistol and died as a result of that. The traitor was fascist Pretoria's hope of installing a puppet regime in Namibia. After the shooting,

KAPUUO underwent surgery, but his miserable life could not be saved. KAPUUO followed close on the footsteps of another traitor, Toivo SHIYAGAYA, who was shot on February 7th".

10. On 3rd April 1978 the same station broadcasted the following:

"The assassination of Clemens KAPUUO was committed by John Vorster's killers in order to make room for a more useful puppet, Eric GETZEN, otherwise known as Mburumba KERINA, as a potential candidate for the post of puppet nr. 1".

11. Shapua KAUKUNGUA, SWAPO representative in London, stated on 12th April 1978 in a press statement that South Africa is responsible for the murders of Minister Toivo SHIYAGAYA and chief Clemens KAPUUO. S.A. planned these assassinations to confuse the people of SWA/Namibia and to start a civil war.

12. Documents which were later seized in Angola proved that the terrorists who killed chief KAPUUO were highly praised for their "heroic deed" by NUJOMA and other leaders.

(P. L. A. N.)

MISSION
27/04/1978

THE MISSION THAT ELIMINATED
PUPPET CLEMENCE KAPUUO

The mission was assigned to comrades Justice Mbangu and Damaseb Mbango on the 5th January 1978. It was to last up to the 31st of March 1978.

The mission was as follows:-

1. To study the military and political situation in the South of the country.

2. To establish contacts with the workers and to recruit some youths and to politicise them sothat they develop the consciousness and the understanding of why sacrifice in the national liberation struggle is sometimes necessary.

3. To organise accommodation in the south for the group A.c. to organise places where to carry out some future missions.

4. To reconnate the Outjo-Kamanyab, Hopoho highway.

5. To kidnap or to kill any white bourgeois farmer who is against us; this was to be done either in central regions or in the southern parts.

6. To reconnitre enemy installations such as railways, bridges and Police stations.

7. [illegible]

8. To capture or to eliminate one of the most important leaders of the O.T.A.

9. Security measures to be adhered to very strictly.

10. To organise money for their mission.

FULFILMENT OF THE MISSION

The comrades left their bases on the 6th of January 1978. They spent both January and February in the North. On the eighteenth of January 1978 comrade Mbangu was shot and wounded in the ankle by the enemy. He got treatment from the people. That is why they did not go in the south quickly.

Transport was also a problem. They did not gett transport from the collaborators used by the underground units from the Northern and North- Eastern Fronts, because could not help any body without the authority from the above mentioned groups. So they organised transport for themselves.

From North up to Windhoek and later on up to Walvis-Bay they only used the people they knew before but such people were not our collaborators. Of course some of them such as Sem Shivute now abroad where either SWAPO supporters, members or simpathisers.

The other problem faced by the comrades was the financial one. From their base they only had about R30.00 which got finnished on January 18th. They then organised some money and they got R55.00 with which they went in to the south.

Generally they found that the support for SWAPO is growing strong day by day. Contacts with workers and youths was done, but it was only for the special compnent of their mission which was to eliminate one of D.T.A. leader or to kidnap him. The accomodation they organised was also temporal. As for stocks they only got one where the kid two of their handgranades they had. This was in the central towns.

As for bridges and railways they say that the one they saw are not guarded, but at police stations there have always been an officer on duty. They did not find time to reconnitre the Outyo-Kamanyab-Hopoho highway.

Neither did they find chance to eliminate any bourgeois white farmer.

The reasons why the time was not found in most cases were:-

1. Time for treatment of comrade Justice Mbangu was long.
2. They had no transport available to them.
3. They ahad no access to the old collaborators.
4. They directed their intention to Kapuuo when they thought was the most important part of their mission in connection with political development internally and externally.

Kapuuo was eliminated at six o'clock on the twenty-seventh of March 1978 while he was standing near the wall of his shop. He was addressing the old men from the reserves, giving them instructions.

He was shot from the distance of five metres, from behind. Credit here is also to be given to the other two comrades who were recruited inside and who gave accurate information. Those comrades came with Mbangu and Ndongo.

Oneday after Kapuuo was forgotten. they eliminated one black S. A. P. at Usakaos. He had a Walter Pistor with the number 158409 and it is abreviated S.A.P., but it was not loaded and he had no ammunitions whatsoever.

The reaction of the enemy after Kapuuo, was to set up roadblocks but they were successfully evaded. Now the comrades arrived safelly at their base resting and waiting for the next order. The amount of money they used was R208.00. They went as far as Walvis-Bay.

(P. L. A. N.)

THE COMMANDING POST HQ'S
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
OF NAMIBIA
MOSCOW
09/04/1978

THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS
THE REGIONAL STAFFS
FELLOW COMBATANTS OF PLAN!

Dear gallant fighters of PLAN,

MASSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS

We must admit that it is by far too early for any objective pre-conclusion on what the outcome of our military efforts will be this year.

It even appears to be to pre-mature a move to issue this message of congratulations as it might have some tranquillising effect - a feeling of have-done-enough, a tendecy of calling for a brief halt for resting out.

Yet your emmense acheivements thus far, and so early this year cry out loud for nothing less but our heart felt congratulations comrades. What you have done for our mighty Party SWAPO, the oppressed majority of Namibia and the cause for mankind liberation thus far is really great.

Apart from capturing a boer on the battlefield, you performed the wonder of killing puppet Shiyagaya while walled by a gang of security men.

Apart from making it possible for our friends to tread and carry granules of our lovely soil Namibia to their own country, thousands of kilometers away; you performed the miracle of eliminating the most prominent puppet of imperialism in Namibia Clemence Kapuuo and note, you did marvels by eradicating him exactly in the capital of Namibia.

[illegible] having been intended for puppet presidency over [illegible], this elimination, having been done in the capital, his presidential seat, symbolises, his replacement by a better man true to the nation, the President of SWAPO.

SWAPO WILL WIN!

The S.A. government and world imperialism is today at a desperate loss. No other probability seems to be facing them than the victory of Namibians led by SWAPO and defended by PLAN. When Shiyagaya fell, they thought "SWAPO may win" however as the grave of Kapuno looks today in Okahandja, they will silently conclude "treasures are gone". Every hope will be buried today in the same puppet grave where the puppet carcass of Kapuno will be buried.

The other significant fact is the psychological catastrophe the death of these puppets will cause in the Turnhalle circus. For comrades, Shiyagaya died at Okahao extreme north about a month earlier at Okahao and Kapuno a month later in Windhoek in the central part of the Country about 800 km away from Okahao. This made every inch in Namibia a danger zone for puppets. They are today ever panic stricken. There is no better reason why no S.A. governmental official will not attend the funeral of their prominent puppet even if only for the reason of showing their solidarity with those poor souls sacrificing for their interest. The funeral, make sure, will be attended of at all, by "thousands" of panic-ridden entities.

LONG LIVE PLAN!

Hours later after the death of Kapuno, another puppet police Adjudant Officer of SAP E. Johannes, "hero in defending slavery" failed to see his own death as the bullets of our gallant forced the last breath out of his lungs and the last drop of blood out his veins. He was too much for the puppets. From now on many a puppet will feel cold and sweating simultaneously an excellent state of affair for more successes.

... achievements show not only that PLAN ... and ... are ... by heroes hot on pursuit of the liberation mission ... that they are staunch relentless patriotic cadres of SWAPO, "leaving no stone unturned, sparing neither effort ... blood when called for, for the fulfillment of a vital task.

I, the Commander-of-the-Armed Forces, by the will of our ... party SWAPO, I am hereby unhesitatingly, congratulating you ... on behalf of the CHQ, PLAN and SWAPO on your great deliverance.

I further wish you courage, gallancy, indomitable heroism, and indomitable sense of patriotism, unity, mutual love ... respect, discipline and vigilance for the sake of the rapid liberation of Namibia this year 1978.

I would not fail to remind you that "a dying horse kicks the hardest", and that a quarter to an hour is not an hour and ... one inch to the destination is not the destination in itself.

SWAPO WILL WIN!
NAMIBIA WILL BE FREE!

I am,
Yours ever for the national cause,

DIMO HAMAAMBO
COMMANDER-OF-THE-ARMED FORCES

PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY OF NAMIBIA
P.L.A.N.
ARMED FORCES
S.W.A.P.O. OF NAMIBIA

EXHIBIT C

SWAPO DOCUMENTS DESCRIBING SABOTAGE AND ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF CIVILIANS

1. "The First Session of the Military Council : HAMUNIME. 6-7 March 1977 (The "main tasks" of SWAPO cadres are described as: "to lay land mines, to eliminate all prominent figures such as Ndjoba and all Turnhalle delegates, abduction of such as schools, to sabotage all rail routes, to confiscate all government banks and vehicles, etc. And to create a workers underground movement")

2. "Report of Cde Martin Nashandi, Regional Engineer Commander/Mongolian Front : 20/12/1977 : MOSCOW" (Nashandi notes: "Study of the situation also revealed that some of the installations and personnel targets could be easily destroyed. In our strategy the operation will start early next year")

3. "Meeting of the M(ilitary) C(ouncil) : MONGOLIA 4.1.78" ("Targets to be destroyed are:-
   A. The bridge between Otavi and Otjiwarongo
   B. The Okahandja bridge
   C. Electric power station
   D. Roads
   E. And all targets should be destroyed by sabotage special group.
   F. Ndjoba and group to be eliminated"

4. "The 8th Minutes of the Military Council : MONGOLIA : 04/01/1978" (Another - more complete minute of the 8th meeting of the PLAN Military Council. This minute indicates that "Comrade Haiduwa ... (is) ... to assure that the following targets are destroyed:-
   a) Bridge between Otavi and Otjiwarongo
   b) Okahandja Bridge
   c) All power stations
   d) To eliminate all prominent puppets, e.g. Ndjoba, Kapuuo, etc".

5. Selection of SWAPO and PLAN reports on abductions of "puppets", "traitors", "collaborators" and children.

THE FIRST SESSION OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL, HAMUNIME. 6-7 MARCH 77.

Meeting attended by eight members of the council Nacada, Pondo, Hailonga Kapuleko, Shilongo, Andy, Shali and Kalangula.

Re-organisation of the groups:

Our groups have been now re-organised in the following way in other words into detachments. The three groups of Nekongo, Mengela and that of Namuxwika form one detachment.

N ekongo.....Detachment commander
Namuxwika..... " comissar
Mengela.....Recoinnassance commander
Negonga..... Demolition commander

Assipa.....Detachment commander
naufiku..... " commissar
Deanga..... .....Recoinnascance commander
Shipuluvi.....Demolition commander

Kalunga.....Detachment commader
Kakuva.....Recoinnassance commander
Mapumba.....Acting Detach. commissar.
Miitili.....Demolition commander.

Each detachment is suppose to have a specific scouting unit functioning in co-ordination with the demolition group within each detachment.

According to, prevailing circumstances we have found out that inside the ounrty there should be only Ioo fighters all in all. And to oporate mor affectively they should be in very small groups of IO-I5 men. Their main tasks will be to lay land-mines, to eliminate all prominent figures such as Ndjoba and all Turnhalle delegates, abduction of such as schools, to sabotage all rail-routes, to confiscate all government banks and vehicles, etc. And to create a workers underground movement.

20/12/1977.

MOSCOW.

REPORT OF CDE MARTIN NASHANDI, REGIONAL ENGINEER COMMANDER/MONGOLIAN FRONT.

I was supposed to submit my report only to the Regional HQ,however the Commander of our Regione instructed me to come here and submit my report to the CHQ.

A squad of four ,we set out on a mission of two- three months,on 3rd Oct,1977.

Our mission was to organise and make preparations for engineer/sabotage activities in cooperation with civillian comrades close to towns.

We left in a group of about twenty. Only four of us were actually charged with the accomplishment of the task. We later however found four to be too many and we sent two back.

As we proceeded ,we parted and our group of 11 crossed the main road , where we met cds Iifo and others.

The two of us received civillian clothings and set out to Make the necessary contacts. We contacted our usual supporters with ease. We wanted to get cadres who will be trained in dealing with sabotage activities. These were very difficult to be found. Eventually however some were recruited.

Having restudied the matter ,we realised that they, could only be given "piece training ",i.e. instruction on how to accomplish a certain target immediately after the said instructions; instead of "general engineer training." This was our prior intention as this how we were told to do . The cadres who have been recruited have thusfar not receive any training .

Study of the situation also revealed that some of the installations and personnel targets could be easily destroyed. In our strategy the operation will start early next year.

The decisive factor in the pertaining situation will be delay fuses. We have already organised batteries from businessmen and promises are still standing for these.

The materials needed could be found in the list attached.

Generally the situation is as described by cde Iifo.

Mongolia,
4. 1. 78.

Meeting of the M.C.

Starting hours 7.45am.

Held at Mulemba

Present:

1. Comrades Dino C/man.
2. Shalli Sect.
3. Green.
4. Langada.
5. Haiduwa.
6. Pende.
7. Mbulunganga.
8. Chikolele.
9. Mike Namala.
10. Hailenga.
11. Kapuleke.
12. Shilongo.
13. Andy Boy.
14. Namaloh
15. Zulu.

Agenda:

1. Introduction of cdrs
   Haiduwa, Langada, & Nadenga.
   Namhele question. Solved ditto le Zaux.
2. The move of the Big 5" towards the indipendence of Namibia.
   Oct 15. 77. observers of U.N. 1500 S A. troops to be 1300 combat. 3000/ 8 bases.
3. The tasks of the two Acs. cdrs & the Reg. Cdr. Nandenga.
4. Regional Cdr. Mbulunganga ——oper. Zone.
5. The new oper. strategic of both Zones. (Mongolia & Vietnam.)
6. Shifumba, Mfitu, Mulemba & Mulela to be supplied directly from Moskba.
7. The Swedish Journalists to arrive on 15 . 1 . 78.

Planning C.

Agenda.

1. OP. Strategies
2. The Supply System inside.

Decisions.

1. Intensification of Dome. groups inside North, NE & NWP. (deep South).
2. Int. of battles inside & along the borders.
3. The post camps at the front to be no move in the hands of the RCs.
4. "Mock exercises" before the enemy target in undertaken.
5. The Detch. of Pl. & Sections to be issued specific orders of their units before the mission is accomplished.
6. Firing of the cadres in battles to be controlled.
7. RC. Mbulunganga to have his operational area, partly North & partly NE.
8. A/C. A.F. cde Haiduwa to be given his operational money which he will start to operate at the biginning.
9. The Regional Commanders to be with Detch.s from time to time & inspect their basements and terrain of the area of their bases, seriously to push them to go inside for operations.
10. The trainning of TK crews should involve those loyal to the legdership & the Party & they should have experience in driving.
11. The trainning of cdrs. should be throughly checked not to be selected by the Thobias Hainjeko Trainning Centre Officers.

Targets to be destroyed are:-

A. The bridge between Otavi & Otjiwarongo.
B. The Okahandja bridge.
C. Electric power station.
D. Roads.
E. And all targets should be destroyed by sobotage special group.
F; Ndjoba and group to eliminated.

DATE: 04/01/1978.
TIME: 7.30 A.M.
PLACE: MONGOLIA.

Ref. No. 0077/MC.

THE 8 TH MINUTES OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL.

Present were:Comrades
1. Dino Chairman
2. Shalli Secretary
3. Greenwell
4. Haiduwa
5. Lungada
6. Pondo
7. McNamara
8. Mbulunganga
9. Chikololo Ngoya
10. Zulu
11. Hailonga
12. Shilongo
13. Namoloh
14. Andy Boy
15. Kapuleko

The meeting was officially opened by the Commander-of-the-Armed Forces .

Items on the Agenda were as follows:-

1. The Introduction of Commanders,viz.
   i) Haiduwa
   ii) Lungada
   iii) Zulu.
2. The Tasks of the two Assistants and the Regional Commander cde Nandenga.
3. The moves of the Five Western Powers ,the Contact Group at present towards the Independence of Namibia.
4. The Operational Zone of the Regional Commander,Mbulu - nganga.
5. The new operational Strategy of the Detachments of all Fronts.
6. Shitumbe,Efitu,Omulemba,Omulolo and Oshana to be directly supplied from Moscow CHQ.
7. The Swedish Journalists coming on the 15 th January 1978.

PLANNING COMMITTEE AGENDA.

1. Operational Strategy.
2. The Supply System for comrades inside.

The Commander-of-the-Armed Forces began with the introduction as already mentioned above.

Comrade Lungada introduced as Assistant Commander-of-the-Armed Forces. New tasks to be car ied out by him are as follows beneath:

i) Will be the Chief Co-Ordinator between all Regions and the Command Post.

ii) Will be stationed at Shitumba if not Efitu, so as to facilitate the job.

iii) Will travel to and from respective regions; thus working in close co-operation with the Regional Commanders.

iv) Will be in touch with cde Haiduwa from time to time, to exchange views and see what is needed inside.

v) To forward the problems and requirements of all fronts to the CHQ, and what is beyond his power to be transferred to the Commander-of-the-Armed Forces, for final decision or approval.

Comrade Haiduwa was also introduced as Assistant Commander-of-the-Armed Forces. His new tasks are as follows:-

i) To operate right inside the country.

ii) Will be the Chief Supervisor and Co-ordinator inside.

iii) Will have to assign missions to the cadres operating inside.

iv) To take care of the underground work.

v) To be given some money with which to commence the job.

vi) To assure that the folowing targets are destroyed:-

a) Bridge between Otavi and Otjiwarongo.

b) Okahandja Bridge.

c) All power stations.

d) To eliminate all prominent puppets, e.g. Ndjoba, Kapuuo, etc.

vii) To establish special sabotage groups.

N.B. On the part of the underground work, members made strong emphasis on this point, ultimately reaching a con-

clusion that this was a technical problem to be tackled only by comrade Pondo ,Chief of Intelligence and Reconnaissance

Tasks of the Regional Commander Nandenga:-

1. To go back to his region.
2. To accompany cde Haiduwa for a week inside to assess the situation in person. Not to stay too long due to the work tailing behind.
3. For him to know the terrain and the situation of our cadres and the foes' movements in general.
4. To see to it that the so-called elections prepared by the enemy is completely disturbed.
5. To ensure that the seizure of a boer prisoner of war is made a " practice."

N.B. The last 2 numbers,e.i. 4 & 5 apply to all Regional Commanders .

The moves of the Five Western Powers.

Comrade Matongo,Chief Commissar, made a short and brief speech on this . Went on to explain the attitudes of the sides concerned. Proceeded by saying that despite imperialist manoevres,SWAPO has reiterated and clarified its position,mainly that it was not going to participate in the elections as long as South African troops and police remained(in Namibia) on our soil.

The Party has thus called upon the intensification of the liberation war. The Party has made all the necessary arrangements with friendly countries;those prepared to give assistance in all forms.

However,the racists are going ahead with the so-called internal settlement,and should a puppet regime come into existence in Namibia,this will make the issue of independence delicate and crucial and may even prolong the war.

Following the intensification of the war ,more troops should be sent into the country. Each and every member of PLAN should and must work more effortlessly and relentlessly.

The National Executive of SWAPO has hence decided to send in journalists to witness and act on our behalf.

Before closure,he warned MC-members that this was a very confidential issue and even a top secret. It was to be handled as such.

The Commander-of-the-Armed Forces made a short

comment on this . He said and made it out-pointedly clear that PLAN is ready to fulfill the tasks set by the superior Body.

Also called upon the commanders to be more vigilant. He called for a big "PUSH".

Comrade Andrew (Commander inside) was called upon to brief the Council on the current situation in Namibia, e.i. inside.

" The situation there is under control. To generalise it,the enemy movements are numerous. Means of transport are helicopters,horses and vehicles including armoured cars and APC'S. They dont travel by roads mostly. Inside we operate only in smaller groups comprising of 15-20 soldiers. The reason is food as we are supplied by the masses. Our units are mobile only. The situation does not yet allow ur make provisions for us to create bases there. Fighting is continuing every now and then. "

Nakada:-

Food is the main problem. Is there any possibility of getting enough food? As I'm saying this because as soon as the war is intensified ,people will start running away from the other side and secondly in case of a liberated area.

Hatongoh:- N .B. Very Confidential.

Food is at present a problem but in future this will be overcome. The Party has even come as far as deciding to purchase its own Aircraft to transport all the necessities to and from within and without .

Chairman:

Fo d is not only necessary but obligatory. Went on to say that the Party will do her uttermost to assure that all the requirements are made available.

On the question of comrade Haiduwa going inside , said that he was not going to change anything ,but would rather recommend him to proceed.

Haiduwa: Had an objection regarding the situation which provides no room for a base inside. Said he views the essentiality.

Nakada: Finally proposed that comrade Haiduwa should go in to assess the situation in person and report back on the prospectives. (Motion overwhelmingly seconded.)

Matongo: Made a short remark:" If comrade Haiduwa refuses the order ,this will make a bad impression even reputation ;especially to his subordinates ." The war should be intensified and right in the country ,he said.

Pondo: Went on to generalise the situation inside .Finally put up a suggestion that more and more reinforcements should be sent in the country. The forces operating in the frontier zone should also undertake major operations as to make a " push" ,especially during the rainy season.

Chairman: The Swedish Journalists are coming . Called upo n the Regional Commanders to make preliminary preparations. Their going into the country will depend entirely on the situation ,he said.

& SABOTAGE: Work should be intensified and even extended. Qualified personnel are required to blow up targets such as bridges ,power stations,.

& Supply-Group: To be established to transport logistical supplies to comrade inside.

& Re:Comrade Martin Iifo: The latter has been demoted cde Ndafongwe has taken over from him appointed as Regional Commander and automatically member of the Military Council .

& Recruits.: In due course,training would be done locally at Oshana . There is no problem with supplies,he p pointed out.

& Prisoners of War: This should be put into practice. All PLAN combatants should be notified.

TASKS ASSIGNED:

1. Intensification of sabotage in Northern ,North Eastern and Partly Southern.
2. Intensifying the battles inside and along the borders being in Namibia to clear the borders.
3. The post camps at the front to be no more in the hands of the Regional Commanders.
4. To make or have practice before an attack on the enemy target is undertaken.
5. The Detachments ,Platoons and Sections to be issued specific orders of their units before the mission is accomplished.
6. Firing of the cadres to be controlled in battles.
7. Regional Commanders Mbulungenga to have his operational Area,partly North and partly North Eastern.

8. A/C.A.F. Haiduwa to be given his operational money with which to begin.
9. The Regional Commanders to be with Detachments from time to time and inspect their basements,terrain of basement,seriously push them inside.
10. The training of tank crews should involve those loyal to the leadership and the Party and should have experience in driving.
11. The training of Commanders should be thoroughly checked not to be selected by the Officers of the THTC , in Lubango.

The Regional Commanders,viz. Nakada and Mbulungange presented their annual reports.

Joint requirements are:-

1. Well qualified personnel,viz. engineers,medical men, Anti-Aircraft Gunners,Artillery Gunners.
2. Obligatory: Qualified Political Commissars.
3. Arms and Ammunitions:
   i) 60 mm Morters & shells.
   ii) RPG-7 shells.
   iii) Mines.
4. Standarised Communication Systems.
5. Combat food.
6. Refreshment courses for commanders.
7. Logistical supplies,food ,uniforms and boots.

All these were seen as main obstacles contained in the reports were the setbacks and successes experienced during the out-going year.

All the members vowed to intensify the war and to carry out the tasks set by the Party.

Time: 8.00 pm.

Notes by Shalli
/Secretary.

Approved :



Chairman / [illegible] Council.

South West Africa People's Organisation

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

Ref. No. Comr[illegible] Limb[illegible] G[illegible]. 15.02.1977.

Comr[illegible]de Limb[illegible]dungil[illegible] w[illegible]s [illegible] Field Comm[illegible]nder inside N[illegible]mibi[illegible].One d[illegible]y his Deputy [illegible]nd, his took [illegible] decision to go to c[illegible]pture or kill [illegible] old Puppet m[illegible]n,who c[illegible]lled [illegible] Nemulu.On the 22nd November 1976 [illegible]fternoon they re[illegible]ched the Puppet's Home.

They were 7 Comr[illegible]des including Comm[illegible]nder himself.They devide themself in order to fullfil their mission [illegible] e[illegible]sily,Others went into the Puppet's Home, While Comm[illegible]nder [illegible]nd other soldiers were surround[illegible] the Crowd of people who were [illegible] the C[illegible]ffee [illegible]nd Fire, ne[illegible]r the Puppet's home.The Comr[illegible]des who entered the Home first open fire on the Puppet [illegible]nd shot him de[illegible]d.The Comr[illegible]des who were outside the Home s[illegible]w one Puppet r[illegible]n out of the Crowd,direct to the Puppet's Home.They Fired on him,[illegible]nd were [illegible]lso shot de[illegible]d.This Me[illegible]nt the mission h[illegible]d succeed.

Before [illegible] they left th[illegible]t Are[illegible] they h[illegible]d h[illegible]d [illegible] meeting with the M[illegible]nes - (Loc[illegible]l People)to let them know why they killi[illegible] the Puppet [illegible] hi[illegible] fol[illegible]wers,[illegible]nd [illegible]lso to h[illegible]v' more inform[illegible]tions.They were w[illegible]nted to know the [illegible] pl[illegible]ce well.They found - [illegible] m[illegible]n who told them [illegible]bout other Puppet who c[illegible]lled Steven.He told them th[illegible]t the m[illegible]n were [illegible] Puppet before but nov[illegible] d[illegible]ys he is no more [illegible] Puppet.

Before they left the Are[illegible] 4 girls decided to le[illegible]ve with them.The w[illegible]y they took pl[illegible]ce ne[illegible]r [illegible] another Puppet's Home.This were Steven's Home.When they re[illegible]ched the Home,Limb[illegible]dungil[illegible] took one soldier with him,[illegible]nd enter the Home.They found the Puppet inside.He were [illegible]sleep.They told him to wat on [illegible]nd come outside the room. The Puppet get out tog[illegible]ther with his wife.They mat questions on him we[illegible]ther he is [illegible] Puppet,[illegible]nd where he is working.His reply were simple th[illegible]t he is not [illegible] Puppet.He is just the one who tooks c[illegible]re [illegible] the Loc[illegible]l people in th[illegible]t P[illegible]rticul[illegible]r Are[illegible]. They [illegible]sked him [illegible]gain where he h[illegible]d been previous d[illegible]ys when he were [illegible]bsent from his Home.He told them th[illegible]t he went for Ohl[illegible]nwen[illegible] for his Money.They [illegible]sked wh[illegible]t fore is th[illegible]t money? He s[illegible]id it were his pensioen(Gr[illegible]nted to elders). They [illegible]sked [illegible]g[illegible]in,who- much is your money?He s[illegible]id R40.00.Let us see on it.He went in the room.This time - his wife were trying to r[illegible]n [illegible]wy,Limb[illegible]dungil[illegible] r[illegible]n [illegible]fter her [illegible]nd c[illegible]ught her. He brought her b[illegible]ck to th[illegible] pl[illegible]ce they were, [illegible]nd found the Puppet count the money out of his pouse.The Amount [illegible] R40.00.Limb[illegible]dungil[illegible] found out th[illegible]t the m[illegible]n is not re[illegible]lly [illegible] Puppet.His Soldier told [illegible]m to took the money with them,bec[illegible]use it is too- much,m[illegible]ybe the m[illegible]n is re[illegible]lly [illegible] Puppet [illegible]s s[illegible]id.Limb[illegible]dungil[illegible] [illegible]gree with [illegible]nd took the - money with them.They left the [illegible] Puppet's Home to the pl[illegible]ce where they left their - fellows.When they re[illegible]ched the pl[illegible]ce,they [illegible]id not find them there.Th[illegible]n the two- [illegible]decided to le[illegible]ve for Ango[illegible].

People's Liberation Army of Namibia

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

Ref. N.:_____

Ohamuniine,
17/ I/ 1977.

Dear comrade Chief Commissar,

We write to inform you about comrade Mbadungila's case. He is a commander of a group operates inside NamibiA. Several weeks ago after he successfullu eliminated puppet Elia Nevulu a case developed against him. We examined the case and we found that it is rather beyond our control. We therefore adopted the atitude of over-to-you. So according to our examination, the comrade has commited a serious crime and he is charged with the following:-
He accepted the bribe from Stefanus,
He tryed to bribe his fellow comrade with the money he received from ~~S~~ Stefanus. He violated the order of "Turn in every thing captured from the enemy, and lastely he sympathised with the puppet. So for more detailes here is the whole story.

The story is infact that statement issued by Mangolo Ohomundenga, his Deputy-commander.

H.J.FROIT,
Vietnam
14.7.1977.

The Commandind HQ,
Cassinga.

Lazarus Cornelius - an alleged traitor.

The above mention was abduct from his home in Etunda on the 10th July 1977, after information reach us that he is main collaborater with the enemy.

He was a businessman and well imformed about politics, esspecially Turnhalle and all activities inside our country. He possessed two guns, a pistol and 303 similar to those used by Kandove reactionary forces. He had a very good contact with the S.A.D.F.

He is a man who gave imformation to the S.A. Soldiers at Otshekwa near Ongulumbashe of the ware-abouts of our combatants viz, Shipapula, Shixwaku, Pondo, Mbomma and Shihepo, on the 31 st August 1976. It is proved beyond doubt that he is("Omupuli") a traitor. He is a good friend of Jeremia Nakathingo and they know each other activities.

We are sending him to you because he was a big man (state police) so asto extract more imformation form him.

N/W/Front,
Vietnam,
21st August 1977.

To the Chief of Intel. & Rec.,
Cassinga.

Comrade,

Information about Simon Ndapuka, an alleged traiter:-

The abovementioned is already in your hands. He was abducted from his home by our forces on the 2nd Aug. in Onawa after information reaching us that he is among those giving regular information about our activities to the forces of aggression in our country. He was in closer collaboration with Wilhelm Kapweya and Shipopyeni already at your disposal. For more information, consult (1) Sabenes Kapweya, (2) Roswinds Kapweya, (3) Maria Kapweya. All have come to Cassinga.

Yours in the Revolutionary war,
Zaux.

N/W/Front,
Vietnam,
17th November 1977.

The C/H/Q.,
Moskba.

Comrades,

Johannes Nguluwe is a teacher at Omukulukila Primary School in Onbalantu. He was taken from his home by our combatants on the 12th of this month. He was suspected of being an enemy agent because he was frequently visited by his brother Petrus Shiimi who is a S.A. police stationed at Ruacana. According to our interogation, we didn't find out something very suspicious.

Lilongeni Mbangula was paying a visit to this man's home and is from Oukvanjama - obviously he was taken with - so we are sending them to you.

Yours for the just cause,
Zaux.

N/W/Front,
Vietnam,
13 . 1 . 1978.

To the Chief of Int. & Rec.,
Moscba,
P.R.A.

Anangwe Shanjenga - a man resposible for the arrest of Shifidi now with us:-

Dear Comrade,

The abovementioned man was working at Onavivi as a kitchen boy in Jannie Booyson's house a Chief foreman of Onavivi. He was abducted from his house about 700m from Onavivi on the 11 Jan 1978. He was very active in giving frequent traitorous reports to his boss masters in Onavivi. He was a threat to all our supporte rs in the area and they have already expressed their relief after hearing the abduction.

So, far he refused to acknowledge that he is respensible for Shifidi's arrest. However, he admitted that he threatened four times (four groups) the people who wanted to come and join us that he will go and report them to the SA african troops in Onavivi if they proceeded to the border. H e said he done this only to frighten them.

He again admit that he once reported N-akale Mukayi wAndjele & Jafet Ndjale to the Ruacana SA Police.

Among the important inf. he released is the construction of Onavivi - the type of weapon Anumber of troops that there are Portuquese and a number of Ovimbundu. He told us as well that on the 15th Jan 1978. from Jan Booysen's wife that mixed troops of Portuquese, Frenches - German - Zulu - Kandoves will be coming in Onavivi on the 15th of this month so as to launch an offensive into Angola in order to wipe out all our bases in Angola. T here is even a grain of tryth in this because even from our reliable sources inside, they relvealed that a number of unidentified white troops (not boers) are now stationing themselves near the border in order to launch an attack.

For more concrete information about Shanjenga, consult cde Shaanika, he will give you a name.

N.B. Receive this full cassette. My tape recorder's condenser is not functioning. I am now using the one which I got from the new comers.

Yours in the S ar.

Zaux

Int. & Inf. officer N / W - F.

N/W/Front,
Vietnam,
20th Jan. 1978.

The Chief of Int. & Rec.,
Moscow,
P.R.A.

Dear Comrade,

On the 10th of this month - PLAN combatants marched into Oluvango - Ombalantu in order to abduct the most enemy collaborater in this area. The man is called Paulus Abraham (Mumbala Mashatu) - he is a policeman and possessed a .303 Mauzer gun. Unfortunatelly he was not found in the house. Our forces didn't hesitate - they take some of the man's property and all his familly who were present in the house.

They are as follows:-

1. Selma Heitha
2. Mweshimana Mumbala
3. Paulina Mumbala
4. Angula Mumbala
5. Esther Mumbala
6. Zacharia Mumbala
7. Hauna Mumbala
8. Mwalengwa Sheyavali
9. Nandjila Sheyavali
10. Nidengwa Sheyavali
11. Tsolenjele Kamutenja.

Among the materials taken with is Mauser .303 cartridges and a total sum of R30.09. We are sending all these to you.

Yours in the war.

Kaux

Int. & Inf. officer - W - F.

N/W/Front,
Vietnam,
7. 02. 1978.

The Chief of Int. " Rec.,
Moskba,
P.R.A.

Ashipala Nakale a policeman in Onangobe abducted,-

Dear Comrade,

The abovementioned man was a watchman of Shangemwene Hepeni a sub headman of Onangobe (Onaamehandiya). His duty was to receive all reports in this area. and to submit them to the abovementioned subheadman and again Shangemwene forward them to Wily Kapwaya. One day he was seen tracing our shoe-prints.

He was than abducted from his house on the 5th of this month. Together were his wife and their granddaughter, both have expressed their willingness not to be left behind.

In his house we found a handcuffsand a military belt.

Yours in our War

Zaux

Int. & Enf. officer N.W.F.

N/W/FRONT
VIETNAM
26/04/1978

THE CHQ's
MOSCOW
R.P.A.

A BUS CARRYING 60 ABDUCTED

Dear Comrade,

On the 22nd, our heroic combatants under Cde, Mbolongondjo laid an ambush alongside the main road from Ruacana to Oshakati near Mahenene. They went in an ambush for three reasons:-

(a) to attack the enemy and capture her -
(b) to abduct a white civillian with the vehicle -
(c) to abduct the Onipiki bus with all her occupants - used to pass there every Saturday.

At 3-00 p.m., the Onipiki bus arrived after they had been for eight hours in an ambush. All necessary conditions were in our favour. All went as planned, and the bus was driven up to near the 1km strip were about twenty of the occupants (old men and children) were dismissed after a short political education. The bus reached us safe with all her remaining 35 occupants on the 23rd, 11-00 p.m. In the bus we found R46-20 and we are forwarding it to you

Let the struggle continue - Victory is on our side.

Yours in the war,
SWAPO

Intelligence and Information n/w/z

People's Liberation Army of Namibia

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

Ref. N.:_____

ORDERS TO THE PLAN COMMANDERS AT THE FRONTS.

The commanders should move inside,and they will operate as follows:

1. Major Mbulunganga-----will cover these:

   a) Enana, b) Endobe, C)Ondeungilo etc.

2. Major Nakada.....will cover these/

   a) To ~~km~~ take the cows of MBPK and those of Njomba,all thse they should be captured alive. AND Operate in that area.

3. Captain Haulijondjaba.....will cover these:

   a/ Mboloka,Kongo,lupale,etc.

4. Major Zulu.....will cover these:

   a/ Namunama,.....Defence line,and with engineers.

5. All female comrades should be in Ohamunime camp,with those unabled.

6. Comrade Aaron to be commander of the whole camp in Ohamunime.

7. To try to capture the enemy alive for exchange with our comrades.

8. To ask if the commanders are in need of Grad"P" now?

9. All the materials to taken near the boarders.

(P. L. A. N.)

THE TREASURY
COMMAND POST HQ'S
MOSCOW
29/04/1978

RE: R46-20 RECEIVED FROM N/W/FRONT

Money amounting to R46-20 has been received from N/W Front. The money is said to have been found in the Shipiki-abducted bus.

GOLD IN UHURU

A/: DIMO HAMAAMBO
COMMANDER-OF-THE-ARMED FORCES

EXHIBIT D



This Soviet TM-57 landmine is utilized extensively by SWAPO cadres and is responsible for many casualties

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





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EXHIBIT E

FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FÜR POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFT UND EUROPÄISCHE FRAGEN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZU KÖLN

RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE AND EUROPEAN ISSUES

SWAPO - AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Analysis and Documentation

Dr.Henning von Löwis of Menar

"The attainment of the control of Southern Africa is the most important goal of the present Soviet leadership..."

Igor S. Glagolew, former adviser for external political affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

It was with satisfaction that Leonid Breshnew referred to the "growing intensity of the national struggle for liberation in Namibia" when he addressed the XXVI. Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Since the seizure of power by Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe the escalation of the struggle for Namibia is regarded as one of the more prominent tasks of the Communist World Movement. "As from now the liberation of Namibia is on the agenda", said party chief and head of state in East Germany, Mr. Erich Honecker, in September 1980. And Kurt Seibt, President of the Solidarity Committees of the GDR prophesied shortly before the turn of the year 1980/81 that the struggle of Swapo would enter a new stage in the following year. Honecker and Seibt know what they are talking about - since the middle of the 1970's East Berlin functions as the centre for co-ordination of Eastern assistance for Swapo. In East Berlin all threads from Moscow, Havanna, and the Swapo headquarters in Luanda are joined. Swapo President Sam Nujoma is a regular guest along the Spree (river running through Berlin). In the German Democratic Republic, more Swapo-cadres are trained than in any other country in the world - military cadres and civilian personnel, among other mayors for the towns Windhoek, Swakopmund and Tsumeb. After the seizure of power by Swapo they will take up their posts. Swapo-government - more precisely Swapo-dictatorship - in Namibia is and remains the explicit goal of communist Namibia policy. Violence and terror are the means with which this goal is to be realized. Already in 1976 a Soviet commentator emphasized that a negotiated settlement could only be considered if South AFrica would fulfil all of Swapo's demands, above all the demand that Swapo is to be regarded as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people: "If this is not achieved, the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia will continue

with its armed struggle until the colonial occupation forces will completely be ousted." When the UNO voted on Resolution 435 on 30 October 1978, the USSR and the CSSR abstained, because the interests of Swapo were not properly allowed for by eastern concepts. Furnished with precise instructions Swapo followed the path of negotiations as delineated by the western contact states. For tactical considerations Swapo took part in the diplomatic tug-of-war for Namibia, however, without the faintest intention of deviating from its absolute demands.

The debacle of Geneva was preprogrammed. South- and South West Africans were confronted at the negotiation table in Geneva with an organisation which still pretends to be a liberation movement, but which in fact, as a consequence of permanent purges - has long since developed into a Marxist-Leninist cadre-party in the wake of the CPSU. The development into a Soviet-style party was attained in stages. After a regime loyal to Moscow had been installed in Angola in 1975/76 with the support of Cuban bayonets, Swapo had to fall in line with the new rulers.

That meant:

- severing the formerly close contact with the Angolan liberation movement Unita;
- renunciation of aid from the Peoples Republic of China;
- adaptation and subordination within the Soviet sphere of power.

Subsequently heads rolled. Prominent representatives of Swapo were excluded from the organisation. Many turned their backs voluntarily to take part in the setting up of an independent Namibia. What remained were the followers of Moscow - in the first place Sam Nujoma, today a faithful partisan of the Soviet Union.

When Nujoma celebrated his 50th birthday in 1979, the Soviet Weekly "New Age" raised a song of praise on the Swapo president.

> "Not only does Nujoma lead the liberation struggle of his people, he also renders an important contribution to the movement of anti-imperialist solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa. His great merit exists further in the promotion of friendship and solidarity between the peoples of Namibia and the Soviet Union. His are the words: 'The Great Socialist October Revolution encouraged the revolutionary consciousness and the

political activity of the peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against the forces of colonialism, imperialism, racism and all forms of foreign dominance."

On the instigation of Nujoma Swapo entered into close league-relationships with the CPSU, the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the Communist Party of Cuba and other communist parties. Swapo regards itself as "brother-party" of the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) in West Germany. At the DKP congress in Mannheim in October 1978 Kapuka Nauyala, member of the CC (Central Committee) of Swapo declared:

"We, members of the liberation movement, are conscious of the fact that in spite of the complicated labour conditions the progressive and anti-fascist forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, stimulated by the DKP, not only promote and support our just cause but will also mobilize public opinion against the imperialist manoeuvres and dirty ventures of our enemies."

The democratic parties of the Federal Republic of Germany are systematically brought into disrepute by Swapo. This didn't stop the SPD to try repeatedly - without success - to seek familiarity with Swapo. The Federal Minister of the Exterior, Mr Genscher, was induced to invite Nujoma to Bonn. The result of this contact was predictable: Swapo received more international acclaim without any gain of initiative on the part of West Germany. Swapo acts now as ever "in close cooperation mit the socialist states and all other anti-imperialist forces in Africa, Asia and Latin America as well as in imperialist states", says the Namibia-expert of the GDR, dr. Alfred Babing.

It follows that, as a consequence of close cooperation in particular with socialist states Swapo has become a pawn within the framework of Soviet global strategy. The emancipation of the peoples of Namibia which is progressing considerably without Swapo, has long since ceased to be the issue at stake. It is rather a competition between systems to gain ground.

Last but not least the natural resources of Namibia are a magnet for the Soviet Union to thrust forward into the South from the launching pad Angola. Moscow's "New Age" 1980:
"Namibia has many natural resources. The following were exploited in 1977: e.g. 1,7 million carat Diamonds, 28 200 t copper, 39 600 t lead, 48 000 t zinc and 1 100 t tin. Besides that, silver, beryl, sulphur, vanadium,

wolframite and other valuable minerals are produced. Since a few years ago the country is developing into one of the most important uranium producers of the capitalistic world. All these treasures are in the hands of South African, American, British and other Western concerns."

What is to be done with the multinationals when Swapo comes to power is spelt out clearly by Nujoma: "Swapo will totally eradicate all colonial institutions which were created by South African and its imperialist allies, including the multinational companies. They are our enemy."

To deal with the "enemy" tomorrow, thousands of Swapo combatants are training today in the GDR, in the Soviet Union and Cuba. They are politically indoctrinated and receive military drill. Only recently a special jet plane of "Interflug" with 100 Swapo-members landed in East Berlin.

Everywhere in the GDR Swapo cadres are to be met - on the barrack squares and in hospitals, in institutions of the FDGB (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund = Trade Union) and the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend), in the "School of Solidarity" of the journalist association of the GDR and amongst the Volkspolizei. The GDR not only trains guerilla-combatants but also instructs waiters and cooks, sales ladies and nurses, train drivers and automobile mechanics. On the "Isle of Youth" in Cuba 600 Swapo pupils are filling the school desks - along with thousands of other contemporaries from Afro-communist states who were all taken there more or less voluntarily. In Angola too Cubans and GDR-Germans are coming to the aid of their class-brothers and comrades in arms. In the south of this peoples republic a batallion of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), (GDR), is stationed. Although NVA-advisers have the specific instruction to stay away from battle ground they sometimes get between the fronts. In February 1978 a liasion officer of the Nationale Volksarmee was killed in a clash between Swapo-guerillas and the South African Army. In 1980 20 GDR-soldiers met death when the liberation movement Unita shot down a military plane. The GDR makes no secret of its military involvement overseas. Colonel Horst Kühne, professor at the Military Academy "Friedrich Engels": "In view of the world-wide anti-imperialist uprising of the peoples and the dangers engendered by neo-colonialism, racism and imperialist efforts for intervention, our soldiers contribute with an exemplary sense of duty to the strengthening of relations for an alliance of the GDR progressive young national states and liberation movements." and

The alliance SED / Swapo is an important factor in the policy of conquest of the East in Southern Africa. Massive intervention in Namibia is being bolstered up by the thesis that the problem of Namibia is no internal national problem of the Namibian People alone but a "key issue in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and at the same time against the South African Apartheid system" (Babing). Swapo, who regards the socialist states as its "natural allies", subscribes unreservedly to the Marxist-Leninist set of references as propounded by its tutors in East Berlin, Moscow and Havanna. In this fashion Moses Garoëb, secretary of Politburo of Swapo's Central Committee, stressed at a conference convened by the SED and the periodical "Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus" that the "national struggle for liberation of today is an integral part of the struggle of the workers movement for peace and socialism". Garoëb verbatim:

"The October Revolution constitutes the cornerstone of all national freedom movements fighting for basic human rights as well as independence and freedom and against colonialism and foreign pre-dominance. Today the Soviet Union embodies the bulwark of social progress in the world without which each national struggle for freedom would from the beginning be stifled by the callous brutality of imperialism."

The chief ideologist of Swapo in East Berlin avowed the adherence of the organisation to scientific socialism:

"It is the specifically formulated goal of Swapo to turn Namibia into a country in which there will be no more suppression and exploitation of man by man (van die mens deur die mens) and in which the capitalist basis will be eradicated to the root...
Swapo will turn Namibia into a country in which the people will wield power and in which there will be freedom. This constitutes the basis for peace and social progress, a basis which coincides with the basic principles of scientific socialism."

In a Swapo-pamphlet of 1978 with the title "The true nature of Imperialism" it is pointed out that it doesn't suffice to eliminate South Africa as "bastion of capitalism": "To pave the way to real liberation we must smash the imperialist system of the world economy to pieces."

These are clear points of view - points of view which place Swapo neatly

within the international system. The "growing intensity of the national struggle of liberation in Namibia" is not the result of a general protest in the country but a consequence of subversion manipulated from afar.

With words and weapons Swapo fights for a communist Namibia. The words as much as the weapons originate in the eastern block. The "recognised vanguard" of the Namibian People who according to Breshnev "courageously fights for freedom and independence" is in actual fact the prolonged arm of a super power - a puppet of Moscow.

In a Namibia of Swapo basic human rights would just as little be guaranteed as in the afro-communist peoples republics of Angola and Mozambique. A Namibia of Swapo would at best be an African GDR or at worst a second Uganda.

Policy statements and concrete acts of Swapo give no indication that the organisation would be able or willing as an autonomous actor to take part in setting up a free and independent Namibia. The claim to power of a Marxist-Leninist cadre-party is incompatible with the basics of a pluralist political system.

Biographical Note:

Dr. Henning von Löwis of Menar, born in 1948 in Freiburg/Elbe, is Assistant Professor at the Research Institute for political science and European issues at the University of Cologne. He attained his doctorate (Dr. Phil.) on a study of foreign policy of Portugal 1945 - 1974. For the handbook of German foreign policy (Publisher: Hans-Peter Schwarz) he contributed articles on the relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Iberian States, German interests in Southern Africa and the role of radio services in east-western conflict. As contributor of the Deutschlandfunk he delivers specific commentary of the foreign policy of the GDR.

WHAT SAM NUJOMA , PRESIDENT OF SWAPO SAID:

Nujoma about SWAPOs demand for power:

"We are entitled to get the power. And we shall not share the power with anybody

Nujoma about the aims and methods of SWAPO:

"We believe that a really socialistic state in Namibia can only be enforced by means of violent revolution".

Nujoma about majority rule:

"We do not fight for majority rule. We fight in order to take over the power in Namibia for the benefit of the people of Namibia. We are revolutionaries."

Nujoma about South-Africa:

"South-Africa is an outport of the capitalistic Western Europe".

Nujoma about Mudge, chairman of the DTA:

"Mudge and all these"boer"-elements have to leave for South-Africa. They have suppressed and expropriated our people".

Nujoma about the Western Countries:

"The Western Countries are nothing else than allies of South-Africa and intend to solve the Namibia-problem according to their own selfish interests".

Nujoma about the Federal Republic of Germany:

"The FRD in an extremely arrogant manner violates the resolutions of the UNO. Doing so, she strengthens and legalises the fascistic occupation of Namibia by South-Africa".

Nujoma about the United Nations:

"The UNO is still under the influence of the Imperialists".

Nujoma about the situation in South-America:

In Latin-American people are still suppressed by the feudalists, militarists and neo-colonialists together with tremendous multi-national groups which belong to the US-Imperialism and other international monopolistic capitalists."

Nujoma about the October-revolution in Russia:

"The epoch-making triumph of the Great Socialistic October-revolution and the erection of the first socialistic state in the world have introduced a new era in the history of mankind".

Nujoma about the foreign policy of Soviet-Russia:

"Together with all the peace-loving and progressive forces of the world, SWAPO admires the foreign policy of the Soviets very highly on account of the fact that it is aimed on the defeat of the aggressive efforts of world-imperialism, which desperately tries to save the unhuman system of capitalism from its unavoidable collapse".

Mujoma about Moscow help for SWAPO:
"Without the help and support (of the Soviet-Union), we would not be able to fight against the powers which suppress our people".

Mujoma about the states of the Eastern Block:
"The socialistic countries are friends in words and deeds".

Mujoma about Cuba:
"Cuba is an example for revolution. The Cuban revolution is our revolution. It is the revolution of the suppressed people".

Mujoma about the future of Namibia:
"After having taken over the power in Namibia, we have to destroy everything which has been built up by the minority of the white settlers".

Mujoma about the relations between a SWAPO-governed Namibia and South-Africa:
"A SWAPO-Government will have no relations whatsoever with South-Africa as long as South-Africa has not been freed".

Mujoma about the role of the Germans in a SWAPO-governed Namibia:
"I have no use for the Germans in independen Namibia".

Mujoma about Mujoma:
"I am not prepared to give any guarantees to anybody".

EXHIBIT F

East Germany

Marxist Mission in Africa

by
JOHN M. STARRELS

JOHN STARRELS is Adjunct Professor at the American University's School of International Service in Washington, D.C. and a free-lance writer. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California and has served in the Department of Political Science at The George Washington University. He is co-author of *Politics In the German Democratic Public* and has published in such journals as *World Politics* and *Government and Opposition*. His shorter articles on international affairs have appeared in the *Washington Post*, the *Boston Globe*, and the *Journal of Commerce*.

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Introduction

August 13, 1981, will be the twentieth anniversary of the erection of the Berlin Wall. For most people, including far too many policymakers, this monument to political control and oppression represents the sum of their knowledge about East Germany (The German Democratic Republic or GDR). The Wall, to be sure, remains important, particularly so for the people who must live and work behind it. But there are other aspects of this German Marxist state which deserve more immediate attention. East German support of, and active engagement in, Soviet policy toward Africa is one of those subjects, and it will be the focus of this study.[1]

The GDR did not become a major element in Soviet African policy overnight, any more than Cuba did. Until the late 1960s, most analysts in the West (and perhaps in the East as well) brushed off the existence of the GDR as a transitional "problem" which would in some way be resolved within the framework of a re-united Germany. Yet it was during that same decade that GDR military and political cadres were beginning to establish the foundations of an African policy. Over the past two decades, this East German presence in Africa has become an invaluable adjunct of Soviet foreign policy toward that vital region. The East Germans have, in the interim, overtaken Czechoslovakia as Moscow's number-one ally throughout the Third World. Of the bloc countries, only Romania pursues a policy as assertive as that practiced by Moscow's German satellite.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the German Democratic Republic is actively engaged in the advancement of Marxist revolutionary change throughout the Third World. Its Communist leaders have openly proclaimed as much. "From the rostrum of our Party Congress," declared Erich Honecker in April of 1981, "we hail all fighters for national and social liberation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, assuring them that they can always count on our Party and on the people of the GDR in their arduous struggle for national liberation and the happiness of their peoples."[2]

Before the analysis of East German policy toward Africa can proceed, however, several preliminary but vital considerations need to be disposed of now. The most important consideration is that the GDR's relative success in Africa, and in the Third World more generally, is based entirely on its ability to play a "surrogate" role on behalf of the Soviet Union. This means that East Germany can, of course, pursue

specific goals of its own. And it frequently does. But the GDR's capacity to perform is based on its ability to act "as a substitute for the Soviets in certain ways."[3] In other words, East Germany conducts its African affairs as an appendage of Soviet foreign policy.

Another, and related, consideration involves a comparison of East Germany's and Cuba's surrogate roles on behalf of Soviet foreign policy in Africa. Two major points of comparison come to mind:

First, East German activity in Africa is exclusively directed to the supply of highly skilled civil and military cadres to selected Marxist clients on that continent. Cuban involvement, on the other hand, is geared to large-scale military projects which routinely require considerable numbers of its own troops. Thus, the surrogate functions of the East Germans and the Cubans complement, rather than duplicate, each other.[4]

Second, East German activity in Africa, with some notable exceptions, is covert; Cuba's, by contrast, is largely overt (or demonstrative).

A final point of concern is the special relationship between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Ties between the two governments are extremely close. And since the replacement of Walter Ulbricht by Erich Honecker ten years ago, linkages across all levels have become even more intimate, if not interdependent. The "core" of Soviet-East German relations, as always, is on the Party-to-Party level. Between June 1971 and December 1976, the two respective General Secretaries (Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker) met on at least twenty-five occasions.

In an era of national upheaval throughout Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union knows that it can trust the German Democratic Republic to support its most-far reaching imperial claims within the bloc. As a result, the East Germans can be expected to take the most conservative and pro-Soviet line in the defense of orthodox Marxist positions throughout Eastern Europe. GDR anxieties about the "spread" of "revisionism" in 1968 undoubtedly emboldened the Soviet Politburo to send the Warsaw Pact into Prague in August of that year. And the East Germans have been equally assertive in their condemnations of the "counter revolutionary" trends at work in Poland. In sharp contrast with the other European Communist regimes, the GDR makes a conscious effort to subordinate itself to the dictates of the Soviet Union. "Adopting a policy reminiscent of the overzealous Tito of 1945, Honecker [speaks] of integration with the Soviet Union, rather than alliance."[5] In sum, the German Democratic Republic is the one Soviet satellite which is perfectly suited to carry out the most delicate foreign policy projects on behalf of the USSR. This holds true for the conduct of Soviet strategy in Europe, and it holds true no less for East Germany's active, and enthusiastic, support for Moscow's projects throughout the Third World.

1

Moscow In The Third World And The East German Role

Since its inception East Germany has conducted its own policy toward the Third World. For the first two decades of its existence, that policy chiefly involved the GDR in a campaign to win diplomatic recognition. Once recognition was achieved, however, the East Germans began to re-orient their foreign policy toward the less developed countries (LDCs). They did so in two aligned ways. On the one side, the GDR realized that it was in a favorable position to undermine the prestige of its arch German rival to the West—especially since Third World opinion, on the elite level, is traditionally anti-Western. And the East Germans have been ardent advocates of Third World critiques of the capitalist West. Next to the United States, no country plays a more pivotal role in setting the agenda of the industrial West to deal with Third World issues than does the Federal Republic of Germany. East Germany's conscious policy since the early 1970s, when the so-called GDR recognition wave crested, has thus been to weaken the influence of the FRG whenever the occasion presents itself. Such a posture obviously serves long-term Soviet policy interests in the Third World. On the other side, the GDR became a leading proponent of Soviet bloc intervention throughout the Third World. East German efforts to undermine the political influence of Bonn are treated in another part of this study. The East German effort to align itself with Soviet strategies of intervention in the Third World is examined later in this chapter. In order to understand the political and ideological framework guiding East Germany's activities in the developing areas, it is extremely important to examine Soviet thinking on this subject.

Moscow and the Third World

The doctrinal underpinning of Soviet foreign policy toward the developing areas is contained in Lenin's "Theory of Imperialism." The Leninist position, it should be remembered, was that the pending collapse of the European colonial order created major opportunities for Soviet political gains within the industrial West. The logic was decep-

tively simple: Imperialism constituted "the highest stage of capitalism," "and the breakup of the colonial system would [accordingly] deal a major, if not lethal blow to imperialist forces."[6] Lenin, as did his successors, had two ultimate goals in mind: to weaken imperialism at home, in Europe, and to win converts to "socialism" in the former colonial lands. However, Stalin's stormy relations with the Chinese in the 1930s and the Yugoslavs in the 1940s soured him on the practical possibilities of bending Soviet foreign policy to the specific needs of home-grown revolutions. Thus the Kremlin continued to pay only lip-service to the value of Lenin's theory. In reality, however, the Soviet Union under Stalin demonstrated little interest in the formation of alliances with the revolutionary groups which were already active in the developing world by the early 1950s.

Nikita Khrushchev's rise to political power in the mid-1950s represents a watershed in Soviet Third World policy. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, the new Party leader declared that "the present disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world-historical significance."[7] In sharp contrast to Stalin, who largely discounted the revolutionary potential of the non-aligned movement in the ex-colonial areas, Khrushchev immediately grasped the significance of that development. Khrushchev called for the creation of a so-called "Zone of Peace" which would ideally include two groups of countries responsive to Soviet appeals: the neutralist governments of Western Europe (primarily in Scandinavia) and the so-called non-aligned countries who had come together for the first time at the Bandung Conference on African and Asian States held during the previous year. While the European part of that alignment would be employed by Soviet propagandists as a launching ground for nuclear disarmament proposals aimed at the United States, the so-called non-aligned countries would be weaned away from the West and, gradually, brought into the sphere of influence of the socialist world system.

In large measure, however, Soviet support of the non-aligned movement did not result in major breakthroughs for the Kremlin. Soviet involvement in Egypt and India—the unofficial heads of the movement during the 1950s—significantly increased. And Moscow's general standing in the non-aligned community improved as a result of its support of Nasser against the ex-colonial powers and Israel during the Suez crisis of 1956. Soviet readiness to undertake the financial obligations for the construction of the Aswan Dam, which the Eisenhower administration had earlier abandoned, also provided the Kremlin with a propaganda triumph in Egypt.

At the same time, Khrushchev soon learned that diplomatic breakthroughs in the ex-colonial areas did not automatically translate themselves into permanent political gains. Undoubtedly the most painful

setback experienced by the USSR occurred during the Congo (Leopoldville) episode of the early sixties. As one writer describes it:

> In practice, the USSR found many ex-colonial states far less tractable than it had anticipated. Perhaps the most notable case—and certainly the most grievous to Moscow—occurred during the Congo (Leopoldville) imbroglio of 1960–61. The Afro-Asian nations unanimously approved the dispatch of UN troops to the Congo in July 1960 in the wake of the mutiny of the Congolese *Force Publique*, the intervention of Belgian troops, and the secession of Katanga Province; but differences quickly developed among them regarding the UN operation. These eventually led to a major split in Afro-Asian ranks after Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu dismissed the country's Soviet-backed premier, Patrice Lumumba. To Soviet dismay, the UN General Assembly, with major Afro-Asian support, recognized a Kasavubu delegation as the legal representative of the Republic of the Congo and spurned a Lumumba delegation.[8]

It became clear to Moscow, largely in the aftermath of the Congo experience, that a more assertive *and* discriminating strategy toward the emerging areas was required. The assertive portion of the new doctrine consisted of Soviet readiness to provide military and political assistance to countries which gave evidence of a truly revolutionary (i.e., Marxist) potential and those that clearly did not. The discriminating element, of course, was that the USSR would not devote further effort to win allies for Marxism in countries which were clearly choosing a capitalist mode of development. Khrushchev enunciated the revised doctrine at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU in 1961: "neutrality" would be respected by the Soviet Union as it had been in the past. But the thrust of future Soviet assistance to the ex-colonial areas would henceforth be directed toward both governments (such as Ghana) and insurgencies (such as those that were already taking place in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique) actively engaged in the "anti-imperialist" struggle.

As things turned out, the USSR's ability to provide material assistance to its Third World friends—in the form of military aid and economic support—proved quite limited throughout the 1960s and up to the beginning of the 1970s. In part, limited Soviet assistance to a more select group of Third World countries, such as that which was given to Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, was to be explained by Moscow's relative strategic and political inferiority *vis-à-vis* the United States and her European allies. The ability to move large numbers of troops and material by air was not a capability possessed by the Soviet Union until the early 1970s. Beyond that, of course, was the continued realization on the part of the Kremlin that there were few countries in that vast area which could be called truly Marxist—or even potentially Marxist. Furthermore, the overthrow of two major Third World allies, Sukarno

of Indonesia in 1965 and Nkrumah in 1966 only tended to reconfirm the USSR's ingrained caution on the subject of how to go about winning friends in the LDCs.

Starting in the early 1970s, the conduct of Soviet policy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America represents a major—perhaps even radical—break with the immediate past. Nowhere is that change more pronounced than in the shipment of Soviet arms to the LDCs. As one analyst reports, "Between [1955] and the end of 1977, it is estimated, the USSR supplied these states with 21,035 million dollars worth of arms...Of this amount 12,925...were delivered in the 1973–1977 period alone. In other words, 61 percent of all Soviet arms deliveries (in the twenty-three-year period concerned)...were made in the last five years. This is clearly a tremendous acceleration in the development of military ties with the Third World."[9] Soviet economic assistance to the LDCs over a comparable time period (1954–1977), on the other hand, was nearly 50 percent less than its military assistance—$12.9 billion.[10] In other words, the Soviet Union's predominant policy interest in the developing countries today is one of providing them with military, rather than economic, assistance.

Preliminary data on Soviet activities in the past four years further substantiate this point. Estimates of Soviet arms sales to the Third World rose from $9.6 million in 1977 to $14.9 million by 1980, or an increase of 55.5 percent. In contrast, arms sales from the U.S. rose by only 13.2 percent, from $7 billion to $7.9 billion. Thus by 1980 Soviet arms sales to the Third World nearly doubled the total value of U.S. sales. Moreover, Soviet deliveries of individual weapons to the Third World totalled 41,001 during the four-year period, while the U.S. and major Western European weapons delivered amounted to only 28,899. The table on page 5 provides a complete breakdown of the weapons.

Various explanations for the USSR's more aggressive (and "historically more optimistic") posture toward the developing countries include: the collapse of the United States in Vietnam, which increased already significant domestic pressures toward isolationism in the U.S.; the fourth Arab-Israeli war which galvanized the OPEC nations together in an anti-Western coalition on matters of oil pricing policy; the outbreak of revolutionary movements in Rhodesia and in South Africa; and most significantly, the sudden demise of the Portuguese empire in Africa. But two more immediate developments need to be examined as well, both of which have a direct effect on the conduct of East Germany's more precise policies toward the Third World.

First, no assessment of Moscow's Third World activities is complete without an assessment of its increased dependence on military force to effect political outcomes. In fact, there should be no cause for surprise on the use of military force as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. On three separate occasions, the USSR has employed its own troops to

Weapons Delivered to the Third World, 1977–80

Weapons Category	USSR	Major West European	U.S.
Tanks and/self-propelled guns	6,022	795	3,036
Artillery	10,523	2,068	2,270
APC's and armored cars	7,642	2,615	7,167
Major surface combatants	25	34	22
Minor surface combatants	107	367	24
Submarines	5	12	3
Guided missile boats	43	17	N/A
Supersonic combat aircraft	1,761	251	510
Subsonic combat aircraft	296	54	202
Helicopters	676	916	187
Other aircraft	247	407	273
Surface-to-air missiles	13,654	2,049	5,620
Total	41,001	9,585	19,314

(*Source*: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981)

quash unrest in Eastern Europe (1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, and 1968 in Czechoslovakia). That it has now chosen to do so in regions outside its direct sphere of influence, as in Afghanistan, should seem logical enough. As regards present Soviet intentions toward Africa, for example, the Kremlin continues to insist on the "primacy of nonmilitary" factors in the evolution of "progressive" regimes on that continent. These nonmilitary factors include, from the USSR's perspective, the emergence of both revolutionary and progressive movements throughout Africa which are "objectively" allied with the positions of the Soviet bloc on a wide range of matters. This may indeed be the case, but it is also the case that the Soviet Union is attempting to influence the evolution of those favorable trends in very direct, as well as dangerous, ways. In Vernon Aspaturian's words: "While one can plausibly explain revolutionary movements and social ferment as the product of underlying historical forces and trends, one can hardly burden history with the decision to airlift and support thousands of Cuban soldiers in Angola and Ethiopia, or to send 85,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan."[11] That East Germany and Cuba *both* play a major role in this military strategy can be demonstrated in various ways; though the GDR's place in that military policy is what interests us here.

Second, as the military component in Soviet policy toward the Third World, particularly in Africa, has grown, so has Moscow's dependence on substitutes, or surrogates, increased as well. In the case of the German Democratic Republic, its value to Moscow has been three-fold: its previous experience in cultivating ties with Third World countries; its acknowledged bureaucratic and technical skills, which

are in short supply throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America; its readiness to undertake adventures in the Third World as a Soviet surrogate. These subjects, and others, are examined below.

East Germany in the Third World

East Germany's original reason for involving itself in the developing area stemmed directly from its desire for diplomatic recognition. In large measure, those efforts turned out to be fruitless. West German insistence that it alone would speak for the German nation proved itself to be a lethal diplomatic weapon when combined with the Hallstein Doctrine. This doctrine, named after its originator, Walter Hallstein (Konrad Adenauer's first secretary for foreign affairs and former EEC president), was formulated in 1953 by the West German government in an effort to deprive East Germany of diplomatic recognition. It specified that the Federal Republic would enter into diplomatic relations only with governments that refused to recognize the GDR. The doctrine contained a retroactive element as well: that any country which subsequently recognized the GDR and with whom Bonn had relations would have its ties suspended. The withdrawal of diplomatic ties carried with it the withdrawal of economic ties, a threat which most of the LDCs were not prepared to accept.

The product of West German efforts to deny diplomatic recognition to the GDR was East Germany's virtual exclusion from the world political community, minus the Soviet bloc. East German leaders made a continuous effort to get around the Hallstein Doctrine in various ways. But the GDR's major successes were largely confined to the so-called sub-diplomatic level. While Bonn continued to wield substantial political clout throughout the Third World through the 1960s, it was not always able to prevent those governments from entering into consular, general economic, trade, and cultural relations with the GDR. By 1965, for example, the East Germans were able to point to some limited success in the establishment of trade missions in a number of African countries. The list included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Sudan, and Zambia. As with the Soviet Union, East Germany's interest in expanded economic ties was subordinated to the more important goal of forging long-term political alliances with emergent Third World elites. By the late 1960s, the GDR's commitment of foreign aid to the LDCs came to about 0.02 percent of its gross national product.[13] Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, East German trade with those countries remained in the range of 3–5 percent of its total trade turnover.[14] However, the political gains turned out to be substantial, if not immediate. For what was gained from such activities was the opportunity to establish intimate working contact with government specialists who would come eventually to occupy top-executive positions in their na-

tional bureaucracies. By the end of 1979, long after East Germany had successfully terminated its campaign to achieve diplomatic recognition, the GDR had commercial or other forms of economic relations with fifty-two Third World countries. While the GDR now has a more diversified range of interests which it is pursuing in its relations with the LDCs, including the desire to attain secure access to Middle East oil, the economic importance of the LDCs to East Germany remains negligible.

Today, one can identify two fundamental goals pursued by East Germany in its policies toward the Third World: to undermine the influence and prestige of the Federal Republic of Germany, its long-time opponent throughout the Third World, and to undertake complex support functions of a political and military-security nature. This second goal is the object of discussion now.

East Germany's interest in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has expanded rapidly over the past decade. As a Soviet surrogate, the GDR sticks closely to Soviet interpretations of Third World developments; and East German initiatives toward specific governments, such as Angola or Ethiopia, are invariably coordinated with Soviet strategies. Furthermore, the East Germans know that the risks associated with being closely tied to one or another contending faction within an African or Asian country can bring political difficulties, and occasional diplomatic humiliations, in their wake. For example, the GDR's own relations with Somalia have suffered as a result of Moscow's decision to switch sides in support of Ethiopia in its war with the Somalis over the Ogaden region in the late 1970s. Of more recent concern, of course, the East Germans, along with the USSR, have found themselves on the political sidelines in the wake of Robert Mugabe's electoral victory in Zimbabwe in early 1980. The result has been a humiliation for the Soviet Union and its satellites who, as things turned out, picked the wrong side in the Rhodesian insurgency. And in the Middle East, the GDR, again like the Soviet Union, has been forced to absorb political defeats—in Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and to a lesser degree in other Arab countries which remain suspicious of Soviet overtures.[15]

Nonetheless, the East Germans have demonstrated an ability to work closely with the Soviet Union in areas of the Third world which are open to the political influence of Moscow. Most of these countries lie in sub-Saharan Africa, but there are now indications that a number of Central American countries, most prominently Nicaragua, are falling into the category of what Soviet-bloc theorists call the "national democratic state." This designation covers a variety of LDCs in various stages of economic and political transition today. The vast majority of them, however, remain outside the Marxist political framework. Furthermore, as Soviet analysts themselves admit, most of these countries

will remain dependent on the industrial West for their future economic well-being. Their chief selling point for the Soviet Union, however, is their verbal commitment to pursue a "non-capitalist way of development" over the longer term. It is the self-imposed responsibility of the Soviet Union and its various surrogates (but crucially for the GDR) to assist those countries in the management of that transition from pre-capitalism to "real socialism." Such a task is a complicated one, and the East German role in that process is multi-faceted. Some of its more important political activities in support of that goal include the following.

International and Domestic Propaganda Support Activities

Since the Korean War, East German leaders have been active in Soviet-led efforts to mobilize international and domestic opinion against the West. Under the banner of "anti-imperialistic solidarity," GDR propagandists have employed a variety of forums which are organized to promote the spread of anti-Western opinion throughout the Third World. In the United Nations, for one pertinent example, the GDR has vigorously supported a number of Soviet positions geared to enlist Third World political support. This involves, among other things, the LDC demand for a "New International Economic Order"; for a policy of military and economic confrontation with South Africa; for a strategy designed to isolate Israel within the U.N. and in support of the claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

On the domestic front, East German propaganda activities are organized around so-called Solidarity Committees (Kurt Krüger is the General Secretary responsible for the administration of these organizations) whose purpose is to mobilize domestic opinion on behalf of East Germany's various campaigns to demonstrate its fealty to the "anti-imperialist" banner. There are separate Solidarity Committees for the various geographic regions which compose the Third World. And there are specific country-to-country Committees for East Germany's major political allies, all of which are located in the Middle East and in Africa. In addition to these established entities, the East Germans have also created special forums in order to take advantage of specific issues which enjoy the immediate concerns of their various Third World allies. In support of the "Struggle against Colonialism, Racism, and Apartheid," for example, the GDR has, under UN auspices, established its own anti-apartheid commission. Created in March of 1978, this forum has been used as an organizational focus around which East Germany's various anti-apartheid actions, on the home front, have been directed. According to one Western source, these various "Solidarity Campaigns" carried out on the home front have netted approximately $150 million. Most of that went to the various

guerrilla groups, such as the African National Congress and the South-West Africa People's Organization (the two groups which are carrying out insurrections against the South African and the Namibian authorities, respectively).[16]

GDR Foreign Aid and Trade with Third World Countries

In comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR is not a generous aid donor to the LDCs. On average, the FRG donates about 10 billion marks on an annual basis (this includes private investment and commercial loans). East German sources do not divulge their monetary contributions, but Western sources calculate that it comes to about 6 billion marks for the entire period from 1949 to 1976.[17]

East German support also extends to the training of Third World students in the GDR. Honecker announced recently that since 1976, a total of 8,500 students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America had received instruction in the technical areas. The GDR has proved to be especially helpful in providing the following types of instruction: journalist training, which is provided to aspiring students who are expected to join (or found) newspapers in their home countries; instruction in engineering, which includes anything from harbor design to the development of national highway systems; and telecommunications education, which is geared to assist students from the LDCs in the establishment of radio and television systems in their home countries.

The GDR's trade with the LDCs is relatively modest, but it has grown. From a paltry $4.2 million in 1949, it reached about $2.8 billion in 1979. The following table highlights East Germany's trade turnover with a number of African countries over the past decade:

GDR Trade with Africa

Country*	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Angola				236.0	233.7	311.6
Ethiopia	0.6	0.2	0.2	278.2	316.5	63.3
People's Republic of the Congo	0.3	0.1	8.0	3.8	1.0	0.4
Mozambique				24.9	130.5	277.3

*Note** Since 1973, the GDR has not usually reported separate import and export entries; figures are in millions of valutamarks, approximately two valutamarks equal to one dollar.

Sources: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic* (East Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1979); *Annuaire statistique de la République Démocratique Allemande 1980* (East Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1980), p. 79.

While its trade with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique has increased substantially over the past few years, these three countries of-

fer the GDR little in the way of raw materials which could be exchanged in return for East Germany's manufactured goods. It seems to be the case that GDR trade with those important African regimes is based essentially on political considerations. A possible exception to that rule, of course, is Mozambique which has sizable deposits of oil. In any event, one of the more noteworthy points in the above table is the substantial drop-off in East German-Ethiopian trade. GDR sources do not provide any reason for this, but it is a development which bears scrutiny.

Trade between the Middle East and the GDR, alternatively, is more robust. While the total trade turnover in East Germany's commerce with its three major African allies (Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique) came to 652.2 million valutamarks in 1979 (about $326 million), GDR-Iraq trade in the same year alone came to 912 million valutamarks (about $456 million). The table below supplies a more precise overview of these developments:

GDR Trade with the Middle East

Country	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Egypt	389.7	639.6	559.2	546.3	442.2	520.7
Iraq	48.7	764.2	779.0	595.0	724.7	912.3
Libya	6.4	12.1	63.3	84.8	13.3	54.7
Syria	67.0	211.2	348.6	344.4	405.7	436.6

Sources: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic*, and *Annuaire statistique*, pp. 79–80.

The major contrast between East German trade with the Middle East and Africa is oil, which the former has in abundance. Nevertheless, the GDR has attempted to coordinate its foreign commercial and political relations where it has been possible for it to do so. Notably, East Germany's most important trade partner, Iraq, is also the GDR's major political client in the Middle East. At the same time, political vicissitudes do not entirely dominate East Germany's foreign economic policy. Witness the "relative" stability of East German-Egyptian trade. In fact, despite Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisers in 1972, and his more recent closing of the GDR's consulate in Alexandria in December 1977, trade between the two countries has not fluctuated in the manner that the GDR's trade with Libya, for example, has.

In general, East Germany's foreign commercial relations with other LDCs outside of Africa and the Middle East are relatively modest. Its combined trade with India and Brazil in 1979 came to approximately 848 million valutamarks (about $424 million). By way of comparison,

the much smaller countries of Belgium and Luxembourg transacted a total of about 1 billion valutamarks ($500 million) worth of trade with the GDR in the same year. Explanations for why LDC trade remains unimportant to the GDR vary. But two points deserve to be mentioned in this regard. First, the non-covertibility of the East German mark means that the GDR must usually conduct its trade on a straight barter basis: For all intents and purposes, most of the LDCs have little of direct value to the GDR, so trade in and of itself makes little sense for East Germany. Second, as with the Soviet Union, so for the GDR, the non-market economies are not major actors in the global economy; the LDCs, along with the industrial countries, are. For the forseeable future, while various Marxist developing countries will increase their political and security ties with the East Germans, they will remain directly dependent on the West for their economic well-being. There is little, if anything, that the GDR can do about this.

International Educational Support Activities

Throughout the Third World, but particularly so in Africa, the GDR is engaged in the work of educating thousands of "cadres" "in the techniques of managing centrally directed economic and political institutions and by inculcating Soviet-style Socialist doctrine in the process, the GDR is seeking to build what may be called a Marxist-Leninist infrastructure in a number of closely allied Third World states (such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola)."[18] An integral part of the educational process is the use of trade union delegations, women's organizations, and youth groups throughout the developing world in the service of Marxist education.

Of special importance for the GDR are the activities of so-called Friendship Brigades which are currently working in seven African countries. According to Honecker, 2,750 apprentices have been trained by these brigades, almost all of which come from African and Arab countries.[19] These Brigades belong to the Free German Youth, which is the official youth group of East Germany. That most members of these Friendship Brigades probably have an interest in careers in the diplomatic service (or in the international military security apparatus) is a point not lost on East Germany's political leaders.

Substantive comments on the nature, and extent, of East Germany's military and security assistance activities are reserved for the next two chapters. In brief, however, it is clear that the GDR is playing an increasingly significant role in these two related areas. Throughout the Near East and in Africa, East German military and security cadres (estimates run between 5,000–10,000) are actively involved in the establishment of intelligence services, in the training of guerrilla commandos, and in the organization of national military systems. As East

German activity in this sensitive sphere has increased over the past decade, the number of missions undertaken by East German military and security leaders has correspondingly grown. It is rare that GDR official sources ever admit that East Germany is directly helping its Third World clients in these areas. In most instances, one has to scrutinize the content of the various public treaties and agreements which are entered into by the East Germans and their various clientele. It seems, however, that a good deal of military and security assistance is funneled through "scientific-technical" channels.

East Germany's Third World Problems

The brief history of East Germany's relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is characterized by failures as well as successes. The failures largely involve the futile efforts undertaken by the Ulbricht regime to achieve diplomatic recognition from the nonaligned camp. The most notable aspect of that campaign was the hesitance of those countries to accord diplomatic recognition to the GDR. Undoubtedly, a number of those countries were concerned that if they did so, Bonn would promptly break diplomatic relations with them and in the bargain terminate its generous program of economic assistance. Even now, there is little doubt in the minds of Third World leaders that the Federal Republic constitutes a significantly more important economic factor in their development than does the GDR.

On the other hand, it would be incorrect to maintain that East Germany's strained ties with countries such as Egypt or Somalia have much to do with the comportment of the GDR. One of the major disadvantages which a surrogate must assume is that the actions of its patron will largely influence its own fortunes as well. There is limited documentary evidence that the East Germans have attempted to avoid those dangers. Notably there is the effort undertaken by Honecker during one of his African forays to convince Robert Mugabe that he should abandon the Chinese and come over to the Soviet side. Open-source literature does not provide information as to whether Honecker was specifically authorized by the Soviets to make this overture to Mugabe. However, it is hardly possible to assume that the East Germans would have asked the future leader of Zimbabwe to change sides without Soviet concurrence.[20]

A more critical problem which faces the GDR, as it does the Soviet Union, is the tricky question posed by the Third World demand for a "New International Economic Order." This is a subject which has been enthusiastically exploited by the East Germans, especially in the conduct of their propaganda campaigns against the "neo-colonial" designs of the Federal Republic of Germany. But the extremely modest foreign assistance program of the GDR has also opened it up to criticism by

various Third World countries who have accused East Germany of making promises that it could not (or would not) subsequently fulfill. The most notable example of that vulnerability was President Bokassa's decision to break diplomatic relations between his Central African Empire and the GDR in 1971. Bokassa's reason for that action was that the East Germans had not made good on their previous foreign assistance promises.

But the German Democratic Republic has two additional problems, which are in fact interrelated. In the first place, the GDR is considered to be an affluent country, and the Third World knows this. In the second place, the East Germans are probably aware that even if they were inclined to be more generous in their foreign assistance policies, one major disincentive for them is the insistent Israeli demand that the GDR pay indemnification for the depredations of the Third Reich. There are major differences between the LDCs' demand for indemnification for the "plundering" which the colonial powers allegedly subjected them to, and, on the other hand, the Israeli contention that the GDR, as an internationally recognized German state, must also pay its share for the suffering imposed upon the Jewish people. Since the end of World War II, the East Germans have paid in excess of $14 billion to the Soviet Union alone. As East German writers see it, in any event, the East Germans and the LDCs are "objectively" on the same side of the issue in so far as their joint opposition to capitalist exploitation is concerned. In some instances, however, it is asserted that Third World countries seem incapable of distinguishing "between socialism and imperialism and as a result end up making unjustified demands on the socialist states."[22] Or as Honecker charged during an international conference of Third World groups, held in East Berlin (the GDR's capital) in October 1980:

> ...(P)oliticians in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany... miss no opportunity to boast of their so-called development aid. However, they prefer to maintain a discreet silence over the rising profits taken out of these countries. After all, between 50 and 100 billion dollars in profits are squeezed out of these countries each year. This far exceeds the total volume of government-owned and private capital invested in these countries.[23]

For the foreseeable future there is no evidence to suggest that the Third World is about to hold a referendum on whether the Soviet-bloc is doing all that it can to advance their economic development. The next several chapters examine what the GDR is specifically doing to make the Soviet Union's influence felt in that diverse region in a major way.

Footnotes

1. Consult the following sources on GDR Africa policy: Henning von Löwis, "Das politische und militärische Engagement der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic in Schwarzafrika," in *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung* (January 1978), pp. 5-54; Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Corps," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1980), pp. 21-37; George A. Glass, "East Germany in Black Africa," *The World Today* (August 1980), pp. 305-312; Michael Sodaro, "The GDR And The Third World," in Michael Radu, *Eastern Europe & The Third World* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1981), pp. 106-141; Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, "East German Security Policies in Africa," in *ibid.*, pp. 142-168.
2. Press Release, GDR Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Foreign Policy Report, May 1981), p. 6.
3. Samuel T. Francis, *The Soviet Strategy of Terror* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981), p. 5.
4. There is no published information specifically devoted to the organization of East German-Cuban policy in Africa. A brief summary is provided by William F. Robinson, "Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Washington, D.C.: RFE, June 21, 1979), p. 9.
5. Norman M. Naimark, "Is It True What They're Saying About East Germany?," *Orbis* (Fall 1979), p. 556.
6. David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy—The USSR And Africa," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1978), p. 22.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
9. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
10. Rogert E. Kanet and Boris Ipatov, "Soviet Aid And Trade in Africa," in Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henniksen (eds.), *Soviet and Chinese Aid To Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 7.
11. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1980), p. 12.
12. Hans Siegfried Lamm and Siegfried Kupper, *DDR und Dritte Welt* (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1976), pp. 48-63. This section describes the GDR's approach to the Third World *vis-à-vis* the "recognition" issue.
13. Sodaro, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
14. *Ibid.*
15. That Arab countries are suspicious, and frequently hostile, in no way means that they are not prepared to deal with Communist countries. Consult Kurt Seliger, "Solidarität und Staatsraison: Am Beispiel der Beziehungen DDR-Irak," *Deutschland Archiv* (November 1979) pp. 1185-1192.

16. Consult Kurt Krüger, "Solidarität der DDR mit den Völkern Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas," *Deutsche Aussenpolitik* (October 1979), pp. 52–64.
17. Peter Ludz (ed.), *DDR Handbuch* (Cologne: Science and Politics, 1979, 2nd edition), p. 101.
18. Sodaro, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
19. Press Release, GDR Embassy (Foreign Policy Report, May 1981), p. 6.
20. Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record* (New York and London: Holmes And Meier, 1980), p. A19.
21. For a discussion of the Israeli demand on the GDR, and the GDR's response, see, Peter Dittmar, "DDR und Israel (I)," *Deutschland Archiv* (July 1977), pp. 751–754.
22. Friedel Trappen and Ulrich Weishaupt, "Aktuelle Fragen des Kampfes um nationale und soziale Befreiung im subsaharischen Afrika," *Deutsche Aussenpolitik* (February 1979), p. 34.
23. From Erich Honecker's Opening Address, contained in *The joint struggle of the working-class movement and the national liberation movement against imperialism and for social progress* (Dresden: Time in Pictures, 1981), p. 16. (German title for publication house: Verlag Zeit im Bild.)

2

The German Democratic Republic in Africa

Since the mid-1970s, East Germany has earned the reputation of being the "pace setter" in the establishment of a Soviet-bloc presence in Africa. Over this short period, seven of the thirteen members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Politburo have visited that continent. These activities do not include the thousands of trips taken by mid-and low-level members of East Germany's Party and governmental apparatus to that continent. Nor do such actions include the special brand of GDR African diplomacy which was the trade mark of Werner Lamberz, who was until his death in a helicopter crash in Libya three years ago the foremost political expert on Africa in East Germany.[1]

There has also been a reverse flow of African government and guerrilla leaders who have travelled to the GDR in growing numbers as of late. That list prominently includes Samora Machel of Mozambique, the late Agostinho Neto of Angola, and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia. Together with Congo Brazzaville (plus South Yemen), these are the countries which have enjoyed the vast bulk of East Germany's attention over the past few years. And the GDR has also been an important place to visit for the two most prominent figures of the African guerrilla movement today: Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, and Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress (ANC). Until it achieved independence in 1980, East Germany was also a major point of destination for Joshua Nkomo, co-leader of the Patriotic Front—and Moscow's candidate to take power in that country.

Erich Honecker's two trips to Africa in 1979 clearly represented the high point of East German involvement on that continent. During his first trip in February, Honecker visited Libya, Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia. The yield from his visit with Colonel Qadhafi was reported to be meager. But the East German Party chief made up for that in his negotiations with the Neto and Machel regimes. On this occasion, Honecker entered into two "Treaties of Friendship And Cooperation," both of which are designed to increase the pace of political, economic, and military collaboration between the GDR and two of its most prized Marxist clients.

Honecker also went to Zambia where he reportedly attempted to improve East Germany's previously tense relations with Kenneth Kaunda. Kaunda had closed the East German Trade mission in Lusaka in 1971 in retaliation for East German covert activities against his country.[1] The other purpose of Honecker's visit to Zambia may have been of higher priority for the SED chief, however. For it was also on this occasion that Honecker reportedly met for an hour with Joshua Nkomo. Honecker subsequently announced that East Germany would donate about $2 million worth of "Solidarity Goods" to support the armed insurrection in Rhodesia. Nkomo thanked his German patron and then praised the GDR for its contribution to the guerrilla forces.[2]

In November 1979, Honecker journeyed to Ethiopia where he signed another Friendship Treaty with the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The high point of his visit to Addis Ababa, however, was the dedication of the first Karl Marx monument on the African continent.[3]

The East German version of "shuttle diplomacy" however was undoubtedly the three-trip sequence which Werner Lamberz made to Africa in 1977. Lamberz was then a full member of the Politburo and Secretary of the SED's Central Committee. This second post enjoys considerable status and prestige through the Soviet bloc, largely because it involves duties which require a high degree of security and diplomatic training. These were the skills which Lamberz put to intensive use in his African trips of February, June, and December of 1977. During his February trip, Lamberz attended the Third Frelimo Congress in Maputo (the capital of Mozambique). During his time there he met with *both* Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, as well as with Oliver Tambo and Sam Nujoma. The June 1977 trip to Africa took Lamberz to South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, and Zambia. While in Ethiopia, the East German Party leader visited training camps of the "People's Militia" whose administrators were reportedly being schooled by East German security specialists. Lamberz's final journey took him to South Yemen, once again, and to Ethiopia and Libya.

Contacts between the East Germans and Qadhafi had been dormant until a meeting was arranged in Tripoli (the Libyan capital) in October 1977 with Hermann Axen, another member of the SED Politburo. Lamberz's subsequent December visit with the Libyan leader was supposedly designed to lay the foundation for more active and collaborative relations between the two governments. But the respective parties apparently were unable to get beyond a vaguely-worded agreement which spelled-out those steps which would need to be taken in order to establish a closer partnership. While specific details on these negotiations are not available, the fact that Lamberz once again travelled to Libya in March 1978 (a trip from which he never returned) suggests that the East Germans may have been attempting to negotiate a long-

term oil contract with the Libyans. And there is some circumstantial evidence to suggest that Lamberz might have opened the way for East German assistance in the training of Libyan commandos. It is reported in this vein that there are now about 400 East German military advisers in Libya and some of them undoubtedly carry out those responsibilities.[4]

Added to these various travels of high-ranking East German political leaders is the militant role which the GDR takes in the promotion of the guerrilla movement throughout the African continent. The PLO, the ANC, SWAPO, and until March of 1980 the Patriotic Front, all have official standing in East Berlin.[5] As George Glass writes, "East Germany was the only European Communist country where all these...movements were represented with missions enjoying a semi-diplomatic status, and their organizations received approximately 30 million marks in GDR assistance in 1978 alone. The GDR was also the first East European country to take up relations at a party level with Frelimo and the MPLA...."[6]

In other words, the GDR has taken significant initiatives to establish extraordinarily close (if not intimate) ties with both the revolutionary states and movements of Africa. This, in turn, means two basic things. It means that the Soviet Union must accord special value to the East German contribution to its foreign policy toward Africa. And it also means that the East Germans have an aptitude for those specific tasks which the Soviet Union requires the GDR to perform as a surrogate. What are those tasks?

The East German purpose in Africa is to help establish Marxist regimes in countries where the conditions allow for that to occur. Once these regimes have been established, the GDR's responsibility is then to ensure their survival. Responsibilities of this kind require a variety of assets, all of which the GDR possesses in abundance. Those assets include a high level of administrative competence, a sophisticated knowledge of the military and security sciences, and a core of mid-level functionaries who are dedicated to the spread of Marxism in Africa.

One specific East German responsibility, which utilizes this skill mix to the greatest possible extent, and is of fundamental importance in the Soviet Union's effort to bring Marxism to Africa, is the provision of military and security assistance. It will be the focus of attention here. The first part of this discussion focuses on the GDR's activities in Black Africa, while the second part devotes attention to East German military and security assistance to the PLO.

Military and Security Assistance to Black Africa

East Germany's military tradition, its unmatched loyalty to the Soviet Union, and the military instability of its African clients are the

major factors which explain the GDR's military and security role in Black Africa today. As one analyst describes the overall role of the GDR in this area:

> *The GDR* sends highly skilled military cadres (9,000 soldiers and advisers in Africa and in the Near East) and specialists in other areas generally connected with the military (doctors, engineers). It runs three training camps for Palestinian commandos in South Yemen and trains security forces in Angola, Mozambique, Benin, and South Yemen. Further, it trains administrative, political, and journalist cadres. Since 1963 the GDR Solidarity School has graduated over 400 Third World journalists. Many leaders of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement (Rhodesia), the PLO, Namibia, Guinea Bissau, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Angola, the Cape Verde Islands, and St. Thomas and Prince's Island have studied in the GDR. In 1977 the so-called solidarity fund was granted over 200,000,000 marks. The overall sphere of contacts with developing countries is supervised by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Alex Schalk. An East German military delegation lead by Minister of Defense H. Hoffmann was in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Congo-Brazzaville at the end of April and beginning of May 1978. It is obvious that Hoffmann represented more than GDR interests alone since, at the same moment, a session of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact was taking place in Budapest, each country represented by its minister of defense. The absence of the East German minister clearly showed where the priorities of the whole group lay.[7]

East Germany hardly operates alone. While the Soviet Union is responsible for the supply of heavy equipment and the provision for the higher ranking military and political officers, Cuba supplies the ground troops. The GDR's presence throughout Africa (Black Africa and the Middle East) is, in comparison with the efforts exerted by its Communist counterparts, a relatively modest one. Estimates of East German military forces (advisers plus troops) never go beyond 10,000. In a comprehensive report on East German military and security assistance to its Marxist and non-Marxist clients on the continent, *Spiegel* magazine calculated (as of early 1980) that there were: 250 military advisers in Algeria; 400 in Libya; 300 in Ethiopia; 20 in the People's Republic of the Congo; 600 troops and advisers in Mozambique; 1000 troops and advisers in Angola; 150 advisers in Zambia. This comes to a total of 2720.[8] The West German journalist, and expert on East German military-security policy, Joachim Nawrocki has further maintained that there were some 950 East German military advisers in Iraq in the late 1970s.[9]

While their numbers are small, the GDR has played an important role in the spread of Soviet-style Marxism in Africa. And in other instances, such as with the cases of the Libyan regime of Colonel Qadhafi or with the PLO, East German assistance clearly contributes to

the maintenance of Soviet influence over the course of developments in the Middle East. Before examining specific instances of East German military and security assistance, it would be well to highlight the general dimensions of that role.

One of the more pertinent aspects of East German military and security policy in Black Africa and in the Middle East is the denial by its leaders that it is even involved in these activities. Speaking to a recent meeting of Third World representatives held in East Berlin, Erich Honecker asserted that the support provided by the Warsaw Pact to the "National liberation movements" had "nothing in common with the export of revolution."[10] But in the same breath, the SED chief then asserted that the Soviet Union and its satellites would of course "take a determined stand against any export of counter-revolution."[11] This is a self-serving, if ideologically defensible, position on the part of the Soviet bloc as a whole, and it certainly serves East German foreign policy interests. The GDR has consistently maintained that it is a bastion of order in Eastern Europe and a militant advocate of a "socialist peace policy" throughout the world. In practice, nevertheless, what the GDR has ended up doing is to support the use of the Brezhnev Doctrine, originally employed against "counter-revolutionary" Czechoslovakia in 1968, to justify its limited military and security support of various client states in Africa and in the Middle East.

Another major consideration associated with East German military and security policy is its two-fold nature. On the one hand, East German analysts are now convinced that many of the so-called Marxist states of Africa are politically, as well as economically, under-developed. It is the responsibility of the Soviet bloc, but particularly so for the GDR, to help these weak allies "secure their power" (Die weitere festigung der Macht). This is a task which East German military and security organs are uniquely positioned to do. On the other hand, once Marxist political power (with the exception of South Yemen; this is an issue which only drives GDR activities in Black Africa) has been "secured," there is the ongoing need for a secure political apparatus. As the GDR leadership sees it, revolutionary gains must be defended from "subversion," of an external and internal nature.

Added to these major points is the Soviet, as well as the East German, view that the clients of the Soviet bloc must be gradually introduced to a new "world system" in which socialist order will replace the capitalist one. This is not a mere theoretical issue in the Soviet and East German view. For after numerous previous disappointments, notably in Egypt and Somalia, Soviet bloc theorists are soberly aware that their hold on new allies can be a tenuous one at best. The GDR's larger political role, therefore, is to ensure that the economic and governmental apparatus of its various clients is infused with a Marxist dynamic from top to bottom. Along with that concern is the East German enthu-

siasm for educating political cadres who will be able to spread the Marxist doctrine throughout the elite and the mass population.

In practical terms, Western analysts have calculated that between 1955 and the end of 1977, the Eastern European bloc countries exported about $2.1 billion worth of arms to the LDCs as a whole. Approximately $1 billion worth of these were sent to that diverse region between 1973 and 1977.[11] *Vis-à-vis* the GDR's exports to its African clients (this includes the Middle East as well), The Research Institute for Political Science of the University of Cologne "estimated in 1978 that the GDR was spending 200 m. Marks (111 m. US dollars) per year on weapons and military equipment to be sent to Africa... and that an additional 300 m. Marks (167 m. US dollars) was allotted each year for non-military 'solidarity goods'."[12] It is also possible, however, that some East German military supplies are sent to Czechoslovakia, and from there to an African recipient country. This is not simply a hypothetical point. Data compiled by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1977 indicate that the GDR shipped about $190 million worth of military material to the Czechs.[13] (Prague has been the traditional funnel for Soviet-bloc arms to Third World countries.) The ACDA data do not show that any arms shipments went directly from the GDR to Third World recipients, but the Czechs are reported to have sent $330 million worth of arms to what are called unspecified recipients—which one can infer are LDCs. All East German arms shipments may in fact be going through Czechoslovakia, in which case they might be shipping as much as 600 million Marks to their African clients. Or, alternatively, the arms shipments of the GDR which are directed toward Africa are not being picked up in the ACDA report, in which event the West German figure may be more accurate.

In the event that the 200 million mark figure is an accurate approximation of East German military expenditures, it hardly tells the whole story. For in fact, the GDR is now a pivotal influence in the military and security picture in Africa. Following is a case-by-case overview of the major East German activities in this arena.

Angola

East Germany's involvement with the MPLA regime goes back to 1961 when the official foreign policy journal of the SED—*German Foreign Policy*—published the MPLA's statutes. Relations between the Honecker regime and the MPLA since that time—under Agostinho Neto and Jose Eduardo dos Santos—have been intimate. Prior to the departure of the Portuguese from Angola in the early 1970s, the East Germans supplied the insurgent movement with military equipment. During the civil war of 1975–1976, waged between the MPLA and the anti-communist forces of the UNITA and FNLA, East German mili-

tary assistance is said to have been decisive. It was during this period of revolutionary turmoil that more than 700 East German military advisers, who were working closely with Cuban and MPLA forces on the ground, apparently were successful in saving Neto from military defeat. As Henning von Löwis, a West German expert on East German military policy in Portuguese Africa, puts it:

> With three ships laden with war material, including heavy weapons, East Berlin played a crucial role in saving the hard-pressed forces of the MPLA from certain defeat. When Agostinho Neto announced the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975 Neto's troops were only in control of the capital of Luanda. It took the combined efforts of Soviet generals, Cuban soldiers, and East German military advisers to provide the MPLA leader with a secure position of power.[14]

In the aftermath of his victory over UNITA and the FNLA, Neto drew closer to the GDR. On February 20, 1979, the highpoint of East German-Angolan relations was undoubtedly reached when the two Parties (the SED and the MPLA) signed a twenty-year treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This event took place during Honecker's first African journey of that year. Analysts have since compared the content of that document with a similar one signed by Honecker less than one week later in Maputo, Mozambique, with Frelimo. And there are relevant points of difference, of which the most obvious is the inclusion of a bilateral military agreement in the Mozambique Treaty (Article 5), and the total absence of such a provision in the Angolan document.[15] Nevertheless, the practical aspects which surround East Germany's military and security relationship with Angola clearly include a large element of such assistance. The GDR's State Security Service (SSD) has been active in the training of Angola's new security service. And it is noteworthy that the Angolans formally established their own Ministry for Internal Affairs not long after Honecker's visit.

The East Germans have also been engaged in developing the "infrastructure" of the country. Both civilian and military advisers from the GDR have in this regard devoted particular attention to the modernization of that country's transportation and telecommunications system. According to an East German official source, East German maritime pilots had safely guided some 3,300 ships from nearly fifty countries into the Angolan ports of Luanda and Lobito by mid-1978.[16]

As with East German military and security assistance to other clients, so Angola also has access to the GDR's excellent facilities at home. Angolan paratroops, for example, have been able to practice with the crack GDR paratrooper battalion number 40. These joint exercises are reportedly being carried out on the North Sea island of Rügen.[17]

Ethiopia

The GDR has become Ethiopia's "defense patron" as one analyst puts it.[18] As in Angola and in Mozambique, the East German Security Service has trained its Ethiopian counterpart in domestic intelligence gathering and analysis. The SSD has even been responsible for ensuring the personal security of Mengistu Haile Mariam, that country's Marxist leader.[19] Somalian sources assert that the East Germans have provided the Mengistu regime with assistance in the telecommunications area, radar technology, and in the erection of military defense points throughout Ethiopia.[20]

East German military assistance to Ethiopia has included machine guns and panzers, and East German army officers have been active in the training of Mengistu's troops. In May 1979, bilateral military relations were formalized in an agreement entered into by the two governments. Like his Marxist counterparts in Angola and Mozambique, Mengistu Haile Mariam also signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the East Germans on November 15, 1979. This document calls for significant increases in bilateral cooperation in politics, economics, trade, science, culture, and technology. Special attention was given to the coordination of foreign policy positions, a concern entirely appropriate in light of the fact that the Treaty was signed by the two leaders in their capacities as Party spokesmen.

East Germany's interest in the "progress of the Ethiopian revolution," as SED leaders have been known to refer to it, dates back to the original military putsch which disposed of the traditional monarchy in Fall 1974. Nevertheless, the GDR took its time before it became fully engaged in that country. One of the obvious reasons why it seemed to hold back such support was its then close relat ship with Somalia. As things have since turned out, the East Germ s have been able to maintain a limited presence in Somalia, despite t fact that they, following the lead of the Soviet Union, changed sides during the Somali-Ethiopian war.

1977 was the crucial year for East Germany in its effort to forge a political alliance with the Mengistu regime. On three specific occasions during that year, SED Party leader Werner Lamberz travelled to that country (February, June, and December). Lamberz is credited with the responsibility for the coordination and direction of the military operations of the South Yemeni forces that fought in the Ogaden desert against the Somalis in late 1977. Additionally, East German troops may have actually been involved in direct combat in the Eritrean offensive in the spring of 1979. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) made a formal complaint to the Organization of African Unity in July 1979 to that effect.[21]

Mozambique

East Germany's political and economic presence in Mozambique is a formidable one according to Western observers. When Samora Machel held Frelimo's first independence day celebration on June 25, 1975, only one German state, the GDR, was invited. The East Germans have certainly made a significant effort to earn the trust of the Machel regime. According to one source, the GDR's military role in Africa actually began in 1969 with its support of Frelimo forces.

As of late 1980, East Germany had entered into more that fifty treaties, agreements, and partial understandings with Machel. East German military and security assistance to that country has prominently included provisions of supplies for the combat of domestic unrest mounted by the "National Resistance Movement of Mozambique." These supplies include anything from blankets and tents to infantry weapons, helicopters, and heavy vehicles. The GDR State Security Service has trained Mozambique's National Service for Popular Security, while also providing for the personal protection of Machel himself. Furthermore, the East Germans train that country's border troops and assist them in carrying out anti-guerrilla operations against the domestic insurgency movement.[22]

The integration of Mozambique into the Soviet-bloc is probably the most advanced of any African country.[23] Military ties with the GDR are specifically provided for in Clause 5 of its twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which Machel and Honecker signed on February 26, 1979. Of the three separate treaties of this nature entered into by the GDR with its African Marxist clients, only the one with Mozambique contains such a provision. In October 1979 and again in October of 1980, military delegations from Mozambique visited the GDR. On this second occasion, Defense Minister Chipande met with his East German counterpart Heinz Hoffmann, as well as with Erich Honecker. When Samora Machel visited the GDR in September 1980 he further cemented his close political and security relations with the East Germans by signing a new Party-to-Party (SED/Frelimo) cooperation agreement for the years 1981 and 1985.

The strategic location of East Germany's African clients is a major consideration in shaping the Soviet Union's larger strategy in the area. Frelimo has been a militant supporter of SWAPO's insurrection inside Namibia and was an earlier backer of the Patriotic Front. In both cases, East German military advisers are said to have assisted these movements from Mozambique's territory. East German officials make significant note of the fact that Mozambique's confrontation of South Africa and its location on the Indian ocean ("a sea which plays a special role in the strategic calculations of the United States" as one East

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German radio commentator has referred to it) are of major importance to the Soviet bloc as a whole.[24]

The military importance of Mozambique to the Soviet Union is especially pronounced *vis-à-vis* South Africa. In fact, roughly sixty percent of that country's hard currency earnings comes from trade with the Republic of South Africa. Nevertheless, Machel is a strong supporter of the outlawed African National Congress. During his visit to East Berlin, Machel asserted that his country would prevail in any military confrontation with Pretoria because "our state is a socialist state, and because proletarian internationalism is an integral part of our Marxist-Leninist worldview."[25]

Zaire

Two different instances of East German military and security support of insurgent movements in Africa also deserve mention. In the first place, there is substantial evidence that East Germany played a major role in the abortive second invasion of Shaba province in Zaire. The GDR actively assisted in the preparation, and partial execution, of that invasion by helping in the training of the so-called National Liberation Front of the Congo (FLNC) which launched its invasion of Zaire from Angolan territory. The respected British expert on Africa, Colin Legum, has specifically accused the GDR of having worked to engineer the destabilization of the Mobuto government by its support of that invasion which was launched in May of 1978.

Legum's account maintains that the East Germans were assigned this subversive responsibility by the Soviets, just prior to the convening of the SED's Ninth Party Congress in the spring of 1976. Specifically, the GDR was to be responsible for the provision of military equipment (Czech-produced personnel carriers and Soviet surface-to-air missiles, SAMS) to the FLNC. A military contingent under the leadership of Lieutenant General Helmut Poppe (an African expert and a close aide to General Heinz Hoffmann) was given the job of preparing the FLNC for the actual invasion. Based in Angola, the FLNC was to "create 45 pockets of continuing resistance inside Shaba itself [while]...[being] supplied from the three main support bases inside Angola."[26] Legum also maintains that the East German military contingent under Poppe's command was given strict orders not to enter Zaire itself. But "The East Germans reportedly aided the retreat of the defeated FLNC forces by providing tank cover from inside the Angolan border...."[27]

Prior to this abortive invasion effort, both the East German and the Soviet press had conducted a sharply worded campaign against the establishment of a rocket-research and launching operation in Shaba province. That project had been entered into by a small West German rocket firm (OTRAG) and the Zaire government. For what now ap-

pear to be purely propaganda reasons, the Soviets and East Germans decided to play up this bilateral agreement as a primary example of West German "neo-colonialism." In fact, the People's Republic of China had a strong interest in the success of the OTRAG project, since it would have provided the Chinese with an inexpensive rocket-launching capability which it needed for its own satellite program. The GDR and the Soviets accused the West German government of attempting to test Cruise missiles under the protective guise of the program. The charge was false from the outset, but the invasion forced OTRAG's director, Luts Kayser, to cancel the project.

East German official sources have subsequently charged the NATO countries with "military intervention in the internal affairs of Zaire, epitomized in the suppression of the Shaba province uprising."[28] Aside from the fact that the Shaba province "uprising" was in reality a Soviet-backed invasion of a sovereign country, the French troops which were sent into the province can hardly be considered members of NATO.

Zimbabwe

Both the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites have absorbed a major propaganda defeat in the aftermath of Robert Mugabe's rise to power in Zimbabwe. As of mid-1981, the Soviet Union is just beginning to set up its diplomatic quarters in Salisbury. The Eastern European countries have yet to embark upon even that modest task. Nevertheless, Soviet and East German support of the Patriotic Front threatened to make that country into another example of Soviet-bloc success in cultivating yet another Marxist client, or a potential one in either event.

Prior to the electoral victory of Robert Mugabe over Joshua Nkomo early in 1980, however, the East Germans were strongly supporting the Nkomo wing of the Patriotic Front. In a report carried in the *New York Times* (November 18, 1979), the East Germans were reported to have assisted "Mr. Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army with training in flying MIG interceptors, and operating tanks, heavy artillery, and ground-to-air missiles such as those which shot down two of Air Rhodesia's Viscount airlines."[29] The same report also says that East German military advisers had been spotted in Angola and in Zambia where they were advising a guerrilla deployment (presumably from Nkomo's army, or allied with it) en route into Zimbabwe.

As with the other African insurgent groups (ANC, PLO, and SWAPO), the East Germans have been the most assertive member of the Soviet-bloc in according diplomatic recognition to movements such as Nkomo's. He himself visited the GDR on various occasions in the 1970s. In 1976, the Patriotic Front set up its own bureau in East Berlin. When Honecker made his much-heralded African trip of Feb-

ruary 1979, as previously mentioned, Nkomo was able to spend an hour with the East German leader while Honecker was visiting with Kenneth Kaunda in Lusaka. Three months after the Nkomo-Honecker meeting, Heinz Hoffmann took a twenty-person military delegation to Zambia, Mozambique and Ethiopia. While in Zambia, it is reported that Hoffmann committed the GDR to "massive" military aid to the "Front line" states in Southern Africa and to the guerrillas which we in opposition to the Muzorewa government in Rhodesia. Hoffmann further asserted that East Germany would continue to provide such assistance "even after their enemies had been vanquished."[30]

At this juncture, future Soviet, East German, or perhaps even Cuban, military engagement in Zimbabwe seems remote. Mugabe is on good terms with Samora Machel of Mozambique, the country which would play a major part in the support of guerrilla operations against Zimbabwe, as it has in the past against Rhodesia. But as long as Nkomo has what one reporter calls "a potential guerrilla army in the bush," there is the possibility that the USSR will decide, again, that the East Germans should become engaged in that country.[31]

Total Number of East German Military Advisers and Troops as of Early 1980

Country	GDR military presence
Algeria	250
Angola	1000
Ethiopia	300
Libya	400
Mozambique	600
People's Republic of the Congo	20
Zambia	150
	2720

How Valuable is East German Military and Security Support?

Since reports on East German military adventures burst upon the scene several years ago, analysts have wondered about whether, in fact, the GDR can play a major role in determining those African conflicts. Certainly there is a strong case to be made that its support has been crucial. In the cases of Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, East German military assistance has probably made the difference between the defeat and survival of these Marxist regimes. At some point in the future, perhaps, the need for such a military assistance role on the part of the GDR may no longer be necessary. But for the moment, East German military and security advisers seem to make a crucial difference in that volatile region. As far as its support of movements such as the PLO goes, this may be another matter entirely. That organization receives more diversified forms of assistance than most of the GDR's African clients do. And, in any event, the Soviet Union's fortunes have not held up as well in the Middle East—on balance—as they have in Africa.

Footnotes

1. Consult, Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Das afrikanische Erbe von Werner Lamberz," *Deutschland Archiv* (April 1978), pp. 348–351.
2. See, William F. Robinson, "Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Washington, D.C.: RFE, June 21, 1979), p. 8.
3. Consult, Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Die DDR als Schrittmacher im weltrevolutionären Prozess," *Deutschland Archiv* (January 1980).
4. Bulgarian and East German instructors are reported to be training Libyan commandos in Libya. *The New York Times,* May 27, 1981.
5. This writer notes that the PLO was listed as an Embassy in the 1979 East Berlin telephone book.
6. George A. Glass, "East Germany in Black Africa," *The World Today* (August 1980), pp. 306–307.
7. Quoted from Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
8. The 10,000 figure is the high side of an estimation made by *New York Times* reporter John Burns. 2720 comes from *Spiegel* (No. 10, 1980), p. 43.
9. Taken from Kurt Seliger, "Solidarität und Staatsraison," *Deutschland Archiv* (November 1979), p. 1188.
10. Honecker, Opening Address, contained in *The joint struggle of the working-class movement and the national liberation movement against imperialism and for social progress* (Dresden: Time in Pictures, 1981), p. 19.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Figure originally taken from Joachim Nawrocki, "Hoffmanns 'Afrikakorps,' " *Die Zeit* (May 26, 1978).
13. *World Military Expenditures And Arms Transfers* (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, October 1979).
14. Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Das politische und militärische Engagement der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic in Schwarzafrika," *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung* (January 1978), p. 40.
15. For provisions of the two treaties, consult *Deutschland Archiv,* DOKUMENTATION (April 1979), pp., 425–439.
16. ADN News Service (East Berlin, June 3, 1978).
17. "Wir haben euch Waffen und Brot geschickt," *Spiegel* (No. 10, 1980), p. 44.
18. Taken from Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Das afrikanische Erbe von Werner Lamberz," p. 349.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Taken from Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, "East German Security Pol-

icies in Africa," in Michael Radu, *Eastern Europe And The Third World* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1981), p. 155.

22. Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Machtpolitik südlich des Sambesi," *Deutschland Archiv* (November 1980), p. 1170.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 1161; Mozambique has applied for membership in COMECON.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 1171.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 1168.
26. Valenta and Butler in Radu, *op. cit.*, pp., 153–154.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
28. *Jahrbuch Asien Afrika Lateinamerika* (1978) (East Berlin: German Science Publishers, 1979), p. 201. (Publisher in German reads, Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.)
29. John Burns, "East German Afrika Korps," *The New York Times* (November 18, 1979).
30. Taken from Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
31. Martin McCauley, "East German on Safari," *Soviet Analyst*, September 10, 1980, p. 4.

EXHIBIT G


NAMIBIA
THE STRUGGLE
FOR
FINAL LIBERATION
1
POLITICAL MANUAL OF
THE NAMIBIAN INSTITUTE
OF REVOLUTIONARY STUDIES

petulus Shikuko ~~Issa~~ Omawa
Kondya

BOOK 1

NECESSARY INTRODUCTION

The pages in this booklet deal mainly with the historical and ideological aspects of the Namibian liberation struggle. The ideas outlined here are based on the principles underlying the struggle for both unification and strengthening the orientation of SWAPO militants in order to rally them under the banner of SWAPO, the vanguard movement of our revolution.

The material is prepared for THE NAMIBIAM INSTITUTE FOR REVOLUTIONARY STUDIES (NIRS) under the SWAPO Central Committee. The manual is based on the summary of the five lectures delivered between October and December, 1976. The work is divided into five lectures namely:

1. Namibia: The history of colonialist aggression
2. Revolutionary conditions and People's Armed Insurrection
3. Counter-revolutionaries in the Namibian liberation movement
4. The struggle for the final Liberation of Namibia
5. The question of world-wide change and transition from capitalism to socialism.

The first paper deals mostly with the early history of Namibia, and the first encounter with the colonial settlers. It has also dealt with the question of an organized resistance under the banner of SWAPO. Problems of the readiness of the popular armed insurrection is discussed in the second lecture, which bases the whole analysis on the Leninist principles of armed insurrection.

The counter-revolutionary situation which our movement has to undergo has been discussed in the third lecture, and here too, the Leninist principles as regard to the attitudes of a political movement towards its shortcomings was applied.

Our attitude towards the crisis of a neo-colonialist solution at the TURNHALLE tribal racial conference is dealt with in the fourth lecture. Here, once again, an exposé of the imperialist manoeuvres is made to the cadres.

Finally, light is thrown on the question of transition from capitalism to socialism. This led us to the question of why is it necessary for every revolution to go towards socialism and why SWAPO is today part and parcel of the world revolutionary movement.

The ideas of socialist orientation, as stated in the revised Political Programme of SWAPO, has become our way of life, and we have now to grasp this great truth, that the first step in the revolution currently waged by the Namibian proletariat and the working peasants is to raise the two friendly classes in our society to the position of the ruling class which, at

the same time is the first step to winning the battle of a people's democracy.

Only in this way, shall we Namibian participants in the current liberation struggle (which we are waging on behalf of the general masses of all our people) be able to use the political supremacy of people's power to wrest state power from the colonial bourgeoisie, for the purpose of centralizing all the means of production and distribution in the hands of the new state, a state which will be constituted by the alliance of the worker and peasant masses.

NAMIBIA :
THE HISTORY OF COLONIALIST AGGRESSION

As early as the 15th Century, European colonialist conquerors passed along Namibia's coast. Some adventurers stepped ashore and planted crosses in the hope of colonising this part of Africa — like the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão in 1548 at OKAKOVERO (Angra Pequena-Luderitz Bucht). But our coast was backed by a strip of desert 1,000 miles long, making foreign penetration of Namibia more difficult, with the result that Namibia was one of the few African territories to have been colonised only recently.

After the notorious Berlin Conference of European powers (1884/5), Namibia became a German colony. Contacts between the Namibian people and Europeans had begun in the 1870's. The first contact was with Christian missionaries who meant to establish «Christian communities» and to settle in Namibia to «pacify» the people whom they called «savage» and «pagan». Before the coming of the colonialists, Namibia was a region of Royal states, organised into highly developed forms of statehood. These Kingdoms lived peacefully with one another,

receiving foreign visitors for trade or courtesy calls to the royal courts.

When Namibia was declared a German «protectorate» in 1884, the Germans tricked some African Kings into signing so-called «protectorate» agreements. Others refused to sign because they did not know against whom and why they had to be protected. They were confident in the sovereign independence of their people and Kingdoms. Even so, signing of the «agreements of protection» by some ruling monarches of the time did not bring total surrender of their peoples to foreign rule. Many revolts against colonial rule took place in Namibia. On the struggle of the Namibian people against colonialist aggression, the following chronology speaks for itself:

1893: The Witbooi section of the Nama people waged war against German colonial troops.

1896: The Khaua people rebelled against German rule in Namibia. Andries Lambart, leader of the Khaua, was executed by the Germans.

1896: Khaua and Bondelswarts revolted against the German invaders. Their leaders, Nikodemus and Kahimema were executed by the Germans.

1897: Swartboois revolted against the Germans.

1903: A war of resistance broke out between the Bondelswarts section of the Namibian people and the German invaders.

1904-7: War of resistance broke out against the German invaders waged by Herero and Nama sections of the Namibian people.

1917: The Boers and Portuguese waged a war against the African people in Northern Namibia and Southern Angola. Their leader Mandume was executed.

1922: The South African fascist authorities which came to power in Namibia at the end of World War II waged a savage war using bombs against the Bondelswart section of the Namibian people.

1932: The Boers waged a war against King Ipumbu in Northern Namibia. He was banished and died in exile in 1960 somewhere in the forests of Northern Namibia.

1959: Barbaric massacre of the African people in Windhoek Old African Location by the South African colonial authorities.

1966: War of independence waged under the banner of SWAPO.

Namibia's history explains to the world that the Namibian people have never accepted colonial domination, and that they have been and, as we shall later see, still are fighting for their total emancipation from colonial domination and injustice.

When German imperialism was defeated in World War II, Namibia was handed to the South African government to be administered as a mandate

by the Union of South Africa, on behalf of «His Britannic Majesty». That was the decision of the victorious powers at one of the gatherings of the newly formed League of Nations. The South African government was required to submit regular reports to the Mandate Commissions on the situation in Namibia. This it did up to 1946. From that time onwards, South African governments refused to give reports on Namibia, claiming that the United Nations Organization was not the successor to the League of Nations, and that the mandate had become defunct along with the League of Nations.

While the country's international status was changing from that of a German «colony» to a «Mandate» of the «League of Nations», under South Africa, the situation inside Namibia did not change in any way. It was only a change of old masters for new ones, and Africans continued to labour for the well-being of white settlers. Economic exploitation continued uninterrupted and Africans lost much of their land to the great wave of new European settlers.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE

The delay in the reorganization of our early liberation struggle was due to the following factors:

a) There was no national unity of all kingdoms; each kingdom was fighting to maintain its own independence and was unaware of the need to form a united front with the other kingdoms against the foreign invaders.

b) Weapons used by the earlier liberators were primitive compared to the sophisticated arms used by the Europeans.

c) There was no international solidarity support for the cause of Namibia's liberation from colonial slavery. Imperialism dominated the whole world.

As in most colonized countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the National Liberation movement developed rapidly after the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, which changed the balance of forces in the world. For the first time in mankind's history, imperialism was challenged as a system, and its appendage colonialism was declared criminal by the socialist system which expresses its international solidarity and fraternity with the colonized peoples.

Since World War II, the Namibian National Liberation Movement has greatly developed and has changed its tactics e. g. from defence of the kingdoms to the general unified front of all the African people in the country. This unified front began with the movement of Namibian workers in the Luderitz Bay fishing industries in 1946.

The young Namibian proletariat formed local unions to fight for better wages, better working conditions and political freedom. That changed the whole course of events in the country, because for the first time in Namibia, the colonial distribution of wealth, achieved through the labour of the working people, was qustioned. That was the start of a new kind of struggle, a struggle for both territorial and economic liberation.

The workers movement, which is the leading movement of our struggle, came about as a result of the introduction of commerce and industry to our country. And the working class, which is the product of this economic development is following the general rule of the worldwide revolt by productive forces against capital, against property relations which are the conditions for the existence of the colonial system of monopoly capitalism.

THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The crisis building up in our country since the start of colonization was studied by young Namibians, who want to abolish colonialism as a system in Namibia and create a new nation based on the union of all tribal and ethnic groups in Namibia.

1959 is a remarkable year in our history. It is remarkable because it brought a deep feeling of unity among the entire Namibian people, following the massacre of the African people of the Old Location in Windhoek on December 10th, 1959.

The South West Africa People's Organization came into being on April 19th 1960 as a result of long and serious discussions between leaders of various social organizations of the Namibian people. Sam Nujoma, was elected President of SWAPO, and has ever since lead the Organization against the South African colonial regime. Other Organizations and political currents also appeared in 1959 and 1960 in the form of SWANU, NUDO UNIPP SWANIO and SWANUF etc. But due to a lack of roots among working and peasant masses and due to disorgani-

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zation and lack of proper political militancy or political programmes, these so-called organizations disappeared fom the scene.

POLITICAL PROGRAMME OF SWAPO: BASIC AIMS

a) The basic aims of the South West Africa People's Organization, SWAPO of Namibia are to establish a free, democratic government in Namibia founded upon the will and participation of all the people in our country and to co-operate to the fullest extent with all national liberation movements in Africa and progressive forces throughout the world to rid our continent of all forms of foreign domination and to rebuild it according to the desires of our people.

b) The unification of the people of Namibia into a cohesive representative national political organization, irrespective of race, ethnic origin or religion.

c) Reconstruction of the economic, educational, and social foundations which will support and maintain the true Namibian independence our people desire for themselves.

On economic development, SWAPO has pledged to develop the country on the basis of an independent national economy. There shall be nationalization and socialization of the means of production and distribution so as to eliminate the consequences of the colonialist system of exploitation of man by man.

SWAPO will strive for land reform, confiscation of the land of absentee landlords, and of those colonial settlers who use convict labour, or parasites who allow the land to lie idle while the peasant masses have no land to till. The system by which land shall be adminstered is a form of people's co-operative system based on equality and benefits to all members.

SWAPO has also promised in its programme to improve health, develop culture and eliminate illiteracy. It will strive for free education of all school age children.

SWAPO'S APPROACH TO ARMED STRUGGLE

SWAPO's policy on the question was based on the principle of peaceful solution. At its first Congress, held in Windhoek in 1962, the Organization analysed the situation in all its complexity and came to the conclusion that the South African government which refuses to talk to the African people and negotiate with them the future of Namibia will never leave Namibia of its own accord. It will only do so with the violent overthrow of the apartheid system, which itself is employing violence against the people. The First Congress thus decided that a section of cadres be sent abroad for military training so as to come back and create the national liberation army.

SWAPO POLICY AND THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE

SWAPO policy has been accepted by a large part of the Namibian people. Since its formation up to the time of launching of armed struggle on Au-

gust 26th 1966, many young and middle aged people enlisted in the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF NAMIBIA

The People's Liberation Army of Namibia is an organised political instrument of SWAPO. The Organization has built it, educated it and in return PLAN cadres act as a major factor and motive force in the decolonization process of our country.

When the International Court of Justice made its misjudgment on Namibia on July 18th 1966, it was clear to every Namibian that the only way left to us is to act, and to act within our country means to combine political actions with military operations. We are today using guerrilla warfare as our main force of expression towards South African fascist and racist colonial rule in Namibia.

Since 1966, PLAN cadres have been attacking and harassing enemy troops in the Caprivi Strip, Okavango, Ovamboland, Kaokoveld and now in the Grootfontein district. Ambushes, mining of roads and demolition of bridges are the best tactics which a country like Namibia can use to make the enemy feel the pinch, and feel the people's rejection of the inhuman system of colonialism.

On the labour front, the Namibian proletariat is waging a heroic struggle, a struggle which gives strength to the beginning of armed struggle in Namibia. Prominent Namibian leaders of SWAPO are today in Robben Island prision in South Africa. Her-

mann Ya Toivo and 37 of his comrades are serving long term jail sentences on that Island, together with South African leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu.

Included amongst them are youth leaders such as Jerry Ekandjo, Ezriel Taapopi and many other beloved sons and daughters of Namibia. This is the situation in Namibia, a country which should by now have been free like other former League of Nations mandated territories such as Tanganyika, Cameroon and Togo.

ARMED STRUGGLE: AN HISTORICAL NECESSITY

The historical mission of SWAPO and its affiliated mass organizations, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the SWAPO Youth League, the SWAPO Women's Council, the Association of Democratic Lawyers of Namibia, SWAPO Branch of Journalists, the SWAPO Elders Council etc, is to liberate the Namibian people from the imperialist colonial system.

The means by which we can liberate the Namibian people is armed struggle. Armed struggle has been accepted by SWAPO as necessary: this was a logical conclusion drawn from the experience suffered by the Namibian people at the hands of the South African racists who do not want to allow the Namibian people their right to freedom and national independence. SWAPO is carrying out this historical mission in accordance with the historic law of opposing violence with violence and imperialist war with revolutionary war.

Ever since the appearance of states and nations, the questions of national oppression and national enslavement have arisen. And national liberation struggles have consequently taken place in various countries of the world.

Colonizers and colonized, oppressors and oppressed, aggressors and victims of aggression have waged uninterrupted struggle under different forms, of which armed struggle is the highest form of resistance to oppression, domination and aggression. In modern times, over 10,000 * wars of resistance are estimated to have occurred during the past 5,000 * years. Eleven of these wars were fought in Namibia since 1893 against German colonizers and South African racist oppressors.

At the present time, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, SWAPO's armed instrument for waging a war of national liberation of the Namibian people, came into being as a result of the continuous rule of violence imposed on our people by the colonial oppressors. PLAN unites thousands of the sons and daughters of the Namibian people in its ranks, to defend the people from South African colonialism. Our people's army joins hands with similar armies in Africa especially those in colonized countries such as Zimbawe, and in South Africa where they are waging a similar war of liberation from the European colonial yoke. In the struggle for the liberation of Africa, our people and our people's armies are sure to win victory over imperialism.

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* General Vo Nguyen Giap: To Arm the Revolutionary Masses to Build the People's Army p. 13

THE CONDITIONS TO ENSURE OUR VICTORY

The conditions guaranteeing our victory are: —

a) The unity of our oppressed masses based on the alliance of all indigenous class stratas of our people, who are victims of colonial aggression.

b) The assistance and support of independent African national states and the world's socialist community of nations.

As regards the fighting spirit of our people, SWAPO fighters have mastered the usage of modern arms, war techniques, and have inherited and developed the experience of the people's wars fought by our ancestors. We are also inspired by the examples of the heroic fighters of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola who have proved that in the 20th Century, colonialism can be defeated through armed struggle in Africa.

SWAPO of Namibia and our entire people will continue to wage a relentless armed struggle to liberate our country. Our immediate task is to increase our armed forces and improve their quality and

fighting capacity in order to confront the enemy with a bigger and better trained modern army, for the victory of the revolution depends on the participation of the broad masses in the revolutionarymovement and on their skill and training in armed struggle.

Ever Onward to Victory!

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REVOLUTIONARY CONDITIONS AND PEOPLE'S ARMED INSURRECTION

Now we shall discuss questions relating to revolutionary conditions and insurrection by the people against all forms of domination and exploitation.

Before going any further, we must understand that armed insurrection is only possible, and in most cases is in fact inevitable, where oppression exists. Where there is oppression, there is bound to be resistance against oppression.

Lenin, the founder of the first socialist state in the world, defines symptoms of revolutionary conditions as follow:

1. A crisis among the «upper classes», a crisis in the policy of the ruling classes when it is impossible for them to maintain their rule without change.

2. Suffering and want among the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual.

3. As a consequence of the causes above there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses who uncomplainingly allowed themselves to be robbed in «peacetime», but in troubled times are drawn by circumstances into independent historical action.

These historical points made by Lenin are very much valid until today. Now we shall discuss them in the context of our concrete reality in Namibia.

REVOLUTIONARY CONDITIONS AND THE NAMIBIAN CONCRETE REALITY

What are the concrete references of the Leninist conception of revolutionary conditions in the concrete life of Namibia? There are three conditions, as we said earlier. Let us discuss the first condition.

I. CRISIS AMONGST THE «UPPER CLASSES»

According to theory, the crisis amongst the «upper classes» is a reference to the crisis in policies, attitudes and approach to issues of the oppressing class. Most of you can remember how the Boers were always united in their domination of African people in both Namibia and South Africa.

But when they found out that we, too, were united as an oppressed class, and that we are now organised under the umbrella of SWAPO, especially since April 19th 1960, the oppressing classes-Boers, Germans etc. began differing on tactics. Never, however have they differed on strategy.

The crisis amongst the white settlers in the 1960's was based on the question of who can have effective control over the Africans, now in open revolt, particularly from the time of the Windhoek massacre of December 10th 1959. Some settlers, especially German industrialists and big farmers, thought the rising fascism of Dr. Henrik Verwoerd (then South Africa's Prime Minister) was proceeding too slowly and needed speeding up: by exterminating more Africans they thought to «tame» the so-called natives and so discourage them from revolt. Verwoerd tried this tactic by massacring Africans on April 19th 1960 in Johannesburg and Langa in Cape Province. These massacres did not stop the forward march of the oppressed people in Namibia and South Africa but instead stimulated our determination as both fighters and makers of the history of revolutionary change in this part of the world.

The crisis amongst the Boers intensified after failure of the South African army to «wipe out terrorism» following the start of armed struggle by our people on 26th August 1966. There were members of the «NATIONALIST PARTY» (South Africa's fascist party), such as Hertzog, Japie Marais or the group which broke away from the fascist party towards the end of the 1960's better known as the «Verkramptes». Their basic difference with John Vorster's faction, known as the «Verligtes» was, like the German fascists earlier, a feeling that John Vorster's brand of South African fascim was developing too slowly. Their arguments are: Vorster has sold out. He has shaken hands and invited Dr Hastings Banda of Malawi to visit South Africa. He has also initiated detente policies with neo-colonialist

states of Africa etc. But what is the situation within Vorster's faction, the so-called «Verligtes»?

The «Verligtes» see the situation differently. They know that in modern times, here in Southern Africa, minority rule cannot pass. They know too that it is no longer possible for them to maintain their rule without change.

But what are they now trying to do to get out of this impasse? Because of Southern African realities, the national independence of the peoples of Mozambique and Angola and entry into the liberation struggle of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Socialist Cuba on behalf of humanity here in Southern Africa, the imperialist ruling circles have come to understand that things cannot go on as before. There must be change. But the change we are talking about must involve the majority of the people's masses, who as the most exploited are the core of people's resistance in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

2. THE SUFFERING AND WANT OF THE OPPRESSED CLASSES HAVE GROWN MORE ACUTE THAN USUAL

Scientific analysis teaches us that a revolutionary situation may be brought about through various causes. These causes can be: —

a) Economic crises

b) Failure of the foreign policy of the ruling class

c) Military and diplomatic adventures

d) Conflict on national or racial attitudes in internal policies

At present, the South African government is undergoing an economic crisis. There is a fall in the price of gold, and, as elsewhere in the capitalist countries, a growing rate of inflation and unemployment which are already producing their effects.

This situation has pushed the racists into trying to follow a policy of «dialogue» and «detente» with independent Africa. From time to time they have fraternized with Zambia, Malawi, Liberia, Ivory Coast and other countries ready to contact the racists in South Africa. This brought the racists nothing new to calm the masses in Namibia and South Africa. On the contrary, the masses' suffering and want have grown more acute than usual.

Racist South Africa tried another way of using foreign policy to further her reactionary aims: military adventures in Southern Africa.

As long ago as the 1960's, the racists warned Zambia they would «hit her so hard she would never forget it» if Zambia continued to support liberation movements in Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The racist South Africans planted mines in Zambian territory near the Namibian and Mozambique borders.

These mines killed many peasants. Aggression by South African troops occurred in 1968 up until 1973, later in 1975 and recently when a Zambian village was attacked and several SWAPO members were killed on July 11th 1976.

South Africa's biggest military and diplomatic adventure was entry into pre-independent Angola in 1975 on the side of the UNITA/FNLA reactionary movements. South Africa was militarily defeated and, worse than that, she was diplomatically humiliated. Everything she had tried to build up during the time of «dialogue» and «detente» was lost. Countries which had mistakenly thought South Africa's policies towards independent Africa were correct found they had been deceived and South Africa was a wolf in sheep's clothing. South Africa's entry into the Angolan conflict on the side of the reactionaries has shown her intentions in Africa are of war and recolonization.

As regards racial and national conflict within South Africa, the Boers also made their greatest blunder yet in 1976. Following the Windhoek massacres of 1959, the massacres of Sharpeville/Langa in Johannesburg and Cape Town, have come the recent mass killing in Soweto and other townships in South Africa: this is clear evidence that the policies of white South Africa cannot solve the problems of the oppressed masses of Namibia and South Africa.

3. REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MASSES

As a consequence, the masses in both Namibia and South Africa have awakened. In Namibia, the masses see the answer in armed struggle. They are demanding guns and are insisting South Africa's rule over Namibia must come to an end.

In South Africa, the oppressed masses have begun demonstrating to the oppressing classes in both

South Africa and Namibia that they have been robbed enough of their time. Now they intend to make up for lost time.

We can say for certain that the situation is very excellent for revolution in Southern Africa and that nothing can stop the people's masses from liberating Namibia and South Africa.

Our people cannot wait any longer. Only armed struggle can deliver them from oppression and the system of exploitation of man by man.

SWAPO of Namibia, ANC of South Africa and the Communist Party of South Africa are therefore called upon by history to guide the masses who are no longer prepared to wait.

COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE NAMIBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Comrades, since we have been discussing the politics and policies of SWAPO, it is also logical to discuss difficulties SWAPO has undergone.

Lenin, the founder of the first socialist state in the world, teaches as follows.

«The attitude of a political party towards its errors is one the most important and certain criteria of its seriousness, of its ability to fulfil its duties towards its class and the working masses. Openly to *recognize a mistake, discover its cause, analyze what lead to it, examine carefully ways of overcoming it,* is the indication of a serious party, it is what a par-

ty is called upon to do to fulfil its duty, educate the class and therefore the mass».

It is no secret today that the South African racist authorities in Namibia have been working very hard to plant agents in our movement. Since the beginning of our armed struggle in 1966, South Africa has tried by all means to infiltrate our movement. They have infiltrated Castroli, who after the assassination of Comrade TOBIAS HAINYEKO, SWAPO's First Commander-in-Chief, became Acting Commander-in-Chief, of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia. This miserable type of infiltration led to a heavy crackdown against the movement. HERMAN YA TOIVO and 37 other underground workers were arrested. Numerous military cadres were sold out, and worse than that, the fascists organized a court in 1967 which sentenced our comrades to various terms of imprisonment.

This traitor, sent many of our comrades to torture and death. He has also given the enemy the opportunity to organize manoeuvres to discredit our movement, so as to make some comrades lose hope and feel that all is lost.

Another set of traitors came into the movement during the 1974's «exodus». Thousands of young and middle-aged men and women arrived in Zambia to look for. —

a) scholarships

b) military training

c) control over the movement's leadership abroad

d) pleasure and adventure

e) espionage

They came at a time when the movement was beset with numerous problems. We wanted to increase the size of our people's army by recruiting more cadres, and to prepare some cadres to be trained as future functionaries of an independent Namibia. The movement was also tackling the problem of training cadres to work in our diplomatic missions abroad.

But we must admit, we were not careful enough in handling the new situation. The comrades who came were mixed together and their class origins were different. Some were teachers, petty traders, others were workers, peasants, school leavers, some were lumpen urban dwellers, there were even policemen and police-informers etc.

Most comrades, especially the workers, peasants and some school leavers were honest, and ready to co-operate and to live with new realities. But some teachers and another faction of the school leavers ganged up with the ex-policemen and hooligans. They were demanding many things, chiefly: —

a) position in the movement

b) further scholarships to capitalist countries

c) houses for themselves and their families (social privileges)

Since these demands were not immediately met, such groups started to make trouble for the Orga-

nization. They accused it of every imaginable sin. Some of the allegations were:

a) corruption

b) nespotism

c) inefficiency

d) shortage in logistics and food supplies

e) lack of medicine and medical care

These groups saw their difficulties as having been caused by bad leadership, which they said lacked education and «charisma». They further demanded a SWAPO Congress to elect a «new» and «able» leadership. Numerous pamphlets and circular letters were printed and insults were public order, especially in Lusaka.

Part of their agitation was facilitated by some SWAPO «old guard», centered around power-hungry fellows such as Mr. Andreas Shipanga, (then Secretary of Information and Publicity), Mr. Solomon Mifima (then Secretary of Labour), Mr Sakaria Shikomba (then Research Officer) as well as Hans Beukes who joined SWAPO only two years ago although he left the country in 1958, and Rev. Hailonga who in collaboration in this evil scheme with his Finnish wife, was thinking of becoming SWAPO Secretary.

Some people were misled and the confusion spread to our camps. Soldiers were incited to disobey their Commanders and elect new ones on a «democratic basis». They even went as far as arresting their

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Commanders, disarming the patriotic section of our army and stopping people from going to fight the Boers in the Eastern Zone. Some of these people we are now prepared to call counter-revolutionaries crossed over to the South African side to give the enemy information about our military secrets. There was total chaos and the lives of many unarmed comrades were in great danger. Dates to assassinate the SWAPO President and Executive Committee members and commanders were set.

An ex-South African policeman by the name of Shafooli took over the whole command, and in Lusaka, Shipanga and Mifima were ready to proclaim themselves as «*President*» and «*Vice-President*» respectively. But they were too late. They were disarmed, and since the plot was being carried out on Zambian soil, they were handed to the Zambian authorities.

But we must not forget one thing. Before the counter-revolutionaries were detained, they sent a band of their followers to the Boers'side of the Eastern Caprivi. These traitors brought the Boers to our camps in Zambia on July 11 th 1976, killed 25 SWAPO comrades and wounded 40 others.

This was the first crime they perpetrated on the Namibian people. The spokesman of the group that went over to the Boers is Nangutuwala. On August 29th 1976 some of the group appeared at Luanda's St. Paul Stadium where SWAPO was holding a rally in commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the armed insurrection in Namibia. They were arrested and they are in our hands.

What lessons can be learned from this scandal? Not only did they cause confusion within the ranks of our organisation, but this very confusion led a number of comrades into the shameful scandal of a revolt against the movement. 843 members of our People's Army were involved in this scandal.

It is not true to say that all these people were convinced our struggle would not be victorious. But some, and for that matter, a number of them, whom we call defeatists, drew the conclusion that the war of liberation waged by our heroic people under the direction of SWAPO against South Africa was impossible to win.

In order to fulfil our histoic mission, we must stick to our proletarian line and be a movement of unity and discipline, and as Lenin said.

...«a small compact, group we follow a thorny and difficult path, strongly linked to the masses. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies and must almost always walk under fire. We have united in the cause of a freely contracted union, precisely in order to fight the enemy and not fall into the swamp in the company of those who, since the beginning, have reproached us for having formed a group apart and having preferred the way of struggle to the way of conciliation and revolutionary rhetoric».

Our unity and our discipline must be a matter of life to each one of us. Without unity and without discipline, there can be no work, and without work, our revolution will not succeed. On the question of the overall unity of the Namibian people, SWAPO relies on the unity of the Namibian proletariat and

the peasant masses. In our unity platform, SWAPO believes in unity of:—

I. The mobilization of all progressive forces into one cohesive movement which must unite all the people, who as a matter of fact must be opposed to apartheid and South African colonialism. This unity must be realized through a programme of action that satisfies all the sectors of the people.

2. The imposition of armed struggle as a practical measure effectively to combat the South African racists and their puppets and defeat them in order to establish in Namibia state power of a new type that satisfies the popular demand of our people, and to carry forward a democratic programme capable of transforming the people's economic, social and cultural conditions.

To isolate the puppets and defeat the imperialist enemies, participants in our struggle and in the kind of unity we are talking about must realise that:

a) The people's struggle must take the form of an armed struggle to conquer political power for the Namibian working class and its allies the peasantry and other progressive strata of our society;

b) The question of armed insurrection must be weighed evenly by each Namibian, and

c) That the revolution in Namibia must serve as a base for the proletarian revolutian to be waged on the African continent against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

In all, we can safely say our work is for internal unity of our people and the unity of the proletariat in general. Fighting against the rule of reaction and against imperialism is the permanent duty of all revolutionaries, and we members of SWAPO must feel proud to be part of the revolutionary peoples of the world.

Ever Onwards to Victory!

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THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FINAL LIBERATION OF NAMIBIA

Since our people took up arms ten years ago, our call has always been that in spite of all the difficulties and obstacles in our way, our people will definitely win freedom and drive the South African bandits out of Namibia. Today, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and the entire people have made a great breakthrough.

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT

As a result of the effectiveness of our armed struggle in Namibia, and of course within the context of the relation of forces in Southern Africa following independence of Mozambique and Angola, our enemy the South African racists have had to have recourse to political manoeuvres in order to try setting up a neo-colonial regime in Namibia.

Since September ist 1975, a gathering in Windhoek, called the «SOUTH WEST AFRICA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE» has existed. Its

other name is the «TURNHALLE CONFERENCE» after the hall where it is taking place.

This so-called «constitutional conference» is composed of carefully selected «representatives» of the so-called eleven ethnic groups. These groups, according to information available to us are: BUSHMEN, DAMARAS, HERERROS, COLOUREDS, CAPRIVIANS, KAVANGOS, NAMAS, OVAMBOS, REHOBOTHERS, TSWANAS and WHITES.

Their terms of reference are: TO FIND A SOLUTION ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE.

While SWAPO has had nothing to do with this «conference» from the start, it is imperative we make our position clear once again to our members and to all our Namibian compatriots.

1. COMPOSITON OF THE CONFERENCE

To SWAPO, the conference is nothing but a reunion of the fascist puppeteers and their puppets. From the so called native ethnic groups, the usual yes-men of the Bantustans have come. We can find the usual Njobas, and the Kapuuos. We see false and opportunist intellectuals like Africa, Kloppers etc.

As to the «white» representatives, we find nothing new either. Here again we see the senior members of the South African National Party's Executive Committee — Dr. Mudge, Du Plessis, and Eben Van Zijl.

The two groups have always worked as a team to create the Bantustans and to maintain apartheid in Namibia in accordance with their Party policies.

The question now is: what have they found to be wrong with their earlier schemes of dividing up the country, so that each of the so called ethnic groups could have its independence? Who demanded the convening of this «Constitutional Conference»? And who has elected these «representatives», and under whose auspices were they elected?

To all these questions we are sure, the fascists and their puppets at Turnhalle have no answer for us. The obvious reason for their gathering there over the past year and three months is to try both to confuse world public opinion and to attempt to divide the national liberation struggle of our people under the leadership of SWAPO.

THE NAMIBIAN VICTORY IS NOT FAR OFF

In our country all the conditions guaranteeing victory are now ripe. We can sum up our experience as follows:

1. In Namibia today, a crisis in the policy of the white ruling class exists because the white settlers can no longer maintain their rule without change, and have started partial changes (swapping Bantustans for a neo-colonial settlement);

2. The suffering of our people and their wishes to be free have grown more acute than ever before;

3. As a consequence of the above mentioned contradictions between the oppressed and the oppressors, the masses have come out in open rebellion with the aim of winning freedom and national independence.

Our popular masses have been oppressed and cheated for too long. Now, through SWAPO, they see their destiny more clearly than ever before. For us in SWAPO, there is nothing promising in the «Turnhalle conference».

By collaborating with the fascists, the puppets in Turnhalle have forfeited their right to speak for our people. They have also forfeited their credibility to speak as natives of our great fatherland by organizing the scandal of a sell-out of our country to the foreigners.

DESERTERS

Interesting are the cases of deserters from the national liberation movement who have now ganged up with the tribal racist Turnhalle circus in Windhoek. Jarirethdu Kozonguizi (a barrister-at law and former President of SWANU), Emil Appolus (Journalist and at one time member of the SWAPO Executive Committee), Mburumba Kerina (political scientist and at one time SWAPO Honorary Chairman), Jackson Kambonde former trades union official and one time SWAPO member) etc. have crossed over to the side of the Boers and are members of the Turnhalle circus.

But to us, this is nothing new in the history of National Liberation. These elements have a rich his-

tory of being expelled from the movement. Kerina, Emil and Kambonde were expelled from SWAPO for embezzlement of SWAPO funds. Kozonguizi was expelled from SWANU for being a South African informer. Such bad people are now what the South African racists call «genuine» representatives of the people in the Turnhalle!

SWAPO, addressing itself to our people and the world public declares we of SWAPO are making demands something the weak and cowardly elements cannot do. We are making demands on our oppressors. By demanding and fighting for our rights, SWAPO is not seeking concessions, promises or favours. What SWAPO is demanding from the oppressors is our human rights, freedom and the transfer of power from the present colonial state power to our people.

THE TURNHALLE CRISIS

Because of the wrongness of the whole concept of the «constitutional talks» in Windhoek, crisis amongst the participants is inevitable. There we have the white racists, pretending they will work out a solution with the puppets. But the white «delegates» do not consider the black «delegates» as their equals. Right up to now, they continue calling them names, reminding them that «it was the whites who dragged them from the mountains, clad them and protected them », as Van Zijl was saying to the Damara and Bushmen delegates the other day. The crisis is also aggravated by secret meetings the white «delegates» conduct with Vorster, without the knowledge of the socalled black delegates. Each of the socalled ethnic groups appears not to trust the others, which of

course is a sign that these crooks have nothing in common except their mischievous and deceitful aims.

So we see the black «delegates» victims of both their racial inferiority complex and of tribalism. There the poor chaps are, listening to eloquent Dirk Mudge and provocative Van Zijil and du Plessis. Some have got angry to the point of fighting in the conference hall, and others have threatened to walk out and join SWAPO. The whole show is nothing but a caricature of white racism and the stupidity of black puppets.

KISSINGER'S SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY AND ITS FAILURE

While the circus was going on in Turnhalle, Kissinger, the outgoing American Foreign Secretary was getting excited in Washington. He wanted to see this circus, and to do so he met the General Manager of the Turnhalle Circus, Mr John Vorster.

The two men met in West Germany, Switzerland and later in Pretoria. Dr Kissinger thought the show could be made more interesting if SWAPO could be dragged into it, in order togive the show «National» credibility. The new showplace should also be changed from Turnhalle to Geneva, to give the same show much needed international credibility.

But his efforts failed. SWAPO stated quite clearly, that circus attendances have nothing to do with our decolonization process.

We do not wish to see the Turnhalle puppets, and SWAPO is ready at any time to meet the manager

of the puppet show, Mr Vorster, to discuss with him or his representative the following points of the struggle of the Namibian people:

a) to fix a timetable for the independence of Namibia

b) evacuation of the South African troops, Police Force and South African administrative appa ratus

c) release of all Namibian political prisoners

d) Namibia's territorial integrity as one entity

e) holding of free and democratic elections under the auspices of the United Nations.

These just demands were not met either by Vorster or by Kissinger himself and his everfailing shuttle diplomacy.

SWAPO'S TERMS FOR FULL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OCCUPYING POWER

In terms of the POINTS OF THE DIGNITY OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE, our movement, SWAPO, wishes to draw the attention of both whites and blacks currently participating in the Turnhalle «Constitutional Conference», to the fact that acceptance of the points by the South African regime does not automatically entitle the puppets to sit in any meeting with us. Puppets have no credibility to sit with fighters for liberty who have never betrayed the fatherland.

THE FIVE POINTS OF THE NAMIBIAN PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE PLATFORM

General terms of participation in the Namibian peace and independence platform are: —

1. that participants (if organised in groups) must have genuine written Political Programmes, statutes of their movements or political currents, which must necessarily be democratic, anti-feudal, anti-colonial, anti-racist and anti-imperialist in character;

2. all propaganda and agitation of participants in the future Namibian peace and independence platform should be popularized in such a manner that they reach the heart of the masses especially the workers, peasants and other progressive sectors of our people;

3. any person, or group of persons, wishing to participate in the future Namibian peace and independence platform should consistently dismiss from his mind the idea that freedom can only be achieved through talks. They must, as a matter of principle, support the three ele-

ments of our way to peace and independence, namely:—

a) armed struggle (where and when it is possible).

b) political mobilization (using strikes, rallies, demonstrations, and working for release of prisoners through co-ordinated limited force, raising funds for relatives of political prisoners etc).

c) diplomatic efforts to isolate, expose, harass and embarass the racists anywhere in the world.

4. it is in the interests of the person or groups of persons willing to participate in the future Namibian peace and independence platform to break completely with the Turnhalle elements, and with any political thoughts connected with the situation of sell-out of our fatherland or the delay of our freedom or independence;

5. the persons or groups of individuals willing to participate in the future Namibian peace and independence platform must support the struggle of the colonised and other oppressed peoples everywhere;

SWAPO of Namibia being internally and internationally recognized as the authentic representative of the Namibian people wishes further to make it clear to our people that one can co-operate with us, or join us as a full member. Those who wish to

co-operate with us must accept the afore-said POINTS OF THE DIGNITY OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE AND THE FIVE POINTS OF COOPERATION IN THE PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE PLATFORM.

In our independence movement, we must be united, and we must insist on continuity of this unity in order to create the conditions for emergence of an anti-imperialist Namibian nation.

THE BOER «INDEPENDENCE BY DECEMBER 31, 1978»

The South African racists announced on 18th August 1976, that South Africa will give independence to its puppets on December 31st 1978.

The so-called independence will deprive Namibia of its only large seaport, Walvis Bay, and of the port's 434 square miles as well as of a number of islands off the coast of Namibia.

Whether the railways, the water and electricity supply, monetary and financial matters and security etc. will remain «part of South Africa» or not, will have to be «negotiated» with the South African government.

This bogus independence is to be backed by the signing of a military treaty with racist South Africa and the establishment of American bases for a period of 10 years. All these efforts were arranged to counteract SWAPO's future activities, and its pro-

gressive position in the efforts to liberate Southern Africa.

SWAPO's CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

As much as we want to achieve our independence, as soon as possible, it is important to note that we cannot settle for everything our oppressors intend for our country.

SWAPO is fighting for genuine independence and not for transformation of our country into a neo-colonial state. Our people who for years, ever since the colonial conquest, have been engaged in the struggle, will feel robbed of the valuable years of arduous struggle they have given in the past if at the end of it all they give in to neo-colonial manoeuvres.

To us in SWAPO, neo-colonialism has neither a place nor a future in our continent. Although our history is not exactly the same as the histories of sister republics in Africa, one thing especially has been proved. That neo-colonialism, foreign military bases and protection by former colonial powers never helped the broad masses of the people.

SWAPO of Namibia will continue the war of liberation until victory. And as to the international status of Namibia, SWAPO will continue to respect the relevant UN resolutions on Namibia and the decisions of the International Court of Justice. But at the same time, SWAPO and indeed the international community cannot fold their arms and watch violations of these resolutions by racist South Africa and its puppets.

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SWAPO will use all the forces at its disposal (including its international prestige) in order to bring South Africa to accept SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people to whom power should be handed by the present occupying power.

ON THE MILITARY PLANE

To struggle for liberty in Namibia means to wage a war for National emancipation. For the last 10 years now, our people under the tireless guidance of our glorious organization SWAPO have been fighting for our freedom and will continue to do so.

The war being fought on our soil today is between our Namibian people and the South Africa government. This war is being conducted by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, (PLAN). Our people are supported by the peace-loving people of the world, especially the independent African states, the USSR and other socialist countries, as well as the conscientious workers', unions, parties and students organizations in the capitalist world.

Against the Namibian people is the South African Army, an instrument of violence, repression and terrorism at the hands of the South African Nazi Party which has occupied our country since 1920. This machinery of repression is supported by international capital and by warlike countries such as France, USA, West Germany etc.

Whereas SWAPO combatants are being supported by our entire people, the workers, peasants, stu-

dents and strata of the intelligentsia, our enemy, racist South Africa on the other hand is being supported by the enemies of our people — feudal and aristocratic chiefs, cruel headmen, police and black lackeys obedient to imperialism. They are all supported by world imperialism.

In our difficult but noble struggle to free ourselves, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia has scored numerous victories on the battlefield and in mass mobilization.

ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL PLANE (GENERAL NATURE OF OUR STRUGGLE)

Although our preoccupation is with the question of the national liberation struggle from colonial domination at the moment, the future of our struggle has to take the form of class struggle and must bring about a society of equal and emancipated people. It is from this point of view, that each one of us must adhere to, and follow the policies set in the new revised SWAPO Political Programme as adopted by the last plenary session of the SWAPO Central Committee that met from July 28th to August ist 1976 in Lusaka, Zambia.

While recognizing the present structure of the Namibian class society, it is very important to bear in mind that we must work and organize the working masses of urban centres and other economic areas which can, and which are able to help in reorganizing the peasant masses of the countryside (including those confined in the Bantustans).

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Like in other countries, the Namibian working class (the proletariat) is a really revolutionary class, and acts in a really revolutionary manner. Its participation in class struggle using strikes as a form of emancipation, is well known. Ever since the introduction of industry and commerce into our country, the young Namibian working class has demonstrated its ability to wage its class struggle against the power of capital.

Now, as we are entering the year 1977, it is the task of each SWAPO member at all levels to organize those who are not organized, and to mobilize those who are already organized.

Organizing along the lines of the SWAPO Constitution and Political Programme is the guarantee of our victory.

Ever Onwards to Victory!

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THE QUESTION OF WORLD-WIDE CHANGE AND TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM

The discussion in this short paper is about socialism and the question of the struggle of the working people against the rule of capital.

Socialism, as defined by Marx-Engels-Lenin, means a stable comunity free from antagonistic contradictions, uniting in a friendly alliance of classes and strata of the people. We shall discuss the

later when we come to our next discussion on the question of building socialism as it prevails in the socialist countries of Europe, Asia and America (e. g. Cuba).

What we are going to discuss here is rather the role played by socialist countries in the struggle against the rule of monopoly capitalism, and the contribution of the socialist countries in supporting the national liberation struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The other reason for discussing this question is to give more light on what we have already read in the revised POLITICAL PROGRAMME OF SWAPO, which stipulates among other things, that our future society in free Namibia will be organized along the road of scientific socialism and for a classless society.

Your time in this Institute of Revolutionary Studies is too limited to grasp everything at once, but we hope that you will take whatever has been given you as a basis for your further studies when you leave this Institute.

Dear comrades,

Our era is an era of transition from capitalism to socialism. There are 14 Socialist countries existing today. These are:

1. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
2. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
3. Bulgarian People's Republic

4. People's Republic of Poland
5. German Democratic Republic
6. People's Republic of Albania
7. Socialist Republic of Romania
8. Yugoslavia Federative Socialist Republic
9. People's Republic of Mongolia
10. Socialist Republic of Vietnam
11. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
12. People's Republic of China
13. Republic of Cuba
14. People's Republic of Hungary

The Socialist system is extending an increasingly decisive influence on world-wide developments. It is also proving its validity and superiority in ideology and culture and in the economic, military and scientific fields for all the world to see.

Here in Africa, several countries such as: —

a) People's Republic of the Congo

b) People's Republic of Angola

d) People's Republic of Mozambique

c) Democratic Republic of Somalia

have also declared the philosophy of scientific socialism as their way of life and development. Countries such as the Republic of Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria etc. have declared they are also moving towards socialism although in different ways.

Now this proves the truth of what Marx, Engels and Lenin discovered and predicted. Their discoveries are being confirmed by historical development, by the triumph and advance of socialism and by the rapid decline of capitalism. Marxism - Leninism is therefore proving to be the only theory enabling the oppressed and exploited classes (the proletariat and the peasantry) to carry out their historical mission (i. e. the destruction of the rule of capital and of the system of exploitation of man by man).

The emergence of the USSR as the first state built by the liberated proletariat, and the emergence of the people's democracies in a number of countries in Eastern Europe as well as in Asia and Cuba, in Latin America, are the main sources of inspiration of peoples fighting for their freedom and national independence.

The achievement, and the revolutionary wealth of revolutionary experience accumulated by the countries of the socialist camp are irreplaceable assets and sources of strength to the international working class, and the national liberation movements of the world.

The successful advance of socialism gives impetus to the world revolutionary process and to the creation of conditions for the forward march of the anti-imperialist forces of the world.

Here, we can cite the examples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the three heroic countries of South East Asia, which through armed struggle have defeated the biggest, most powerful imperialist state, the United States of America and its marionnettes. Within the same struggle too we can mention Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, where freedom and independence have been wrested by force of arms of the liberation forces of these countries. Portugal, fascist Portugal of Salazar-Caetano, Thomaz and Spinola, which was supported by the United States America was defeated with the support rendered the liberation movements by the socialist countries.

While socialism is advancing, offering stability, and an assured future for the working people, capitalism is bogged down more and more every day in a crisis, shown in the current growing inflation, unemployment and crime rates in the capitalist world.

Capitalism is the root cause of hunger, misery, wars and political oppression among the peoples of the world.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKERS' AND COMMUNIST PARTIES

But nothing can stop the people of the capitalist, dependent and semi-dependent countries in their just struggle against the rule of capital. In the lead of this struggle are the communist and workers' parties which vigorously defend the true interests of the working and oppressed peoples and classes.

The communist and workers' parties as well as other organizations which advocate the union of all

democratic forces such as the trades unions, youth and students' organizations etc. — give the people in the capitalist world a clear perspective on the future. Their aims are putting an end to the rule of capital, and opening the new road to socialism. In connection with this, we can mention the heroic role being played by the communist parties of Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

The struggle to overthrow the rule of capital is also waged by the peoples of the colonised and semi-colonised countries.

The national liberation struggle waged by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America is a major component part of the world revolutionary process.

Here in Africa, the present national liberation struggle is being conducted in the form of an armed revolutionary struggle. In Namibia and Zimbabwe, people are waging an heroic struggle to end colonialism / racism and undemocratic minority rule of the European settlers.

During the last few months, we have witnessed the victory of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Mozambique and Angola. The victory of these brave people has once again proved that in the last quarter of the 20th Century, armed struggle can be victorious in the African continent and that the myth of the invincibility of the superiority of the settler colonial racist armies can be shattered.

Of course, there are many difficulties, but despite all these difficulties the general trend is towards a common anti-imperialist and anti-exploitation struggle, waged first by the world socialist system, the working class movement of the capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements of the colonised and semi-colonised countries.

The existence of the socialist system that changed the balance of forces, the ever increasing crisis of capitalism, the growth of class struggle against imperialism and monopoly capitalism and the national liberation movements of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America are giving greater impetus to the world-wide struggle for peace, freedom and national as well as social liberation of peoples.

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

ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SWAPO ORGANIZING SECRETARY 1977.

EXHIBIT H

SPEECH BY PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE : MAPUTO : MARCH 18, 1980

"ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1964, WE DECLARED WAR ON THE FOREIGN ENEMY - PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM. HERE TODAY, MARCH 18, 1980, WE DECLARE WAR ON THE INTERNAL ENEMY. AND WE ARE GOING TO FLUSH THEM OUT BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. IT WILL BE SPOTLESS ON ALL SIDES. WE ARE GOING TO PUT THEM TO FLIGHT.

THIS IS A DECISIVE BATTLE. IT IS A BATTLE IN THE CLASS STRUGGLE. WE DO NOT SHARE POWER WITH THE ENEMY. HERE THERE WILL BE NO COMPLACENCE. THERE WILL BE NO TOLERANCE OR SENTIMENTALITY. THOSE WHO TOLERATE, PROTECT AND ACCOMMODATE ARE THE ENEMY'S ACCOMPLICES. THEY ARE OUR ENEMY.

THE REVOLUTION IS IRREVERSIBLE. IT IS A STEAMROLLER CRUSHING EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH TO OPEN AND CONSOLIDATE THE WIDE ROAD TO SOCIALISM THE REVOLUTION IS THE PEOPLE ON THE MARCH, BUILDING THEIR FUTURE AND DECIDING THEIR DESTINY. FOR THIS REASON WE CAME HERE TO SAY : OUR STATE APPARATUS IS CORRUPTED. IT IS SICK, FULL OF PARASITES, SOME CLINGING TO THE SKIN AND OTHERS INTERNAL. IT IS IN THE PEOPLE THAT WE FIND STRENGTH. IT IS IN THE PEOPLE, ORGANISED AND LED BY THE FRELIMO PARTY, THAT WE FIND THE CORRECT SOLUTIONS.
WE WANT SOCIALISM. WE WANT HAPPINESS, PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING.
WE ARE GOING TO TAKE MEASURES, RADICAL MEASURES, THOROUGH MEASURES, MEASURES TO CUT THE FEET FROM UNDER THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION.
WE ARE GOING TO DEFINE TASKS FOR EVERYONE TO CARRY OUT. WE WILL BE RUTHLESS WITH THE UNDISCIPLINED, THE INCOMPETENT, THE LAZY, THE NEGLIGENT, THE CARELESS, THE CORRUPT, THOSE WHO GO IN FOR RED TAPE, FOR INERTIA, THOSE WHO CULTIVATE A SPIRIT OF ROUTINE, THOSE WHO DESPISE THE PEOPLE, THOSE WHO MISAPPROPRIATE STATE PROPERTY OR DAMAGE THE PROPERTY OF THE PEOPLE.
IN DISCIPLINARY CASES WE WILL TAKE MEASURES ACCORDING TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ERROR. IN SERIOUS CASES, SEVERE MEASURES. IN THE FACTORIES WE WILL EMPLOY DISMISSAL, REGARDLESS.
OTHER SITUATIONS ARE CRIMES: THEFT IS A CRIME; SABOTAGE IS A CRIME; NEGLIGENCE IS A CRIME; LYING AND GIVING FALSE INFORMATION WHICH LEAD TO WRONG SOLUTIONS ARE CRIMES. THEY MUST BE PUNISHED.

THE PERSON IN CHARGE WHO ALLOWS RICE, MAIZE, MILK, BATTERIES, BEANS, CLOTH AND CASHEWNUTS DESTINED FOR THE POPULATION TO ROT IN THE WAREHOUSE IS A CRIMINAL. WE CALL IT CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. IT IS THE ACTION OF THE ENEMY. HE MUST BE PUNISHED. THE WORKER WHO DAMAGES A MACHINE THROUGH CARELESSNESS COMMITS A CRIME AGAINST OUR ENEMY. HE MUST BE PUNISHED. THE DRIVER WHO DAMAGES A LORRY THROUGH BAD DRIVING OR SPEEDING COMMITS A CRIME AGAINST OUR ECONOMY. HE MUST BE PUNISHED CRIME IS NOT ONLY STEALING AND KILLING. THE MACHINE, THE LORRY, THE TRACTOR, THE GENERATOR, THE WELDING TORCH AND THE SAW WERE BOUGHT WITH MONEY PRODUCED BY THE PEOPLE. THEY REPRESENT THE PEOPLE'S SWEAT AND SACRIFICE. THEY ARE ESSENTIAL TOOLS IN THE PRODUCTION BATTLE. DESTROYING THESE TOOLS THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR CARELESSNESS IS A CRIME AGAINST THE ECONOMY. A CRIME AGAINST THE ECONOMY IS A CRIME AGAINST

THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE. WE HAVE LAWS TO PUNISH THESE CRIMES. WE ARE GOING TO APPLY THEM. WE HAVE SNASP (THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE), WE HAVE THE FPLM (MOZAMBIQUE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES), WE HAVE THE POLICE FORCE, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNALS. AND THEY ARE GOING TO ACT.

WE ARE GOING TO TAKE MEASURES. IN THE STATE APPARATUS; IN THE FACTORIES; IN ENTERPRISES; IN ALL PRODUCTION SITES. WE ARE GOING TO IMPLANT IRON DISCIPLINE EVERYWHERE. WE LEARNT THE VALUE OF DISCIPLINE DURING THE ARMED STRUGGLE. OUR FREEDOM FIGHTERS WON BECAUSE THEY WERE DISCIPLINED. OUR PEOPLE WON BECAUSE THEY LEARN TO VALUE DISCIPLINE. IT WAS WITH ORGANISATION, DISCIPLINE AND STRUGGLE THAT WE OVERCAME COLONIALISM. IT WAS WITH UNITY, WITH WORK, WITH VIGILANCE THAT WE CONSOLIDATED AND BUILT PEOPLE'S POWER. IT IS WITH WORK, DISCIPLINE AND ORGANISATION THAT WE WILL WIN THE BATTLE AGAINST UNDERDEVELOPMENT.

IN THE FIRST PLACE WE WILL PURIFY OUR RANKS. WE WILL CLEAN UP THE STATE APPARATUS. WE ARE GOING TO SWEEP OUT OUR HOME. THE BROOM WILL REACH INTO EVERY CORNER. WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN WITH THE STATE APPARATUS BECAUSE IT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF PARTY POLICY. OUR STATE APPARATUS MUST BE FREED OF ALL THE INFILTRATORS, ALL THE UNDISCIPLINED, ALL THE INCAPABLE, ALL THE LAZY AND ALL THE NEGLIGENT. OUR STATE IS A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' STATE. IT IS NOT A STATE OF THE USELESS, THE LAZY AND THE REACTIONARY.

WE ARE GOING TO GIVE ALL THE MINISTERS THE TASK OF CLEANING UP THEIR MINISTRIES. WITHIN THREE MONTHS, EACH MINISTER MUST ENSURE THAT HIS MINISTRY IS A SOUND STRUCTURE. THE PEOPLE HAVE THE TASK OF PARTICIPATING IN THIS CLEANING UP. THE PEOPLE ONCE MORE WILL BE THE FILTER, AS IN THE ELECTIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLIES, AS IN THE STRUCTURING OF THE PARTY. THE PEOPLE MUST DENOUNCE INFILTRATION, POINT OUT THE UNDISCIPLINED, UNMASK THE INCOMPETENT, ATTACK THE ARROGANT AND DRIVE OUT THE VILLAINS. WE WILL CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE PEOPLE TO TAKE PART IN THIS TASK.

AN OFFICE OF CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE, HEADED PERSONALLY BY THE MINISTER WILL BE CREATED IN EACH MINISTRY. THE POPULATION CAN CONTACT THIS OFFICE DIRECTLY OR BY LETTER. THEY MUST REPORT CASES OF INFILTRATION, LACK OF DISCIPLINE OR INCOMPETENCE OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OR WHICH THEY KNOW ABOUT. ALL THE CASES WILL BE CAREFULLY INVESTIGATED. THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED EITHER DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE WHO REPORTED THEM, OR, WHEN IT IS JUSTIFIED, IN THE PRESS.

THIS IS A PERMANENT, CONTINUOUS BATTLE. BRIGADES WILL LAUNCH THE SAME PROCESS IN THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS OF ALL THE PROVINCES. THESE BRIGADES WILL BE HEADED BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. THE PEOPLE ARE CALLED UPON TO GIVE THEIR OPINIONS ON THE STATE APPARATUS. THE PEOPLE ARE OUR STRENGTH. ONLY THOSE WHO HAVE THE NECESSARY QUALITIES CAN BE WORKERS OF THE STATE. TO BE A WORKER OF THE STATE IS ABOVE ALL TO SERVE THE PEOPLE. IT IS AN HONOUR AND A GREAT RESPONSIBILTY TO WORK IN THE STATE APPARATUS. WE MUST BE DEMANDING.

ONLY THOSE WHO SHOW PATRIOTISM, DISCIPLINE, HONESTY, A SENSE OF

RESPONSIBILTY, RESPECT AND COURTESY IN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC, DYNAMISM AND INITIATIVE, PUNCTUALITY, AND A LEARNING AND CREATIVE SPIRIT CAN WORK FOR THE STATE. THESE ARE THE QUALITIES THAT WE MUST DEMAND OF ANY WORKER TO BE A CIVIL SERVANT. THE STATE CANNOT BE A REFUGE FOR THE USELESS AND INCOMPETENT. THE STATE CANNOT BE A REFUGE FOR THE INDISCIPLINED AND THE CORRUPT. TO BE A CIVIL SERVANT IT IS NECESSARY TO SIT A TEST. TO BE PROMOTED WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE AN EXAMINATION IS NECESSARY. THE CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION AND PROMOTION MUST BE RIGOROUS AND OBJECTIVE. THEY MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN NORMS AND REGULATIONS.

THE STATE APPARATUS IS THE BASIC INSTRUMENT IN OUR POWER, OF THE POWER OF THE WORKER AND PEASANTS. WE CANNOT ALLOW IT TO CONTINUE TO BE INFILTRATED AND CORRUPT. IT IS THE STATE APPARATUS THAT MUST DIRECT THE ECONOMY. IT IS THE STATE APPARATUS THAT MUST ASK ENTERPRISES TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN, FOR REACHING TARGETS. IT IS THE STATE APPARATUS THAT MUST DEMAND EFFICIENCY, SPEED AND QUALITY FROM ALL SECTORS. THE STATE APPARATUS MUST ITSELF BE HIGHLY EFFICIENT, DYNAMIC AND EFFECTIVE. FOR US TO BE ABLE TO DEMAND DISCIPLINE, WE MUST BE DISCIPLINED. FOR US TO BE ABLE TO DEMAND HONESTY WE MUST BE INCORRUPTIBLE. WE WILL TRANSFORM THE STATE APPARATUS INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL WEAPON IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST UNDERDEVELOPMENT.

AT THE LEVEL OF THE ENTERPRISE, WE WILL DEMAND A HIGH DEGREE OF DISCIPLINE, PRECISE PUNCTUALITY AND HIGH-QUALITY PRODUCTS AND SERVICES. WE WANT FACTORIES TO REACH THEIR CAPACITY. WE WANT FACTORIES TO BE IMPROVED. STATE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES MUST GENERATE PROFITS. EACH WORKER MUST PRODUCE HIS WAGES, THUS JUSTIFYING THAT HE OCCUPIES HIS POSITION, AND PRODUCE PROFITS FOR THE FIRM. IT IS WITH PROFITS THUS OBTAINED THAT WE WILL CARRY OUT MAJOR PROJECTS TO BENEFIT THE WHOLE POPULATION. WE WILL BUILD NEW HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS, DAMS, ROADS AND FACTORIES. WE WILL IMPROVE OUR LIFE.

THE STATE IS NOT GOING TO CONTINUE TO PAY WAGES TO PEOPLE WHO DO NOT PRODUCE, TO FIRMS THAT ONLY PRODUCES LOSSES.

THE STATE'S MONEY COMES FROM THE PEOPLE. IT IS PRODUCED BY THE PEOPLE'S SWEAT. THE STATE'S MONEY CANNOT BE USED TO PAY THE USELESS AND THE PARASITES.

ANOTHER CENTRAL QUESTION IN ENTERPRISE IS THE QUESTION OF MANAGEMENT. WE FOUND MANAGEMENT DILUTED AND POWER DISPERSED. LET US SAY CLEARLY : AT THE LEVEL OF EACH FIRM, POWER IS EXERCISED BY THE MANAGER. IT IS THE MANAGER WHO ORGANISES, MANAGES AND CONTROLS PRODUCTION. IT IS THE MANAGER WHO DECIDES. IT IS THE MANAGER WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCIPLINE IN THE FIRM.

POWER MUST BE CONCENTRATED. IT CANNOT BE DIVIDED. IT IS NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE THE CONFLICTS AND CONFUSION OF TASKS BETWEEN THE MANAGEMENT AND OTHER STRUCTURES IN THE FIRM. EACH STRUCTURE HAS ITS TASK DEFINED. IT HAS ITS OWN AREAS OF ACTIVITY. THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE MANAGEMENT, OF THE OTHER STRUCTURES AND OF ALL THE WORKERS IS TO ENSURE THAT THE FIRM'S PRODUCTION PLAN IS CARRIED OUT. EVERYONE MUST BE INVOLVED IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE PRODUCTION TARGETS

TO BE REACHED, SINCE THE ECONOMIC BATTLE IS OUR MAIN STRUGGLE. WE WILL ASK THE MANAGER TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THE PLAN. IN LARGE FIRMS THE MANAGEMENT MUST BE PROPERLY STRUCTURED. AND SO THERE WILL BE A CLEAR DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN EACH SECTOR; THERE WILL BE THE CORRECT EXERCISING OF AUTHORITY IN EACH SPECIFIC AREA. IN FIRMS WHERE IT IS JUSTIFIED AS WELL AS THE GENERAL MANAGER, THERE WILL BE A PRODUCTION MANAGER, A SUPPLIES MANAGER, A PERSONNEL MANAGER, MANAGERS FOR EACH SECTOR, SECTION CHIEFS AND SEVERAL OTHERS.

IN THE PORTS AND AIRPORTS AND TRANSPORT IN GENERAL WE FOUND THE SAME PROBLEM OF WEAKENING OF POWER. WE ARE GOING TO TAKE MEASURES TO OVERCOME THIS SITUATION. IN THE PORT THERE MUST BE A DIRECTOR WITH THE PARTY'S CONFIDENCE AND ALL, I REPEAT, ALL THE STRUCTURES ACTING IN THE PORT WILL BE UNDER HIM. THE SAME PRINCIPLE MUST BE APPLIED IN THE AIRPORTS AND ALL THE TRANSPORT STRUCTURES.

THE TRANSPORT SECTOR, AND ESPECIALLY THE PORTS, AT THIS MOMENT ARE TAKING ON GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR ECONOMY. WITH THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE, OUR PORTS AND TRANSPORT WILL SERVE MANY COUNTRIES IN OUR REGION. THIS IS A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR COUNTRY AND IT WILL BE A POWERFUL MEANS TOWARDS OUR DEVELOPMENT. FOR THIS REASON OUR PORTS MUST BE HIGHLY EFFICIENT AND OPERATIVE. IN THESE SECTORS WE WILL DEMAND A HIGH LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE. WE WILL EXPECT OUR PORTS TO BE MOST EFFICIENT, THE MOST FUNCTIONAL AND BEST ORGANISED.

STILL IN THE REALM OF TRANSPORT, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION THE GRAVE PROBLEM OF ROAD ACCIDENTS. WE FOUND INCOMPETENCE, IRRESPONSIBILITY AND A LACK OF PROFESSIONAL PRIDE. IN THE DRIVING SCHOOLS IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO BE ABLE TO DRIVE TO GET A DRIVING LICENCE. THEY NO LONGER GIVE INSTRUCTION ON THE ENGINE AND LOOKING AFTER CARS. WE WILL FINISH WITH THIS. TODAY DRIVERS NO LONGER KNOW WHAT IT IS TO RESPECT THE RULES OF SAFETY AND THE SPEED REGULATIONS. THEY DESTROY HUMAN LIVES EVERY DAY. CRIMINALS. THEY DESTROY THE PEOPLE'S PROPERTY. THEY DRIVE AT HIGH SPEEDS. THEY DRIVE DRUNK. THEY DRIVE AS IF THEY WERE CARRYING CATTLE OR FIREWOOD. THEY DO NOT RESPECT TRAFFIC SIGNALS. MANY DRIVERS NO LONGER BOTHER TO KEEP THEIR VEHICLES CLEAN AND IN GOOD WORKING ORDER. THEY LIMIT THEMSELVES TO TAKING THE KEY, STARTING THE MOTOR AND DRIVING OFF AND THEY CARRY ON UNTIL THE VEHICLE BREAKS DOWN. EVEN A MONKEY COULD DO THIS. WE FOUND HUNDREDS OF WRECKED CARS ON THE ROADS, IN GARAGES AND IN SCRAP YARDS. THAT IS MANY MILLIONS OF ESCUDOS IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE THAT OUR STATE LOSES. IN THE STREETS WE SAW WALLS AND LAMP POSTS IN RUINS. IN THE CITY OF MAPUTO, LAST YEAR ALONE, WE SPENT TWO MILLION ESCUDOS REBUILDING ELECTRICITY POSTS DESTROYED BY VEHICLES. IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO WALK PEACEFULLY IN THE CITY STREETS. WE RUN THE RISK OF BEING RUN DOWN, EVEN ON THE PAVEMENT. IT IS NOT ALLOWED TO GO ABOVE 60 KM AN HOUR IN THE CITIES, BUT SPEEDS AT 80 AND 100 KM AN HOUR ARE REACHED. OUTSIDE THE CITIES IT IS NOT PERMITTED TO DRIVE AT MORE THAN 80 KM AN HOUR, BUT SPEEDS OF 120 AND 150 KM AN HOUR ARE REACHED.

THIS IS CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. IT IS A CRIME THAT WE ARE GOING TO PUNISH SEVERELY. THE TRAFFIC POLICE WILL BE REINFORCED AND THEY WILL HAVE RIGOROUS DIRECTIVES TO PUNISH CRIMINAL DRIVERS. WE WILL

DEMAND STRICTNESS IN GRANTING DRIVING LICENCES. WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY BY RE-EXAMINING THE DRIVERS IN THE STATE APPARATUS.

THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLY THAT WE ARE FACING REQUIRE RADICAL MEASURES. OUR IMMEDIATE AIM IS TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT, AT THE LEVEL OF THE LARGE CITIES, BASIC NECESSITIES ARE DISTRIBUTED JUSTLY AND RATIONALY AND THE MAJORITY OF QUEUES ARE ELIMINATED. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THESE MAJOR OBJECTIVES, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN THE CONTROL OF SUPPLY. EACH WORKER, EACH FAMILY MUST RECEIVE A FAIR SHARE OF BASIC NECESSITIES WITHOUT HAVING TO QUEUE.

HOW ARE WE GOING TO ACHIEVE THIS? WE HAVE EXPERIENCE OF ORGANISED CONSUMER COOPERATIVES - I STRESS THE ORGANISED - WHERE EACH MEMBER IS SUPPLIED BY MEANS OF A RATION CARD. EACH FAMILY IS THUS ASSURED OF A QUOTA OF BASIC NECESSITIES ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE FAMILY. DISTRIBUTION IS CONTROLLED BY MEANS OF THE RATION CARD. WE WILL CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT EACH FAMILY HAS A CARD IN A SHOP NEAR HOME AND CAN BUY RICE, SUGAR, FLOUR AND SOAP. PRIVATE SHOPKEEPERS WILL BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS. OTHER PRODUCTS WILL BE ABLE TO BE BOUGHT IN ANY SHOP. IN THIS WAY WE WILL CREATE CONDITIONS FOR EACH FAMILY TO RECEIVE A FAIR SHARE OF THE EXISTING PRODUCTS. WE WILL NOT ELIMINATE ALL THE QUEUES, BUT WE WILL ELIMINATE THE MAJORITY OF THEM. EVERYONE WILL BENEFIT FROM THIS MEASURE. THE ENEMY WILL TRY TO MISREPRESENT THIS MEASURE BECAUSE IT IS GOING TO BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE MUST BE VIGILANT. THE PEOPLE MUST TAKE PART ENTHUSIASTICALLY IN THIS TASK. TO IMPLEMENT THIS MEASURE, WE MUST BE ORGANISED. WE HAVE TO KNOW HOW MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN EACH URBAN DISTRICT, HOW MANY HOUSES IT HAS, HOW MANY SHOPS AND WHAT IS THEIR CAPACITY, HOW MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN EACH HOUSE AND HOW MANY PEOPLE IN EACH HOUSE WORK. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE PLAN CORRECTLY THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS TO EACH AREA. FIRSTLY, IN MAPUTO, BEIRA AND NAMPULA WE WILL LAUNCH A MAJOR CAMPAIGN TO SURVEY THE SITUATION AND THIS WILL LATER BE EXTENDED TO OTHER TOWNS. WE WILL FORM PEOPLE'S BRIGADES IN EACH URBAN DISTRICT TO GO FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE FINDING OUT WHO LIVES THERE AND MAKE A REGISTER. EACH URBAN DISTRICT MUST HAVE A COMPLETE REGISTER OF ITS RESIDENTS. ANY NEW PERSON WHO ARRIVES IN THE DISTRICT MUST PRESENT THEMSELVES TO THE DYNAMISING GROUP TO BE REGISTERED. THIS CAMPAIGN WILL BE A FUNDAMENTAL STEP IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANISING COMMUNAL CITIES AND URBAN DISTRICTS. THE CAMPAIGN WILL ALSO ENABLE US TO DETECT AND NEUTRALISE CRIMINALS, VAGRANTS, PROSTITUTES AND SOCIETY'S MARGINAL ELEMENTS.

THE PARTY STRUCTURES, THE ORGANS OF PEOPLE'S POWER, THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLIES, THE DEMOCRATIC MASS ORGANISATIONS, THE MOZAMBICAN WOMEN'S ORGANISATION, THE MOZAMBICAN YOUTH ORGANISATION, THE NATIONAL ORGANISATION OF JOURNALISTS AND THE PRODUCTION COUNCILS MUST ALL TAKE PART IN THIS CAMPAIGN ORGANISING THE PEOPLE. THE CONSUMER COOPERATIVES AND PRIVATE SHOPKEEPERS MUST TAKE PART IN THE PROCESS OF DISTRIBUTING PRODUCTS. THE PEOPLE, THROUGH THEIR STRUCTURES, MUST BE VIGILANT IN ORDER TO PREVENT DIVIATIONS AND ABUSES.

STARTING FROM NOW, LET US END ABUSE AND PRIVILEGE IN THE QUEUES. IN THE QUEUE NO-ONE HAS PRIORITY. THERE IS NO PRIORITY FOR BEING

IN THE DYNAMISING GROUP. THERE IS NO PRIORITY FOR BEING A MEMBER OF THE MILITIA. THERE IS NO PRIORITY FOR BEING IN THE MOZAMBIQUE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES. THERE IS NO PRIORITY FOR BEING IN THE MOZAMBIQUE PEOPLE'S POLICE. THE STATE CANNOT CONTINUE TO PAY WAGES TO THOUSANDS OF WORKERS IN THE PEOPLE'S SHOPS ENTERPRISE, MANY OF WHOM PRODUCE NOTHING. THE PRESENT PEOPLE'S SHOPS MUST CHANGE OR BE HANDED OVER TO CONSUMER COOPERATIVES OR PRIVATE TRADERS. SOME WILL HAVE TO CLOSE BECAUSE OF HAVING NO CUSTOMERS AND NO-ONE TO RENT THEM. WE WILL CLOSE THEM DOWN. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN OUR COUNTRY. THIS WAS CLEARLY DEFINED AT THE THIRD CONGRESS OF FRELIMO. THE STATE CANNOT CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE'S SHOPS. THE STATE CANNOT CONTINUE TO MANAGE SMALL BUSINESSES. THE STATE MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO DIRECTING THE ECONOMY AND CARRYING OUT MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE STATE MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO DYNAMISING THE COMMUNAL VILLAGE PROCESS WHICH WILL ENABLE SPEEDY DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT MUST DIRECT ACTIVITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR PROFITABLE CROPS, CROPS WHICH BRING FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTO THE COUNTRY.

THE STATE MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO EXECUTING THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE LIMPOPO AREA AND INCOMATI VALLEYS AND IN ANGONIA. THEY WILL PRODUCE FOOD. THEY WILL PRODUCE EMPLOYMENT. THEY WILL PRODUCE WEALTH. THE STATE MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO BUILDING LARGE DAMS AND IRRIGATION SCHEMES. IT MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, THE CENTRE-NORTH LINE AND THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE RURAL AREAS. IT MUST INCREASE THE INFORMATION ON OUR AGRICULTURAL, FISHING AND MINERAL RESOURCES, PROSPECT AND TAKE STOCK OF OUR WEALTH. THE STATE MUST BUILD MORE FACTORIES TO PRODUCE CLOTH, SHOES AND DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES. IT MUST BUILD FACTORIES TO PRODUCE AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS, TRACTORS, LORRIES AND VANS. THE STATE MUST CREATE HEAVY INDUSTRY FOR US TO OVERCOME UNDERDEVELOPMENT. IT MUST CREATE A PAPER INDUSTRY, AN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY AND AN ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY.

THE STATE MUST DEVOTE ITSELF TO THE IMPORATNT SOCIAL SECTORS, EDUCATION HEALTH, HOUSING AND JUSTICE. THE STATE APPARATUS MUST ASSURE THE CONDITIONS FOR INCREASED PRODUCTION AND IMPROVED QUALITY OF PRODUCTS, AND CAREFULLY TEST THE PRODUCTS OF THE FACTORIES. IT MUST ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF RAW MATERIALS OR SPARE PARTS IN THE FACTORIES ESSENTIAL TO OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TO PRODUCTION FOR SUPPLYING THE PEOPLE. FOR THIS REASON, AND WE REPEAT IT, THE STATE CANNOT BE ABSORBED IN, IT CANNOT DISPERSE ITS FORCES IN MANAGING SMALL BUSINESSES. THE STATE IS GOING TO CREATE CONDITIONS TO HELP PRIVATE TRADERS, FARMERS AND MANUFACTURERS WHOSE ACTIVITY IS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR OBJECTIVES. THE STATE IS GOING TO HELP THEM IN THEIR ORGANISATION AND GRANT THEM MEANS NECESSARY TO WORK.

I HAVE RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM MOZAMBICANS LIVING IN SOUTH AFRICA, SWAZILAND AND RHODESIA WHO WANT TO KNOW IF THEY CAN COME AND INVEST IN TRADING, RESTAURANTS, AGRICULTURE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. THESE ARE MOCAMBICAN PATRIOTS WHO WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR COUNTRY'S PROGRESS. THEY ARE WAITING FOR THE STATE TO HELP THEM AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR RETURN.

THEY MAY RETURN. WE WILL HELP THEM TO INVEST THEIR SAVINGS IN AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY OR COMMERCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY. WE SPOKE OF WHAT WE FOUND IN THE WAREHOUSES, OF WHAT WAS NOT DISTRIBUTED, BUT STAYED THERE AND ROTTED, OF WHAT WAS NOT SOLD WHILE THE POPULATION SUFFERED IN QUEUES. BUT NOW THAT THOSE PRODUCTS ARE COMING OUT OF THE WAREHOUSES, DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE QUEUES WILL DISAPPEAR? DOES IT MEAN THAT WE HAVE SOLVED THE PROBLEM? NO. AND YOU KNOW THAT IT IS NOT SO. WE ASKED WHAT THE SOLUTION IS, AND THE PEOPLE REPLIED - THE SOLUTION IS TO PRODUCE. THIS IS WHAT YOU SAID TO ME IN THE NUMEROUS MEETINGS WE HAD DURING THE OFFENSIVE. WHERE ARE WE GOING TO PRODUCE? IN THE GREEN BELTS. HERE AROUND MAPUTO THERE USED TO BE AN EXTENSIVE GREEN BELT. IT WAS SETTLERS WHO PRODUCED THERE. AND WHEN THEY ABANDONED THEIR FARMS THE PRODUCTION STOPPED. WHAT MUST WE DO? WE HAVE LAND TO CULTIVATE. HERE IN INFULENE, MANHIQA, MATUTUINE, BOANE, MOAMBA AND NAMAACHA WHERE THE SETTLERS WERE PRODUCING. WE HAVE THE LABOUR FORCE.

IN THIS CITY OF MAPUTO IT IS ONLY A MINORITY OF THE POPULATION THAT WORKS. THE REST OF THE POPULATION IS IN QUEUES AND PRODUCES NOTHING. WHEN WE PROCLAIMED INDEPENDENCE WE OCCUPIED THE SETTLERS' PLACES. THE PLACES AND THE SALARIES. THE MAJORITY OF WORKERS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM GAZA AND INHAMBANE, PARTICULARLY THOSE COMING FROM MAHIQA MOAMBA, MATUTUINE, NAMAACHA AND MAGUDE, HAD THEIR WIVES THERE. THEY HAD THEIR CHILDREN THERE. THEY EARNED 500 ESCUDOS. HOW WERE THEY GOING TO KEEP THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN HERE? THEY HAD AN INCREASE IN WAGES AND BROUGHT THEIR WIVES HERE TO STAY. THEY BROUGHT THEIR CHILDREN HERE. THE CHILDREN NO LONGER GO TO SCHOOL THERE, THEY GO TO SCHOOL HERE. NOT SATISFIED WITH WIVES AND CHILDREN, THEY WENT AND BROUGHT THEIR BROTHERS HERE. STILL NOT SATISFIED, THEY WENT TO BRING THEIR MOTHER. SHE IS HERE IN MAPUTO. STILL NOT HAPPY, THEY BROUGHT THEIR MOTHER-IN-LAW HERE. STILL NOT HAPPY, THEY BROUGHT ALL THEIR IN-LAWS TO LIVE AT THE EXPENSE OF ONE MAN ALONE. SOME MINISTERS ALSO DID THIS. THEY BROUGHT THEM FROM CABO DELGADO, FROM NAMPULA, FROM BEIRA. IN THE ARMY AND THE POLICE IT IS ENOUGH TO BE A COMMANDER. TO SHOW THAT HE IS A "BIG MAN" HE HAS TO HAVE THIS REGIMENT AT HOME, AT THE LEAST A PLATOON FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO ORDER AROUND. AND SO HE HAS AUTHORITY TO WORK, WHERE HE IS A CHIEF, AND WHEN HE RETURNS HOME HE IS ALSO A CHIEF. HE HAS HIS PLATOON THERE. WE ARE GOING TO END THIS. EVERYONE DOES THIS. AND SO MAPUTO IS FULL. THERE IS NOT ENOUGH FOOD.

IT IS THOSE WHO GROW MAIZE WHO CAME HERE. THOSE WHO GREW CASAVA CAME HERE. IT WAS THEY WHO PRODUCED A WHOLE SERIES OF THINGS LIKE BEANS AND FISH. NOW THEY DO NOT PRODUCE ANYTHING. THEY CAME TO STAY HERE. BUT YOU WANT TO EAT. INDEPENDENCE MEANT COMING TO THE CITY, THEREFORE WE HAVE THE LABOUR FORCE. FIRSTLY THERE ARE THOSE USELESS ONES IN THE STATE APPARATUS. WE ARE GOING TO REDUCE THE STAFF NUMBERS IN ALL THE MINISTRIES, IN ALL THE SECTORS. WE WILL ESTABLISH THE CORRECT NUMBER AND THE REST WILL GO AND PRODUCE. THEN WE WILL GO TO ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES AND THE LAZY AND THE UNDICIPLINED WILL GO AND PRODUCE. NO-ONE WILL STOP US. THAT WAS WHY I ASKED HERE: IS THE ARMY READY FOR A NEW BATTLE? THE FIGHT IS NOT ONLY AGAINST THOSE WHO GO AROUND SABOTAGING, IT IS ALSO AGAINST THE LAZY, CRIMINALS, VAGRANTS AND SOCIETY'S MISFITS. THERE ARE FAMILIES OF TWENTY, BUT ONLY ONE PERSON WORKS. AND THEY ARE ADULTS. THEY EAT A LOT.

WHAT DO WE NEED THEN? WE ARE GOING TO GIVE TRACTORS AND HOES TO THESE UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE FOR THEM TO PRODUCE, IN THE INFULENE VALLEY, IN MANHIQA, IN MATUTUINE, IN MOAMBA AND IN NAMAACHA. ALL THAT THIS CITY CONSUMES, TOMATOES, CABBAGE, ONIONS, POTATOES, RICE, MAIZE, CASSAVA, LETTUCE AND BABALA, USED TO COME FROM ALL THESE AREAS. IT IS EXACTLY THIS THAT WE ARE GOING TO PRODUCE. MEAT, MILK, CHICKENS, RABBITS AND PORK USED TO COME FROM THESE AREAS. WE ARE GOING TO PRODUCE ALL THIS AGAIN. THE STATE IS GOING TO HELP THOURGH THE BANK. WE WILL GIVE LOANS TO ACQUIRE MEANS OF PRODUCTION : TRACTORS, HOES, SEEDS AND FERTILISER WE ARE NOT ABANDONING THEM. BUT WE DON'T WANT THEM TO LIVE LIKE PARASITES. WE WILL REVIEW THE PRICES PAID TO THE PRODUCER SO THAT THE PRODUCER BENEFITS AND IS INTERESTED IN CONTINUALLY INCREASING PRODUCTION. SOME FARMERS CAME AND SAID TO ME : "MR. PRESIDENT, WE ARE GOING TO ABANDON THE FARMS. FERTILISER COST A LOT OF MONEY. THE NECESSARY CARE TAKES A LONG TIME AND THE PRICE DOESN'T COMPENSATE. IT'S BETTER TO QUIT PRODUCTION." FOR THIS REASON IT IS NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE PRICE OF PRODUCE. IN THIS WAY WE WILL FINISH WITH THE SHORTAGES OF THIS PRODUCE WHICH WAS ALWAYS PRODUCED IN THIS REGION, PRODUCE THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES FORCED TO IMPORT. HERE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY THERE ARE MANY FARMS WHERE THE SETTLERS USED TO GROW VEGETABLES AND FRUIT AND KEEP SMALL ANIMALS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE WAS INVESTMENT TO CREATE INFRA-STRUCTURES, WELLS, RABBIT HUTCHES, PIGSTIES, HEN HOUSES AND WATER PUMPS. THAT'S THE CASE IN MATOLA, MACHAVA, BENFICA, MAHOTAS AND CATEMBE. WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE SETTLERS AND THE NATIONALISATION OF BUILDINGS, THESE FARMS WERE RENTED TO MOZAMBICANS. TODAY THESE INFRA-STRUCTURES ARE NEGLECTED. THE GRASS IS GROWING IN THE FARMS AND THE GARDENS. THE TENANT LIMITS HIMSELF TO LIVING IN THE HOUSE. HE DOESN'T MAKE USE OF THE WELL, THE RABBIT HUTCHES OR THE WATER PUMP. WE ARE GOING TO REVIEW THIS SITUATION.

THOSE WHO ARE OCCUPYING HOUSES HAVE TO MAKE FULL USE OF THE EXISTING INSTALLATIONS. IF NOT, THEY MUST QUIT. WE WILL RENT THEM TO THOSE OF OUR CONQUESTS. BUT IN THE CENTRE OF THE CITY, WE DON'T WANT VEGETABLE PATCHES. WE DON'T WANT PATCHES OF BEANS, OR CASSAVA, OR MAIZE OR PEANUTS. WE DON'T WANT PATCHES OF SWEET POTATOES. WE DON'T WANT ANY KIND OF VEGETABLE PATCH. IN THE CENTRE OF THE CITY WE WANT GARDENS AND CHILDRENS PARKS. WE WANT FLOWERS TO BEAUTIFY. WE WANT BEAUTY. WE WANT WELL LOOKED AFTER, WELL PRUNED TREES. WE ARE HERE, BUT THIS DIRECTIVE IS FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY. WE DON'T WANT THE TREES TO BE MURDERED AS THEY ARE, WITH HATCHETS AND AXES, IN THE CITY. WE MUST PRUNE THE CITY'S TREES WITH SPECIAL SECATEURS. THE GOVERNOR OF MAPUTO IS HERE AND THE OTHERS ARE LISTENING AT THIS MOMENT. THE CITIES ARE BEING MURDERED, THE TREES ARE BEING MURDERED. TREES ARE THE LUNGS OF THE CITY. THE CITY BREATHES BY MEANS OF THESE TREES.

IN THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE WE DISCOVERED THREE CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE WHO MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO PRODUCTION IN THE GREEN BELT. THE FIRST CATEGORY :THE CRIMINALS WHO ARE AT THIS MOMENT DETAINED. FOR THESE, HARD LABOUR. THESE ELEMENTS STOLE FROM THE STATE. THEY LEFT THE PEOPLE'S PRODUCE TO ROT. WE DON'T WANT TO KEEP THESE CRIMINALS IN PRISON, EATING FOOD PRODUCED BY THE PEOPLE. THEY WILL BE TRIED, CONDEMNED AND SENT TO PRODUCTION CAMPS. WE WILL SEND THEM TO PRODUCE, FIRSTLY THEIR OWN SUBSISTENCE, AND SECONDLY TO COMPENSATE THE PEOPLE

FOR WHAT THEY STOLE. THEY ARE NOT GOING TO NIASSA. THEY WILL BE SETTLED HERE IN MAPUTO. THEY WILL BE GUARDED BY TROOPS, FOR FIVE, SIX YEARS, UNTIL THEY PRODUCE THE MONEY THEY STOLE, UNTIL THEY COMPENSATE FOR THE PRODUCE THEY LEFT TO ROT. THIS IS THE FIRST CATEGORY FOR THE GREEN BELT.

THE SECOND CATEGORY : UNDEREMPLOYED WORKERS AND UNPRODUCTIVE WORKERS. WE SAW DURING THE OFFENSIVE THAT MANY WORKERS DON'T PRODUCE THEIR WAGES. WE SAW THE PEOPLE'S SHOP EMPTY, WITH 20 EMPLOYEES WHO DO NOTHING. WE SAW THE BAKERY WHICH USED TO HAVE TEN WORKERS AND NOW HAS TWENTY TO PRODUCE HALF OF WHAT IT USED TO. WE SAW FIRMS WITH AN EXCESS OF WORKERS WHO PRODUCE NOTHING. THEY COLLECT THEIR WAGES AT THE BANK. WE SAW PEOPLE IN THE STATE APPARATUS WHO HAVE NOTHING TO DO. THEY ONLY MAKE TEA FOR THE BOSS. WE ARE GOING TO END THIS SITUATION. THE BANK'S MONEY IS THE PEOPLE'S MONEY. IT CANNOT BE USED TO PAY THE USELESS, THE LAZY, THE DRUNKARDS, THE CARELESS AND THE UNDISCIPLINED.

THE THIRD CATEGORY : THE UNEMPLOYED AND SOCIETY'S MISFITS. ONLY THOSE WHO PRODUCE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EAT IN THE NEW SOCIETY THAT WE ARE BUILDING. HE WHO DOESN'T PRODUCE HAS NO RIGHT TO WAGES. WE CANNOT ALLOW THE PARASITES TO CONTINUE SUCKING OUR BLOOD. WE ARE GOING TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THESE PEOPLE TO PRODUCE. WE WILL GIVE THEM LAND AND TRACTORS. THE BANK OF SOLIDARITY WILL GIVE LOANS. WE WILL ESTABLISH RULES FOR PAYMENT. THEY WILL PRODUCE IN ORDER TO PAY. THEY ARE GOING TO PRODUCE IN ORDER TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO EAT. THUS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ORGANISE THEIR FAMILIES, HAVE DECENT HOUSING, AND EDUCATION FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND TAKE ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AS HEAD OF THE FAMILY.

THE OFFENSIVE THAT WE HAVE BEGUN IS THE START OF A NEW WAR. WAR AGAINST UNDERDEVELOPMENT. WAR TO BUILD AN ADVANCED SOCIETY IN OUR COUNTRY. WAR WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO MAKE MOZAMBIQUE A STRONG, DEVELOPED, PROSPEROUS COUNTRY, A COUNTRY WHERE EACH MOZAMBICAN HAS WORK, GOOD FOOD, ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE, CORRECT EDUCATION AND SUITABLE HOUSING, WHERE FREEDOM, DIGNITY AND HUMAN LOVE FLOURISH, A COUNTRY WHERE OUR CHILDREN GROW UP HAPPY AND HEALTHY.

OUR PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS STRUGGLED FOR THESE OBJECTIVES. WE AGAIN ACCEPTED SACRIFICES FOR THESE OBJECTIVES. THE BEST SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF OUR PEOPLE LAID DOWN THEIR LIVES FOR THESE OBJECTIVES. THE BATTLE NOW LAUCHED IS A CONTINUATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION WE WILL ALSO HAVE HEROES IN THIS PHASE, HEROES OF PRODUCTION, HEROES OF DISCIPLINE, HEROES OF IDEOLOGICAL COMBAT, HEROES OF BUILDING SOCIALISM. THERE WILL ALSO BE TRAITORS AND WAVERERS. WE HAVE ALREADY DETECTED SOME DURING THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE. CONTINUOUS PURIFICATION OF OUR RANKS IS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLES, IT IS A REQUIREMENT OF THE STRUGGLE, IT IS A CONDITION OF VICTORY. WE SAW THAT WE ARE STILL CARRYING A GREAT LOAD OF DREGS. THIS DOESN'T SURPRISE US. THIS ALWAYS HAPPENS IN THE PHASES OF GROWTH IN OUR STRUGGLE. WHEN THERE ARE FLOODS IN THE LIMPOPO, THE RIVER RISES SHARPLY AND DRAWS IMPURITIES WITH IT. THE WATER BECOMES MUDDY WITH THE DIRT THAT COMES FROM THE MOUNTAINS. BUT WHEN THE FLOOD SUBSIDES, THE DIRT IS DEPOSITED ON THE BANKS, THE RIVER-BED BECOMES CLEAN AND THE WATER AGAIN BECOMES CRYSTAL CLEAR. THE FLOOD FERTILISES THE LAND, THE RICE GROWS VIGOROUSLY AND THE RIVER REGAINS PURITY OF ITS WATERS. OUR REVOLUTION IS ALSO LIKE THIS. WE WILL EMERGE

FROM THIS BATTLE STRONGER AND FORTIFIED AFTER FREEING OURSELVES OF THE LOAD OF IMPURITIES.

NEXT MONTH WE BEGIN THE ELECTIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLIES AT DISTRICT, LOCALITY AND CITY LEVEL. LET US MAKE THE ELECTIONS A TIME FOR GIVING ACCOUNT, A TIME FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF OUR DEPUTIES AN OFFENSIVE IN ORGANISATION, AND AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRRESPONSIBILTY, ROUTINE AND DISORGANISATION. WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS, REVOLUTIONARY INTELLECTUALS, WORKERS IN ALL SECTORS, CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, WE HAVE ENTERED A DECISIVE PHASE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SOCIALIST COUNTRY. THIS PHASE WILL BE A PHASE OF HEIGHTENED CLASS STRUGGLE- ON THE ONE HAND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF MOZAMBICAN WORKERS WHO WANT SOCIALISM - ON THE OTHER HAND A HANDFUL OF REACTIONARIES, ENEMY AGENTS. OUR DETERMINATION, THE CERTAINTY OF OUR VICTORY AND THE CERTAINTY OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM ARE INVINCIBLE.

WE GIVE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE HAPPINESS OF THE WORKERS IN THE FACTORIES WE VISITED, WHICH EXPRESSES THE FEELINGS OF ALL PEOPLE; THEIR VIGOUR IN DENOUNCING REACTIONARIES, THEIR DETERMINATION TO PRODUCE MORE AND BETTER; THEIR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE FACTORY AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAKE SOCIALISM A RED FLAG COVERING OUR COUNTRY WITH EVER INCREASING HAPPINESS.

WE HAIL THE GLORIOUS MOZAMBIQUE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES, THE ARMED WING OF THE PEOPLE. WE HAIL THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES. THEIR MAIN TASK WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE INTRACTABLE DEFENCE AND CONTINUAL CONSOLIDATION OF OUR PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY CONQUESTS. SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE MOZAMBICAN WORKERS, THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES HAVE SHOWN ONCE MORE THAT IT IS NOT AN ARMY EXCLUSIVELY IN BARRACKS. THEY HAVE SHOWN ONCE MORE DURING THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE, THAT THEY KEEP THEIR TRADITION ALIVE, THE TRADITION OF BEING AN ARMY WITH THE SPIRIT OF HARD WORK, ENGAGED IN FIGHTING, STUDYING AND PRODUCING.

OUR PEOPLE ARE GOING TO OVERCOME UNDERDEVELOPMENT. OUR PEOPLE WANT REVOLUTION AND THEY ARE GOING TO MAKE IT. OUR PEOPLE WANT SOCIALISM AND WE WILL BUILD IT.

WE CANNOT ADVANCE WITH INFILTRATION. AND SO WE ARE SWEEPING OUT OUR HOUSE. WE WILL CARRY ON SWEEPING.

WE WILL CONTINUALLY ATTACK THE ENEMY INFILTRATOR. WE WILL UNMASK THE ENEMY AND DISLODGE IT FROM THE POSITION IT OCCUPIED.

WE WILL CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY OVER UNDERDEVELOPMENT.

WE WILL BUILD SOCIALISM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.

THE REVOLUTION WILL WIN

SOCIALISM WILL TRIUMPH

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!

EXHIBIT I

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today. I appreciate the courtesy given my testimony. I do have to return to the Department, but Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Harrop will remain and be available for questions. I regret personally I cannot hear the statements of the other two witnesses but I look forward to reading them.

I will give a shortened version of the statement which has been submitted to the subcommittee.

I wish to commend this subcommittee and its chairman for the serious and positive interest in our relations with Africa which you have displayed. It is the continuation of a long tradition of which I was the beneficiary some years ago when I was Assistant Secretary.

You have asked me to speak today on the issue of communism in Africa. I thank you for the opportunity to put this current and significant subject in perspective.

Since few African governments describe their policies or ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist or scientific socialists, and since they do not follow any rigid Soviet model when we speak of communism in Africa we are speaking almost exclusively of the role of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries under Soviet domination, Cuba, and to a much lesser extent, China.

We believe U.S. interests are affected by the presence of substantial organized military forces from Cuba backed up by assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and particularly by the extensive flow of weaponry from Communist countries to Africa.

At a time when African countries continue to struggle under the burden of enormous economic problems, the Communist presence and its accompanying military hardware represent an economic and financial burden that diverts resources from constructive development.

The obligations incurred for the Communist nations' support can and do include facilities and rights to the naval forces of the Soviet Union while states which have a substantial Communist military presence have sought to maintain their essential independence. We cannot discount the effect of the financial political debts they must repay to the Communist world.

In addition, Communist states have not lent support to the fair and peaceful solutions to the tragic and complicated problems of southern Africa, problems to which the highest priority must be given both in global and in African terms.

Let me turn to discuss where Communist personnel and assistance are found in Africa, where their influence has been reduced and finally to the policies of the United States with respect to this presence.

It is my understanding that the focus of the subcommittee's attention is sub-Saharan Africa. I will therefore concentrate on that area.

By our best estimate Communist military personnel numbered approximately 41,000 in sub-Saharan Africa in 1978. They were primarily Cuban in Angola and Ethiopia.

Communist country civilian technical experts in Africa in 1978 were estimated at 37,000 of whom about 7,500 were Soviets or East Germans and most of the remainder were from Cuba.

Approximately 18,000 were Cubans and 11,000 Chinese.

The largest concentrations of Chinese technicians are in Somalia and Zambia; 3,000 in the former and 5,000 in the latter.

For the record we can provide the subcommittee with a complete breakdown of these estimates.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be useful if we included that material in the record when you submit it.

[The material referred to follows:]

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—1978 [1]

Country	Totals	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe [2]	Cuba	China
Angola	9,910	1,400	8,500	10
Ethiopia	1,400	650	500	250
Gabon	75	10	.....	65

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—1978 [1]—Continued

Country	Totals	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe [2]	Cuba	China
Gambia	75			75
Ghana	175	95		80
Guinea	1,035	700	35	300
Guinea-Bussau	405	265	85	55
Kenya	30	25		5
Liberia	210	10		200
Madagascar	200			200
Mali	1,025	475		550
Mauritius	15			15
Mozambique	1,270	750	400	120
Niger	160	10		150
Nigeria	1,750	1,625		125
Rwanda	60	10		50
Sao Tome and Principe	260	20	140	100
Senegal	500	100		400
Sierra Leone	310	10		300
Somalia	3,050	50		3,000
Sudan	755	125		650
Tanzania	1,365	165	200	1,000
Zambia	5,645	125	20	5,500
Others	7,525	1,020	1,090	5,415
Total	37,225	7,640	10,970	18,615

[1] Number of persons present for a period of 1 month of more during 1978. Rounded to nearest 5.
[2] More than half are Soviets, nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans.

COMMUNIST MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—1978 [1]

County	Total	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe [2]	Cuba [3]	China
Angola	20,300	1,300	19,000	
Equatorial Guinea	290	40	150	100
Ethiopia	17,900	1,400	16,500	
Guinea	330	100	200	30
Guinea-Bissau	205	65	140	
Mali	195	180		15
Mazambique	1,130	230	800	100
Other	1,330	500	485	345
Total	41,680	3,815	37,275	590

[1] Number of persons present for a period of 1 mo or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.
[2] Mainly Soviets, Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.
[3] Include troops.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me make several observations about the Communist nations present.

With the exception of Ethiopia it will be noted that the largest concentration of Communist military personnel is in those former Portuguese territories where the successful liberation movements received strong preindependence Soviet support.

In Ethiopia a leftist revolution turned to the Soviets and to the Cubans for military and civilian help emphasizing the threat posed by Somali military activities in the Ogaden region.

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious but not necessarily synonymous. Castro sees a special mission for Cuba in Africa. Soviet motivations are probably a mixture of geopolitical, strategic and ideological. To gain their objectives the Soviets rely heavily on military rather than economic assistance. They probably attach the greatest importance to their help to Ethiopia.

Despite the close ties there are undoubtedly problems in the Moscow Addis Ababa relationship.

Communist nations continue to support liberation movements in southern Africa primarily through equipment and advisers. Soviets and Cubans provide support for combat operations against UNITA in Angola.

The publicity afforded Soviet activities in Africa gives the impression that Soviet policy in Africa is an across-the-board success. Such is not the case. The Soviets' position over the years has been reduced in Ghana and Guinea, The Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. Even some of the states where the Soviets retain considerable influence have indicated a desire to strengthen their ties with the West.

Recently we have seen the ouster of two more Soviet clients. Idi Amin in Uganda and Macias in Equatorial Guinea. Both of these regimes, well recognized as two of the grossest violators of human rights, received considerable support from the Soviet Union and its allies including military hardware and training.

The supply of weapons and training by the Communist nations to these insecure and repressive regimes has helped sustain them and has contributed to some of the most grisly crimes against human dignity ever perpetrated on the African or any continent.

The committee has also expressed an interest in the question of Chinese influence and activities. Chinese activities are less significant today than in the 1960's and reflect a policy aimed primarily at parrying Soviet advances. Their efforts have been largely in the propaganda field although they continue modest aid programs and military assistance.

EXHIBIT J

97th Congress
2d Session } JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

FEBRUARY 1982

Printed for the use of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. The government and the sole political party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), espouse Marxist-Leninist principles and pursue this conception of socialism. An extremely poor country, Mozambique's development since independence has been hampered by emigration of much of the trained personnel, military attacks during the Rhodesian war, adverse weather and a persistent insurgency. Civil and political rights are greatly circumscribed. Application of the law is becoming somewhat more uniform. There have again been publicized releases from the "reeducation camps," discussed below, and a presidential instruction to bring the operation of these camps into conformity with the constitution. Organized religious groups have noted some improvement in the government's acceptance of their role.

Parts of central Mozambique have been afflicted by civil unrest perpetrated by one or more anti-government organizations. Evidence strongly suggests that the oppositon forces are encouraged and supplied from the Republic of South Africa. There are documented cases of forced recruitment into these bodies as well as their use of torture to intimidate the populace. The government has responded by attempting to concentrate the population in more easily defensible communities and reportedly has resorted to coercion in doing so.

In January 1981, a South African military force entered Mozambique and the environs of the capital. It destroyed three residences, killing and kidnapping a number of South African citizens who were members of the African National Congress. Since this occurrence, there has been at least one border incident between South African and Mozambican military forces resulting in fatalities.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Torture

Torture is prohibited by the constitution. President Machel admitted in a speech on November 5, however, that police and security officials had, on occasion, illegally used corporal punishishment and intimidation to obtain confessions.

b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Extremely spartan conditions in places of detention reflect societal conditions and are not imposed for purposes of discipline. Prisoners of all types were forcibly detained in isolated detention camps called by the government "reeducation centers" in the period following independence. Those still confined in these centers reportedly are individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary acts or attitudes. No other distinction by type of penalty is apparent. Conditions in some of the camps are reportedly severe, reflecting official neglect of the camps.

During the last year 14 individuals were convicted of capital crimes and nine executed, by order of revolutionary military tribunals, for crimes "against the people and state security." In the absence of a supreme court, there is no right of appeal in such cases although there is a presidential review.

c. Disappearances

There have been no reports of officially inspired "disappearances."

d. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment

As Mozambique's judicial system has become more institutionalized, the occurrences of arbitrary arrests have declined. Individuals detained for criminal and political counter-revolutionary activities in the immediate post-independence period were sent to "reeducation centers." There have been publicized releases of different categories of such prisoners in recent years including the qualified release of approximately 1,250 individuals in August and September 1981. Many were released only on the condition that they stay and live in the isolated regions near the camps where they had been detained. On the occasion of the release of one such group in September, President Machel acknowledged that individuals were being held in reeducation camps in apparent contradiction of Mozambican law. A national commission to investigate the situation and bring practices into conformity with the constitution was established. Its report is still awaited. The government has never published figures on the number of individuals confined to reeducation camps but those who remain may still number in the thousands.

The concept of habeas corpus is recognized but administrative shortcomings and deficiencies vitiate its application. Regulations prescribing brief periods of detention prior to bringing formal charges have been promulgated.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Mozambique uses the inquisitional system of justice which places considerable initiative and power in the hands of investigatory and trial judges. In significant cases in the main provincial courts, public defenders are provided. Judgment is rendered by one qualified judge and four elected "jurors" by majority vote. In district courts one qualified judge and two jurors are instructed to apply "good sense" and the constitution in reaching their verdicts. They may not direct incarceration. Non-security related trials are open to the public.

A revolutionary military tribunal, established in 1979 in response to overt and covert Rhodesian military actions in Mozambique, deals with cases involving (undefined) "crimes against the people and state security." Since Zimbabwe's independence, tribunals have tried individuals captured in encounters with insurgent groups and those found to be associated with foreign military activities. Nine individuals have been executed, five more have been condemned to death and several score more have been sentenced to lesser penalties by four tribunals. Tribunals are staffed by military officers and take place in camera.

f. Invasion of the Home

The constitution guarantees sanctity of the home. In practice, however, civil and security authorities exercise broad discretionary powers in carrying out their duties. In the last year there were a number of warrantless arrests of prominent Mozambican and foreign residents. It is widely assumed that surveillance devices are attached to the telephone network.

2. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion and Assembly

Public opposition to government policies and personalities is not tolerated and criticism is confined to matters of marginal importance. The press is operated by the government, and admittedly and actively promotes Frelimo's social and political objectives. Publication and distribution of domestic and imported books is controlled through the government's institute for books and records. There is no formal censorship, but journalists hew closely to the party line.

There is no state religion in Mozambique. The constitution grants individuals "the right to practice or not to practice" religion. After independence there were extensive expropriations of religious facilities, arrests of a number of clergymen because of their presumed links to the colonial regime, and the imposition of administrative controls on the practice of religion. A gradual relaxation has occurred in the past year. Meetings between religious leaders and the highest levels of the government have been publicized and have contributed to an improved climate for the activities of religious groups. There have been joint efforts in humanitarian undertakings. Administrative procedures which had created obstacles to fulfilling religious observances have been applied more evenly so as not to impede them. However, many former places of worship and instruction remain unavailable to their sponsoring sect and administrative restrictions still limit the activities and movements of clergymen in some areas.

Membership in any organized religious group does not appear to confer appreciable advantage or disadvantage in an individual's secular standing. Some of the practices of traditional cults are criticized and ridiculed by the Government and Party organs.

Assembly and the right to organize are greatly circumscribed. The government and party authorize and dominate mass movements, professional associations, and "production groups" at industrial and commercial enterprises. There are no recognizable trade unions.

b. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation

Travel within the country is controlled by administrative and security requirements. Travel abroad is not regarded as a right but permission is routinely granted for business, educational, recreational, and humanitarian reasons. Emigration by Mozambican citizens is not addressed in law or regulation although in practice it is discouraged. These conditions apply equally to both sexes and all groups.

There is an indeterminate flow of economic and political refugees to neighboring countries. A 1980 agreement with Swaziland provides for the reciprocal, forcible return of citizens apprehended for illegally entering either country. An average of between 35-50 individuals, primarily from neighboring countries, are registered as refugees in Mozambique at any one time. A larger number of individuals from South Africa enjoy safehaven. Although Mozambique is not a signatory to international conventions on refugees, Mozambique generally observes their terms.

There are two broad groupings of individuals seeking repatri-

ation. Those who for economic or political motives left the country before independence are generally encouraged to return to Mozambique. Those dual nationals who, after independence, exercised their option to assume their non-Mozambican nationality must apply for the right of return. The government has shown clemency in considering several hundred such cases.

c. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Mozambique is a one party state controlled by the Marxist-Leninist party, Frelimo. The party's membership is an unknown but small percentage of the total population. The constitution guarantees universal adult suffrage. At the community and district levels local issues are discussed and formal elections held. Officials are chosen from a single slate and the extent of public participation is limited to endorsement or rejection. Official candidates are occasionally rejected. There is no open opposition to the party or the government. The issues of nationality, citizenship and statelessness have not arisen.

Women are constitutionally guaranteed the same civic rights and duties as men. The government and the party have promoted the concept that all citizens, including women, must take an equal responsibility in society. Women participate in all aspects of political life and a few hold senior positions in the party and government. Urban women seem to have the same access to training and positions of authority as do men. The National Women's Organization is given attention and status designed to ensure that women enjoy equal rights and the full protection of the law. The organization is particularly active in areas of development, adult education, literacy and social services.

3. Government Attitude and Record Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Neither independent internal nor systematic outside investigations of human rights have been carried out in Mozambique. Amnesty International, relying on reports and public documents, has registered its concerns with alleged detention without trial, political imprisonment and use of the death penalty. The government has allowed journalists and selected scholars to travel extensively in the country and visit "reeducation centers."

There is local representation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a chapter of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was opened in 1981. Mozambique's performance in response to massive dislocation caused by the war in Zimbabwe was generous and undertaken at considerable sacrifice. Mozambique is not a signatory to international human rights or refugee conventions.

4. Economic and Social Circumstances

Mozambique has a GNP per capita income of less than $250. An estimated 85 percent of its 12.2 million inhabitants is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Since independence in 1975, the modern sector has been beset by chronic equipment, personnel and raw material shortages. Production and pro-

ductivity in the small industrial sector have experienced a general decline, and it is estimated that most industrial enterprises are operating at less than 50 percent of capacity. There has been a proliferation in the number of state companies and enterprises as the government pursues its objective of organizing the economy along socialist lines. However, in the retail and internal trade sector, the government has devolved a number of small businesses and shops to private enterpreneurs. Appeals for foreign investment have continued, but without marked success.

A continuing cycle of natural disasters, including floods and drought, has dimmed Mozambique's agricultural production prospects, and made problematical the provision of adequate food to a growing population. Mozambique allocates a significant portion of its foreign exchange to purchase cereals abroad. It receives food relief from a number of international donors and continues to subsidize food staples and other basic necessities in an effort to meet the fundamental nutritional needs of its citizens.

A food rationing scheme for the capital of Maputo and surrounding areas was introduced in March 1981 and plans call for extending the system to other cites. In rural areas, malnutrition and undernourishment continue to afflict a large segment of the peasant population. Life in rural areas remains extremely austere despite government efforts to "urbanize the countryside" through creation of communal villages and other larger groupings. Resultant dislocations have, in fact, further disrupted the already tenuous food production/distribution system.

Unemployment and underemployment in urban areas are high. A new wage and salary law which was introduced in late 1980 established a national wage and salary scale. It increased the wages of the lowest paid agricultural and industrial workers to the relative financial detriment of trained and professional workers.

Despite growing demands on its limited financial resources, the government has continued to emphasize health, human services and agriculture as its top development priorities. In the publicized 1981 budget, the equivalent of $154.2 million was allocated to health and education, 14.1 percent more than last year and 40 percent of the total increase in current government expenditures for 1981. Mozambique's social programs are administered in a nondiscriminatory fashion to all elements of its population. Racism is abhorrent to the Frelimo regime, and no major ethnic conflicts exist among the country's major tribal groupings. Many ethnic Portuguese and Asians hold important positions in the government and party. Genuine efforts have been made to integrate women at all levels of society and particular attention is paid to the rights and needs of women and children.

During the colonial period, the African population had little access to medical services, and few medical facilities existed outside of major urban areas. The cumulative effect of this historical neglect is reflected in the vast medical and health needs faced by Mozambique in 1981. Population growth is about 2.5 percent per annum, and life expectancy at birth is about 46 years. Maternal mortality and morbidity rates are among the highest in Africa. The infant mortality rate is 48 per thousand live births and, according to UN statistics, 40 percent of all deaths in Mozambique occur among children under 5 years of age. At least 30 percent of all Mozambican children under 12 suffer from undernourishment or malnutrition. Only about 10 percent

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of Mozambique's population has access to safe water supplies, although the government has initiated a program to supply safe water and sanitation facilities to rural and underserved urban populations.

Medical care in Mozambique is nationalized and available at very low cost, but its scope and effectiveness are limited by a shortage of facilities, doctors, and medical personnel.

A national program of maternal and child health care and family planning was initiated in 1981 in cooperation with the UN Fund for Population Activities. Efforts to increase the number of doctors and para-medics through training and expanded recruitment abroad have continued.

Mozambique has made some gains in its educational programs. Current estmates are that 15 to 20 percent of the population age 15 or more is literate as compared to an adult literacy rate in 1978 of only 11 percent. This increase results from two national literacy campaigns since independence, continuing emphasis on adult education, and growing access to primary school education. Serious problems remain, however. There is a critical shortage of qualified primary and secondary school teachers and UN sources estimate that 2 million of the eligible school age group still remain beyond the reach of the existing educational system. In 1981, a campaign was launched at the highest level of the government to improve the recognized poor quality of primary and secondary school education in Mozambique.

EXHIBIT K



POLITICAL PROGRAM
OF THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO)
OF NAMIBIA

Adopted by the meeting of the Central Committee
July 28th-August 1st 1976, Lusaka, Zambia.

INTRODUCTION:

The historical development of SWAPO up to present time can be discussed in terms of four important stages and their respective tasks. Firstly, the fundamental question which confronted the Namibian people during the latter half of the 1950's was the establishment of a political organization or a party which was capable of provinding leadership and an organizational framework through which spontaneous and scattered anti-colonial activities which characterised that period could be given an organizational expression. Prior to the formation of SWAPO, there were unco-ordinated, anti-colonial activities which were expressed in the form of localised strikes against colonial rule and individual petitionings to the United Nations concerning the South African racist oppression in Namibia. It was thus realized then that the establishment of a political organization was the most appropriate and effective way by which the politically conscious elements of our society could come into a direct and constant contact with the broad masses of our poeple to give articulate expression to the problems, aspirations and hopes of these masses. Thus SWAPO was formed on 19th April, 1960, as a concrete response to that fundamental need.

The Apartheid regime's initial reaction to the formation of SWAPO was to nip the young movement in the bud by restricting most of its leading activists as well as by forcing many of its leaders into exile. These initial measures of repression helped to underline two facts which were to prove basic to the development of the struggle in subsequent years. These are

(a) The Namibian people were made to realize the limitless nature of the South African brutality when it came to the defence of white supremacy; and

(b) SWAPO was obliged to take stock of the fact that only a political organization with firm roots in the broad masses of our society could weather the storm of repression and bring the liberation struggle to a successful conclusion.

Secondly, the issue of rooting SWAPO fimly in the Namibian society came thus to be the main task during the early half of 1960's. To this end, steps were taken to establish branches in different parts of the country, especially in the industrial areas of Windhoek, Otjiwarongo, Tsumeb, Walvis Bay, Luderitz Bay, and Oranjemund.

Since the system of contract labour has been and continues to be one of the most blatant manifestations of colonial oppression and exploitation in Na-

mibia, it was felt essential to initially root the movement in the workers' section of the population. This close historic identification of our movement with the interests of the toiling masses of the Namibian people is one of the main factors which explain the resilence of our movement when compared to other anti-colonial groups which had emerged in Namibia and have either collapsed or remained paper organizations.
The task of rooting the movement firm in the society entailed also the concentration of the principal issues around which the masses had to be mobilised. This meant that SWAPO had to place the particularized problems, such as those of arbitrary residential recolation and contract labour into the broader context of Namibia's national independence. This was the real beginning of the development of Namibian national consciousness. But since this trend of development represented a direct antithesis to South African colonialism in Namibia, it brought about new waves of repression against SWAPO. For instance, by December 1963 the South African government banned all public meetings in Namibia. A score of SWAPO cadres came under severe harassments in the form of dismissals from jobs, schools, and expulsions from urban areas to the countryside. Concomitant with this stream of harassments, the South African government set up a commission (known as the Odendaal Commission) early in 1964 to draw up a plan for the balkanization of Namibia into a chain of bantustans.

Thirdly, in the face of the above stated measures of repression, designed to thwart the growth of our movement, it became neccessary to establish a guerrilla network of which the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) - SWAPO's military wing - is today the living expression. The consolation of PLAN, in the face of the enemy's concerted effort to wipe out this guerrilla force while it was in its infancy, became crucial during the latter half of the 1960's. The basic problem was the horrendous demand imposed on PLAN to overcome the enemy's strategic plan to cut off our eatern logistic network linking our fighting units inside the country and the supplying rearbase - independent Africa.

While the enemy was tightening his grip on the internal activities of SWAPO, following the initial encounter in 1966 between our combatants and South African troops, the leadership abroad called a Consultative Congress of SWAPO during the months of January and December, 1969/1970 to plan a strategy and programme of action for an intensified armed and political struggle. To achieve this objective the organizational structure of the Party was broadened by creating new departments e.g. Labour, Women, Youth etc., for political mobilisation of the people of Namibia in masses. Other departments like that of Defence were reactivated to meet the demands of intensified armed struggle.

The immediate effect of this programme was manifested in the growing militancy of the Namibian populance as demonstrated by the historic 1971/72 general strike of workers as well as by the militant activities of the SWAPO Youth League.

Fourthly, the first half of the 1970's has seen armed liberation struggle becoming the main form of SWAPO's campaign to bring about genuine and total independence to the people of Namibia.

In summary, it can be said that the roots of the contemporary Namibian national liberation movement can be traced to the formation of political organization during the latter half of the 1950's.

The year 1960 saw the formation of SWAPO. The first half of the 1960's witnessed the dynamic development of the movement, characterized by the consolidation of SWAPO in the Namibian society and the establishment of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia. During the latter half of the 1960's the movement had to strengthen its guerrilla infrastructure in the face of the enemy's harsh counter-revolutionary measures. The early part of the 1970's was marked by the application of the Tanga strategy of intensified political and military struggle.

In the present phase, armed struggle has become the main form of SWAPO's resistance to South Africa's racist, oppressive and exploitative occupation of Namibia.

The defeat of fascist rule in Portugal in April 1974 brought a new dimension to the Namibian liberation struggle. It has made it possible for thousands of our people to move across the Angola/Namibian frontiers to the rear bases of our struggle to obtain both the skill and tools of armed struggle. Hence, thousands of workers, peasants and patriotic intellectuals have been enlisting into PLAN since the early half of 1974.

PRESENT AND FUTURE TASKS

(a) The tasks before SWAPO at present and in the immediate future are:

(b) The liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and the establishment of a democratic people's Government; and

(c) The realization of genuine and total independence of Namibia in

the spheres of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs.

To these ends, SWAPO has resolved:

(a) To persistently mobilise and organise the broad masses of the Namibian people so that they can actively participate in the national liberation struggle.

(b) To mould and heighten, in the thick of the national liberation struggle, the bond of national and political consciousness amongst the Namibian people.

(c) To combat all manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation and racial discrimination.

(d) To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safe-guarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialsim.

SWAPO FOREIGN POLICY

(1) SWAPO holds high the banner of international anti-imperialsit solidarity. In pursuance of anti-imperialist solidarity, the movement has resolved:

(a) To work in solidarity with other national liberation movements and other anti-imperialist, progressive and peace-loving forces throughout the world with a view to ridding Namibia, the African continent and mankind of colonialist and imperialist domination;

(b) To support and promote the ideals of unity of Africa as provided for in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU);

(c) To work in close co-operation with all progressive governments, organizations and popular forces for the total emancipation of the African continent;

(d) To fight against all manoeuvres, from any quarter, that are aimed at a reactionary solution which is contrary to the ralization of a total and genuine liberation of Namibia; and

(e) To forster and strengthen the anti-imperialist unity amongst the national liberation, world socialist, progressive and peace-loving forces in order to eliminate all forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

(2) The Foreign Relations Secretariat of SWAPO is urged upon to streamline our foreign missions in different parts of tne world for an intesified diplomatic offensive aimed at exposing the current South Africa colonial manoeuvres designed to impose a puppet confederation of Bantustans on our peaople. This offensive is to be carried out along the following lines:

(a) Strive for comprehensive publicity about the fact that the South African puppets, now gathering at the Turnhalle circus, have no mandate or support from the Namibian population for their collaborationist role;

(b) expose the attempts by certain Western governments to give international publicity to the Turnhalle puppets by extending invitations to these puppets and by giving publicity to the puppets' treacherous views on radio, television and in the press; it must be made clear that this publicity is being orchestrated behind the scenes by the South African government and its big business public relations lobby - the South African Foundation;

(c) strengthen our anti imperialist international solidcarity with the socialist countries, working class movements of the capitalist countries, liberation support organizations, and friendly governments and ordinary people;

(d) heighten the campaign to isolate South Africa from every possible source of support, of acceptance of comfort or of contact with the rest of the world because of its illegal occupation of Namibia and its institutionalized race oppression at home;

(e) this heightening campaign is aimed at the following aspects of international contacts;

(1) financial and commerical;

(2) professional and sporting;

(3) cultural and academic; and

(4) diplomatic and tourist.

(f) make it abundantly clear to the world that SWAPO will never stop the armed and political struggle until Pretoria meets the following pre-conditions:

(1) South Africa must publicy accept the right of the Namibian people to independence and national sovereignty.

(2) South Africa must publicly announce that Namibian territorial integrity is absoltue and not negotiable in any quarter.

(3) All political prisoners must be released including Herman ya Toivo and many other leaders and colleagues on Robben Island and elsewhere.

(4) All political exiles, of whatever political organization, must be allowed freely to return to their country without fear of arrest or victimization.

(5) South Africa must commit herself to the removal of her police and army and stop using Namibia as a base for aggression against neighbouring, independent African countries.

(6) Any constitutional talks on the future of Namibia must take place under United Nations supervision, and should aim at the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control.

(g) reiterate our stand that SWAPO shall under no circumstances accept the South African plan to impose on our people a weak and fearful confederation of Bantustans, a confederation which will be incapable of contradicting neo-colonial orders from Pretoria.

INTERNAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES

(1) To achieve the aims and objectives of SWAPO and to implement its revolutionary political line, all sections and organs of the organization are charged with the immediate task of disseminating the Constitution and policy documents to the broadest masses of the Namibian people.

(2) All sections and organs of SWAPO are called upon to make supreme efforts towards the building up of a reliable core of leading cadres who are capable of being in close and constant touch with the people at all levels. This task is to be accomplished in the following ways:

(a) strive to heighten the political consciousness of the cadres through regular discussion groups in the local community; the discussions must aim at imparting a fundamental knowledge of the concrete political reality in Namibia and the world revolutionary process; and

(b) the more politically conscious cadres in each section and organ are urged upon to put themselves in direct contact with the comrades who are less acquainted with the complex issues of national and social liberation.

(3) The cadres have the immediate and imperative duty to rally the broadest masses of the Namibian people against the occupation regime. This programmatic directive is to be carried out in the following manner:

(a) each cadres must link himself or herself, in a fundamental way, to the inarticulate, largely illerate, toiling masses of our people, learn from them about their true aspirations, their problems, their doubts and their sense of possibilities;

(b) the cadres must then sum up these information and ideas in terms of their own wider experience and sense of responsibility;

(c) they must then return those ideas and information to the masses in an articulate form and pose new questions with a view to deepening the political understanding of the masses and help them to overcome their inarticulateness, their suspicions for

change and their ignorance of modern organizational possibilities; and

(d) By this method of political work, SWAPO shall involve the whole population in active discussion which is the main pre-condition for the peoples's explicit and conscious commitment to the policy of the movement.

ARMED STRUGGLE

SWAPO holds the conviction that armed resistance to the South African occupation in our country is the only viable and effective means left for us to achieve genuine liberation in Namibia.

However, much as we are convinced that armed struggle must now be the main form of our liberation activity, we do not beautify war as a purpose or regard it as a form of sport. We see war for what it really is — an extension of politics by other means. It is the continuation of political relations in the form of violence.

But as in all other political relations, one must seek to understand the nature of the politics being pursued in examining any war. As social relations, political acts are either just or unjust and just political acts are naturally to be suppported. Hence, a clear distinction between the war of justice and wars of injustice must always be made. We consider our own armed liberation struggle as just and, therefore, deserving support from all the justice and peace-loving peoples. In supporting or committing oneself to the winning of victory by the oppressed peoples or nations, one is helping to bring about conditions under which war will be ended for ever. For, were there is oppression, there will always be armed resistance to bring about justice. It is in this light that we appeal for world support in our war of liberation.

In our struggle to bring justice to oppressed people of Namibia, SWAPO is working towards a universal arming of the people, that is, to transform the armed struggle in Namibia into a truly people's war. The necessary political mobilization to implement this vital aspect of our programme is already in motion.

In pursuance of this strategic objective, the following measures are being undertaken:

(a) All cadres of PLAN are exhorted to uphold the supremacy of the Organization over all its sections;

(b) All commanding cadres of the Peoples's Liberation Army of Namibia are called upon to make concrete effort towards the correct grapping of the revolutionary role of the masses in the struggle as well as to recognize that that role is the primary condition for victory;

(c) These cadres are not only to lead the war but also to assist in propagating SWAPO's political line among the people in all the zones of combat;

(d) New zones of combat must be constantly opened up in application of the strategy of active attacks on the enemy at many places at the same time in order for PLAN to maintain and etend its control of the battlefield; and

(e) Political education in the people's armed forces must, at all time, be deep-going since it is the most vital pre-condition for bringing about a steeled revolutionary discipline among the combatants.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

Colonized Namibia's economy is characterised by two prominent features:-

(a) Capitalist component of the economy based on extensive extraction of the country's varied natural resources, fishing and ranching industries; and

(b) A subsistency agriculture enveloping the majority of the African population who are forced to live in Bantustans.

This economic state of affairs has been consciously designed in accordance with the social interest of the white settler group and international monopoly capitalism.

The African masses have been forced to live in impoverished Bantustans.

They are being held in these Bantustans as labour hostages because in order for them to survive, they must of necessity seek imployments as cheap labourers in the white-controlled mining, fishing and ranching industries.

The colonialists argue faciously that Namibia does not have agricultural potential. Their strategy has been to prevent the process of commercial farming in Namibia so that the country can depend on the agricultural products of South Africa. That is to say, Namibia has been consciously reduced to a captive market or dumping ground of South Africa's own agricultural industry.

A nation which is dependent on other country for the food consumption of its population cannot be but a dependent hostages of the particular country which feeds its population.

A close analysis of Namibia's agricultural potential can show that the northern/central areas of Namibia are quite capable of producting more than sufficient food to feed the entire Namibia polulation, provided that a conscious policy is adopted to engage a considerable number of the working masses of the people in this particular field of production.

In a SWAPO-governed Namibia, the state shall take keen interest in providing adequate, modern tools and instruments for large scale agricultural production with a view to making the country agriculturally self-reliant.

The colonial regime in our country has not only been interested in making Namibia a captive market of South Africa's agricultural industry, but also in concentrating the African labour in the extensive extraction of Namibia's mineral resources with a view to taking out as much of our resources as possible in the shortest possible time.

The other negative consequence of this colonial strategy has been the conscious effort to prevent Namibia from developing processing industries. Thus, the huge bulk of the finished products in Namibia comes from South Africa. In this respect, Namibia is again used as a dumping ground for the products of South African factories.

Thus the economic reconstruction in a free, democratic and united Namibia will have, as its motive force, the establishment of a classless society. The social justice and progress for all is the governing idea behind every SWAPO policy decision. The government of a truly liberated Namibia will, therefore, be calledc upon to take the following measures:

(1) Wage the struggle towards the abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the destructive spirit of individualism and aggrandissement of wealth and power by individuals, groups or classes.

(2) Ensure that all the major means of production and exchange of the country are ownership of the people.

(3) Strive for the creation of an intergranted, national economy in which there is a proper balance between agricultural and industrial developments along the following lines:

(a) the establishment of processing industry;

(b) a comprehensive agrarian transformation aimed at giving land to the tiller;

(c) the establishment of peasants' corporatives or collectives;

(d) the establishment of state-owned ranching and crop farms, aimed at making Namibia an agriculturally self-sufficient nation, and

(e) the cultivation of a spirit of self-reliance among our people.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

A deep going socio-economic transformation of the Namibian society requires fundamental change in production relations which will ensure the speedy development of the Namibia productive forces, particularly the development of the skills, knowledges and cultural creativeness of the toiling masses. Hence, our movement is called upon to embark on:

(1) urgent training of technical and professional cadres at institutions of technical and higher learnings in different parts of the world as well as the newly established United Nations Institute for Namibia.

(2) Provision for work-oriented, comprehensive education and training for illiterate and semi-literate adults (with a literacy component built in) at SWAPO schools.

(3) laying the foundation of a free and universal education for all Namibians from primary, through secondary to university level by training many teachers and educationists now.

(4) developing the people's cultural creativeness as a weapon in the struggle for liberation.

(5) the sufferings and aspirations for the masses must be the central themes of all our artistic expressions, namely, drawings, music, paintings, dancing, literature, etc.

(6) We must strive toward the elimination of all the vesteges of tribal or feudal mentality, particularly the unscientific or supersitious conceptions of the natural and social phenomena.

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES

(1) At present, the Health and Social Welfare Secretariat of the movement is called upon to strengthen our existing clinics in the rear bases as well as our mobile clinics in the operational zones and to set up new ones.

(2) Our health and social services programme in an indepentent Namibia shall strive for preventive as well as for curative medicine for all the citizens along the following lines:

(a) there shall be comprehensive, free medical services in an independent and democratic Namibia;

(b) there shall be hospitals and clinics in every district of our country;

(c) there shall be nursaries and clinics in every community for the working people and their families;

(d) there shall be health education centres for preventive medicine and family planning;

(e) there shall be training institutions for the training of medical, and para-medical personnel;

(f) there shall be rehabilitation Centres for disabled and infirmed persons, and

(g) there shall be an International Red-Cross society.

SOLIDARITY FREEDOM JUSTICE

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